|Date||5 June 2001|
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The situation in Afghanistan Letter dated 21 May 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/511).
|(The Presidency changes each month to the next member in alphabetical order)|
|Members:||Mr. Wang Yingfan
|Mr. Teixeira da Silva
Expression of sympathy in connection with the deaths of His Majesty King Birendra, Her Majesty Queen Aishwarya and His Majesty King Dipendra of Nepal, and other members of their family
At the outset of this meeting, I should like, on behalf of the Council, to express grief and sorrow at the passing away of His Majesty King Birendra and Her Majesty Queen Aishwarya of Nepal, and of other members of the royal family. His Majesty King Birendra contributed greatly to the social and economic development of Nepal, promoted peace in the region and was deeply loved by his people. I should like also to express our heartfelt sorrow at the passing away of King Dipendra.
On behalf of the Council, I should like to extend our profound condolences to the bereaved family and to the Government and the people of Nepal.
I invite the members of the Council to rise and observe a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of His Majesty King Birendra, Her Majesty Queen Aishwarya and His Majesty King Dipendra of Nepal.
Adoption of the agenda
The situation in Afghanistan
Letter dated 21 May 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/511)
I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Haile Menkerios, Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), and to his fellow members of that Committee.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
I invite Mr. Menkerios and his fellow members of the Committee to take the designated seats at the Council table.
Also in accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso of Colombia, Chairman of the relevant sanctions Committee.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
I invite Mr. Valdivieso to take the designated seat at the Council table to enable him to present the report.
The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.
Members of the Council have before them a letter dated 21 May 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a letter dated 18 May 2001 from the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000) addressed to the Secretary-General, enclosing the report of the Committee regarding monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan, document S/2001/511.
The first speaker is Ambassador Valdivieso, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan. He will present the report contained in document S/2001/511.
In my capacity as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Afghanistan, I warmly welcome the members of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), who prepared the report submitted to the Council several days ago. That report was prepared in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of resolution 1333 (2000) and appears in document S/2001/511.
The sanctions Committee met yesterday with the members of the Committee of Experts for a preliminary presentation. I should like to highlight some of the elements aimed essentially at emphasizing the primary purpose of proposing a sanctions monitoring mechanism, as provided for by this Council in resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000. At the same time, I should like to stress at this public meeting that, as established in the text of the report, the participation and commitment of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries are essential to the efficacy of the sanctions.
At the outset, I wish to say that the Committee of Experts had the very concrete mission of presenting its recommendations on the best ways of monitoring effectively, first, the arms embargo and, secondly, the closure of terrorist training camps. In its report, the Committee of Experts has made recommendations as to the best way to monitor compliance with the sanctions, but I must say that members of the Council will find express reference to other, related matters, such as sources of funding — drug trafficking in particular — trafficking in goods and illegal flights. The experts feel that these are directly connected with the traffic in arms and, undoubtedly, with the existence of the terrorist training camps. The Committee of Experts was not called upon to undertake an investigation or to establish responsibilities or facts. I reiterate that its mandate was very concrete and specific.
The Committee met several times here at Headquarters in New York and in the various countries that it visited. It analysed the information made available by those countries and in official and unofficial documents referred to in the report. It also assessed various alternatives in drafting some of the recommendations now before the Council.
The sanctions Committee and the Committee of Experts have met three times: once at the beginning of the work of the Committee of Experts; once upon its return from its field trip, before the final draft of the report was prepared; and at the meeting yesterday, to which I have already referred.
From an operational point of view, the recommendation of the Committee of Experts for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism is innovative and interesting. I wish to point this out because it has also been discussed in the sanctions Committee, without, of course, any country’s taking a definitive position. The mechanism, I repeat, is a novel one that has two parts.
First, it would involve the establishment of small Support Teams designed to strengthen existing mechanisms, as set out in the report, in each of the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan. The Support Teams would be entrusted with verifying allegations of sanctions-busting. The other element would be the establishment of an Office staffed with specialists in arms-embargo issues, counter-terrorist activities, the investigation of other international crimes — such as drug trafficking — and legislative and legal support. This Office would be headed by a Director and staffed with those specialists, who would advise the Committee of Experts and support the work of the Teams responsible for activities in the field.
The Committee of Experts has also highlighted the need to monitor movement of acetic anhydride, the indispensable chemical precursor in refining heroin. The Committee recommends closer scrutiny of the granting of export permits for that chemical precursor. It has also recommended that aircraft turbine fuel and lubricants needed for use in armoured troop-transport vehicles be specified in the embargo.
It is clear from the report that the six neighbouring countries are committed to implementing the provisions of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). In every country we visited, it was stressed that stability in Afghanistan is necessary and that there can be no military solution to the conflict. These considerations are set out in the report, which also states that no monitoring mechanism will be effective without the cooperation and commitment of the six neighbouring countries. Moreover, it will be extremely desirable to establish coordinating mechanisms among the six countries. Compliance with sanctions must be enforced in order for them to be effective and in order to preserve the credibility of the United Nations. The report also says that sanctions must be seen as a way of encouraging the Taliban, primarily, to participate in negotiations to find a political solution to the conflict.
The Council will therefore have to take a decision on the proposal made by the Committee of Experts. I would like to stress that the Council should do so as expeditiously as possible, for almost six months have already passed since sanctions were adopted through resolution 1333 (2000). As everyone knows, those sanctions are in force for a period of 12 months, and we are still at this stage. There are various reasons for that delay, but unfortunately I feel that there was an excessive delay in appointing the Committee. With regard to the Committee’s work, I would like to make it quite clear that once the Experts were finally appointed they met as quickly as possible, carried out their work and provided their report within the deadline.
It is now up to us to work in a more speedy manner. That is why this public meeting is important, as it will enable us to hear the views of the countries that are key elements of the proposed mechanism, as the report clearly states. It is hoped that this will help give impetus to all the actions required to take a decision regarding the monitoring mechanism called for in the report and envisaged in resolution 1333 (2000).
I thank Ambassador Valdivieso for his presentation of the report.
Before giving the floor to the members of the Council, let me mention that, in addition to the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Menkerios, we also have at the table Mr. Reynaldo Arcilla, Mr. Michael Chandler, Mr. Mahmoud Kassem and Mr. Atilio Molteni, who are here as members of the Committee of Experts to join in the Council’s deliberations today.
My delegation would also like to thank the Committee of Experts for preparing this excellent report pursuant to the Security Council’s resolution. We note with appreciation that the members of the Committee, who worked very intensively, have fulfilled the Committee’s mandate and provided us with a realistic and thought-provoking document.
We feel certain that the specific recommendations on the implementation of resolution 1333 (2000) that are contained in the report will be of practical value to the Security Council in achieving the full potential of its decisions aimed at restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan. We fully endorse the recommendation that an international monitoring mechanism should be established where the sanctions are in place in order to ensure the credibility of the Security Council. Past and current experience — specifically in some African States — proves the importance of a well-designed structure and terms of reference for such a monitoring body to be effective and result-oriented.
We also believe that it is important to take into account the views of the neighbouring countries. Their cooperation is absolutely essential. Clearly, no monitoring body will be successful unless there is full commitment from the Member States involved in the implementation of sanctions. My delegation welcomes the fact that six neighbouring countries have confirmed their full compliance with resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000).
We believe that the question of strengthening control on the borders of neighbouring States is central to the monitoring process. From the standpoint of future challenges in the area, they would benefit from a greater level of coordination, which would be broadly welcomed. In our view, consideration of this issue in the “six plus two” group would be a logical step.
We think that the issue of an arms embargo is of the utmost importance in the context of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. As the report says,
“The flow of arms into … and from Afghanistan is a major long-term cause of insecurity and instability in the central Asian region.” (S/2001/511, annex, enclosure, para. 33)
We also believe that establishing an effective mechanism to prevent illicit arms trafficking into and from Afghanistan will be the most challenging task before the Council. It is obvious that cooperation on the regional and international levels will be crucial in finding the solution to this problem. In that context, we hope that decisions and recommendations of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which will be held at New York this July, will be of practical use in our deliberations on the situation in Afghanistan.
The report also includes many other recommendations — regarding drug trafficking, the closure of terrorist training camps, the establishment of field teams, et cetera — that fall squarely within the competence of the Security Council and that need to be addressed promptly. The Chairman of the sanctions committee, Ambassador Valdivieso, has elaborated on this subject. I will simply state that we fully share the views of the Committee in that regard.
Finally, I want to stress that we believe that the establishment of a monitoring body in Afghanistan will be an evolutionary process that will require continued attention on the part of the Council. Here, I would also like to reiterate once again my delegation’s full support for the idea expressed by the Secretary-General in his previous report, and which is also reflected in the present report, that an integrated or comprehensive strategy is needed to provide for a solution to the Afghanistan problem.
The Chinese delegation appreciates the work done by the Committee of Experts headed by Mr. Menkerios. China attaches great importance to the Committee’s report. We will carefully study the report and its specific proposals. We are very grateful to Ambassador Valdivieso for the presentation he just made. We believe that the sanctions committee that he heads will conduct further discussions on the specific elements of the report after today’s discussions in the Security Council. I will therefore confine myself only to some brief comments.
It is the obligation and duty of all Member States comprehensively to implement Security Council resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1267 (1999), on sanctions against the Taliban. We have noted that the report of the Committee of Experts proposes new measures, such as the establishment of a new sanctions-monitoring mechanism. The establishment of such a mechanism is intended effectively to enhance monitoring. The Security Council should therefore take actual results fully into account after that mechanism is established.
The border between Afghanistan and neighbouring States is more than 5,000 kilometres long. We would like to know the size and scale required of a monitoring mechanism in order for it to be effective. We also wish to know whether the United Nations will be provided with guarantees of sufficient resources. China does not wish to see a situation develop by which excessive haste in implementing relevant measures leads to the failure to achieve their objective. If that happens, it will be a monitoring mechanism in name only, and that will damage the credibility of the United Nations.
We also wish to point out that the establishment of a new sanctions monitoring mechanism will require the close cooperation of States neighbouring Afghanistan. Before arriving at a decision, the Security Council should carefully consider and respect the opinions of those neighbouring countries.
The Committee of Experts has put a great deal of work into this report, and its efforts should be acknowledged. The report makes certain allegations, however, without specifying its sources. Mere allegations should not be used to prove a point, still less serve as the basis for action. Greater efforts should be made in this regard.
I should like to take this opportunity to provide some information about the border region between China and Afghanistan with which all Council members may not be familiar. The border between China and Afghanistan is located in a cold, mountainous region. Its total length is 92 kilometres, and its average elevation above sea level is more than 5,000 metres. The geography is varied and the climate harsh. There is hardly any human presence in the region, and access to it is extremely difficult. China and Afghanistan have not established any travel routes between the two countries in the border region. Given these features of the border region between China and Afghanistan, what does the Committee envisage doing — indeed, what can it do — there? That issue requires further clarification.
I should like first of all to thank Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso, our colleague and the Chairman of the Security Council sanctions Committee on Afghanistan, and, through him, Ambassador Haile Menkerios, the Chairman of the Committee of Experts, as well as all of his colleagues, for the report that has just been introduced. It is a comprehensive and exhaustive document. The detailed supplementary information that it contains, compiled from different sources, shows the firm commitment of the experts to provide us with a complete picture of the situation on the ground so that we can draw appropriate conclusions and take the necessary decisions.
I should like to make several comments and share some thoughts about the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report.
First of all, My delegation welcomes the commitment of the countries in the region to abide by the provisions of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) and to seek a political resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan. Secondly, we share the opinion of the experts that sanctions, the search for a political solution and humanitarian and economic initiatives must be seen as a package of elements in an integrated strategy aimed at the achievement of a representative Government in Afghanistan. Assistance may be necessary for those among Afghanistan’s neighbours that need concrete support in order to strengthen and develop their monitoring mechanisms.
Thirdly, it is important to stress the fact that the countries visited by the Committee of Experts showed their commitment to cooperating and to accepting the assistance of the international community. They made it very clear that they would implement the provisions of Security Council resolutions using their own border control services.
That leads me to my fourth point, regarding the recommendations of the Committee on the establishment of a United Nations Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination-Afghanistan. The Office — which, according to the Committee’s recommendations, would have headquarters in Vienna — would benefit from the support of Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams working alongside the border control services in the States neighbouring Afghanistan. That is an interesting recommendation, but there are practical difficulties involved. We believe that setting up such a mechanism will depend to a considerable extent on the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighbours, who will have to demonstrate their support for the Office.
In this regard, we believe that it will therefore be necessary to discuss with the countries concerned all the modalities involved and to gather their opinions on establishing the mechanism so as to ensure its success at the practical level. We truly need their cooperation and support.
Fifthly, with regard to the conclusions of the Committee on the implementation of the arms embargo, as well as annex I of the report, which contains a list of arms control measures to be considered by the Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination, my delegation would like to recall that certain issues relating to small arms raised by the members of the Committee are still being considered by States Members of the General Assembly. It would therefore be useful to pay close attention to the United Nations conference on the illicit trade in small arms due to take place in July. In the view of my delegation, we would be well advised to await the conclusions of that conference.
Sixthly, with regard to the recommendations on the imposition of a possible embargo on the chemical substance used in the manufacture of narcotics, we believe that it is important to impose strict controls so as to prevent the production and sale of illicit drugs coming from Afghanistan.
Finally, we believe that sufficient time must be taken to carefully examine the report and assess the impact of the recommendations made by the Committee of Experts so that the most appropriate decision can be taken regarding the establishment of a mechanism to ensure that Security Council sanctions are implemented.
I join in the words of gratitude expressed to the Chairman of the sanctions Committee and to the Chairman of the Committee of Experts, which prepared the report in accordance with resolution 1333 (2000) and made recommendations about the monitoring of the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps in the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. We have studied the report and support its main conclusions regarding the need to set up a monitoring mechanism to control the implementation of resolution 1333 (2000).
It is clear now that since the resolution’s adoption half a year ago the Taliban have in no way tried to comply with the Security Council’s demands. They have not taken the least step to extradite Usama bin Laden, nor to close those camps where international terrorists are being trained in Taliban-controlled territory.
In the broader context, the Taliban, relying on external military assistance, are continuing to try to resolve the Afghan conflict by force. In addition, recently we have witnessed new Taliban activities that go against all norms of human morality and ethics. There continue to be gross violations of the rights of women and girls. The Buddhist statues were destroyed. Discriminatory measures, similar to those used in ghettos in the past, have been imposed against adherents of non-Islamic faiths who are living in Afghanistan. As I said, no progress has been achieved as regards the Taliban’s support for international terrorism.
Given this situation, it is particularly important to consistently implement resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1267 (1999). In our opinion, an important step along this road should be Council support for the experts’ recommendations regarding the creation of a monitoring mechanism.
Of course we understand that no sanctions monitoring will be effective unless the States neighbouring Afghanistan cooperate in the matter, first and foremost the States bordering Afghanistan. We welcome the proclaimed willingness of the six States to comply with resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). We believe that cooperation with them should continue as we work further with the experts’ recommendations. I support the appeal made by the Permanent Representative of China regarding the importance of cooperating with neighbouring countries.
We believe that initially the work of the monitoring mechanism should focus most fundamentally on the key requirements: ensuring compliance with the arms embargo and closing the terrorist training camps. I understand that these are difficult tasks; however, we cannot afford to do nothing. That would be worse. It seems to me that the experts’ proposed plan will allow real progress to be made. Perhaps all of the Security Council’s demands will not be completely implemented as a result, but the plan will, I repeat, promote real progress towards that goal. I am referring in particular to the proposals to set up the Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination and the Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams in the region. We are prepared to use this plan as a foundation. Of course we will still have to define the plan’s specific parameters, including the functions of each of the proposed elements, particularly with regard to the teams to be set up in bordering countries. Of course there should be the closest possible consultation with the interested States on this matter.
With regard to the location of the monitoring mechanism, we think it would be preferable for it to be in New York. This is important for effective interaction with the sanctions Committee, and also so as to have a link with the Security Council. If the monitoring mechanism is set up in a location other than New York, this link would be weakened, which we think would be a mistake. It is important to take a close look at the possible options for financing the mechanism so that its activities are properly funded.
The report contains many other practical proposals, including on expanding the list of embargoed goods and on unifying national legislation as regards arms trading, customs policies and so forth. We are prepared to review these proposals, many of which will require careful study. But right now, I repeat, we believe the Council should concentrate on preparing and adopting a draft resolution that would allow the monitoring mechanism to quickly begin work. The recommendations requiring further study can be considered at subsequent stages.
We support the view that sanctions against the Taliban should be implemented in close connection with other United Nations decisions that seek to ensure peace and stability for Afghanistan. Most serious attention should be given to retaining the targeted nature of the sanctions: making sure that they continue to be directed against the leadership of the Taliban, rather than against the Afghan people.
On the basis of these principles we will be cooperating with other Council members in the further work on this report.
I would like to take this opportunity first of all to commend Ambassador Valdivieso for the critical leadership he has provided to the Council’s sanctions Committee. We rely on him for his leadership and expertise. I would also like to thank Ambassador Menkerios and congratulate him and his Committee of Experts on the extraordinary work that they have been able to do in a very short period of time. They have given us a significant and substantive report that merits our full consideration.
The challenges and threats presented by Afghanistan are immense and multifaceted. The Council has addressed these issues many times and will have to continue to do so. Today we are here to focus on the report of the Committee of Experts on how to monitor the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps that was demanded in Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000).
This Council has stated repeatedly that the Taliban must cease its support for terrorism. We have taken an unambiguous stand in our resolutions. We are prepared to back up words with action — primarily through implementing an effective arms embargo against the Taliban.
Now this Committee of Experts has informed us that for our resolutions to have an impact we need to establish a mechanism to monitor compliance. The United States agrees with this recommendation and would support a resolution to establish such a mechanism. We support the conclusion of the Committee of Experts that the proposed monitoring mechanism should augment the ability and efforts of Afghanistan’s neighbouring States to enforce the Council’s resolutions, especially to cut off the flow of weapons and to close down the terrorist training camps. I would like here to note the cooperation that each of Afghanistan’s neighbours provided to the work of the Committee of Experts.
The mechanism will be useful in providing information and assisting countries bordering Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan so that they can improve the national enforcement of each nation’s international obligations under resolution 1333 (2000). The mechanism should also provide accurate information to the sanctions Committee so that suspected violators can be named and shamed. We believe this action should also serve as a deterrent.
The mechanism, as we see it, should be put together carefully. It cannot replace the work that has to be done by the thousands of border police, customs agents and other national officials responsible for compliance with the arms embargo. Nor should it seek to duplicate the efforts of other agencies such as the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), Interpol and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
We see this mechanism as a critical means to assist Ambassador Valdivieso with his work as Chairman of the sanctions Committee. Therefore, we agree with the comment just made that the monitoring mechanism should be established in New York, where it can have close links with the work of the Council, and that it should have the capacity to have some staff in the field.
Although financing for the mechanism needs to be discussed, the United States favours the immediate establishment of a trust fund through which the mechanism, whatever its exact final form, would be financed. The United States Government is in the process of identifying resources that will allow it to make a substantial contribution to a trust fund, so that an effective monitoring mechanism can be established as soon as possible.
Finally, the United States congratulates Ambassador Menkerios for his leadership and his Expert Committee’s invaluable contribution. We also thank Ambassador Valdivieso for his continuing and critical leadership.
The United States looks forward to working with all present to establish an effective monitoring mechanism and to adopt a draft resolution later this month to put this into effect.
I should like warmly to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this open meeting of the Security Council to discuss the report of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to paragraph 15 (a) of Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), regarding monitoring of the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan.
I should like also to thank the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan, chaired by Ambassador Haile Menkerios, for the outstanding work it has done in such a short space of time and in rather difficult conditions. This is a perfect opportunity for my delegation to state how pleased we are at the conclusions reached by the Committee. We would also like to thank Ambassador Valdivieso, Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Afghanistan, for having given us a detailed introduction to the report.
The principle underlying my delegation’s view of sanctions regimes is that the goal of sanctions should not be to punish, but to modify behaviour. In order to attain this goal of behaviour change, it is more than ever necessary rigorously to apply sanctions imposed against States. This can be done only through an effective mechanism to monitor compliance with the requirements set out in the relevant resolutions. That is why we support the recommendations of the Committee of Experts contained in the report before us — recommendations that will make it possible to improve the effectiveness of sanctions imposed, which will lead to a change of behaviour.
We note the fact that Afghanistan’s neighbours realize that there can be no military solution to the conflict that has bloodied Afghanistan for two decades. Those who are fuelling this conflict must put an end to their behaviour and understand that there is a link between stability in Afghanistan and their own security.
As indicated in paragraph 88 of the report, my delegation supports the creation of a United Nations Office for monitoring the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the Taliban authorities in Kabul. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness should be taken into account when deciding on the location of the office. In any case, the location that is chosen should be able to provide the necessary administrative and logistical support to the Office. In this way the groundwork can be laid for exemplary cooperation between the United Nations and Afghanistan’s neighbours, in order to ensure total respect for the international embargo on weapons destined for the Taliban and to monitor activities in the terrorist training camps.
To that end, we support the idea of sending small teams of specialists, which would work closely with the various border control services and anti-terrorist teams in each of the six countries that are neighbours of Afghanistan. Given the fact that the considerable funds resulting from the opium and heroin trade are being used to buy weapons and other war matériel and to fund the training of terrorists, my delegation firmly supports the recommendations of the Committee contained in paragraph 61 of the report regarding the interdiction of smuggled drugs from Afghanistan. The international community should do everything in its power to deprive the Taliban of the important funding that it gets from the illicit drug trade.
Finally, I should like once again to congratulate Ambassador Haile Menkerios and his team on the excellent work done. We reiterate the fact that my delegation is ready to take an active part in seeking a consensus whereby this important document can be followed up.
I shall be brief, for two reasons: first, because there has already been a chance for an initial discussion of the report of the sanctions Committee, and, secondly, because one of the important functions of this meeting is to allow Council members to hear the views of neighbouring States before the Council itself moves to take action on the recommendations of the monitoring report.
What I have to say today will not be exhaustive, but will, I hope, give Council members and others in this room a good feel for the way in which the United Kingdom is approaching the discussion on the report.
But first, I think that congratulations are due both to Ambassador Valdivieso and to Ambassador Menkerios for the excellent work they have done. It is good to see Ambassador Menkerios around the Council table again, albeit in a slightly different incarnation from last time. It is very good to have him here.
We regard the Committee of Experts’ report as a very thorough, very inventive and very useful document. We agree with most of the recommendations, and in particular we agree with the key recommendation that we should work towards establishing a monitoring mechanism along the lines the Panel recommended.
We also agree that there is benefit in having field teams on the ground to support the efforts of the neighbouring States. We welcome the commitment of the neighbouring countries, as set out in the report, to implement sanctions and cooperate with the monitoring mechanism. I hope and believe that we will hear more of that today.
The first step will have to be an evaluation of what skills are required in each country — in other words, how best the United Nations can help. It is also important that the teams on the ground should have a monitoring role in addition to an advisory role. This is not just because this two-pronged approach accurately reflects the main thrust of the problem; it is also because it is one of the best ways, as we see it, to achieve a truly cooperative effort, which, as a number of speakers have already said, will be the key to ensuring the success of this enterprise.
We have looked at the idea of having a central headquarters in the light of the wider debate that is going on on sanctions monitoring. As the Council is aware, there are a number of proposals on the table for establishing a centralized global monitoring mechanism for sanctions. The establishment of a monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan should not preclude the development of such semi-permanent global mechanisms encompassing all the monitoring regimes.
We do, however, see benefit, in the Afghanistan case, in setting up a light, flexible headquarters to coordinate the work of the six teams and carry out some of the centralized tasks, as described by the Committee of Experts.
We believe that the team should be established within, or closely related to, the existing sanctions team of the Department of Political Affairs. That, again, points to establishing it in New York. We hope we can move as quickly as possible to establish the monitoring mechanism. As the debate proceeds and as the work continues on the details of establishing semi-permanent global sanctions monitoring structures, we will want to look at how the Afghanistan monitoring mechanism and the other monitoring mechanisms can be brought into such structures.
On funding, we are looking carefully at how this can best be done. There are a number of bottom lines, I think: to ensure that, whatever is done, the monitoring mechanism is adequately and securely funded; to ensure that it can be funded quickly; and to ensure that we do not incur unnecessary expenditure. I have noted in this context what Ambassador Hume has had to say about the establishment of a trust fund.
I will leave it there. I hope my statement contains the essence of the United Kingdom approach. We look forward to hearing the views of others in this Chamber, both members and non-members of the Council, and we look forward to working in the Council to ensure that the report is properly followed up.
I shall try to be brief. I would like to begin by thanking Ambassador Menkerios and the rest of the Committee of Experts for their report (S/2001/511), which was compiled in difficult circumstances and which contains many useful recommendations. I would like also to take this opportunity to recognize the energy and leadership of Ambassador Valdivieso in his chairmanship of the Afghanistan sanctions Committee.
As the wider issues of Afghanistan will be discussed later this month, I shall restrict my comments here to the report of the Committee of Experts. Ireland supports the recommendation of the Committee of Experts that an office for sanctions monitoring and coordination be established in a central location with sanctions enforcement support teams working with border control services in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan. The practical aspects of that structure, including the modalities for cooperation with neighbouring States, should now be discussed in the sanctions Committee, which has the relevant expertise, with a view to presenting recommendations to the Council as soon as possible.
In order for such a mechanism to be effective, it must, we believe, have sustainable and continuous funding. When costings become available, Ireland will consider offering assistance in the light of available resources.
Many of the other recommendations of the Committee of Experts are also worthy of consideration and should be further examined by the sanctions Committee. We appreciate the emphasis placed on the significance of drug trafficking, and we fully agree that this must be addressed as part of the overall problem. We also agree with the two-pronged approach to the closure of terrorist camps, as outlined in paragraph 52 of the report.
We note with interest the recommendation in paragraph 32 regarding aircraft turbine fuel and fluids for armoured personnel carriers. But on that point, I would be grateful for clarification that this proposal relates to military flights and that any restrictions could be implemented without inadvertently affecting humanitarian flights.
I join previous speakers in welcoming Ambassador Menkerios and the other members of the Committee of Experts and in congratulating them on the quality of their report, which was submitted most promptly. I also echo their praise for the leadership of Ambassador Valdivieso as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Afghanistan. I have four comments to make on the report and on its anticipated outcomes.
The prime merit of the report is that it emphasizes the central role of neighbouring countries in the true implementation of the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps. We note the confirmed commitment of Afghanistan’s neighbours to implement the embargo and to cooperate with the United Nations to that end. The Committee of Experts itself participated in an effort to increase awareness of this issue. We must take the neighbouring States at their word, and must help them overcome the obstacles noted by the Committee of Experts.
Secondly, we support the overall structure of the proposed monitoring mechanism. We feel that the structure should be as light, flexible and adaptable as possible. The first task would be to bring the national forces of neighbouring countries up to standard. The proposed general monitoring and disarmament measures are of interest and should be considered in greater depth. Similarly, it has been proposed that new arms-control legislation be enacted and existing legislation strengthened; that would be useful to encourage work now under way in a number of international bodies. That is true also of proposed measures that are set out in the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, recently adopted by the General Assembly. Most of the proposed measures will be addressed at the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects. Clearly, there is a great deal of work to be done here that lies beyond the mandate of the Security Council but that still complements the Council’s work.
Thirdly, we fully support the recommendation that the monitoring mechanism could serve as the nucleus for a more general mechanism to monitor sanctions and the illicit trade in raw materials in armed conflict. We would observe with interest that the Committee of Experts has noted that arms embargoes have inherent problems, irrespective of the sanctions regime. Resolving these problems demands the implementation of comprehensive measures at the international level. It would obviously be useful to be able to take advantage of the synergy among the various sanctions mechanisms and panels of experts that are put in place over time. In that spirit, and to make reference to what Ambassador Eldon said, we feel that the monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan would best be established in New York, precisely to foster synergy with sanctions committees and with other existing mechanisms.
Finally, let me say a word about financing. Here, predictability is important to enable the monitoring mechanism to function well and independently. That is why we would prefer funding from the regular budget of the United Nations; that would also have practical advantages with respect to the day-to-day operation of the mechanism: we must ensure that there is no interruption in the funding, because that would be extremely damaging to the functioning of the mechanism. To expand on my earlier remark, the establishment of a general monitoring mechanism for sanctions and illicit trade would not only facilitate synergy in its work, but would also offer significant budgetary savings.
In general terms, we share the views of the Committee of Experts on the need to conceive and make use of sanctions as part of a comprehensive strategy for a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. We hope that in coming weeks we will be able to discuss that more general topic.
My delegation thanks the Chairman of the sanctions Committee, Ambassador Valdivieso, for introducing the report of the Committee of Experts and extends its appreciation to the Committee for its important work.
We have carefully reviewed the report and have concluded that the ideas and recommendations provide a basis for effective implementation of the measures mandated in resolution 1333 (2000). It is our view that, having adopted resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), we must seek to enforce the measures we have approved. Responsible parties must take appropriate action to prevent illegal flights and the entry of arms and ammunition into the territory and ensure the closing of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.
The report addresses the steps that need to be taken to give effect to these measures and we welcome the opportunity to discuss effective measures to address this problem. We feel that the report provides guidelines for action at the national, regional and international levels that require the commitment of the concerned States if these provisions are to be implemented.
At the regional level, neighbouring States must coordinate their efforts and indicate the level of assistance needed to effectively monitor their borders. It is important that transit and supply States comply with Security Council resolutions. It is commendable that neighbouring States have expressed their commitment to this process and it is left to us to encourage them to put these words into action.
At the international level, it is important that these levels be supported, in the short term, by the provision of technical and financial assistance to those countries. In the long term, the gains made and decisions taken in other United Nations bodies must be taken into account. In this regard, we note the observation of the Committee, contained in paragraph 34 of the report, that
“any measures proposed for Afghanistan must be seen in the wider context of arms control measures targeted elsewhere”.
It is clear that we need to move quickly to strengthen monitoring mechanisms in order to support border arrangements. We look forward to further discussions on the modalities and financing of these mechanisms. We are also particularly interested in the Committee’s recommendations regarding the inspection of shipments under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement. It is important that we examine carefully how this recommendation can assist us in the implementation process.
In closing, my delegation wishes to reiterate that the Security Council must continue to seek a comprehensive solution to the problem in Afghanistan. The Committee of Experts, in its report, notes the position of all concerned States in the region. We concur with its conclusion that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and that only a political solution by the people of Afghanistan can bring an end to its suffering. The international community must continue its efforts to bring this about. The effective monitoring of sanctions should be undertaken as a means to this end. While we focus on this issue, we should also remain conscious of the dire humanitarian situation that prevails and make a concerted effort to ensure that our decisions do not add to this crisis.
I thank you, Sir, for organizing this public meeting on Afghanistan, where the situation on all fronts seems only to be getting worse on a daily basis — the latest scenario being the edict that the Taliban has issued against minority communities.
We deeply appreciate the important briefing provided to the Council this morning by Ambassador Valdivieso and we felicitate Mr. Menkerios and members of the Committee of Experts for their comprehensive and important report.
Today’s discussion has to focus on the report, and in that connection my delegation has noted the many highly commendable suggestions that have been made by the Committee. Among the important suggestions, we note the following: publication of information concerning violations of end-user certificate provisions, including the names of companies, countries and individuals involved, as well as cases of unauthorized re-transfer of weapons to third parties, as referred to in paragraph 39 of the report; the need for assistance in providing data on aircraft movements in and out of Afghanistan, which would help to monitor illegal flights, as referred to in paragraph 40; the need for neighbouring Pakistan to regulate the curricula at the madrassas, as referred to in paragraph 43; the return or repatriation of foreign terrorists under international supervision, as referred to in paragraph 48; and the idea of creating a dual-control sanctions monitoring mechanism, as referred to in paragraph 77.
My delegation strongly supports those recommendations, which are in line with the mandate of the Committee to deal with the growing problems in Afghanistan. We believe that they are important guidelines for the management of sanctions in general. We agree with the observation made in the report that the close cooperation of neighbouring countries is imperative in resolving the Afghanistan problem. We appeal to the neighbouring countries to cooperate fully with the international community in this regard, and we hope that they will.
The proposal for a sanctions monitoring mechanism is very commendable, but we have to assure ourselves that such a body will not become a mere reporting panel for further action by others. Instead, it must have a solid structure, with all financial and human resources to effectively deal with sanctions-busting cases. We believe that the monitoring body should be financed out of assessed contributions and supported by voluntary funds from donors. The body should work in close cooperation with the sanctions Committee and report its findings to the Committee for action as appropriate.
Finally, we hope that, in the course of this month, the Security Council will hold an open debate that will allow the Members of the United Nations to express their views on a more comprehensive basis on all aspects of the Afghanistan question.
First of all, I would like to thank Ambassador Valdivieso for his introduction and for his energetic leadership of the Committee.
Secondly, I would like to thank Ambassador Menkerios and the Committee of Experts for providing us with a thorough and thought-provoking report.
I would also like to congratulate you, Mr. President, for holding this open meeting, which enables the Council to hear the views of representatives of countries whose efforts are crucial to the success of our efforts to implement the sanctions against the Taliban in the region.
My statement will be limited to the report before us because later this month we are going to have a discussion of the overall question of Afghanistan.
My Government regards the report and its recommendations as an excellent basis for establishing a monitoring mechanism with regard to the effective implementation of resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1267 (1999). Norway supports the realistic approach taken in the report. A mechanism should be based on neighbouring States’ national border control efforts and be supported by small international Support Teams of experts that would also monitor and investigate violations. In the report it is suggested that such Support Teams should be based at existing United Nations offices in the region. In that connection, my delegation would like to ask the Committee whether the Committee of Experts has considered any potentially negative consequences of co-locating the Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams together with United Nations offices and agencies operating inside Afghanistan, including those involved with the provision of humanitarian assistance.
We have noted the arguments presented for locating the headquarters office in Vienna. We find that there are also sound arguments for locating the office in New York, including the need for close and continuous contact with the Security Council, the sanctions Committee and the Secretariat.
It is also necessary to see a sanctions monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan in connection with the discussions on the establishment of a permanent mechanism for monitoring United Nations sanctions regimes, including arms embargoes. The report has raised important issues in that regard that need to be studied further.
As for the question of financing, Norway’s position is that the mechanism needs secure and stable funding and that it should thus be financed by assessed contributions. We have also noted arguments in favour of initial voluntary funding in order to ensure speedy implementation of the recommendation. We are also ready to consider that.
Norway is ready to consider the other recommendations, including that aircraft turbine fuel and special fuels for military use be specified in the arms embargo, but with the provision that this does not negatively affect the humanitarian assistance efforts in Afghanistan.
Before giving the floor to the next speaker, let me review with the Council the situation regarding the time and the number of speakers we have. We still have three other Council members to hear — Singapore, Colombia and Bangladesh. To help the situation, I can forgo my national statement. But we will still need at least 10 minutes for Singapore and Colombia, five each. We also have four speakers under rule 37. My initial contacts with them told me that the four of them will need about 35 minutes. Thereafter we will hear from Ambassador Menkerios, whom I believe should be given at least 10 minutes to respond to many of the questions raised. That makes a total of 55 minutes. It is my intention to close this meeting at 1.15 p.m. If we need to go beyond that, we will have to come back at 3 p.m.
Our thanks go to Ambassador Valdivieso for his presentation. We look forward to the presentation to be made later on by Ambassador Menkerios.
My delegation would like to thank the Committee of Experts for having provided the Council with a comprehensive analysis of the subject and for having made concrete and realistic recommendations to strengthen the implementation of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). We note that the Committee has considered a whole spectrum of options on how to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo, as well as the closure of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. We are gratified that in making its recommendations, the Committee has given emphasis to the need for the proposed mechanism to be not only effective but also affordable and realizable. We therefore believe that the recommendations of the Committee merit serious consideration.
We look forward to working with other members of the Security Council to consider how we can take the process forward, drawing from the Committee’s recommendations. We also agree with the views expressed by others that we should expedite that process. My delegation would like to note, however, that any decision of the Council emanating from the report of the Committee should, insofar as this is possible, be taken by consensus.
We will be commenting on the specific recommendations of the Committee in greater detail in subsequent discussions of the Council. But permit me, at this juncture, to make a few general points.
First, like others, my delegation is of the view that the Council cannot proceed with the implementation of the recommendations of the Committee without adequate consultations with the countries that have specific involvement in the implementation of the Council’s resolutions. Singapore has noted with deep appreciation that the six States that share borders with Afghanistan have stated their intention to abide by the resolutions of the Council. The Council will now have to work very closely with them to find the best possible way of helping those countries implement the decisions of the Council. The Committee was right when it asserted that
“enforcing sanctions must rely on the will and initiative, primarily, of the countries bordering Afghanistan”. (S/2001/511, para. 90)
As the Committee also noted, in paragraph 21 of its report, those countries
“stressed the fact that without a stable Afghanistan their own stability and security was threatened”.
Secondly, in creating the mechanism to monitor the implementation of the resolutions against the Taliban, the Security Council should not unwittingly institute measures that would impede the ability of humanitarian agencies to bring aid and relief to the Afghan population. I note that the delegations of Ireland, Norway and others have also made that point. This applies in particular to the monitoring of flights in and out of Taliban-controlled territories. The Council should ensure that the frequency and viability of humanitarian flights, which are crucial for dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, are in no way adversely affected.
Thirdly, on the proposal by the Committee that the proposed monitoring mechanism for Afghanistan serve as the nucleus for future sanctions-monitoring requirements, we would counsel some caution. The Council’s approach towards the issue of Afghanistan is governed by a set of political and strategic considerations that may not apply in other cases and issues. We should be slow to regard the proposed mechanism, if it is eventually adopted, as a general template for other situations.
Fourthly, with respect to the Committee’s recommendation on measures to enforce the arms embargo, we agree with the views expressed by others at the meeting held yesterday between the sanctions Committee and the Committee of Experts that, where relevant, the Council must consider the recommendations within the framework of existing international mechanisms. The Security Council should take into account the international debate on the control of the illegal trade in small arms. The United Nation Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects will be held in New York next month. It should give us an indication of the extent to which there is an international consensus on this issue.
Fifthly, my delegation is pleased that the Committee has expanded the scope of its work to investigate the connection between the illicit drug trade and the financing of arms purchases and terrorist camps in Afghanistan. This is a very important dimension of the problem, and it deserves our attention.
Let me conclude by highlighting paragraph 89 of the Committee’s report. I think it is important enough for me to read it out to the Council.
“The sanctions imposed on the Taliban must be seen and implemented as part of an overall package pursued by the United Nations to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Thus, the sanctions, the search for a political solution, and the humanitarian and economic efforts all need to be taken as a whole and pursued as parts of an integrated strategy leading to a broad based and responsible government in Afghanistan.”
My delegation looks forward to future opportunities to exchange views with Council members, and also with Afghanistan’s neighbouring States, to see how we could best find a well-defined, long-term, comprehensive strategy to bring peace to Afghanistan.
We have given careful consideration to the report of the Committee of Experts, which has made recommendations to the Security Council on how the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps demanded in paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 1333 (2000) could be monitored. We also listened carefully to the statement made by Ambassador Valdivieso, in his capacity as Chairman of the sanctions Committee, in which he summarized the content of the report. Colombia concurs with many of the recommendations contained in the report with regard to setting up a monitoring mechanism.
I should like to highlight four preliminary issues that are important to my delegation as starting points for the discussions that will follow this meeting of the Council. The first relates to the neighbouring countries. It is essential for the Security Council to properly involve all the countries neighbouring Afghanistan and to obtain their cooperation in order to ensure that the monitoring mechanism is effective. In this regard, Colombia welcomes the willingness of all of those countries to cooperate with this organ of the United Nations. This is indispensable for ensuring the effective monitoring of illicit activities taking place along the borders. We believe that this is the right approach — the recommendations should be aimed at strengthening national capacities.
My second comment relates to the issue of coordination — horizontal coordination among the neighbouring countries and vertical coordination among those countries, the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. This Organization could contribute to establishing greater harmony, coordination and compatibility among governmental and security bodies in order to enhance both horizontal and vertical coordination.
My third comment relates to border activities of interest to the Security Council. In this respect, it is important to have effective and comprehensive controls on trafficking in arms and chemical precursors, including acetic anhydride, on the smuggling of goods and on other activities that might fuel or facilitate terrorist activities.
My fourth comment relates to the peace process. In its decisions, the Security Council must be careful to avoid any incompatibility with the efforts of the international community to contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan. At the appropriate time, when the Security Council carries out a comprehensive review of the situation in that country, we will have an opportunity to highlight and test that necessary compatibility.
In conclusion, Colombia will participate in the scrupulous and detailed analysis of the recommendations presented to the Council by the Committee of Experts so as to ensure that appropriate decisions are taken, including on the modalities of the monitoring mechanism, its location, in either New York or Vienna, and its funding.
This open meeting is the first step towards that analysis and will enable us to hear the opinions of the States concerned.
In interests of better time management, I will forgo making my national statement at this point.
I will move on to the list of countries invited under rule 37. The first speaker on that list is the representative of Afghanistan, on whom I now call.
I should like first of all to congratulate you warmly, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for June 2001. We are also grateful to the head of the Mission of the United States to the United Nations for presiding over the Council for the month of May. We are also very grateful to you, Sir, for arranging this meeting, which is taking place at such an important time.
As we have consistently and amply explained in earlier statements to this Council and to the General Assembly, foreign intervention in Afghanistan remains the main cause of the present conflict and of all the sufferings of the Afghan people. That is not mere rhetoric or allegation, but a crystal-clear fact, recognized in United Nations documents. In this regard, I would like to draw the attention of the Security Council to the observation made by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan as early as September 1999. Paragraph 3 of his interim report (A/54/422) states,
“the people of Afghanistan continued to be victims of gross violations of human rights and persistent breaches of international humanitarian law. The basic cause of this was that the people of Afghanistan continued to be virtual hostages in their own land, where externally armed forces seek to rule Afghanistan without the effective participation or consent of the people.”
These externally armed forces referred to by the Rapporteur, Ambassador Kamal Hossain, in his report consist of an alliance of Pakistani military junta, religious extremists groups from Pakistan, Usama bin Laden’s groups, including the notorious Al Quaeda, Central Asian extremist groups and the so-called Islamic Emirate of the Taliban. This alliance is part of a great scheme — let us call it a hallucination — for the domination of Afghanistan and Central Asia by Pakistan, which is seeking to secure “strategic depth”. This is a new version of Lebensraum, cherished by groups with an anachronistic ideological agenda. This is not only a threat to Afghanistan but also a serious menace to the peace and security of the region and of the world.
The discrimination against women and girls, the massacre of the civilian population based on ethnic or religious origin, cultural vandalism, the stigmatization of religious minority groups, raids on hospitals run by humanitarian organizations and many other atrocities are part of politico-social agenda of the Pakistan-Taliban-bin Laden alliance. All of these endeavours are focused on establishing an Emirate of terror serving the interests of Pakistan and achieving the dreams of dull-witted people of an “ideal Islamic society”. The purpose is to establish in Afghanistan a so-called Islamic regime which does not resemble any other Islamic country of the world.
The pursuit of creating such an idealistic society could be considered one of the main causes of the humanitarian crisis in the country. This man-made disaster has deprived more than one half of the Afghan population of productive activities. There is no infrastructural economic plan for the reconstruction or rehabilitation of Afghanistan, due to the harsh policies issued daily by the Taliban. The skilled workers, intellectuals and knowledgeable people have already left the areas occupied by the Taliban. This is part of Pakistan’s scheme regarding Afghanistan, where ignorant people remain in power and become increasingly dependent on Pakistan and on Pakistani military intelligence.
Despite the international community’s outcry about Taliban policies and actions — including the safe haven being given to international terrorists in the parts of Afghanistan occupied by the Taliban — in spite of the presence of thousands of Arab and Central Asian fighters and their training camps in Afghanistan, and given the drug trafficking by the Taliban, Pakistan continues to cherish its infamous offspring and puppet, called the Taliban. Pakistan encourages others to recognize this strange entity as a legitimate Government. The interview given by the head of Pakistan’s military junta to the Russian daily Izvestia on 31 May 2001, demanding the recognition of the Taliban, is clear evidence of the continuing aggressive policy of Pakistan in Afghanistan and in the region. General Musharraf does not cease to repeat his litany that “Pakistan supports the Taliban”. He believes that this constitutes “the national interest of Pakistan”.
The history of the world in the past century has shown that any policy of appeasement towards an aggressor and turning a blind eye to the facts cannot serve the interests of peace, justice and stability. A firm and strong position against an aggressor can highly serve the interests of peace, justice and stability.
Unfortunately, in the case of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s direct involvement in Afghanistan and its aggressive policies in the region, which are a threat to international peace and security, are not addressed properly in the Security Council. Thousands of Pakistani fighters are recruited and openly sent to Afghanistan from different segments of Pakistani society, including its military. The United Nations has confirmed this fact by a mere stereotypical phrase — “deeply concerned” — which appears in United Nations documents without the determination that this action constitutes aggression, requiring appropriate measures against the aggressor.
This indifference by the United Nations encourages Pakistan to pursue its hegemonic adventure in Afghanistan, and — in blatant violation of Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) — to continue to supply arms and ammunition for the armed conflict there. Pakistan remains engaged in providing the Taliban with support in the areas of planning, mobilization, logistics and recruitment.
In this regard, I would like to quote from the article written by Mr. Anthony Davis, the most famous scholar and writer on Afghanistan. This article was published on 30 May 2001 in Jane’s Defence Weekly.
“Intelligence sources understand Pakistan has continued to provide logistic and advisory support for the build-up of the Taliban despite Islamabad’s earlier assurances that it would abide by United Nations Security Council resolution 1333 that since January has prohibited provision of material or advisory support to the Taliban. The United Nations has no mechanism in place that might monitor the implementation of the sanctions regime by Pakistan, which has backed the Taliban since the movement’s inception in 1994.
“In one week in early May two convoys of about 15 trucks each were moving daily from the Pakistan border at Torkham through Jalalabad to Kabul, according to reliable sources. The Mercedes-Benz trucks carried Pakistani AF [applied for] plates [issued in advance of normal registration plates], giving them a degree of anonymity, noted the sources. Munitions are understood to have been concealed under sacks of wheat.
“Other munitions are understood to have been moved across the southern borders at Chaman between the Pakistani city of Quetta and Kandahar in Afghanistan.”
Once again we would like to put on the record that the Islamic State of Afghanistan is firmly convinced that there is no military solution to the present conflict in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military junta should withdraw its military personnel and so-called volunteers from Afghanistan. All foreign fighters should leave Afghanistan immediately. All foreign fighters should leave Afghanistan immediately. The Afghans should be left to resolve their problems through negotiations.
The Islamic State of Afghanistan has already expressed its readiness to attend the Japanese-proposed peace talks, and also positively responded to the Kazakhstan-proposed peace negotiations, to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. It also positively responded to the appeal by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, for a ceasefire. All these proposals were all systematically rejected by the Taliban.
The Islamic State of Afghanistan strongly believes that it is high time for the Security Council to discharge its duty under the Charter of the United Nations to save the people of Afghanistan, to end the suffering of the Afghan nation and to maintain the peace and security of the region. The Security Council should determine the extent of Pakistani aggression in Afghanistan and decide the measures to be taken to maintain peace and security.
As my Government remains unwaveringly committed to defending the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country, I would like to reaffirm our strong belief in a peaceful political settlement of the conflict and to reiterate our wholehearted support for the pivotal mediating role of the United Nations, aimed at the establishment of a broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative Government in Afghanistan.
In this context, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan already — last Friday — sent identical letters to the Secretary-General and to yourself, Sir. These letters are to be published as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly. We expect you will give great attention to the text and its annexes. We thank the Ambassador of Colombia, Alfonso Valdivieso, the Committee of Experts headed by Ambassador Haile Menkerios and all Ambassador Menkerios’ companions for their efforts deployed to submit a report on how the arms embargo and the closure of the terrorist training camps could be implemented in accordance with resolution 1333 (2000).
Finally, let me endorse the conclusions of the Committee of Experts, in particular the establishment of a control mechanism and the ideas reflected in paragraph 89 of the Committee’s report, which I wish to read out:
“The sanctions imposed on the Taliban must be seen and implemented as part of an overall package pursued by the United Nations to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Thus, the sanctions, the search for a political solution, and the humanitarian and economic efforts all need to be taken as a whole and pursued as parts of an integrated strategy leading to a broad-based and responsible government in Afghanistan.”
Paragraph 90 begins:
“No sanctions monitoring will be effective unless there is total commitment of the Member States involved with its implementation.”
We support the immediate funding of the monitoring mechanism from the regular United Nations budget, so that it can be both predictable and secure.
In view of the lateness of the hour, and with the concurrence of the members of the Council, I shall suspend the meeting now until 3 p.m.