The situation in Angola Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2000/1225).
|President:||Mr. Ben Mustapha
|(The Presidency changes each month to the next member in alphabetical order)|
|Mr. Shen Guofang
Adoption of the agenda
The situation in Angola
Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2000/1225)
I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Mozambique, Namibia, Portugal, Romania, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo and Zimbabwe in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
On behalf of the Council, I welcome the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda.
In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations, and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola.
There being no objection it is so decided.
I invite Mr. Ryan to take a seat at the Council table.
The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.
Members of the Council have before them a note by the President of the Security Council transmitting a letter dated 21 December 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, enclosing the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, document S/2000/1225.
I now give the floor to Mr. Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola.
In my capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, I wish to express my thanks to you, Sir, for arranging this meeting of the Council in open format.
The situation in Angola continues to be of concern to the United Nations membership as a whole and to the international community. It requires the attention and scrutiny which this meeting of the Council permits. We are here to discuss the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism, which has been presented to the Council pursuant to resolution 1295 (2000). I should like at the outset to welcome the presence of the Minister for External Relations of the Republic of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda. I also wish to extend my appreciation and admiration to my Canadian predecessors, who chaired the Committee for the two years before I assumed this position. Their work was widely commended. It has also had, I believe, a wider, beneficial knock-on effect. Its dynamic, its sharply focused character and its persistence in dealing with the hard realities thrown up one by one in the specific case of Angola have impacted significantly upon the ongoing wider debate within the United Nations regarding our sanctions policies, both in general and in specific cases.
I speak today as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), rather than in my national capacity. Ireland will not be making a national statement today and associates itself fully with the statement which Sweden, the Presidency of the European Union, will be making on behalf of the Union.
Following the adoption last April of resolution 1295 (2000), the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, established on 11 July, 2000, a Monitoring Mechanism consisting of five experts. It is important to recall that the decision to establish the Mechanism was taken by the Council after its consideration of the report of the Panel of Experts on Angola Sanctions (S/2000/203). It was clear to the Council that the ongoing realities of the situation required systematic, sustained further action. For this reason, the Monitoring Mechanism was established. The Mechanism was mandated to collect additional relevant information and to investigate relevant leads relating to ongoing violations of resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998). It was also charged with investigating any relevant leads initiated by the Panel of Experts.
Four of the five members of the Mechanism — Ambassador Juan Larraín, its Chairman, Ms. Christine Gordon, Mr. James Manzou and Mr. Ismaila Seck — are here at the Council table. Ambassador Lena Sundh is in Africa on official duties. They are to be commended for the commitment and diligence they have demonstrated in discharging a complex task characterized by frequent apparent intractabilities.
The Mechanism commenced its work on 20 July and submitted its report to my predecessor on 21 December last. It had earlier submitted to the Committee, on 23 October, its interim report. Its members visited 19 countries in connection with their agenda, which evolved directly from the report of the Panel of Experts. In conducting its work, the Mechanism employed only the strictest evidentiary standards in its investigations. It also allowed the right of reply to all those against whom allegations concerning sanctions violations had been made. These exemplary procedures further enhance the authority and transparency which, I believe, characterize the report before us.
Following the submission of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) forwarded the report to the President of the Security Council on 21 December to enable its circulation for the information of all the States Members of the United Nations. Subsequently, the Committee undertook detailed analysis of the report of the Mechanism at meetings which I convened on 16 and 26 January last, and the Committee then decided to recommend today’s meeting of the Security Council.
The work of the Mechanism had two points of departure: first, the report of the Panel of Experts and, secondly, the current situation on the ground in Angola. As regards the report of the Panel of Experts, the Mechanism focused its efforts on four main areas which the Panel had exposed as susceptible to sanctions-busting. The first area — arms and military equipment — is detailed in parts II, III, IV and V of the Mechanism’s report. The second area — UNITA representation and travel and residence outside Angola of senior UNITA officials and their adult families — is detailed in part VIII. The third — the role of transport in the violation of the sanctions against UNITA — is detailed in part IX. The fourth — sanctions on diamond trading and financial assets — is detailed in part X.
Based on its findings, the Mechanism has made a number of specific recommendations in all four areas. These are contained in part XI, paragraphs 228-243, of the final report. I would draw the particular attention of the Security Council to these recommendations and to further recommendations contained in paragraphs 224 and 244-245. I would also draw the attention of the Security Council to the conclusions drawn by the Mechanism, which are contained in part XII, paragraphs 246-254.
Resolution 1295 (2000) expresses the intention of the Security Council to review the situation regarding the implementation of the measures contained in resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998) on the basis of information provided, inter alia, by the Monitoring Mechanism. Today’s meeting provides us all with an opportunity to take stock in this regard. The Mechanism’s recommendations range from the general to the highly specific. What is clear about all of them is that they require action by the United Nations, by individual States and by the international community. It is also clear that effective response to and action on these recommendations will require committed and sustained engagement not only by the Security Council and the United Nations system — including, for example, the International Civil Aviation Organization — but also and essentially by certain organizations outside the United Nations system.
If the international community is to implement effectively the recommendations contained in the report, it will require persistence and financial resources. I am confident that, collectively, we possess and will demonstrate such resolve. The history of sanctions against UNITA has been and continues to be an incremental one. Beginning in 1993 and continuing today, we have worked to put into place, piece by piece, the crucial elements of a regime that would undermine and, over some time, eradicate UNITA’s capacity to pursue violently its political objective — an objective on which the people of Angola have adjudicated democratically.
The Security Council resorts to a sanctions regime only in prescribed, restricted circumstances when it has exhausted all other available approaches. Sanctions regimes, by their character, also require careful judgement, in addition to tenacity, to make them work effectively and to keep them on target. The Council has recently done innovative work on sanctions issues, not least in developing mechanisms such as experts’ panels and monitoring mechanisms. This new thinking has breathed a renewed sense of capacity into some intractable cases which had hitherto been regarded as close to the outer edge of our collective capacity, if not beyond it. We have reached this point only recently, as was correctly noted by Minister Miranda in this Chamber last April. However, progress — real progress — on the most difficult cases requires not only good new thinking; it also requires, essentially, good, old-fashioned ingredients, including political will and determination, preparedness to stay the course for as long as it takes and a direct engagement with all involved States, international organizations, agencies and individuals. All these ingredients, new and already familiar, are needed in full measure over the next phase and for as long as it will take in upholding the sanctions regime against UNITA.
A particularly important aspect of the work of the Panel of Experts and the Monitoring Mechanism is the clear evidence of the involvement of the same people, as well as the same organizations and corporations, in two at least, and very probably more, of the major conflicts in Africa with which the Council is presently preoccupied. The Angola case history and the work of the Monitoring Mechanism have directed a sharp, investigative beam into hitherto largely uninspected but highly organized and active networks, driven for the most part by State, commercial or personal greed for profit, regardless of the cost in human lives and misery. This monitoring work, together with the wide publicity the various reports have received, will, if we reiterate our determination and match it with sustained cooperative action, encourage very careful reflection by any States, organizations and individuals, whoever they may be, who might hitherto have considered it safe to seek to derive financial gain from these conflicts or who, at Government level, might be tempted to turn a blind eye towards the now largely identified profiteers, whether within or externally connected into their jurisdictions.
Against this background, it should be noted that the United Nations presently lacks the necessary permanent capacity for following up on the findings of the report of the Panel of Experts and of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism. In this connection, it should also be noted that, for now, the Monitoring Mechanism has been granted a limited extension of its mandate. In the case of UNITA, it will clearly be necessary for the Council to maintain the effectiveness of the sanctions regime until the established objectives of the resolutions concerned are achieved.
The United Nations sanctions regime against UNITA is working. This is the result of sustained efforts over time on the basis of the Security Council’s decisions and, flowing from them, the work of the established Monitoring Mechanism and the cooperation of involved States and relevant organizations. It is now much more difficult and more expensive for UNITA to conduct business with the suppliers of essential materials. Crucially, and largely because of our incremental progress, it is riskier and less attractive for State and commercial suppliers to engage in business with UNITA.
In my role as Chairman I will work in a positive, forward-looking manner to convince all concerned that they can and must end their assistance to UNITA — assistance that is in defiance of the will of the international community. Determination and financial resources will be required to implement the Mechanism’s essential recommendations. However, the challenges that they pose and their cost do not diminish their absolute necessity. An effective, monitored sanctions regime will, over time, remove any international support for politically motivated violence in Angola.
With the Council’s support, the Committee will work closely with all States, international organizations, agencies and individuals to erode systematically UNITA’s remaining military capacity. Our ultimate objective is to bring closer the day when all the people of Angola, 1 million of whom have lost their lives in this 30-year war, will be freed from the threat of violence and will be able to work together in peace to rebuild their country.
I should like to ask Mr. Larraín and other members of the Mechanism to kindly take their seats behind Ambassador Ryan.
The United States would like to welcome Foreign Minister Miranda back to the Security Council for this important meeting.
Today the United States is pleased that Portuguese Ambassador Monteiro will speak for us in his capacity as coordinator of the troika of observer States to the Lusaka Protocol. The United States subscribes fully to the statement that he will make and would like to take this opportunity to thank him for his outstanding service here, both to his country and to this Organization. We wish him well on his next assignment and look forward to welcoming his successor.
At the outset, I would like to welcome here the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, as well as the members of the Mechanism to monitor sanctions against UNITA, in particular its Chairman, Ambassador Juan Larraín. May I also pay tribute to the new Chairman of the Committee on sanctions, the Ambassador of Ireland, to whom I wish every success in his new duties.
France fully agrees with the views that will be expressed in a few moments by the Ambassador of Sweden on behalf of the European Union regarding a conflict that has lasted too long and whose catastrophic humanitarian consequences we have all seen: 300,000 deaths in the past 10 years, 3 million displaced persons today and every day more victims, especially from anti-personnel mines.
As I did last month during the open debate of the Security Council on the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, I would like once again to emphasize the importance that France attaches to the holding of real debates that are transparent and open to all regarding reports that in some way or another make accusations towards States. Since the effectiveness of any sanctions regime depends first and foremost on the determination and capacity of States to implement it, it is essential that each one be able to put forward its views in a constructive dialogue. I welcome the fact that today we are able to have such a discussion on the report of the Mechanism to monitor sanctions against UNITA.
France welcomes the rigorous work done by Ambassador Larraín and his team. They have endeavoured to follow a strict methodology with regard to evidence, cross-referencing information sources and respecting the right of response of protagonists, States, organizations or individuals that have been the subject of accusations. The report also has the major advantage of attempting to describe problems in arms-trafficking and diamond-trafficking linked to sophisticated organized crime networks, comprehensively and in all their complexity, without simplifying or glossing over the difficulties and the responses.
The work of the Monitoring Mechanism shows that violations of sanctions are continuing. It is encouraging, however, to note that the sanctions have, at least in part, achieved results. The military capacity of UNITA has been considerably weakened, and the organization has hardly any territorial bases left in the country itself. Several thousand rebels have given themselves up to the legitimate authorities in order to take part in the process of pacification and national reconstruction and in the implementation of the Bicesse and Lusaka Protocol agreements. There is no doubt that the sanctions-monitoring process has, under the authority of the Committee, yielded results by helping to maintain and to intensify the pressure on Jonas Savimbi and his movement.
We must continue to find concrete means that will help to enhance the effectiveness of measures against UNITA and to dismantle diamond-, oil- and arms-trafficking networks, as well as transport networks and networks for the falsification of documents — be they false identity papers or forged end-user certificates for arms exports. These networks, with the complicity of some and by taking advantage of the weakness of others, continue to fuel the conflict and hold back progress towards a genuine process of national reconciliation and a lasting return to civil peace.
In this context, France attaches particular importance to two of the recommendations of the Monitoring Mechanism.
First, there is a need regularly to update the list of UNITA leaders and their family members to whom States must refuse entry into their territory. In this connection, I welcome the imminent publication of an updated list by the sanctions Committee. This is a necessary instrument for States to be in a position to implement the sanctions effectively.
The second recommendation, which I should like to emphasize, is the importance of the establishment, as soon as possible, of a system — monitored by the Security Council — for the certification of Angolan diamonds, as well as a system for licensing buyers. In the same vein, France supports the establishment of an overall certification system for diamonds and welcomes the encouraging results of the international conference held in Windhoek last week on conflict diamonds. We want to be able to submit a draft convention to the Sixth Committee at the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly next fall.
Above and beyond these two recommendations, France notes with great interest all of the proposals — most of which are extremely relevant — put forward by the Monitoring Mechanism. However, I should like recall the position of France on the question of secondary sanctions. Clearly, it is not enough to highlight sanctions violations; we must also find the proper means to put an end to them. But for this purpose, rather than doling out punishment, we must help States, regional organizations and the other actors involved — such as companies and professional organizations — to implement the measures taken by our Council and to ensure compliance with them.
As my delegation had the opportunity to note previously, during an earlier debate on Angola last April, we believe that only a constructive, instructive and unified approach can, in the long term, ensure the success of sanctions and fulfil their objective of completely isolating UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. Only that approach will allow us to force them to comply with their obligations and their commitments for national reconciliation and a return to peace.
Imposing secondary sanctions against countries that are believed to have violated sanctions is the wrong response to a genuine problem. As we have had the opportunity of stating on several occasions, sanctions, in order to remain relevant and credible and retain their political force, should be used in a limited manner, as provided for by the Charter. They should be limited to cases in which there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. An increase in sanctions regimes would, furthermore, result in practical management problems that would be difficult to resolve.
I should like to conclude this statement by making a comment and putting forward two proposals.
First, there are obvious parallels between the report of the Monitoring Mechanism and that of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, with regard both to the observed sanctions violations and to the recommendations made to remedy them. This similarity is due, inter alia, to the sources that are fuelling the conflict: a rebel movement supplied thanks to arms trafficking, itself fed by revenues from illicit diamond trafficking and supported by sophisticated transport and intermediary networks.
Quite logically, the same weaknesses are apparent in the sanctions provisions regarding organized crime and the merchants of war. We note the same violations. Victor Bout and his company, Air Cess, are at the heart of sanctions-busting operations. No less than seven pages of the report of Ambassador Larraín are devoted to him. This comparison of the two conflicts leads me to put forward two proposals, which we have submitted to the Security Council.
First, we have in mind a plan to create a permanent mechanism for monitoring sanctions and illicit traffic in valuable raw materials involved in conflicts. Such a permanent mechanism would allow us to gather in one location the necessary expertise to cross-reference data systematically and to formulate comprehensive recommendations.
Secondly, and in a more targeted manner, we would propose that we ask States to undertake inquiries and, if need be, to take the appropriate administrative and judicial measures against the activities of merchants of war such as Victor Bout, who are internationally acknowledged to be primarily responsible for sanctions-busting operations.
I join the other members of the Council in welcoming Foreign Minister Miranda of Angola to today’s debate. I also take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Ryan for his excellent presentation on the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism established under resolution 1295 (2000) in relation to the sanctions against UNITA. We look forward to the written addendum to the final report from the Mechanism under its extended mandate, pursuant to resolution 1336 (2001).
I would like also to thank the previous Chair of the resolution 864 (1993) sanctions Committee, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker of Canada, for his contribution towards the issuance of the report. His countryman, the Permanent Representative of Canada before him, was a hard act to follow. However, Ambassador Heinbecker rose to the occasion admirably, and carried on the fine tradition set by Ambassador Robert Fowler in the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1237 (1999) on Angola document S/2000/203, which was the mother of all name-and-shame reports.
The five members of the Mechanism, ably led by its Chairman, Ambassador Juan Larraín, also included Ambassador Lena Sundh, Ms. Christine Gordon, Mr. James Manzou and Mr. Ismaila Seck; they truly deserve our thanks for producing an excellent report. Like those of the recent report (S/2000/1195, annex, enclosure) of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000) on the situation in Sierra Leone, chaired by Mr. Martin Chungong Ayafor — the Ayafor report — the findings in the report of the Mechanism are sobering. Once again, the illicit trade in diamonds was shown to be the cornerstone of the edifice which fuels conflict, this time in Angola. The well structured network that has been set up for this illicit trade in diamonds could almost be admired for its precision and success, were it not for the fact that the creation of that network has been paid for in the blood of the peoples of Angola and of the other countries of the region.
The war in Angola has now entered its fifth decade. In the Mechanism’s report, it was noted that the network of structures used by the União Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)
“in their turn, profit from conflicts, the trade in illicit arms and diamonds, and, not least, … the transport of such illicit merchandise”. (S/2000/1225, annex, enclosure, para. 23)
It was also noted in the report that
“The people and companies involved in these kinds of activities are instrumental in facilitating war and armed conflict”. (Ibid.)
Clearly, the arms and diamonds industries have spawned a very profitable war economy, such that the diamonds industry, which was the resource for the arms, has in turn generated an arms industry to protect the diamonds. It is a stalemate that has a high price: violence for economic control.
In the case of Angola, however, there is some good news: the inroads the Government has made into territory previously held by UNITA — for example Moxico province — together with the effect of the sanctions on the illicit diamond trade, which is the main source for UNITA’s guerrilla activities, have brought about a diminishment of UNITA’s war capacity. Hence the importance of maintaining the sanctions against UNITA.
We are here today to review the recommendations of the Mechanism on the effectiveness of the implementation of the many sanctions against UNITA and to consider appropriate action against the sanctions-busters. The Mechanism’s report acknowledges that the sanctions have curtailed UNITA’s ability to wage war. It also emphasizes the continued need for their imposition, identifies various instances of violations and makes recommendations for the strengthening of the sanctions regime.
A significant part of the report focuses on the circumvention of restrictions on UNITA’s official representation abroad and on travel by its officers. Although a number of Angola’s neighbouring States and West African States have been identified as States involved, the circumvention has been attributed more to the use of front organizations and to the insufficiently updated list of persons subject to restrictions maintained by the sanctions Committee and by the Secretariat. Loopholes in the European Schengen Agreement’s regime have also been identified.
In the case of the diamonds sanctions, modes of circumvention similar to those being used in the Sierra Leone sanctions as described in the Ayafor report appear to have been used to conceal the true origin of diamonds from UNITA mines. These include the potential loopholes found in the Swiss tax-free zones. However, a serious allegation was made in paragraph 181 of the Mechanism’s report: that well known clients of De Beers are knowingly buying rough diamonds from UNITA. This and other questionable methods uncovered by the Mechanism require further investigation as to the validity of the findings.
On the issue of sanctions-busting, the report mentions some familiar names. On the use of aircraft for sanctions-busting, Victor Bout has been identified as a key player, as has Air Cess. The countries named in the report as being the countries of origin for arms exports to UNITA, and those accused of complicity in permitting the forging of end-user certificates for arms imports, should address the issues raised in the report.
What is most disturbing in the Mechanism’s report are the common criminals described in it, namely Victor Bout, Fred Rindel and the European network connection — they are “common” because they appear to be the same individuals named in the Ayafor report for activities linked to the trade in illicit diamonds and arms in relation to Sierra Leone.
If sanctions-busters continue to be “rewarded” and not punished for their acts, the damage will not be limited to the exploitation of the resources of Angola. It will undermine the credibility of the United Nations itself, because the sanctions imposed against UNITA are one of the tools of the Security Council for carrying out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As stated in the conclusions of the Mechanism’s report,
“Peace in Angola will also have an important impact in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Sierra Leone”. (para. 252)
Angola is a country that has a tremendous potential for overcoming the ravages of the conflict with UNITA. It is time to work for genuine and comprehensive peace in Angola.
My delegation joins previous speakers in welcoming the presence among us today of the Foreign Minister of Angola, His Excellency Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, and in thanking the Permanent Representative of Ireland, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), for his presentation of the comprehensive report contained in document S/2000/1225. My delegation’s appreciation goes to Ambassador Juan Larraín and to the other members of the Monitoring Mechanism for the excellent quality of their work. Their activities, and those of the sanctions Committee and of the earlier Panel of Experts, broke new ground in regard to the use of sanctions by the United Nations.
Jamaica welcomes the report of the Mechanism as another step towards the effective implementation of the sanctions against the União Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) aimed at expediting the end of the long-running conflict in Angola.
We are heartened by the observation in the report that UNITA’s procurement of arms and fuel has clearly diminished, due in part to the reluctance of States and individuals to engage in business as usual lest the connection be established between UNITA and themselves. This is a direct result of more effective monitoring of the sanctions and of the strategy of “naming and shaming” to expose sanctions violators. If this is done consistently and with equity, it will prove to be a powerful disincentive for sanctions violators to continue their activities.
In this regard, we reiterate our call for the Security Council to seriously consider the establishment of an ongoing capacity to monitor the implementation of sanctions, as well as to study their unintended consequences.
The Monitoring Mechanism is a good example of what can be accomplished if sanctions are monitored effectively. However, we need to go further. By institutionalizing the monitoring of sanctions, we would ensure that the requisite expertise and methodology are applied for the duration of sanctions regimes: from conception to execution to termination. We would be able to ascertain what has worked in the past and what is likely to work in the future. We could make sanctions regimes more incisive and targeted.
My delegation is supportive of the broad thrust of the recommendations contained in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism relating to arms and military equipment, travel and representation, diamonds and finance, and transport. I wish to comment on some of the recommendations.
We are particularly supportive of the recommendation to implement a certificate of origin scheme for the export of diamonds. There are many countries in the region with fragile economies, heavily dependent on legitimate exports of diamonds, and these can ill afford the dislocation caused by disputes arising from uncertainty as to the source of their diamonds. A certificate of origin scheme would go a long way in ensuring the legitimate source of exported diamonds.
In the same vein, we support the establishment of a licensing system for diamond buyers to complement the certificate of origin scheme. If these measures are adopted simultaneously, it may prove unnecessary to record the characteristics of diamonds from each mine. We recognize that this kind of cataloguing may prove onerous for some countries, and there remains uncertainty about the dependability of the current technology to be employed. We therefore believe that the efficiency of the technology needs to be assured before this method can be used to adjudicate the origin of diamonds.
Arms exporting countries should also strengthen their system pertaining to arms exports, in particular by verifying the authenticity and country of issuance of the relevant documents. The standardization of the format of end-user certificates would greatly assist authorities to authenticate that weapons imported into the region reach the intended buyer. The problem of the proliferation of small arms will be solved only when arms exporting countries agree to the establishment of a database for the export of their weapons, which will allow for greater transparency in the use of small arms.
The countries of the region have recognized the need to work together to prevent the transhipment of weapons through their territory, and we commend them in this regard. The international community may also wish to give full support to the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States moratorium and the Southern African Development Community action plan for the control of light weapons.
The international community cannot be satisfied until UNITA’s ability to wage war is completely degraded. We wish to commend the Government of Angola for the steps it has taken to focus on the economic and social development of the people in the areas under its control. But we recognize that their efforts have been hampered by UNITA’s continued activities in areas where it is still able to operate.
In addition to improving the efficiency of the sanctions on UNITA, we must respond to the pressing humanitarian and developmental needs of the people of Angola. My delegation commends the ongoing work of all humanitarian agencies that have persevered in the face of tremendous difficulties in order to assist the people of Angola. We also commend the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa, Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, for their tireless efforts to bring peace to the people of Angola and for the steps taken to improve relations between the United Nations and the Government of Angola.
In regard to the humanitarian situation, I wish to note that the World Food Programme has emphasized that its operations this year will succeed only in places where the security situation has improved and where targeted beneficiaries have been provided with sufficient arable land and agricultural supports such as tools and seeds. The programme for this year shifts its emphasis from emergency relief to encouraging greater self-reliance among the communities currently dependant on food aid for survival. In this regard, it is clear that the activities of agencies such as the World Food Programme have been made possible by the spin-off effects of the work of the Monitoring Mechanism and its predecessors.
In the final analysis, the measures and recommendations of the Monitoring Mechanism will be effective only if all Member States adhere to the terms of the sanctions regimes. Those who violate sanctions need to realize that by so doing they help to perpetuate violence and uncertainty in the lives of the majority of Angolans and put at risk the ability of the Angolan people to chart their own destiny and to put an end to the 30 years of conflict.
It is extremely good to see you here today, Mr. President. A welcome also goes to the members of the Monitoring Mechanism, and thanks go to Ambassador Ryan for his very useful and comprehensive introduction to the debate.
It is right that the Council should be having this open debate today. The length of the speakers list alone testifies to the growing interest in the situation in Angola both in and outside the Council.
As the representative of Sweden will say later in the debate on behalf of the European Union — a statement that we fully support and subscribe to — we are all anxious to see a lasting peace in Angola and an end to the dire humanitarian and economic situation in the country, which itself has caused horrendous suffering and has contributed to instability in the whole region. More effective sanctions must be an important element of a solution. The pressure on Savimbi must be maintained.
But there is also much to do in terms of development, governance and dialogue among the people of Angola. We very much welcome the initiative taken by the Secretary-General in asking Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, his Special Adviser for Africa, to take a special interest in the situation in Angola. We call on all parties to the conflict to make every effort to assist him in his task. We look forward in particular to Mr. Gambari’s next visit to Luanda later in the year, and we hope he will have a warm, fruitful and open-minded reception.
The remainder of my statement will focus on sanctions and the report of the Monitoring Mechanism. The United Kingdom very much welcomes the report. The Mechanism has worked hard and methodically over the past few months to produce a detailed document. Its findings on continuing violations of the United Nations sanctions against UNITA are extremely disturbing. The United Kingdom greatly welcomes the Mechanism’s endorsement of a concept of a global certification scheme for rough diamonds.
Let me emphasize our strong support for last year’s General Assembly resolution on conflict diamonds, which the United Kingdom co-sponsored, and our commitment to participating fully in international efforts to take this important work forward as a matter of priority. We want to see a simple, workable international framework in place at an early date, one which protects the legitimate diamond trade and enhances its reputation while dealing a deathblow to the illicit trade.
We note the Mechanism’s recommendation that a continuous system of sanctions monitoring should be in place. We would support the creation of a dedicated capacity within the United Nations Secretariat to assist the sanctions committees and the Security Council in their work to ensure maximum effectiveness and implementation of sanctions. If there is to be a permanent monitoring mechanism, as Ambassador Levitte has suggested, it is vital that it should be properly resourced and staffed, with expertise in monitoring, implementation and enforcement. We have put forward proposals for the creation of a database of alleged sanctions violations and a database of experts who can advise the Secretariat on all aspects of sanctions, including the specific areas I have just mentioned.
We also fully support the Mechanism’s recommendations that the sanctions Committee should continually update the list of senior UNITA officials and adult family members. It goes without saying that for this measure to be effective, it will be necessary for the Government of Angola to provide regular information to the Committee, to expand the list and to remove the names of those who appear on the list but have committed themselves to the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.
As others have said, the report usefully identifies a number of individuals and companies involved in sanctions violations, and a number of countries from whose territories such violations are taking place. The United Kingdom will look very seriously at any hint that United Kingdom citizens and companies might be involved in violating sanctions, and will investigate fully where necessary. We would urge other Member States to do the same and to ensure that violation of United Nations sanctions is a criminal offence in their domestic legislation.
We are alarmed by the malign role played by individuals such as Victor Bout in the illicit arms-supply chain. His name, for one, seems to crop up again and again. We call on the Governments of all Member States to ensure that their territory is not being used as a base for the operations of such people. As I have said before around this table, there should be no sanctuary for sanctions-busters.
In conclusion, the United Kingdom welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1336 (2001), extending the Mechanism’s mandate for a further three months. We call on members of the Mechanism to use this time to probe further into all aspects of sanctions-busting. It is important in this context to identify specific instances of possible sanctions violations. The Mechanism must leave no stone unturned to focus the international spotlight on the dark and murky world of sanctions-busting.
I would like to welcome your decision, Mr. President, to include this open debate on the Council’s programme of work. I would also like to join other delegations in welcoming the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda. I would also like to thank Ambassador Richard Ryan of Ireland for presenting the report of the Experts of the Monitoring Mechanism, whose Chairman, Ambassador Juan Larraín, along with three other members of the Mechanism, honour us today with their presence.
An open dialogue on this issue is extremely useful to the Security Council because it gives us a chance to follow up the implementation of sanctions and to hear the views of countries accused in the report, while making all States aware of their responsibility to abide strictly by the sanctions regime under discussion.
The report of the Monitoring Mechanism suggests that the sanctions imposed on UNITA have reduced its capacity to wage war, but it warns us that we must remain alert due to that organization’s great regenerative capacity. The sanctions regime against UNITA has some very unique characteristics: it is eight years old, involves six types of sanctions, is directed against a non-State actor and requires technical and professional monitoring. In the light of the recommendations made by the report of the Monitoring Mechanism, allow me now to make a few comments on each of these characteristics.
First, the fact that the sanctions have been in place for eight years is a telling sign of the rebel group’s ability to survive, of the relative degree of commitment to the regime demonstrated by States, and of Angola’s porous borders. It is sufficient to mention here that the network of arms traffickers and aircraft operators employed by UNITA is a legacy bequeathed by the protagonists of the cold war. Furthermore, a regional economy prospering in the shadow of the conflict has developed in areas bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia.
Secondly, the report gives us broad recommendations on the six types of sanctions, namely, those covering arms, oil, travel by leaders, flights, diamonds and finances. Although we support most of the recommendations, we would like to state explicitly our support for the following recommendations in particular.
Arms-exporting countries should be requested to institute effective controls on their exports to conflict areas, especially those under import moratoriums or Council sanctions.
An international certificate-of-origin system should be established for rough diamonds in order to keep conflict diamonds off the market.
National standards should be developed to impose sanctions on aircraft operators and pilots linked to the illicit transport of arms. This should be based on a list drawn up by the United Nations of firms, people and aircraft involved in that type of activity.
Thirdly, with regard to Angola, sanctions are directed against UNITA, a non-State actor, and not against the Government of Angola. In other words, the threat to international peace and security comes from an armed organization, not a State, that has not complied with the peace agreement it had promised to respect. This sort of situation requires well-oriented working methods within the Council, as well as firm action by States against structures providing political, military, economic and propaganda support to the organization.
With regard to violations, for example, some success has been achieved by the method of publicly “naming and shaming” the perpetrators of violations. The Monitoring Mechanism suggests to the Council the possibility of imposing sanctions on Governments that violate sanctions. We believe that doing so would run the risk of proliferating such measures, operating selectively and politicizing the sanctions regime — something that could affect the credibility of the system itself. However, we would like to hear alternative ideas from other delegations on this matter.
Fourthly and lastly, I would like to make a comment on the technical knowledge required to improve the monitoring of sanctions against UNITA. We believe that the Council took a great step forward with the establishment in 1999 of the Panel of Experts, whose recommendations have supported the work of the sanctions Committee and of the Monitoring Mechanism. We are now considering the need to commission an investigation of UNITA’s financial assets so as to reduce its ability to acquire arms. It is clear that a study of that nature requires technical knowledge, a great deal of experience and advanced technology.
We have two concerns, however. First, such a study runs the risk of leading the Council to gradually depend on outside bodies to monitor the sanctions regime. Secondly, it might reduce States’ responsibility to carry out their own financial investigations and apply penal or administrative sanctions, as necessary. In particular, it could reduce the responsibility of States that are able to provide know-how, experience and advanced technology.
As a result, my delegation supports the proposal to set up a permanent monitoring mechanism for sanctions within the Organization. That would reduce the number of expert groups and increase the pressure to adopt national legislation against the violation of sanctions imposed by the Council.
I should like conclude by saying that it is crucial for States to firmly assume their responsibility for implementing sanctions. Without such cooperation, Council action would be ineffective, and the system would lose its credibility, in Angola as well as in other conflict areas in the world.
We would like to encourage the members of the Monitoring Mechanism to continue their work to promote international peace and help the people of Angola, the main victim of this long conflict. We would like to offer the Chairman of the sanctions Committee, Ambassador Ryan of Ireland, our best wishes for the success of his activities during his forthcoming visit to various African countries.
I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Rwanda in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
I would like to associate myself with the words of welcome to the Minister for External Relations of Angola and with the words of gratitude extended to Ambassador Richard Ryan for the statement he made at the beginning of our discussion.
As one of the observer States for the implementation of the Angola peace process, Russia, like the United States, fully associates itself with the statement to be made today by the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations, Ambassador António Monteiro, on behalf of the troika.
I should like to add briefly that we believe that the current sanctions against UNITA are the most effective instrument available for applying pressure, on behalf of the international community, on the combat wing of UNITA, headed by Savimbi. We are also convinced that peace in Angola can be restored only on the basis of the principles of the Lusaka Protocol. Together with other colleagues, we welcome the productive work carried out by the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA, under the leadership of Ambassador Juan Larraín, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1295 (2000). The report submitted to the Security Council will no doubt help to increase the effectiveness of sanctions against UNITA.
Russia, both in its national capacity and as a member of the troika, will promote concrete steps designed to ensure that all the members of the international community scrupulously observe Security Council sanctions against UNITA. This pertains, first and foremost, to those States neighbouring Angola. We will consistently pursue a policy to strengthen the effectiveness of such a regime and to enhance the United Nations Monitoring Mechanism, which has performed well.
The Chinese delegation welcomes Mr. Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, who is present with us today. We would like to thank the Ambassador of Ireland for his introductory statement in his capacity as Chairman of the sanctions Committee. The Chinese delegation would also like to thank the Monitoring Mechanism for its outstanding work under the leadership of Ambassador Larraín.
The question of Angola has been on our agenda for a long time. The security and humanitarian situation remains grave, and it is seriously affecting peace and stability in the region. UNITA, headed by Savimbi, must bear the primary responsibility for this. China supports the Council in taking effective measures to enhance sanctions against UNITA so as to compel it to return to the peace process as soon as possible.
The Council’s sanctions against UNITA have effectively contained the growth of its military strength, weakened its capacity to wage war and achieved other notable results. At the same time, it should be noted that UNITA, through transnational criminal networks, is still engaged in the illegal trade in diamonds and weapons and in related financial activities, such as money-laundering. Furthermore, UNITA is taking advantage of the loopholes in the regulation mechanisms of certain countries and regions, and it is continuing its activities in violation of the sanctions. In view of this, the Security Council should step up its work, formulate policies and further enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions against UNITA.
The final report of the Monitoring Mechanism provides a very detailed account of its investigation into, and an analysis of, the implementation of the sanctions in the areas of oil, weapons, travel, financial activities and diamonds. It proposes enhanced measures and targeted recommendations. China believes that the Council should seriously study and implement the recommendations contained in the report and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions against UNITA.
In conclusion, we call on all countries to truly implement the relevant resolutions of the Council and actively cooperate with the Monitoring Mechanism.
I should like first of all to welcome the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, who is with us today. I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this very important open meeting today in order to allow Ambassador Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, to present the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA. We would also like to thank Ambassador Ryan for his noteworthy statement, as well as the members of the Monitoring Mechanism for the work that they have accomplished. We congratulate them.
The Monitoring Mechanism concerning Angola has proved to be very useful, and we can now say that the sanctions imposed against UNITA have seriously undermined its ability to wage war on a large scale. This result should encourage us in our resolve to strengthen sanctions against UNITA as well as to strengthen the current sanctions control and monitoring system so that we can obtain better cooperation from States.
The final report that we are considering today covers the second stage of work of the Monitoring Mechanisms on Angola Sanctions and contains recommendations on specific areas on which I wish to comment.
First, my delegation believes that arms-exporting countries should strengthen their arms exports regimes in order to allow for better verification of the authenticity of relevant documentation and the issuing country. We feel that the responsibility for the proliferation and illicit distribution of small arms in Africa also resides with producing and transporting countries.
We support the proposed mechanism to improve the provision of end-user certificates necessary for arms purchases. We also encourage the establishment of a system for rapid information exchange and for verifying the validity of end-user certificates. An exhaustive inventory of firms involved as intermediaries for arms imports and exports would also contribute to improved awareness of those involved in that important aspect of sanctions.
For its part, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) recently renewed its moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa. We reiterate the appeal launched to the international community to support ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in their efforts to control the movement of light weapons. We also believe — as stressed by the ECOWAS ministerial delegation at our meeting of 12 February — that improving air surveillance, so as to give the States of the region the means to control their airspace in order to reduce and curb illicit arms trafficking, should be taken into account.
Secondly, we are in favour of extending the diamond certification system. Countries without the financial and technical resources necessary to implement the certificate of origin scheme should be assisted as soon as possible in establishing it. We also feel that a broader mechanism covering precious objects would have the advantage of allowing us to have a clear strategy with respect to all sanctions-busters. We also support the Kimberley process, the ultimate aim of which is to establish a standardized diamond certification system.
Thirdly, with respect to secondary sanctions against States that violate measures adopted against UNITA, my delegation feels that we can impose sanctions only once we have exhausted all other recourses and means at the Council’s disposal. We welcome the idea of creating a follow-up system for the implementation of sanctions. While waiting to learn more about such a mechanism, we believe that any such system should cooperate fully with regional organizations, without which it will be very difficult to implement and properly follow up the implementation of sanctions. The opinions of regional organizations in this field should be taken into account.
Fourthly, my delegation welcomes the cooperation established between the Monitoring Mechanism and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS and some of its member States, which has allowed us seriously to address the issue of UNITA travel and representation in ECOWAS territory. We strongly encourage the continuation of this cooperation, which was long sought by ECOWAS.
We must keep in mind that UNITA’s financial network remains the weak link in our Mechanism. Like others, my delegation is aware of the critical need to shed light on this issue and is determined to move forward in this area in order to put a definitive end to UNITA’s military capacity. We believe that any approach to this important matter requires the full cooperation of States, especially those possessing the most advanced technology and the technical means necessary to expose UNITA’s funds and financials assets.
I cannot conclude without stressing once again the need for the enhanced cooperation and total support of the United Nations and the international community for the preventive and peace-oriented efforts of the subregional organizations, such as SADC and ECOWAS, which are heavily involved in conflict management and without which it will be very difficult, despite the measures already undertaken, to achieve the peace we all long for.
My delegation joins others in welcoming the Foreign Minister of Angola to this meeting. We also thank Ambassador Ryan for his presentation.
Norway commends the Monitoring Mechanism for its thorough work and welcomes its report and recommendations on improving adherence to the sanctions regime against UNITA. The report is a vital follow-up to the adoption of resolution 1295 (2000). We welcome this opportunity to discuss the report in an open meeting, thus publicly focusing on the issues of arms and diamonds as they relate to the conflict in Angola. Before I go into specifics, allow me to make some general comments.
In Angola, every effort must be made to bring the peace process back on track. This includes supporting the Government’s initiatives to implement the Lusaka Protocol, such as the amnesty law and the efforts to reintegrate former UNITA soldiers into Angolan society. Equally important is support for the various peace initiatives recently taken by the Angolan churches and civil society.
In the past, Jonas Savimbi and UNITA have demonstrated their ability to rebuild their forces. The Monitoring Mechanism describes how Savimbi set up his diamond activities to pay for rearmament. It further describes the importance to UNITA of petroleum and petroleum products and the significance of UNITA’s representation abroad in relation to continued warfare. In light of the report’s conclusion that the sanctions are hurting UNITA’s ability to wage war, the need for continued sanctions is obvious. Obvious, too, is the need for improved implementation of the sanctions regime.
As we see it, finding a solution to the protracted conflict in Angola, as well as in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, represents two of the most important challenges facing the Security Council at present. In this connection, Norway encourages the Government of Angola to play a constructive part in the ongoing and revitalized process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We have carefully studied the recommendations included in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism. First, let me stress the importance of the general responsibility of Member States to implement the obligations laid down in the Security Council resolutions establishing sanctions. It is unfortunate that the United Nations sanctions measures are not fully followed up, as is evident from the present report and the earlier report of the Panel of Experts. Strict compliance with the sanctions by all Member States is needed in order to demonstrate to UNITA that it must fully comply with the Lusaka Protocol.
The illicit trade in arms, drugs or diamonds nurtures devastating conflicts in many parts of the world. The Monitoring Mechanism’s report describes serious cases of illicit trade in diamonds and arms, contrary to the sanctions regime against UNITA. The report provides useful suggestions about how each State may further improve its implementation of the sanctions. These suggestions should be thoroughly considered.
The Government of Angola and other state authorities have taken important steps to gain control of the flux of illicit diamonds. However, more efforts are needed in order to provide increased transparency and accountability in the control of the trade in diamonds. As we recently said during the Council’s open debate on sanctions related to Sierra Leone, Norway supports the idea of establishing a standardized global certification scheme for diamonds as soon as possible and we co-sponsored the General Assembly resolution of 1 December 2000 on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict.
Much remains to be done in order to strengthen the control systems in connection with the export and import of arms. The use of end-user certificates is essential in this regard. It is also important to ensure that documents are of such a quality that they cannot easily be misused or falsified. Close cooperation between Governments is necessary in order to allow for the effective exchange of information needed for verifying the validity of end-user certificates and other documents. A general improvement with regard to the circulation of small arms would help improve the security situation for both the civilian population — including a huge number of internally displaced persons — and humanitarian workers in Angola.
We welcome suggestions from the Southern African Development Community sectoral committees on how to control the movement of petroleum and petroleum products in the region. Specifically, the report has already made a positive contribution by encouraging African countries to comply with the sanctions regime regarding travel and representation by UNITA members.
Norway shares the concern of the Monitoring Mechanism that the Security Council resolutions on sanctions against UNITA are being broken with impunity. Through its recommendations, the report raises the question of imposing secondary sanctions. I will use this opportunity to make some general comments on the issue of secondary sanctions. We believe that we should exert caution with regard to this important but difficult issue. The need for thorough documentation before introducing secondary sanctions would entail complex assessments. Norway is of the opinion that secondary sanctions may only be imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on the grounds that non-compliance with the sanctions regime, either in itself or as part of a State or an entity’s conduct, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
In order to make existing and future sanctions more effective, we find that the recommendation regarding the establishment of a general mechanism for monitoring the implementation of sanctions deserves serious consideration.
In conclusion, I would like to underline the importance of a concrete follow-up of the report and its recommendations. Norway will fully cooperate to this end. In this connection we are also glad that the Mechanism’s mandate has been extended, and we are looking forward to seeing the results of the continued work.
My delegation welcomes the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola as he participates in the Security Council’s meeting. We also would like to thank Ambassador Ryan, Chairman of the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), for the important statement he made earlier today. The report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA is a well-prepared study that sheds light on the network of support for the activities of UNITA. We believe that the report, coupled with the investigation of UNITA’s financial assets, is an important step in the right direction in disclosing the sources fuelling the conflicts in Africa.
We already had an opportunity to provide our views on the report at the meetings of the Angola sanctions Committee, so today I would like to comment on some of the most important points of that document.
My delegation informed the Committee about the visit of the Mechanism, headed by Ambassador Juan Larraín, to Kiev in September last year and expressed the satisfaction of the Government of Ukraine with the results of that visit. It is particularly encouraging that the Chairman of the Mechanism shared our positive assessments and also expressed his satisfaction with the exhaustive information provided by the Ukrainian authorities. As the members of the Mechanism stressed during the meeting in Kiev, the current export control system of Ukraine is an effective one and is consistent with international standards in this area. This, in fact, was confirmed in the report of the Mechanism.
I would especially like to express our satisfaction with the transparent and effective methods of work demonstrated by the Mechanism. Its representatives were able to check with responsible governmental bodies any relevant information and drew their conclusions taking into account the responses received from those concerned. My delegation strongly believes that the same approach should be pursued by any monitoring body to ensure a high level of cooperation with the States concerned and to help them undertake prompt and careful investigations and corrective measures if necessary.
After the visit my Government prepared additional information in response to the query of the Monitoring Mechanism and formally notified the Mechanism as to the results of that investigation.
After providing the additional information, as well as documents on illegal activities of some arms brokers, we are continuing to look into possible links of Ukrainian legal and physical persons with those disclosed by the Mechanism. As soon as we get any substantial data, we will immediately provide the relevant information to the Mechanism. Let me also take this opportunity to provide assurances of the willingness of the Government of Ukraine to undertake most careful investigations into alleged violations of sanctions against UNITA and to cooperate to this end with the Monitoring Mechanism.
Referring to the provisions of the report regarding the lack of familiarity of some Eastern European arms-producing countries with the official documents of the countries concerned, I would like to report that all deliveries of weapons and dual-use goods can be carried out in Ukraine only after the authenticity of end-user certificates is verified and political approval is received from the relevant export control body in the cases of such deliveries to the regions of special concern.
At the same time, we recognize the need to strengthen the existing mechanisms in the arms-importing countries and welcome the proposals to improve them in order to deter and prevent forgeries. Ukraine also sees a need to put in place systems to allow for the speedy exchange of information and verification of the validity of end-user certificates. The recommendation of the Mechanism concerning development of a register of brokers dealing with the import and export of arms also deserves our support.
Considering that UNITA representatives and senior officials abroad play a crucial role in assuring the continued existence and advancement of UNITA’s political and military objectives and in maintaining its financial networks and assets, we believe that this matter should be followed up by the Mechanism with particular attention. We agree that the relevant requirements of Security Council resolution 1127 (1997) regarding travel restrictions on UNITA representatives should be fully implemented, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations under any other international agreements.
As far as the recommendations of the Mechanism on diamonds are concerned, we consider them as useful terms of reference. My delegation recognizes the need for improvements in the field of diamond certification and believes that national certification systems should meet the internationally agreed minimum standards. We note, however, that these issues are also being debated in other forums, and we consider that the relevant recommendations of the report should be reviewed in light of the developments and decisions to be taken within the Kimberly process. At the same time, I wish to stress that preventing the access of UNITA to world diamond markets must remain a priority task.
My delegation is in favour of strengthening control on aircraft operators to prevent them from circumventing sanctions. And I would like to inform the Council that Ukrainian authorities have already adopted legislation regulating the leasing of aircraft for the transport of weapons and military equipment. Apart from that, the legislation provides for criminal and administrative penalties for violations of the established regime of export and transport of weapons.
The de-licensing of pilots could be considered as an appropriate measure to ensure compliance with Security Council sanctions. While the adoption of such measures remains the sovereign prerogative of each Member State, the Security Council has an important role to play in encouraging States to take strong action with respect to sanctions violations.
In conclusion, I wish to reiterate my delegation’s support for the activities of the Monitoring Mechanism in ensuring strict compliance with Security Council measures against UNITA and its readiness to provide any necessary assistance and information to that end.
Let me join previous speakers in welcoming to this meeting Foreign Minister Miranda of Angola. My delegation would like to commend you, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting. This gives us an opportunity to exchange views on the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against UNITA. We thank Ambassador Ryan for his presentation of the report earlier in this meeting. We also want to express our deep appreciation to Ambassador Juan Larraín, Chairman of the Monitoring Mechanism, and the team he leads for their valuable work.
Last April, the Security Council adopted resolution 1295 (2000) on the basis of the recommendations of the report of the Panel of Experts established by Security Council resolution 1237 (1999). The Panel was mandated to investigate violations of the sanctions, identify the violators and propose ways and means to make the sanctions more effective. It left some unfinished business, such as leads not investigated for want of time. In addition, the Monitoring Mechanism was also mandated to investigate any additional leads relating to allegations of violations of the measures and to collect additional relevant information. These tasks were aimed at improving the implementation of the measures imposed against UNITA.
Bangladesh welcomes the report, which is well-structured, with supporting information. We find that the method of work adopted by the Mechanism was suitable to the task. We are particularly happy that a strict evidentiary standard has been employed and that the views of concerned quarters have been reflected, as appropriate.
We have examined the Mechanism’s recommendations with interest. In doing so, we see value in keeping in mind the recommendations of the Panel, as appropriate. Our comments, therefore, will focus on seeing where the Mechanism has advanced the cause.
In the area of the illegal arms trade, the work done on reviewing the export and import procedures of concerned countries, on current practices in the issuance of end-user certificates and on the uncovering of forged ones, as well as the profiling of firms or brokers involved in the export and import of arms, merits our appreciation. The latter, however, remains unfinished and should be a key task for the Mechanism in future. We cannot overemphasize the need for concerned States to strengthen legislation relating to the export and import of arms and to check for forged end-user certificates. The system of issuance of such certificates should be made more secure, and a mechanism should be set up to facilitate the verification of their authenticity by authorities in arms-exporting countries.
The issue of transport naturally arises when discussing illegal arms trafficking. The report vividly brings out the nefarious activities of individuals and the countries that collaborate with them. We support the recommendations relating to tighter controls on aircraft registration procedures and agree that aircraft used in sanctions-busting should be de-registered and their pilots de-licensed. Obviously, enforcement will be up to the concerned Governments.
The report argues that with the loss of secure areas inside Angola, UNITA increasingly has resorted to using its representatives abroad to maintain contact with dealers and to manage its external relations as a whole. The Mechanism found UNITA structures in certain European, Western and southern African countries as well as in the United States. While it is encouraging to note that most such countries have formally ended UNITA representation on their soil, UNITA continues to have a presence in some identified countries, using non-governmental organizations as fronts. Clearly, these actions are designed to circumvent the sanctions, and the States concerned have an obligation to prevent this.
Owing to their long stay in certain countries, some UNITA representatives have acquired nationality or permanent resident status there, along with rights that allow them to continue their activities and travel abroad. One problem identified by the report in this area is a conflict that appears for the member States of the Schengen Agreement — a conflict between their national obligation to allow their nationals free movement across their borders and the international obligation flowing from the relevant Security Council resolutions. We believe that a way must be found out of this situation, in consultation with the concerned States. It has also been reported that travel documents issued by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been used by UNITA representatives. We believe that a regularly updated United Nations list of senior UNITA officials and their adult family members forms the basis for action to be taken by Governments for effective implementation of the sanctions relating to the ban on travel and on UNITA representation abroad.
The people of Angola have for a very long time lived in an unreal world, characterized by a great wealth of natural resources, contrasting with poverty and despair. Angola’s diamonds have bred only suffering for its people and sustained the one of the longest-lasting conflicts in the world. In the report, the Mechanism, inter alia, traces the history of UNITA’s diamond mining and its linkage to different phases of its military capability. The report also establishes details on the rough diamond export mechanisms that UNITA employed and the role that certain neighbours and individual brokers played in it. On the other hand, considerable statistics are provided in its follow-up on the Panel’s work on diamond centres. However, the Mechanism realized that UNITA was able to hide most of its trade from the official statistics maintained in these centres. This necessitates the tracking of the origin of rough diamonds.
The Mechanism suggested that devising a global certificate of origin regime would resolve much of the problem of illicit diamond smuggling and protect the legitimate diamond industry. Supporting measures such as licensing diamond miners and buyers, profiling production from mines and recording the characteristics of diamonds from each mine will be required to settle disputes regarding the origin of diamonds. The Angolan single channel buying system (ASCorp) is a laudable effort towards this end. On the other hand, the standardization of statistics and custom codes by diamond centres will be useful for monitoring the movement of diamonds.
The work of the Mechanism helped to further enhance the Council’s understanding of the ways and means employed by those violating the sanctions. It has become apparent that there remains some unfinished business that the Mechanism will have to address. Notwithstanding the ongoing nature of the process, we believe that it is vitally important to focus on tasks that should help close the loopholes and make the sanctions against UNITA more effective. On this understanding of its remaining tasks, we agreed to the three-month extension of the Mechanism’s mandate. Before doing that, however, we were constrained to raise the issue of fair and equitable representation. We found it difficult to accept that no candidate from Asia was proposed for inclusion in the Panel of Experts or in the Mechanism.
The weakest aspect of the United Nations quest to curb UNITA’s capability to wage war remains the funds and financial network. We believe it is important for the Council to have an insight into these matters in order to ascertain the extent to which they support UNITA’s continued war efforts. Due to the technical nature of the work of tracing UNITA’s assets and financial resources, the Committee agreed to the commissioning of a private firm for a feasibility study.
The report of the study and the need for further work are currently under active consideration in the sanctions Committee with a view to taking a decision. There may be a need to strike a balance between desirability and feasibility. The work of both the Panel and the Mechanism brings to the fore the issue of continuity in monitoring the implementation of sanctions. We welcome that in principle, and we look forward to further consideration of it in the Council.
We believe that no regime of sanctions can be effective unless Member States and all other relevant actors fulfil their obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. While we urge all concerned to act accordingly, the larger goal of bringing back peace and stability to the people of Angola should not be lost sight of. The international community has to guard against the appalling prospect of that people enduring a no-war-no-peace situation for an indefinite period, compounding the humanitarian crisis. Such situations are often left at the doorstep of the international community for resolution. That is why, alongside sanctions, a process of peaceful resolution of disputes and of genuine national reconciliation is what we encourage. The responsibility for this fully rests with the players at the national level. The work of the United Nations and of other humanitarian actors is essentially aimed at facilitating such a process in Angola, not at achieving a military solution.
I would like first of all to thank Ambassador Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, for his presentation of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions (S/2000/1225) this afternoon. We know how seriously Ambassador Ryan has been working since he took over the chairmanship of the Committee on Angola in January this year, along with the other members of his Committee, for the early examination by the Security Council of the report and the recommendations of the Monitoring Mechanism.
In the same breath, I wish to express our thanks to the former Chairman of the Angola Committee, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker of Canada, for his very able stewardship of the Committee last year. We take this opportunity to pay tribute to Ambassador Heinbecker’s predecessor, Ambassador Robert Fowler, whose vision and dedicated work laid the foundation for the important work of the Monitoring Mechanism. We are very pleased to welcome Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, in our midst today.
My delegation has taken careful note of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism, and we fully endorse that report as well as all the recommendations of the Monitoring Mechanism. We are confident that the recommendations will help make a further dent in the capacity of the União Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) to acquire arms and logistics paid for through illegal exploitation of Angolan diamonds in order to wage war against the Angolan people, war which over so many years has inflicted so much misery on the population of Angola, has brought about a humanitarian disaster and has retarded the development process of the country.
We have no doubt that Mr. Jonas Savimbi knows full well that he cannot achieve a military victory in Angola. The reverses he has suffered recently are clear evidence of that. The only alternative open to him if he wishes to be a serious stakeholder in the political life of Angola is to renew his commitment to the Lusaka Protocol and to participate in its implementation.
The fact that Mr. Savimbi persists in waging civil war is a clear indication that his motive is other than to serve the cause of peace and stability and the well-being of the Angolan people. Indeed, it seems that it is the lure of Angola’s diamond resources that principally motivates him.
Mr. Savimbi and UNITA have been a bad influence elsewhere in Africa. The misery the people of Sierra Leone are enduring is also attributed to the lure of diamonds and to the looting of the mineral and other natural resources of their country. We also know of the similar situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore, the destabilizing role of Liberia in Sierra Leone and Guinea has its motivation in taking advantage of conflict diamonds. It is reprehensible indeed that the greed of a few in Africa and elsewhere should cause so much suffering to so many people in the African continent. That cannot be allowed to continue.
The nefarious trade in conflict diamonds involves not only sellers, but buyers as well, in addition to other greedy beneficiaries who supply rebel forces with weapons paid for with blood money from the sale of conflict diamonds. It also involves many unscrupulous elements in the air and sea transport trade. The nexus includes not only private individuals and business persons but, in certain instances, even political leaders who allow their territories to be used as transit points for the movement of illegal arms and fuel to forces of senseless rebellions, all for the personal rewards they reap in the process. This is done with impunity, in violation of sanctions regimes established by the Security Council.
The Monitoring Mechanism, like the panels on Sierra Leone and on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed the leads and came up with very credible conclusions in that regard. We in the Security Council must go beyond the “naming and shaming” system to impose appropriate sanctions against those found guilty of complicity in sanctions-busting.
We strongly support the recommendations on setting up a global certification scheme for the diamond trade, as this would help make clear the difference between legal and illegal diamonds in that trade. We urge weapons exporting countries to further strengthen their control of arms exports in order to prevent their arms from reaching the forces of rebellion and destabilization against legitimate Governments. We also support strong action, as mentioned in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism, against aircraft, ships and persons in the transportation industry involved in busting embargoes on arms shipments. In this regard, in order that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can assume the responsibility for surveillance in the southern African region as proposed by the earlier Panel, we call upon the international community to provide the necessary financial and technical support to SADC without further delay.
Finally, we urge the countries where UNITA elements have sanctuary, and from which they provide support for the sinister designs of UNITA, to exercise stronger control over the activities of such elements so that the use of their territories does not constitute a factor in UNITA’s perpetuation of the sterile conflict in Angola.
We warmly commend the Chairman and the members of the Monitoring Mechanism for all their work and their comprehensive report. My delegation supports France’s proposal for the establishment of a permanent monitoring mechanism for all sanctions regimes and for sanctions-busting in particular. In the meantime, we support the extension of the Mechanism mandate for another three months.
I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Tunisia.
I wish to welcome once again Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, and express our happiness at having him among us, especially since I met him several times before in the context of the excellent bilateral relations between our two countries.
I wish to express my delegation’s appreciation to Ambassador Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, for his commendable efforts to secure effective sanctions against UNITA. We also welcome Ambassador Larraín and the other members of the Monitoring Mechanism, and we commend the efforts Ambassador Larraín is deploying as Chairman of the Monitoring Mechanism established pursuant to resolution 1295 (2000).
The armed conflict in Angola, which has gone on for a long time, is a source of grave concern to the entire international community. We emphasize once again that the responsibility for the continuation of this conflict in Angola lies squarely with UNITA and its leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, who refuses to fulfil his commitments and obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and to comply with Security Council demands. The effective implementation of the sanctions imposed on UNITA is one of the most important means of deterring UNITA and forcing it to desist from threatening peace and security in Angola and the entire region. Indeed, the efforts deployed by the Monitoring Mechanism enriched the first report submitted by the Panel of Experts to the Security Council on 15 March 2000, particularly because of its depth, solid arguments and compelling evidence of sanctions violations. The Monitoring Mechanism, in our view, whose mandate is set forth in relevant Security Council resolutions, supports the objective that the international community is seeking in this regard.
In this regard, we welcome the emphasis placed by the Mechanism on important aspects related to the comprehensive strategy to destroy UNITA supply sources, to limit its movements through its representation abroad and its network of officials and associates, to put an end to its acquisition of illicit arms and to pursue and dismantle all the international networks that, directly or indirectly, support UNITA efforts.
Regarding illicit trade in diamonds, one of the primary sources of funds for the rebel movements in Africa in general and in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular, we welcome the Monitoring Mechanism’s recommendations relative to strengthening the certificate-of-origin system, which could focus on all international dealers in this field, emphasizing not only the secondary channels, which are no less dangerous in this respect, but also the States and the transnational corporations that deal in this commodity and that we think stand to benefit most from the illicit trade in diamonds.
The sensitive nature of the Monitoring Mechanism mandate obliges the Mechanism to carefully analyse and sift the information it receives, especially information related to the imposition of sanctions on States. In this respect, we believe it is essential to fully investigate and consider the principle of premeditation in the violation of sanctions imposed against UNITA. This, in our view, is important, particularly since most of the African countries cited in the report lack adequate means to monitor diamonds and arms in transit to UNITA.
Therefore, even though these countries remain fully committed to abiding by the sanctions imposed against UNITA, they may find themselves technically unequipped to deal with the diamond and weapon smugglers, whose capabilities exceed those of many countries, particularly African countries. It therefore becomes essential that we initiate dialogue with these countries to help them develop their monitoring capabilities so that we can limit UNITA’s activity. This is a collective responsibility and a primary objective.
My delegation expresses its hope that the publication of some elements contained in the report will raise the awareness of the international community so that it will fully comply with the sanctions, implement them effectively and deploy all efforts to close all loopholes and to break supply lines to UNITA, in order to force it to fulfil its commitments.
In conclusion, on behalf of my country, I wish to welcome the Mechanism’s recommendation that the Security Council consider the establishment of a system that will enable the continuation of sanctions monitoring. We also welcome the extension of the mandate of the Mechanism for three more months.
I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.
The next speaker inscribed on my list, whom I welcome once more on behalf of the members of the Security Council, is Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola.
Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on behalf of my Government, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate last month’s President, Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani.
At this meeting, convened to discuss the second report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions established pursuant to resolution 1295 (2000), I wish to congratulate Ambassador Richard Ryan, and through him, the Republic of Ireland, on his election to the chairmanship of the sanctions Committee. We firmly believe that Ambassador Ryan and his team will undertake their mandate with the same commitment, dynamism and political courage as the team led by Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, whose work at the helm of the Committee deserves our appreciation and recognition.
Since their adoption, and despite continued reports of violations, the sanctions against the armed wing of UNITA, led by Mr. Savimbi, have proved to be a fundamental tool to persuade members of that organization to abandon the path of war and embrace the peace accords. The primary impact of the sanctions is clearly reflected in the significant reduction of the military capacity of the rebels. In addition to the internal measures taken by my Government — in particular those measures in the political and military fields with a view to restoring order and State authority throughout our national territory — the sanctions have left no other way out for the military wing led by Mr. Savimbi than to embrace the path of reason. Otherwise, history will judge him.
Events today are very clear to everyone. The number of former rebels joining the efforts for the national reconciliation and reconstruction of Angola is increasing daily. They are adhering to the amnesty law recently passed by the Angolan Parliament, which was initiated by President José Eduardo dos Santos. Accordingly, Angola today is experiencing a climate of greater political, military and economic stability. It has evolved gradually, which permits us to face the future with confidence and optimism.
It is in this context that my Government continues on the path of political and economic reform. It is currently engaged in creating conditions that will permit the next general elections to be held in the second half of the year 2002.
The report of the sanctions Committee submitted for discussion today enjoys the full support of my Government. It brings to light clear evidence of what the Fowler report has already stated and of what members of the Council have denounced and strongly condemned here in this Chamber. It is important that this investigative work continue; and for that reason we support the decision of the Council to extend the mandate of the Mechanism established under resolution 1295 (2000).
Despite the fact that systematic violations of sanctions are declining, some countries and entities continue to challenge the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the armed wing of UNITA and in the interest of peace in Angola and in the entire southern and central African region. We note with particular concern the involvement of the networks of organized crime operating in direct support of rebels in Angola. Given this situation, it is imperative that the Security Council reinforce the sanctions Monitoring Mechanism. It should also adopt concrete measures to combat the scourge of transnational organized crime networks in Africa today.
The United Nations and the international community must apply pressure to persuade the rebels to follow the path of peace, and should also consider strengthening the sanctions, as provided for in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1295 (2000). It is equally important that members of this body consider imposing measures against countries that continue to facilitate propaganda activities in favour of the armed wing of UNITA.
My Government supports completely the recommendations contained in the report and hopes that the members of this body will incorporate these measures in the decision to be taken next April.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to direct a word of appreciation to Ambassador Juan Larraín and his team of Experts for the quality of the report submitted to the Council. It is the product of a painstaking, in-depth and impartial investigation, and will surely contribute to the application of more effective sanctions so that peace and stability can take hold in my country.
On behalf of the members of the Security Council, I should like to thank the Minister for External Relations of the Republic of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda. I would kindly ask him to convey our appreciation to the Government of Angola for its efforts to restore peace and stability in that country.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Burkina Faso. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
Before getting to the point of my statement, I must pay tribute to you, Mr. President, for the seriousness, competence and spirit of self-sacrifice with which you are so honourably carrying out your difficult responsibilities as President of the Security Council. Like your predecessor, Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani, to whom we would like to reiterate our sincere congratulations, you have brought your own style to your mission by essentially giving pride of place to such issues of major interest as the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Western Sahara, as well as to the problem of peace-building and the question of relations between the United Nations and regional organizations. I need not dwell on the quality of relations between your country and mine, Mr. President. Those relations have always been quite excellent.
This meeting of the Security Council is being held to consider the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA. As we know, some of the report’s conclusions concern my country. After reading the report carefully, it did not seem to us absolutely necessary to go into great detail or to indulge in any sort of polemics. We would therefore simply like to take note of the report, as we did with regard to the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone — especially because we feel everything has been said through our various exchanges with the United Nations.
In order to clarify matters for the Council, it may be worth highlighting the fact that my country has worked harmoniously and in close cooperation with the Panel of Experts led by Ambassador Juan Larraín. The team itself can certify that during its two visits to Burkina Faso it carried out its activities with full independence and without any obstruction or hindrance. By working in that way we wanted to show and attest to the fact that our decision to cooperate fully with the United Nations was not taken lightly but was a genuine commitment on our part to help to resolve not only the question of Angola but all other crises that seriously compromise international peace and security.
Furthermore, that commitment has been supported by a series of concrete measures undertaken by the Government of Burkina Faso as a guarantee of its good faith and full readiness to cooperate.
Indeed, immediately after the appearance of the first report on Angola, an inter-ministerial committee was set up by presidential decree to follow up on sanctions against UNITA, with the express mission “to work towards the follow-up and implementation of United Nations sanctions against UNITA”.
Article 1 of the order implementing that decree bans the entry into Burkina Faso of any Angolan nationals who are not on official mission under instruction from the Angolan Government. On the basis of a list of names provided by the United Nations, article 2 of the order prohibits the entry of 83 UNITA officials. Subsequently, again on the basis of a list provided by the United Nations, a further order added six more UNITA officials to the initial list of undesirable persons. This refutes the claims in paragraph 95 of the report. The suggestion that, despite the steps taken by the Government, certain UNITA officials are still in Burkina Faso, remains in the realm of hypothesis.
Other measures that I could mention include the governmental communiqué of 12 March 2000, firmly condemning UNITA; the decree of 27 October 2000 banning, throughout the territory of Burkina Faso, transactions in precious stones and metals that originate in conflict zones; and the creation of a high-level authority to monitor the import and use of arms by the Government of Burkina Faso, which is under the supervision of the United Nations. Furthermore, I have had the opportunity to study the report (S/2000/1195) on Sierra Leone, which also refers to that monitoring mechanism, which was greatly welcomed and hailed as exemplary. I should like to thank those friendly States that have expressed their readiness to help us in its implementation and functioning.
I have undertaken a minor exercise that has led me to form an idea of the number of countries referred to in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism: those that are clearly implicated and those that are referred using the subtle euphemism, “sensitive” countries, of which there are about 40. If we add to that observation the judgement of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone — a judgement that, by analogy, can be equally applied to the case of Angola — it should not be so easy to accuse any particular country. Indeed, in paragraph 165 of the report in S/2000/1195, the experts state that
“Throughout its work, the Panel was struck by the widespread breaking of Security Council sanctions on both weapons and diamonds.”
Consequently, instead of continuing to accuse certain Member States, the Security Council, as the guarantor of international peace, should, with the cooperation of regional and subregional organizations and based on lessons drawn from the two reports, on Sierra Leone and on Angola, organize better monitoring of the traffic in diamonds, arms and related materials. We believe that the suggestions made by the Panel of Experts are worthy of interest.
The Security Council, through resolution 1336 (2001) of 23 January 2001, decided to extend for three months the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism. We are not against this, a priori, but we remain convinced that other investigations are pointless as long as we do not set up a permanent international mechanism that could guarantee continuous monitoring for follow-up of sanctions as decreed by the Security Council. In its final recommendation, the Panel of Experts came to the same conclusion, a point which many speakers have made here.
Burkina Faso fervently hopes that this recommendation will receive the closest attention.
In conclusion, I should like, on behalf of my country and my Government, to pay tribute to the Security Council for its foresight and wisdom in the exercise of its work.
I thank the representative of Burkina Faso for his kind words addressed to me and to my country.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is our former colleague in the Security Council, the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this important meeting on the report of the Monitoring Mechanism on the sanctions against UNITA.
We warmly welcome the return to this Chamber of the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, and I should like to thank him for his earlier comments to us. His presence here is entirely appropriate. At issue is nothing less than the Council’s commitment to the people of Angola. Also at issue is the credibility of the Security Council — indeed, of the United Nations itself — that is, all of us.
The members of the Monitoring Mechanism, under the leadership of Ambassador Larraín, are to be commended for the excellent and detailed report (S/2000/1225) that they submitted to this Council. Theirs is extraordinarily difficult work. They have done it well, with dedication and professionalism, despite the often frustrating disregard for their work by the apparently paralysed United Nations bureaucracy. All of us — this Council and the Organization — are in their debt.
The findings of the Monitoring Mechanism are entirely consistent with those of the Panel of Experts on Angola. Each report corroborates the other, despite having been prepared by separate groups of experts, appointed through different processes.
The report of the Monitoring Mechanism provides welcome reading insofar as it demonstrates that progress is being made and that some Member States — Belgium and Bulgaria, for example — have taken serious steps to correct the deficiencies identified by the Panel of Experts. The Governments of Belgium and Bulgaria, and the other Governments that have made a genuine effort to improve the implementation of the sanctions against UNITA, are to be commended. The purpose of sanctions enforcement monitoring is not to punish, but rather to ensure that the sanctions in question are being applied, that behaviour is being changed and that loopholes are being closed.
We also welcome the Monitoring Mechanism’s conclusion that “there is no doubt that the sanctions… are hurting UNITA’s ability to wage war” (S/2001/1225, para. 250).
The report provides distressing reading, however, insofar as it demonstrates that a small number of Member States have not been respecting the decisions of this Council regarding UNITA. Indeed, it is of particular concern that one Member State was cited not only by both monitoring bodies on Angola, but also by the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone — that is, by three separate, independent groups of experts. Such action by a Member State constitutes a challenge to this Council and to this Organization, and therefore to us all.
In resolution 1295 (2000) of 18 April 2000, which was adopted unanimously, this Council formally expressed
“its readiness … to consider appropriate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in relation to States it determines to have violated the measures” (res. 1295 (2000), para. 5)
against UNITA. An initial decision in this regard was to have been taken by 18 November, but that deadline was missed because of delays in the appointment of the Monitoring Mechanism, which we all remember. It is crucial, in our judgement — both to the credibility of the Council and to the realization of the objectives for which the sanctions were imposed — that this difficult decision be taken soon. In cases where the Council’s decisions are deliberately flouted, the Council must not shrink from an appropriately vigorous response.
In our view, the imposition of secondary sanctions targeting the sanctions-busters is an entirely appropriate option to consider. Sanctions violators are well aware of their responsibilities and of the potential consequences of evading them.
Other options for Council action might include a requirement for States deemed to be in violation of the sanctions to report regularly to the Council on steps taken to comply with them. This could be supplemented by periodic visits to those States by delegations of Council members to ascertain that the remedial steps are adequate and have in fact been taken. The point is that violators should be censured by the international community until they comply with Security Council-imposed and internationally accepted standards of behaviour.
Resolution 1295 (2000) also took up the majority of the recommendations contained in the Panel of Experts’ report and provided a blueprint for further action in each of the areas covered by the sanctions regime. When fully acted upon, these stand to further degrade UNITA’s capacity to wage war by reducing its revenues, increasing its costs and choking off its supply.
Significant progress has been made in some of these areas — for example, on conflict diamonds — under the leadership of South Africa and other southern African producers, with the participation of the United Kingdom and other countries. The diamond industry has taken impressive preliminary measures of its own to reform its operations. These must be consolidated and built upon if the industry is to live up to its promise as a true partner in eliminating conflict diamonds.
Action in other areas is underway, including with regard to the implementation of arms embargoes. There will be a conference of experts convened by Canada and Hungary in the coming months and one by Switzerland on financial sanctions. The appointment by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity of an ad hoc committee to evaluate the implementation of resolution 1295 (2000) is especially welcome. We look forward to the committee’s report, due this month. The Southern African Development Community is also seized at the ministerial level in the implementation of resolution 1295 (2000). That, too, is very welcome.
More remains to be done, by no means in Africa alone. The full implementation of resolution 1295 (2000) should be a priority for the Council. So, too, should be the early implementation of the additional recommendations contained in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism — recommendations that we believe to be both realistic and achievable. The report of the Monitoring Mechanism emphasized new areas requiring Council attention, most notably the roles of arms brokers and air transport companies in sanctions violations.
In the course of our work as Chair of the Angola sanctions Committee for the past two years, the Canadian Government became absolutely convinced that enforcement monitoring is necessary if targeted sanctions are to work. Quite simply, if the Council is not willing to monitor and enforce its sanctions, there is no point in pretending to impose sanctions or in retaining them. The world can recognize fraud when it sees it. “Let’s-pretend” sanctions make the world safe for perpetrators and tarnish the reputation of the United Nations. We therefore welcome the Council’s decision to extend the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism, if only for three months, as evidence of the Council’s intentions. We are grateful to the five members of the Mechanism for agreeing to remain engaged despite the personal inconvenience and sacrifice this may involve.
Existing ad hoc monitoring arrangements are not sustainable over the medium or longer term. We look to the Council to take quick and positive action on the draft resolution before it for the regularization of the Council’s monitoring arrangements. That draft resolution, under the stewardship of France, appears to enjoy widespread support. We are aware of reservations on the part of only three delegations and we appeal to those delegations today to join the majority on this crucial issue.
The monitoring office proposed in the draft resolution would not constitute a supranational entity, untethered to the Security Council and its various sanctions Committees, nor would the proposed office be at risk of evolving into a costly and large new bureaucracy. A small, dedicated office with ongoing contacts with other organizations would suffice. What the small office would do is provide an institutional memory and a centre of expertise. It would be mandated by the Council, which would thereby retain full discretion regarding the renewal or non-renewal of that mandate and would report through the sanctions Committees. The office would enable the monitoring of targeted sanctions to be made more effective and more efficient. It does not make sense to start from scratch each time a monitoring body is decided upon, nor does it make sense to have two or more uncoordinated monitoring bodies operating simultaneously, duplicating each other’s efforts and travelling to the same capitals to talk to the same people about the same perpetrators.
In the meantime, while the proposed monitoring office or alternative means of achieving the same objectives are being discussed, it is essential that the Secretariat continue to improve its ability to support any ad hoc monitoring bodies and to facilitate cooperation between them. It is also important that the Secretariat improve its ability to interact with other relevant bodies. For example, since the visit of my predecessor, Bob Fowler, to Lyon in July 1999, the Security Council has enjoyed exemplary cooperation on the part of Interpol in the area of sanctions monitoring. A single point of contact needs to be established with Interpol and, until the monitoring office can be established, the Secretariat should identify that point.
In the range of possible actions open to it in times of need, the Security Council has few options between issuing well-intended but not necessarily compelling statements and authorizing the use of expensive and risky military force. We believe it to be essential that sanctions be preserved and enhanced as an effective, precise, credible and, above all, available diplomatic tool and as a viable alternative to words or to war. Effectiveness depends on monitoring. We are not talking about unwarranted interference. We are talking about enhancing the United Nations effectiveness.
With respect specifically to Angola, the sanctions’ objective is to foster a durable political settlement to the war by curtailing UNITA’s ability to pursue its objectives through military means and to take through force what was denied to it in 1992 by the voters of Angola. Sanctions on their own cannot end the human catastrophe that has unfolded in Angola through three decades of fighting, but they can help to create the conditions conducive to stopping the war once and for all. To do so, they must be monitored and they must be enforced. We call upon the Council to take the action needed to hasten an end to this horrific civil war. We call upon the Council to give itself the means to monitor its sanctions decisions. History will judge us all by what the Council does.
I would like to extend my thanks for the very gracious comments directed towards us and towards my predecessor by various speakers. I would also like to offer my best wishes here in this public forum to Ambassador Richard Ryan, who is doing an excellent job and who can count on our cooperation.
I thank the representative of Canada for the important and effective role he has played and, before him, Ambassador Bob Fowler, as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Angola.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Swaziland, whom I invite to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
At the outset permit me to express the pleasure of my delegation in seeing the Minister of Angola, Mr. Miranda, in our midst. My delegation joins previous speakers in thanking the President of the Council for convening this important open briefing to discuss the interim report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions established by the Security Council in accordance with its resolution 1295 (2000) regarding violations of sanctions against UNITA — an issue of critical importance to my country and to the entire subregion of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
A little over a year ago, we welcomed with great relief the report of the Council’s sanctions Committee on Angola in document S/2000/83, which gave a detailed account of the situation in Angola and detailed recommendations for addressing the sanctions-busting activities of UNITA. Some of those recommendations in that report have already been implemented, and my delegation commends the Security Council for continuing to vigorously pursue this matter.
It is common knowledge that UNITA and its leader, Savimbi, have constantly refused to abide by the peace initiatives they concluded with the Angolan Government and, instead, have resorted to the use of armed force. As a matter of fact, their continued menace in the country has brought nothing but peril to the Angolan people, leaving the international community with no option but to find other means with which to end the conflict, which remains an obstacle to peace, reconciliation and reconstruction in that country.
Today, this distinguished body is yet again called upon to review further sanction violations by UNITA and its friends. In that regard, and through the President of the Council, we extend our profound appreciation to the Chairman of the sanctions Committee, Ambassador Ryan of Ireland, for the report that further elaborates on the sanctions-busting activities of UNITA. Our thanks also go to the Monitoring Mechanism for maintaining the momentum of pressure in further identifying the illicit activities of UNITA and its collaborators, who seek to further undermine the United Nations sanctions regime.
The current report of the sanctions Committee contained in document S/2000/1225 is indicative of the hard work the Committee is facing, which, as we all are aware, borders on the cooperation of Member States to realize the Committee’s objectives. In this regard, it is essential for each Member State to fully comply with all Security Council resolutions on this issue, including cooperation by those working with UNITA to support the Monitoring Mechanism set up in the terms of resolution 1295 (2000).
We are grateful to those Member States that have adopted new measures against UNITA to strengthen the Monitoring Mechanism. In order to ensure this, SADC, among others, is considering the introduction of mobile radar systems to be deployed in the region for the purpose of detecting illegal flight activities across national borders. We also look forward to the report of the study commissioned by the Monitoring Mechanism to locate and investigate the financial assets of UNITA. To that endeavour, we further appeal to Member States to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Mechanism to ensure that it fulfils its mandate. It is our hope that peace and stability will return in Angola. By the impact they have had so far, the measures are proving to be a success.
Like other countries, the Kingdom of Swaziland believes that strengthening the sanctions regime against UNITA is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a tool to create the necessary conditions for a final political solution to the Angolan question. The international community can only do well by stepping up its support for Angola and thereby ensuring that national reconciliation until nation-building is achieved.
I give the floor now to Ambassador Monteiro, the Permanent Representative of Portugal. I would like to express on behalf of the Council all best wishes for success in his new tasks. I would also like to express our appreciation for his continuous work during the last 10 years as head of the Permanent Mission of his country to the United Nations and for his representation in the Security Council.
It is a pleasure to see you, Mr. President, chairing this meeting. Thank you for your kind words addressed to me and to my delegation. I would like to commend you on your work guiding the Council as it seeks to assist Africa, and I wish you every success. Thank you again for your kind words to me.
Today I am speaking on behalf of the troika of observer States to the Lusaka Protocol: Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States.
We would like to welcome Foreign Minister João Bernardo de Miranda back to the Security Council, where we have come to know him as a valuable interlocutor on the difficult issues that face Angola and Central Africa. Indeed, we are grateful to him for his participation in the Council’s meeting with the Political Committee.
We often hear that the Lusaka Protocol has been rendered irrelevant due to the catastrophic events that plunged Angola back into war in December 1998, a new round of fighting from which the country has yet to emerge. UNITA’s failure to implement the Lusaka Protocol was the primary cause of this renewed fighting, and UNITA’s reversal of this policy must remain a demand of the Security Council.
We regard the Lusaka Protocol as partly implemented, and we believe that the role of the Security Council should be to help complete the process. While it is true that Lusaka may not be completed as originally envisioned, it contains fundamental principles that offer the only viable solution for peace in Angola.
Key Lusaka principles have already been translated into reality. Angola has a multiparty National Assembly, a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, and integrated armed forces. It has the beginnings of an independent media, a gain that we must encourage the Government to nurture and protect, and it has an increasingly vibrant civil society movement. Although we will continue to encourage additional steps, we should also periodically reflect on a decade of both suffering and progress for the people of Angola. We believe that there are concrete gains from the Lusaka and Bicesse eras that need to be maintained and developed, even though the belligerent wing of UNITA has chosen the path of conflict. We are often asked why we maintain the troika when the Lusaka process is — at best — stalled. The answer is that our three countries have spent over a decade working together with the United Nations and the Government of Angola in the search for peace.
We do not offer ourselves as the exclusive interlocutors for peace, but rather we offer ourselves to the Lusaka parties and the international community as three countries with unique perspectives on Angola. We welcome the Government of Angola’s renewal of its commitment to the Lusaka Protocol and call on UNITA to lay down its arms and take the path of peace. We appeal to our partners in the international community to rededicate themselves to the Lusaka Protocol, which we consider to be Angola’s last, best chance for peace.
The troika will continue to support the only principle by which the people of Angola can be delivered from the scourge of war: the demilitarization of political parties, in return for their full freedom to compete for the support of the Angolan people. This means that UNITA — on which the Council has consistently and accurately placed primary responsibility for the current conflict — must demilitarize and irreversibly enter Angola’s political life as a vibrant democratic Party.
The troika welcomes the intent of the Government and parliamentary opposition to hold elections in 2002, which will be an opportunity for all parties to seek a popular mandate through a peaceful and democratic political process. Help from the United Nations and the international community would do much to ensure the success of these overdue elections. We look forward to discussions with Angola’s many partners on how we can collectively support this process.
Sanctions against UNITA are a tool for peace in Angola. Over time, they have increased the difficulty and cost of UNITA’s resupply and contributed to a degradation of its capacity to wage war. Any step we take to improve the implementation of these sanctions contributes to the search for peace in Angola. It is, of course, painfully slow progress for the people of Angola, who continue to suffer, but it is important progress nonetheless.
The Angola sanctions Committee, under Chairmen Fowler, Heinbecker and Ryan, and the Expert Panel, under the leadership of Ambassadors Mollander and Larraín, have done groundbreaking work in the implementation of sanctions. They are innovators whose willingness to explore new methods must be encouraged. At the end of the day, we must focus on outcomes, not process. The outcome we seek is peace in Angola through, inter alia, the improved implementation of sanctions against UNITA.
The troika has actively supported the three packages of United Nations sanctions on UNITA and will continue to do so. At the same time, we, as the troika, believe that neither sanctions nor military action alone can bring Angola the just and lasting peace its people so deeply desire and so richly deserve. While we must work with the Government of Angola and others to improve the implementation of sanctions, our dialogue with Angola goes well beyond these narrow issues.
The troika has consistently maintained that only the practice of good governance, respect for human and civil rights and the delivery of better social and economic conditions to the Angolan people can bring the Angolan conflict to a lasting conclusion. The Troika’s support for sanctions is part of a broader policy to engage the Government of Angola on good governance as its best counter-insurgency tactic.
We note that Under-Secretary-General Gambari will soon travel to Angola, and we look forward to continued discussions with him. We hope that Professor Gambari’s trip will contribute to improved relations between the Government of Angola and the United Nations. We believe that Angola needs the engagement of the United Nations in the difficult search for peace, and it is our hope that the Government of Angola and Professor Gambari will work together in our common cause. As the troika and as individual Member States, we pledge our support to this effort.
Allow me, as this is the last speech that I will be making in the Security Council, to say how much I appreciated working with the Council, when I was a member, in the search for peace in Angola and how much I have enjoyed working with my colleagues in the troika — the delegations of the United States and the Russian Federation. I very much hope that the Security Council, the sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts will be able to help Angola to find lasting peace.
I thank the representative of Portugal for the kind words he addressed to me and to the Tunisian delegation as well as to my colleagues, the members of the Security Council.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Sweden. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia — and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries members of the European Economic Area — Iceland and Liechtenstein — align themselves with this statement.
The armed conflict in Angola has lasted for decades, causing the population horrendous suffering, creating a dire humanitarian and economic situation in the country and contributing to instability in the region. The responsibility for this situation rests primarily with UNITA, under Jonas Savimbi. The European Union demands that UNITA put an immediate end to hostilities, discharge its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and abide by the relevant Security Council resolutions.
The European Union also calls upon the Government of Angola to extend the State administration to areas previously controlled by UNITA in a manner consistent with the principle of democracy, good governance and human rights.
The European Union believes that the United Nations can assist the Government of Angola to achieve those objectives, in particular through the United Nations Office in Angola. The European Union remains deeply committed to a peaceful political solution to the conflict in that country, and we welcome the initiative of the Secretary-General to appoint Mr. Ibrahim Gambari as his Special Adviser. We call upon all parties to the conflict to make every effort to assist him in his task.
The failure of UNITA to accept the 1992 election results and the ensuing breaches by UNITA of the Lusaka Protocol led to the adoption of Security Council resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998). The sanctions against UNITA, which clearly identified that movement as responsible for the continuing war, were adopted unanimously by the Security Council and were welcomed by the international community. The sanctions were specifically targeted to put pressure on the UNITA leadership and to reduce the capacity of UNITA to wage war, while minimizing the effects on the people of Angola. Large-scale humanitarian assistance was provided continuously after the sanctions came into effect. Moreover, the sanctions were imposed only after repeated warnings to UNITA that measures would be taken if the rebel movement failed to join in the efforts to find a lasting, peaceful solution, and they were designed with clear exit strategies.
UNITA has consistently refused to participate constructively in the Angola peace process, and has instead sought ways to inflict suffering upon the Angolan people. In that context, the European Union expresses its concern about information on the continuing use of mines by UNITA. Moreover, UNITA has continued to seek alternative methods to evade United Nations sanctions, thereby enabling itself to pursue military activities and further hindering the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.
The report of the Monitoring Mechanism, while confirming that significant and systematic violations have continued from both within and beyond the region, also indicated that sanctions were restricting the supply routes to UNITA and making imports more costly for the rebel movement.
The European Union welcomes the work of the Panel of Experts and the Monitoring Mechanism, and believes that it has contributed significantly towards strengthening the implementation of the sanctions against UNITA.
The European Union notes that the Mechanism raised the question of UNITA members trying to take advantage of the structures of the Schengen Agreement to circumvent the travel ban imposed by Security Council resolutions 1127 (1997) and 1295 (2000), and recognizes that member States and the Union should study this in order to enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions. The European Union attaches considerable importance to the question of UNITA representation abroad. Its member States have therefore formally ended UNITA representation in their countries and have denied entry into or transit through their countries, as well as suspending the visas or residence permits, of UNITA representatives, in accordance with resolution 1127 (1997).
An important tool in enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions against senior UNITA officials resides in the regular updating and improving of the United Nations list containing the names of those subject to United Nations travel restrictions and financial sanctions. In that respect, the European Union welcomes the input given by the Monitoring Mechanism to the sanctions Committee and looks forward to the early publication of a new list.
On 25 January 2001, the Security Council in an open debate discussed violations of the sanctions against the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. In its statement that day, the European Union noted that systematic and deliberate violations of Security Council resolutions continued to fuel the long and bitter conflict in Sierra Leone. The international community cannot disregard the fact that the actors violating the sanctions in Angola and in Sierra Leone respectively are to a large extent the same. As stated in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA, there are many common elements in terms of arms dealers, diamond dealers and air-transport carriers involved in these conflicts. Thus, these situations must not be seen in isolation, and measures must be taken in a coordinated manner. There is clearly a need to give urgent consideration to the establishment of a global certification scheme for diamonds, and to the harmonization of trade practices such as statistics and customs codes. In that context, the European Union reiterates its full support for last year’s General Assembly resolution 55/56, on conflict diamonds.
The Monitoring Mechanism has made a wide range of important recommendations aimed at addressing violations of sanctions in the areas of arms and military equipment, travel and representation, diamonds and finance, and transport, as well as at maintaining the effectiveness of sanctions. Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 1295 (2000), as well as the Charter of the United Nations, the European Union further takes note of the recommendation that the Council should consider applying sanctions against any Government found to be intentionally and systematically violating them, and it believes that that proposal merits further discussion in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in the context of sanctions regimes in general.
As regards the Monitoring Mechanism itself, the European Union welcomed the extension, on 23 January, of its mandate, to enable it to complete the tasks and the investigations it has undertaken, in consultation with the sanctions Committee. The work of the Mechanism is an important tool for keeping up the pressure and for ensuring continued and strengthened implementation of the sanctions against UNITA. The European Union would like to take this opportunity to express its full support to the new Chairman of the Committee, the Permanent Representative of Ireland, and to welcome the commitment he has shown here today to active pursuit of effectively implemented sanctions against UNITA. We would like also to pay tribute to the important work accomplished under Canada’s chairmanship of the Angola sanctions Committee of the Security Council.
Effective implementation and monitoring of sanctions against UNITA can reduce UNITA’s capacity to prolong the conflict in Angola and can, by extension, enhance the credibility of sanctions regimes and the authority of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. Member States should thus be ready to make available adequate resources for the effective monitoring of sanctions. The European Union supports the ongoing deliberations with the Security Council on this issue, and encourages measures aimed at strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to perform that task effectively. Wholehearted support should be given to monitoring mechanisms, expert panels and sanctions committees, and to any further United Nations initiatives in this regard. Attention should be paid in order to avoid overlap and duplication caused by the simultaneous existence of different panels of experts.
In its conclusions, the Monitoring Mechanism notes that
“Only tight control on the strict compliance with the sanctions will assist in forcing UNITA, at some time, to fully comply with the peace process it has betrayed.” (S/2000/1225, annex, enclosure, para. 251)
The European Union fully concurs with that statement and would like to stress once more its commitment to maintaining strong international pressure on UNITA and its leadership, in particular Jonas Savimbi, through the full implementation by all Member States of United Nations sanctions against UNITA.
The next speaker is the representative of Argentina. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
I wish again to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the very effective way in which you are guiding the work of the Security Council. I also welcome the presence and the contribution of the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda.
I should like to thank Ambassador Richard Ryan of Ireland, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, for his introduction of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions established by resolution 1295 (2000). I would also, through you, like to thank Ambassador Juan Larraín and the team that makes up the Mechanism for their excellent work and for the preparation of this valuable and very sound report.
Less than two years ago, the delegation of the United States put forward an interesting plan which proposed the establishment of a group of experts to study comprehensively the violations of the sanctions regime against UNITA. This idea developed, thanks to a strong impetus from Canada, and resulted in the creation of the first panel for Angola.
That first panel succeeded in answering a number of essential questions: how sanctions were being violated, who was violating them and what measures could be taken to make the sanctions a more effective instrument for peace in Angola.
Following that, and given greater awareness of the problem on the part of the international community, the Monitoring Mechanism has succeeded not only in going into greater depths on these issues, it has gone much further, serving as a genuine monitoring or control mechanism on the implementation of sanctions.
Among the important recommendations made by the Mechanism, we concur on the need for the countries exporting weapons to strengthen their monitoring mechanisms and, whenever necessary, incorporate into end-user certificates monitoring elements that would make it difficult to falsify them. In this regard, we encourage contacts with the Wassenaar Agreement, which should make it possible, on the basis of their experience in the field, to build in useful elements in the area of arms export monitoring.
As far as diamonds are concerned, although significant advances have been made, much remains to be done. The report clearly indicates the existence of lacunae which still make it possible to evade the recently established controls, and consequently enable UNITA to secure the resources it needs to advance its military objectives.
In the light of the important work done by the Mechanism, we feel that it was right to adopt Security Council resolution 1336 (2000), which extends the operation of the Mechanism for three more months. We also regard its paragraph 2 as particularly sound. The policy of “naming and shaming” sanctions-busters is not sufficient. We also need to take specific measures with regard to them.
Recently, the progress made in monitoring and refining the sanctions instrument has been significant. In that regard, we have acknowledged the link between illegal exploitation of natural resources, and in particular of diamonds, and the continued waging of armed conflict. The creation of the panels on Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a clear example of this.
We have placed illegal traffickers on an equal footing, whether they trade in arms or in diamonds. We have agreed on the importance and have acknowledged the benefits of having all sectors involved working together, be it in the area of arms sales or in the diamond area. In the latter sector, the General Assembly last December adopted resolution 55/56 on the international diamond certification regime.
We have launched a serious campaign to heighten the awareness of the international community. We have agreed that sanctions violations should not go unpunished and we have taken actions to ensure that this is not the case. Lastly, we have recognized that monitoring mechanisms are essential if we are to have effective control of sanctions, as an instrument whereby to deter violations and to exert continued pressure on the targets of sanctions.
Consequently, we believe that the Security Council should take the following step: it should establish a monitoring mechanism for all sanctions regimes, one that is comprehensive and semi-permanent. By this means and by the analysis of elements common to the various armed conflicts involved, this new monitoring mechanism will be able to act in an integrated way, leading to more effective monitoring of sanctions and a more rationale use of available resources.
The measures implemented through the Panel and the Monitoring Mechanism have undoubtedly affected UNITA’s military capacity. However, the situation is far from being under control. Long-term monitoring measures are required to avoid a relapse in the situation. Almost a year ago in this Chamber we were asking ourselves what message would be sent by a sanctions regime without effective monitoring, and what consequences might more strict control have had for the peace process in Angola. Let us avoid having to ask ourselves these same questions in a few years’ time.
After more than 25 years of fratricidal conflict, it is clear that there is no military solution to the conflict. We are convinced that there is no dispute that cannot be resolved peacefully and fairly if both parties are inspired by a genuine willingness to talk and to act reasonably and with restraint. We believe that after so much shedding of innocent blood, a final solution to the conflict is an obligation that both parties have towards the Angolan people.
I thank the representative of Argentina for his kind words addressed to me.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Togo. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
Before beginning my statement, I would like to congratulate you wholeheartedly, Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council this month, and to express our full admiration at the masterful way in which you have been steering the work of this body. The impressive role that Tunisia has played through you and your delegation only confirms the good feelings that Togo and its people have for your country, its leaders and its people. All our wishes for success go out to you, Sir.
Allow me also to reiterate to the new members of the Council — Colombia, Ireland, Mauritius, Norway and Singapore — my delegation’s congratulations. We are sure that they will make a significant contribution to the work of the Council during their term. To your predecessor, Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani, I must pay tribute for the ease and excellence with which he was able to carry out his office.
The open debate that the Security Council is holding today to consider the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions occurs within a context of strengthening cooperation between the Security Council and all States, with a view to guaranteeing the effectiveness of the embargo regime, for the following reasons.
In carrying out its mandate the Monitoring Mechanism has to a great extent tried to favour an approach based on research, in cooperation with all parties concerned. That research is aimed at finding adequate ways of strengthening the sanctions regime imposed against UNITA. My delegation welcomes and congratulates the Chairman of the Mechanism, Ambassador Juan Larraín, as well as the members of his team, for that constructive and positive approach, which has brought considerable change to the propensity, which prevailed only a few months ago, to resort to sensationalism and calumny with regard to this question.
We note with satisfaction that the new Chairman of the sanctions Committee for Angola, Ambassador Richard Ryan of Ireland, intends to take up his mandate by opting for a constructive approach conducive to starting a frank and open dialogue with all Governments in order to obtain their steadfast cooperation for effective and stringent respect for the sanctions imposed against UNITA. We wish once again to extend our congratulations to him and to reiterate our firm commitment to assist him in carrying out his duties. My delegation remains convinced that it is through substantive dialogue and seeking ongoing cooperation with all States that the United Nations will be able to achieve effective implementation of the sanctions imposed by the Council, and in particular those against UNITA.
It is against that background that the Government of Togo committed itself fully to cooperate with the Angola sanctions Committee as soon as certain allegations — and not always very innocent ones — drew our attention to this matter. Since deciding, on 22 March 2000, to establish a nine-member inter-ministerial commission of inquiry to carry out an in-depth investigation of the allegations contained in the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1237 (1999), the Government of Togo has continued to take decisive measures aimed at ensuring strict compliance with national legislation and the conformity of that legislation with the standards set out by the Security Council.
Among the measures is the signing and implementation of the following texts. In a ministerial decree of 15 May 2000, the Government of Togo decided to expel from its national territory 56 Angolans, even though they were not on the list of UNITA leaders and adult members of their immediate families targeted by the sanctions. A 17 May 2000 directive by the Ministry for National Defence regarding the security of borders instructed security and customs forces to deny entry into Togo to all individuals referred to in resolution 1127 (1997). Another directive of that Ministry, dated 12 July 2000, imposed a ban on all transit by land, air or sea of military matériel destined for UNITA.
The readiness demonstrated by the Government of Togo and the various measures it has successively adopted have already made it possible to shed light on some of the allegations contained in the report of the Panel of Experts. Those concern, among other things, military matériel allegedly procured by UNITA. The Monitoring Mechanism, which succeeded the Panel of Experts, has established that the 18 end-user certificates that were supposedly remitted by the authorities of my country to UNITA leaders were in fact false documents. This is described in paragraphs 34, 43 and 49 of the report under consideration.
The fact nevertheless remains that we must deplore that arms were sold and transferred on the basis of some of those false end-user certificates. It is therefore important that the necessary support be given to the recommendation of the Monitoring Mechanism to ensure that exports regimes for military matériel and weapons are strengthened by, among other things, establishing a verification system to determine the authenticity of relevant documentation and the actual delivering country. As the Monitoring Mechanism suggests, we should ensure in particular that the form used to issue end-user certificates is standardized and has a degree of security adequate to discourage and prevent their falsification.
Strengthening these monitoring measures would be aimed at ending the practices to which numerous arms merchants resort, with the complicity of greedy individuals whose sole concern is to make exorbitant profits in disregard of established rules and norms. We should also hope that the conclusions and recommendations to be reached by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which is to be held next July, will make it possible to remedy such phenomena. In the same vein, it is important that importing countries define and set up appropriate mechanisms to manage arms imports with a view to favouring an exchange of information between importing and producing countries.
When questioned with regard to the transit of military matériel to Togo, the Government of Togo informed the Monitoring Mechanism about the documented case of the movement of military matériel between the former Zaire and Togo in May 1997, as mentioned in paragraphs 46 and 47 of the final report. That information was confirmed in writing to the Monitoring Mechanism only a week ago.
With regard to the chapter concerning UNITA representation and the travel and place of residence of UNITA leaders and the adult members of their families, the final report seems to cast doubt on the application of the decision by the Government of Togo regarding the expulsion of 56 Angolan nationals residing on its territory. To be more precise, this was a matter of 36 pupils and 2 students residing with 18 members of their families. In this regard, I should like to recall that in my statement to the Council on 15 March 2000 on the occasion of the report of the Panel of Experts, I recognized that the authorities of Togo had in fact authorized the stay in Togo of Angolan children accompanying some of their family members for humanitarian reasons.
Despite the fact that Angolan nationals were not on the list of UNITA leaders and adult members of their families established by the Committee on sanctions, and even though their presence hardly represents any danger to their country or its institutions, the Government of Togo decided on 15 May 2000 to expel them from its national territory. One must agree that this was a painful decision that had to be taken and carried out, although it certainly contravened international humanitarian norms. It is even more intolerable to take note today of doubts regarding the effectiveness of the implementation of that decision.
With regard to the section dealing with the trade in diamonds, and specifically paragraph 188, the final report indicates that South African records of rough diamond imports refer to an import on 12 January 1999 of diamonds weighing 587.89 carats, with a value of $48,500 and originating from the “Presidence du Togo”. Laymen though we are in this area, we nevertheless have difficulty in believing that such transactions would take place without the identity of the seller being revealed, retained and recorded. We do hope, however, that the clarifications required by the Monitoring Mechanism will be provided by the competent South African authorities, and that this will also make it possible to shed light on the real persons behind that operation.
I would like to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that last Tuesday, 20 February 2001, the Minister of Defence of the Togolese Republic, who is present in the Chamber, and I myself held a working meeting lasting about two hours with Ambassador Larraín and three members of his team.
On that occasion, the Monitoring Mechanism was provided with an explanation and additional information about the military matériel in transit at the Niamtougou base on 17 and 18 May 1997 and about that which was confiscated by Togo. Discussions also took place with regard to the question of expelled Angolan nationals. On each of those points, we reiterated our promise to continue to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Mechanism, provided that the Government receives assistance for that purpose.
In that context, the imminent issuance, as announced, of the updated list of UNITA representatives and leaders, as well as the adult members of their families, will no doubt contribute to strengthening cooperation in this area. Likewise, further detailed information from the Angolan Government to help to identify accurately the individuals concerned, would assist enormously. For its part, convinced that it is the victim of improper accusations, and resolved not to allow itself to continue to be used as a scapegoat, the Government of Togo will in due course take appropriate measures to institute proceedings against individuals or companies that, through their misdeeds, endeavour to tarnish Togo’s image.
In conclusion, I should like to reiterate the ardent wish of the Government of Togo for a speedy end to the conflict in Angola. We are prepared to make a vigorous contribution to that end.
Furthermore, this was borne out by the audience that the head of State of Togo gave on 30 January to the Angolan Ambassador to Togo and Nigeria, who, at the end of his 13-year mission, came to bid farewell.
I thank the representative of Togo for his kind words addressed to me and to my delegation.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Bulgaria. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
I am pleased to express my Government’s appreciation for the Council’s decision to hold an open meeting on the situation in Angola in the context of the recently issued report (S/2000/1225) of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions. We welcome the participation of Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, the Minister for External Relations of Angola, in the discussion, and we are confident that such debates can only contribute to the common efforts of the international community to increase the effectiveness of sanctions and bring reconciliation to the war-torn Angolan society.
Allow me, Mr. President, to extend, through you, my warmest congratulations to Ambassador Richard Ryan, Permanent Representative of Ireland, as the newly elected Chairman of the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), and to express my full confidence in his abilities to successfully guide the work and promote the further improvement of the monitoring capacities of that important body. I would also like to pay tribute to his predecessor, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, for his valuable activities.
As pointed out earlier today by the Permanent Representative of Sweden, my delegation aligned itself with the statement made by him on behalf of the European Union and other associated countries. We fully share the positions expressed in that statement on the situation in Angola. That is why it is my intention to elaborate on some specific issues of particular interest to my country.
On behalf of the Bulgarian Government, I would like to welcome the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism as a further step towards ensuring effectiveness of the implementation of the Security Council sanctions against UNITA. We share the view that the Mechanism deployed all necessary efforts to produce an objective, comprehensive and well-substantiated report. We commend the all-inclusive approach taken by the authors, ranging from carefully studying the import and exportation procedures and practices in certain countries, including Bulgaria, to holding extensive discussions with Governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. It is worth mentioning that the spirit of cooperation and interaction established by the Chairman, Ambassador Juan Larraín, and the other members of the Mechanism with all the parties concerned contributed immensely to the positive and concrete results of the Mechanism’s work.
Against this background, we appreciate the overall positive assessment, contained in the Mechanism’s report, of the implementation by the Bulgarian authorities of various sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council, and in particular sanctions established against UNITA. We value the acknowledgement contained in the report that the Bulgarian export control system fully reflects and complies with the guidelines and international standards established by the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Code of Conduct of the European Union.
In the spirit of transparency and openness, the Bulgarian Government rendered full assistance and cooperation to the Chairman and the members of the Monitoring Mechanism during their two visits to Bulgaria in September and December last year. In the course of the productive dialogue continuing throughout the Mechanism’s mandate, the Bulgarian Government provided comprehensive answers to all the enquiries raised, as well as technical and other support to the Mechanism’s members. As a result, relevant conclusions have been drawn and appropriate measures taken by the Bulgarian authorities for the further improvement of the implementation of the Security Council sanctions against UNITA. I would like to assure Council members that, in the case of any Bulgarian national being found guilty of violating those sanctions as a result of the investigations currently undertaken by the competent authorities, he or she will be prosecuted in accordance with the established administrative or criminal law in Bulgaria.
Let me briefly dwell upon the measures recently undertaken or currently being designed by my Government to address some of the recommendations made by the Panel of Experts and those contained in the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism. First, a decree providing for strict implementation of all Angola-related resolutions by the respective Bulgarian authorities, Bulgarian nationals and corporate entities was adopted by the Bulgarian Government on 11 July 2000. Similar governmental decrees were adopted in the year 2000 to ensure compliance with Security Council sanctions against Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. Moreover, as a rule, all Security Council resolutions involving sanctions are now enacted in Bulgaria through specific Government regulations.
Secondly, a comprehensive regulatory mechanism is now being considered by the appropriate authorities to impose strict control on arms export operations in potentially risky markets. These strengthened regulations are aimed at ensuring the systematic implementation and update of all commitments flowing from existing international sanctions and restrictions.
Thirdly, the submission of a delivery verification certificate by the importing party is now a mandatory requirement for each arms transaction to non-embargoed countries in Africa and Asia which are situated in close proximity to risky or embargo-subjected zones.
Fourthly, with regard to permission to import arms and dual-use goods, a stringent verification regime is applied to ensure the proper end use of the imported equipment in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and to prevent any possibility of re-export without authorization from the exporting country. The procedure for permission to export arms requires a check-up on the origin of the equipment.
Fifthly, a register of companies acting as intermediaries and brokers is being put in place to improve control on transnational channels of arms supplies with the aim of preventing any possibility of illegal diversions of arms from their originally established destinations. Those measures have been deemed to reinforce and complement the existing two-tier system of control over foreign arms transactions in Bulgaria, including by providing more safeguards to avert the diversion of weapons to embargoed countries. The model thus established by my country was positively assessed by the Monitoring Mechanism. We believe that there is a further need for all States to consider ways to avoid inconsistencies and gaps in national approaches and that identifying good practices could serve as an additional incentive to that end.
My delegation strongly believes in the need for the establishment of internationally recognized norms and standards in the field of arms transfers. However, this appears to be a challenging goal for the international community. There is a lot to be done to overcome the concerns and reservations of some countries, despite the considerable progress made in recent years in increasing the awareness of Governments and the public about the vital importance of this issue to the prevention of illegal arms flows to conflict areas. We are convinced that full implementation of Security Council sanctions, including those against UNITA, can be achieved only through a synergy of actions at the national, regional and global levels. Improved international cooperation and the coordination of national policies are indispensable for the attainment of this goal.
In concluding, Sir, let me assure you of my Government’s willingness to continue its cooperation with the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies on the monitoring of sanctions against UNITA. We are determined to render all necessary assistance for the implementation of resolution 1336 (2001) of 23 January and to contribute further to the complete fulfilment of the Mechanism’s mandate.
The next speaker is the representative of Brazil. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
Let me express our appreciation for the way in which you, Sir, have been conducting the work of the Council. This open debate is yet another important contribution by Tunisia to the work of the United Nations in the search for peace and stability in Africa.
We warmly welcome the presence of Minister João Bernardo de Miranda.
We recall that two years ago, in February 1999, when Brazil was still a member of the Security Council, the renewal of the United Nations Mission in Angola was considered amidst a deep sentiment of frustration and impatience, both with the violations of the sanctions and with the persistence of war. Today, the situation has improved. UNITA’s capacity to wage war is almost entirely broken and the sanctions have contained its war machinery.
We have always held the view that the full implementation of the sanctions is essential for peace to be fully restored in Angola. The sanctions regime outlaws any financial and logistical support for UNITA and shows that the international community does not accept Savimbi as a credible interlocutor in the peace process.
It is our hope that this meeting will provide the opportunity for the renewal of our commitment to remain vigilant and to strictly implement the measures established by the Security Council. We are sure that, under Ambassador Ryan’s leadership, the sanctions Committee will maintain the path of creativity and innovation inaugurated by Ambassadors Fowler and Heinbecker. We thank Ambassador Ryan for his lucid presentation of the report before us. Brazil is also encouraged to see that the hard work of the Monitoring Mechanism is being effective. We commend Ambassador Larraín and the other members of the Mechanism for their personal dedication.
The sanctions regime can be fully implemented only when no armament can reach UNITA’s hands; when UNITA is prevented from making any financial transaction; when the illegal trade in diamonds is curtailed; and when the ability of UNITA’s representatives to travel and operate abroad is denied. We have gone a long way towards severing the links of UNITA with its sources of material means to continue with the war.
The situation does not invite complacency, however, as the potential still exists for a return to previous levels of breaches of the sanctions. Indeed, the ever-increasing illicit traffic in arms and diamonds worldwide encourages greed in those who might be available to re-supply UNITA with armaments. It is therefore fundamental that the Council remain firm with those who persist in violating the sanctions.
The implementation of the sanctions is no special favour whatsoever to the Government of Angola. It is an institutional responsibility of the Security Council to strive for the fulfilment of the resolutions it has adopted. If strict observation of the sanctions means depriving UNITA of its tools of war, it also means laying the ground for the long-waited stability and prosperity in Angola.
Follow-up is a standing need. Brazil hopes that the Mechanism or any other group mandated with assessing the implementation of the sanctions, can proceed with the full support and cooperation of the international community. Cooperation means taking the allegations and recommendations made by the Mechanism seriously and acting upon them. Member States can also cooperate by assisting in the setting-up of an appropriate air-traffic control system and, as the report puts it, by taking action “through concerted law enforcement”.
We commend those States that have understood the work of the panels and of the Monitoring Mechanism as a motivational anchor — as a lever for action aimed at curbing illicit activities.
Sanctions alone cannot resolve the instability in Angola. The serious humanitarian situation should be addressed on a priority basis. United Nations bodies, in their respective areas of competence, should continue to help the Government of Angola to generate the necessary environment for humanitarian assistance in the field. A comprehensive and long-standing solution to the humanitarian question, however, depends on a political process that leads to the transformation of UNITA into a political party committed to democracy, tolerance and pluralism.
Unfortunately, UNITA’s leadership continues to avoid abidance by its commitments to peace and national reconciliation. The guidelines for achieving peace and stability are contained in the Lusaka Protocol and in the Peace Accords, which have been agreed upon by the parties and rightly upheld by the international community and the Security Council.
Sanctions are not the result of an impromptu decision by the Council. In their background, there is a history of systematic violation of peace agreements and Council resolutions by UNITA. Sanctions will work only if the Council maintains the pressure. The report of the Mechanism challenges the Council to rise to the international community’s expectations. We hope that it will lead to renewed efforts.
The history of sanctions in Angola over the past two years shows that, if there is political will, a lot can be done. The level of success is encouraging indeed. We should proceed with our efforts to transform the sanctions regime in a rare but highly needed example that determined action by the international community can indeed make a difference to the lives of people.
I thank the representative of Brazil for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Romania. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
At the outset, allow me to express my gratitude for the opportunity to address the Security Council once again during your able presidency, Sir, on a topic of great importance for the specific work of this organ of the United Nations.
I would like to welcome Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, the Foreign Minister of Angola, and to express my appreciation for the introductory remarks of Ambassador Ryan in his capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993).
My delegation fully subscribes to the statement delivered by the Permanent Representative of Sweden on behalf of the European Union and associated countries.
At the same time, I would like to take advantage of the relevance of this debate to stress the Romanian Government’s determination to contribute to solving the problems raised by the report of the Monitoring Mechanism. We commend the professional and objective manner in which the experts of the Mechanism conducted their investigations. I will refrain from elaborating on this subject, but allow me to emphasize just a few particular aspects regarding Romania’s position on the arms trade and conflict in Angola.
First, Romania is a committed participant in the discussions, processes and developments regarding the illicit trafficking in small arms, within the framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement, of the European Union — as an associated country — and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Secondly, we are actively involved in improving the internal mechanisms aimed at increasing the efficiency of controlling Romanian exports of arms and related military equipment. In this context, I would like to mention the latest development relevant to our discussion. The National Agency for the Control of Strategic Exports and Ban of Chemical Weapons, the main authority supervising the export of military equipment, has been integrated within the new structure of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This institutional change, with political leverage, will improve coherence, efficiency and effectiveness in controlling arms exports.
Thirdly, we consider that the recommendations of the Mechanism on arms and military equipment, especially in paragraphs 228, 229 and 231 of the report, should be given effect by this Council. It is very important for every Member State to benefit from additional information about third parties involved in order to avoid any undesirable doubts about its commitment in implementing such regimes.
We are engaged in the long-standing efforts to bring peace and stability to every region of the world, including through United Nations peacekeeping missions. Relevant from this perspective is the Romanian participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions in Angola — the United Nations Angola Verification Mission and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola — where the Romanian contingent has always been appreciated for its work in the field. This constructive approach on the ground is consistent with our general political attitude and action vis-à-vis the situation in Angola.
The next speaker is the representative of Mozambique. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
Allow me to begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and on the brilliant manner in which you have conducted the affairs of the Council during the month of February.
I also wish to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani, on his excellent work during the month of January.
We commend your decision to dedicate special attention to African issues during the first two months of this year.
We want to thank Ambassador Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, for his eloquent presentation of the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions.
We thank the members of the Mechanism, under the able leadership of Ambassador Larraín, for their outstanding report and contributions.
I would also like to recognize the presence of Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, and thank him for his comprehensive and lucid intervention.
The persistent refusal of UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, to comply with the Lusaka Protocol and its continued attempts to pursue its political objectives through military means constitute the sole reason for the protracted conflict in Angola. This situation has brought devastating effects to the Angolan people in the social, economic and humanitarian fields. UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, is responsible for the large number of internally displaced persons and for the ensuing problems of food security and reduced access to potable water, health care, education and other basic needs, affecting drastically the efforts for sustainable human development.
It is within this context that we consider the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against UNITA the most appropriate means to force the UNITA of Jonas Savimbi to abide by the Lusaka Protocol. In this regard, we welcome the reports of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions because of its comprehensive and thorough approach to the sanctions on UNITA, with a view to further strengthening them. The reports of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions clearly indicate that sanctions, combined with firm military action by the Government of Angola, have resulted in a substantial reduction of UNITA’s warfare capability. It is therefore necessary to maintain the pressure and continue the process of persuading the rebels to abandon their arms and join the country’s democratic process.
We welcome the recommendations contained in the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola sanctions. We regard them as appropriate for improving the implementation of sanctions imposed against UNITA and making them more effective. We welcome in particular the Mechanism’s recommendation that the Security Council consider applying sanctions against Governments violating sanctions against UNITA. This measure will certainly enhance the credibility of the Security Council and will make a significant contribution to our efforts to reduce UNITA’s ability to wage war.
The effectiveness and efficiency of sanctions against UNITA depend on the continued commitment of the international community in the implementation of the sanctions. They also depend on the introduction of a mechanism to prevent their violation with impunity. In this regard, we call upon all countries to promptly comply with all relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council imposing sanctions against UNITA. The international community must remain vigilant and exercise tight control on the implementation of the sanctions, assisting in forcing UNITA to lay down its arms and fully comply with the Angolan peace process.
The Angolan Government has continuously made efforts to bring lasting peace to the people of Angola and achieve national reconciliation. In this regard, we welcome the initiative by President José Eduardo dos Santos of offering amnesty for crimes committed during the conflict as a measure to encourage the rebels to abandon the war and take the road of peace.
We also welcome the reaffirmation by the Angolan Government of the validity of the Bicesse Accords and of the Lusaka Protocol as the political and juridical framework for the attainment of a lasting peace in Angola.
The Tripartite Summit of Angola, Namibia and Zambia, held on 10 February 2001 in Luanda, is also a commendable initiative by President José Eduardo dos Santos. This is a clear demonstration of the efforts of the leaders of the region towards bringing peace, stability and security to the subregion.
The efforts towards economic integration in southern Africa will greatly benefit from an atmosphere of peace and stability in Angola. To this end, Mozambique stands ready to continue to give its full support to the genuine efforts by the Angolan Government to bring peace and stability to its country, both on a bilateral basis and within the regional context. The Security Council, the United Nations and the international community as a whole must support the continued determination of the Angolan Government to bring about the peace, stability and prosperity that its people deserve.
It is high time for all of us to unite and fight against organized crime, including the traffic in blood diamonds and small arms, which are fuelling conflicts in many parts of the world.
We believe that the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and the Conference itself, will greatly contribute to meaningful action towards curbing access to these arms by armed groups such as Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA.
Finally, we would like to commend the continued efforts and dedication of the Secretary-General and Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari to the Angolan issue. We equally commend Mr. Mussagy Jeichande, the Secretary-General’s Representative and head of the United Nations Office in Angola, for his work in the ground, in consultation with the Angolan authorities. It is our sincere hope that the focus on Africa in the agenda of the Security Council will be translated into concrete action in support of the continent’s efforts to restore peace and stability in the region.
I thank the representative of Mozambique for the kind words he addressed to me.
The next speaker on my list is the representative of Namibia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting to discuss the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions. I wish to acknowledge the presence of Angola’s Minister of External Relations, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda.
I wish also to thank Ambassador Larraín and his team for his comprehensive and informative report on the sanctions regime against UNITA, and Ambassador Richard Ryan for the impressive introduction. I further wish to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Ryan’s predecessor, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, for his extraordinary efforts and commitment to making the sanctions against UNITA successful.
The report before us provides us with an excellent insight into the status of the investigations and the continuing activities of the Mechanism in this regard. It also sketches a detailed picture for us to understand the complex and comprehensive strategies that UNITA employs to continue its brutal war against the Angolan people.
The report contains some positive information vis-à-vis the implementation of the sanctions against UNITA. However, some major incidents of sanctions-busting are also reported. Of deep concern is the fact that some countries still provide large-scale assistance to UNITA, its officials and their families. This is a grave situation, and appropriate action should be considered.
While we are mindful of the stated difficulties that some countries experience in fully enforcing sanctions against UNITA, such as constitutional reasons or binding international conventions, my delegation is nevertheless glad to see in the report that UNITA’s room for manoeuvring abroad has somewhat diminished.
With regard to the sale of diamonds, my delegation is gratified that the military upper hand of the Angolan Government against UNITA has seriously hampered its production of diamonds. The international community should now ensure that UNITA is prevented from selling its stockpiles. In addition, the countries involved should, as stated by the Mechanism, prevent UNITA’s commercial representatives from illegally operating from their territories to help disrupt UNITA’s external sales programme.
The report furthermore highlights the fact that the tracing of UNITA assets has been limited, due partly to the difficulty of tracing financial operations, particularly when money is moved electronically. However, we remain convinced that this is an error that should not be neglected, and that all possible options should be pursued to discover and impound UNITA’s financial resources. In this regard, we note that the Basel Convention on Money Laundering could be of assistance.
My delegation strongly supports all efforts aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of the sanctions against UNITA. We therefore support the recommendations and conclusions drawn by the Monitoring Mechanism. My Government is studying these recommendations with a view to implementing those applicable as soon as possible.
I wish to confirm the information in paragraph 69 of the report regarding the discussions between Namibia, in its capacity as the current Chairman of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Mechanism. SADC recognizes the important role that it can play in strengthening the sanctions and in particular with regard to the implementation of some measures recommended to it under resolution 1295 (2000). These measures include the establishment of an information exchange mechanism involving petroleum companies and Governments, the introduction of measures to strengthen air-traffic-control systems in the region, and the establishment of monitoring activities in the border areas adjacent to Angola.
In this regard, President Nujoma has written to the Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) indicating that he has proposed to the other SADC leaders that these matters be discussed at the forthcoming SADC extraordinary summit, scheduled for 9 March 2001.
However, in all these endeavours, paragraph 243 of the report remains pertinent, where it is stated that the international community should consider assisting Member States, where necessary, in acquiring equipment for the control of national and regional air spaces.
In conclusion, the Mechanism correctly expressed the fear that any vacuum or discontinuity in the exercise of vigilance by the international community will affect the aims of the Security Council sanctions against UNITA. We therefore welcome the adoption of resolution 1336 (2001) on 23 January, which extended the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism for a period of three months. We look forward to receiving the addendum to this report.
The next speaker on my list is the representative of Zimbabwe. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
In the last few days, Sir, my delegation has had an opportunity to recognize your election to the presidency and to express our confidence in your leadership. We have likewise recognized the work of your predecessor, Ambassador Mahbubani.
I would like, in the same vein, to congratulate the members of the Monitoring Mechanism on a job well done. Let me recognize the presence here of His Excellency Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, which is testimony to the importance of the work that is before the Council, and we welcome him.
Having participated in the April 2000 debate on the groundbreaking report (S/2000/203) of the Panel of Experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against the União Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), and having also been a sponsor of General Assembly resolution 55/56 on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts, which was adopted by the Assembly on 1 December 2000, my delegation has requested the floor to remind members of the Council that the days of the no-questions-asked diamond-buying policy should be over.
During the debate on the report of the Panel of Experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA, my delegation submitted to the Security Council that failure to account for the presence of economic agendas in conflicts had at times seriously undermined international efforts to consolidate fragile peace agreements. The report before the Council today in document S/2000/1225 has confirmed that the true cause of UNITA’s war against the Angolan people is not so much the loud discourse of grievance we hear from Savimbi’s spin doctors, but the silent force of greed.
In the words of one scholar,
“conflict can create war economies, often in the regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members of armed groups can benefit from looting…. [U]nder these circumstances, ending civil wars becomes difficult. Winning may not be desirable: the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes”.
In the case of Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the abundance of natural resources such as diamonds has become a curse. It is the availability of diamonds exported as a primary commodity that spawns violent conflict, because it provides incentives for extra-legal groups to be formed on the basis of capturing loot which sustains their activities.
Let me remind members that a primary commodity such as diamonds offers several advantages to rebel movements such as UNITA. Since they are a generic product, their origin can easily be concealed, and their marketing does not require complicated processes as is the case for manufactured goods. It is in that context that the importance of this report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions becomes apparent.
My delegation urges Member States to consider implementing the certificate of origin scheme with the minimum of delay, as recommended in the report. We further call upon the international community to provide technical assistance to those countries that lack the resources to implement a certificate regime.
It is commonly said that every diamond has its own “DNA”, and in that regard we call upon the relevant ministries of diamond-producing States to profile production from their mines by recording the characteristics of diamonds from each mine in detail. Such a record would enable parcels of diamonds whose origin is disputed to be checked with available data with a greater degree of certainty than is currently the case.
The section of the report on measures aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of sanctions mentions that certain countries have established structures and mechanisms for the formulation of a proper policy to enforce and/or monitor implementation. Some of the structures identified include the establishment of task forces. The region of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one such region, as has just been said by the representative of the SADC Chairman. It has always recognized that the successful implementation of Security Council sanctions against UNITA depends on the capacity and commitment of Member States to deny UNITA the use of the subregion’s land routes, airports and airspace.
In recognition of this fact, at the nineteenth session of the SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 11 to 14 November 1997, an ad hoc committee on cross-border crime was set up under the chairmanship of Zimbabwe. The committee membership initially included Angola, Malawi, Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe; it derived its existence from paragraph 4 of the report of the State security sub-committee of the nineteenth session of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, which — besides elucidating a range of regional security problems that included weapons smuggling and the illicit provision of logistical supplies to UNITA made possible by loopholes in the border-control mechanisms of member States — recommended the creation of an interdepartmental liaison mechanism within member States to ensure effective sharing of information between civil aviation authorities, immigration services, intelligence services and defence and police forces, and the establishment of a mechanism of regional liaison.
The ad hoc committee of ministers met in Harare on 19 November 1997 and set up a task force comprising personnel from civil aviation, immigration and intelligence services, armies and police forces. The terms of reference of the task force were defined as the following: to monitor all suspicious aircraft traversing the subregion’s airspace; to monitor all border posts and check for material and goods likely to be destined for UNITA and UNITA-controlled areas; to investigate all allegations of UNITA activities in the subregion, including companies and individuals providing logistical support to UNITA; to investigate all allegations of violations of Angolan airspace; to place all airports and airstrips located in the subregion under 24-hour surveillance; and to ensure that sanctions imposed on UNITA by the United Nations were not violated by member States.
The task force recommended the establishment of national information centres that would coordinate the collection of data in accordance with the task force’s terms of reference. The task force also recommended that a regional information centre, which would process information received from the national information centres, be established in Harare. The regional information centre was to submit monthly status reports to the national information centres. That elaborate network has assisted SADC countries greatly to reduce UNITA’s capacity to violate sanctions.
Our experience in SADC has shown that the sharing among member States of both strategic and tactical information is an effective method of reducing UNITA’s war-making capacity. Zimbabwe, as coordinator of the regional information centre, submitted detailed operational procedures for the control and monitoring of flights within the SADC region which, when put to use by member States, resulted in the interception of some cargo planes that supplied UNITA with weapons, for example Johannes Pereira’s Inter State Airways, whose flights were successfully intercepted. From information gathered by the national information centres, the regional information centre compiled a comprehensive dossier of companies and individuals that engaged in commercial transactions with UNITA. All that information was made available to the Panel of Experts when they visited Harare.
Experience has also taught us that resources are critical if operational information and intelligence are to be timeously disseminated. Because of the security nature of some of the information that is transmitted between the national information centres and the regional information centre, without secure communication the immediate relevance of some of that information could be lost. While SADC is ready to implement the recommendations in the report, we appeal to the international community to make available the requisite resources, including communication and other monitoring equipment, so that we can resuscitate and improve on the infrastructure that we have already established.
Finally, my delegation wishes to reiterate its support for the sterling work accomplished by the Mechanism in producing a report that identifies — “names and shames” — countries, companies and individuals which, against all international norms, continue to do business with UNITA. Although the dependence of UNITA on international trade networks renders its illicit trade vulnerable to a concerted application of appropriate compliance and regulatory measures, it is the considered view of my delegation that that matter should be treated as more than a specific policing problem, that the tracking and the interdiction of illegal flights and the installation of customs monitors is good as long as it is one of the means of addressing the problem.
I thank the representative of Zimbabwe for the kind words he addressed to me.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Rwanda. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
I would like to associate myself with earlier speakers in performing two very pleasant tasks. First, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the way you have conducted the affairs of this Council throughout this month. My congratulations also go to your predecessor, Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani of Singapore. The second pleasant task is to welcome Minister Miranda of Angola to New York. At the same time, I wish to assure the Council that the Government and the people of Rwanda have sympathized with the Government and the people of Angola throughout the war it has been waging against Savimbi and UNITA, the disastrous effects of which on daily life are still being felt to this day.
We welcome the report introduced by Ambassador Richard Ryan. We commend and congratulate him. We hope the expected results will be achieved: that the war machine that continues to ravage Angola, a friendly and brotherly country, will be stopped.
Rwanda is mentioned in paragraph 58, paragraph 186, paragraph 191, paragraph 192, paragraph 193 and paragraph 213 of the report. In paragraph 213, there is a tangible and verifiable fact. The other paragraphs, however, are partially or fully speculative. This is a pity, but, nonetheless, we will not withdraw our support for the report because it is correct. We accept and support its conclusions and recommendations, and we endorse it with a view to assisting the Committee and the Monitoring Mechanism to continue their work.
However, I believe it is important to make a few points to justify what I have said. In paragraph 58, for example, there is a reference to “contradictory explanations”. It is not clear as to whom or what the contradictions are between. The paragraph goes on to say that the Mechanism “is of the opinion”. It may be “of the opinion”, but opinion is not fact. There are many things that need to be corrected in the drafting of this report.
Rwanda reiterates what it said to the Council last year. Because of the need to withdraw our troops — here I refer again to paragraph 58 — it is true that we used Angolan territory, with the permission of the Angolan authorities, and the mission was a short-term one and very successful. At no stage in that operation was there any question of contacts with Savimbi or with UNITA, and Rwanda does not envisage any such contact in the future.
We hope — and this also applies to paragraph 191 — that corrections can be made to these paragraphs so that Rwanda can be satisfied that these are factual. If there is an initiative under way or planned concerning the provenance of diamonds, I must say immediately that this project is not on the list of projects of our country — and we have many. This project does not exist yet, but even if it did, Rwandan law does not defend the creation of that type of project.
Another fact that is important is that the reference to Mr. Victor Bout as having an operational base in Kigali is absolutely wrong. Mr. Bout never resided in Rwanda. We have passed on the information we have received to the effect that Mr. Bout is established somewhere in the Middle East. Rwandan immigration authorities are instructed to look out for any passage of Mr. Bout through Rwanda, and should he come to Rwanda at any stage, he will be arrested, like any UNITA member. This is very clear and is known.
We are here to implement the Security Council resolutions related to sanctions against UNITA, and we reaffirm our commitment to this. Rwanda will ensure that these war diamonds, wherever they come from, will not be dealt with or processed in Rwanda or by Rwandans. Paragraphs 191, 192 and 193 have nothing to do with any Rwandan traffickers. We know who these traffickers are. I wish to confirm that Rwanda has taken the decision not to cooperate with anyone believed or found to be friends of UNITA.
On this note, we would like to wish every success to the monitoring exercise and the sanctions Committee in their work. If they wish to improve the report, we would be very happy to assist them. Rwanda is ready to work together with the Monitoring Mechanism to ensure that the Angolan people finally find peace.
I thank the representative of Rwanda for the kind words he addressed to me.
It pleases me to give the floor to Mr. Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, who has asked to speak again.
I would like to thank you once again, Mr. President, for giving me the floor. I have asked to take the floor to make a brief statement, namely, to thank all the members of the Council and those who have spoken here. I would also like to express the gratitude of my Government for the quality of the debate and in particular for the reference repeated by all speakers to the need to increasingly isolate Mr. Savimbi in order to prevent him from continuing to wage war against his own people. At any rate, what we have seen here is a demonstration of solidarity. We hope that future debates will be even more enriching. Above all, the Council should contemplate appropriate measures — so-called secondary measures — against countries or entities that continue to violate the sanctions imposed against UNITA.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to shed some light on the statement just made by the representative of Rwanda with regard to what he referred to as a consultation between the Governments of Angola and Rwanda at the time of the transit of their troops through Angolan territory. This does not correspond to the truth. During the westward retreat of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory — which came after, shall we say, the pursuit carried out by our authorities on Congolese territory some three years ago — those troops were in fact in the north of our country, in territory under UNITA control. That transit was carried out with UNITA coordination. There was never any contact between Rwanda and Angola with regard to the transit of Rwandan troops through the territory of Angola.
I very much apologize for having once again imposed on the members of the Council, but it was necessary to shed some light on this matter.
Finally, I would like to give the floor to Mr. Richard Ryan, Chairman of the sanctions Committee for Angola, so that he may share any comments he may have about this dialogue.
I have listened with great care to the interventions of the members of the Council and the large number of other speakers. It is very clear from the debate that the issue and the effectiveness of sanctions against UNITA continue to be of great concern to Member States. I know that Ambassador Larraín and the members of the Monitoring Mechanism have also listened carefully to the debate and that they will wish to draw on it in discussions with the sanctions Committee. In the interim, the members of the Mechanism will now undertake some important visits to Angola and to some other concerned States and organizations. An essential part of my own responsibility will be to follow up on the report of the Monitoring Mechanism with involved States, organizations and individuals. In that regard, I will shortly visit a number of countries, including Angola.
I feel able, very briefly, to draw four clear conclusions from today’s extensive debate.
First, the Security Council and the wider United Nations membership have reiterated their determination under the resolutions concerned to erode and eradicate international support for UNITA’s capacity to use violence for political objectives against the people of Angola.
Secondly, there is overwhelming support for maintaining the sanctions regime and the necessary mechanisms targeted against UNITA for as long as necessary, and pending further consideration of a permanent monitoring mechanism referred to by various delegations today.
Thirdly, the message of the membership to the Monitoring Mechanism itself is clearly that it is on the right track and that it should continue its work with continued determination and diligence.
Fourthly, I feel empowered by today’s debate to convey a clear message to all concerned that the Security Council and the United Nations system and associated systems will maintain their vigilance, their expectations of all concerned States and parties, and their determination that support for UNITA’s violent agenda must be ended definitively. Together we intend that what must be done will be done to bring peace to all the people of Angola. As Chairman of the sanctions Committee, I will take this clear message from today’s open debate in the Security Council.
I thank Ambassador Ryan for his clarifications. I would like to extend our thanks to him and to members of his team for the efforts they have been making in this regard to enhance the sanctions regime in Angola. As most speakers said, those sanctions are not meant to punish; but, rather, to force violators to respond to international law and Security Council resolutions.
I would also like to thank again the Minister for External Relations for coming to the meeting today to listen to the consensus among the members of the Council in support of peace efforts in Angola. I wish the State and Government of Angola every success in their efforts, particularly with regard to reconstruction and development.
There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.
The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.