Security Council meeting 5994

The President

I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Afghanistan, Germany, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Pakistan, in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The President

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Kai Eide, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

It is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2008/617, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Kai Eide, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Eide (Special Representative of the Secretary-General)

When I briefed the Council in July (see S/PV.5930), I spoke about the outcome of the Paris Conference in support of Afghanistan, which was a success in several ways. The Conference provided $21 billion for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and it also gave us a road map for how to proceed together with the Afghan leadership; the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the Paris Declaration. So there was a road map then, and the road map remains.

Since then, we have, I believe, been distracted from the commitments undertaken in Paris. The main reason for that is the deteriorating security situation, as we have seen over the last few months. In July and August, we witnessed the highest number of security incidents since 2002. It was an increase of up to 40 per cent, compared to the same months of July and August last year.

In the report before the Council (S/2008/617), three characteristics of the security situation have been highlighted. First, the influence of the insurgency has spread beyond the traditional areas in the south and the east and has extended to provinces around Kabul. Secondly, there has been an increase in asymmetric attacks, some of them very sophisticated, which has contributed to an increase in civilian casualties. And thirdly, there were more and sometimes deadly attacks against aid-related and humanitarian targets, including deadly attacks against non-governmental organization and United Nations personnel.

During September, the month of Ramadan, we saw a decrease in the number of incidents, as we had expected. On International Peace Day, on 21 September, we saw that hostilities were almost brought to a halt, including by the Taliban, following an appeal by the United Nations. That allowed us to vaccinate 1.6 million children against polio, which was a major achievement.

However, we are now seeing a new increase in the number of incidents, and we must expect that the number of incidents will continue to climb further over the next weeks, with at least four good weather weeks remaining after the end of Ramadan. We should be prepared for a situation where we do not experience the same winter lull -- the same reduction in the level of hostilities -- that we have experienced in past winters. So the situation is challenging, and it is indeed complex.

I would nevertheless caution against the kind of gloom and doom statements of which we have heard so many recently: many of them really go too far. Also, some of them come from people who have scarcely put their feet on the ground in Afghanistan. There are positive developments that we must take advantage of, and these positive developments affect some of the critical elements in our common agenda to solve the conflict. Let me mention three of them in particular.

First, the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has improved. Instead of acrimonious statements, we now see a more constructive working relationship emerging. Following President Karzai's attendance at the swearing-in ceremony of President Zardari, the political dialogue is expanding, and it is based on an understanding that a threat from the insurgency is a shared threat. In addition to this political dialogue, I hope that the jirga process of last year will soon get under way again. It is a useful instrument for helping to address challenges that the two countries have in common. The international community must strengthen this improved relationship in a wise, thoughtful and generous way.

The second development is the changes made by President Karzai in his Government last Saturday. I know from numerous conversations with the President that those changes reflect a desire to better address some of the key areas that have been identified in the ANDS and the Paris Declaration as our common priorities. I am first and foremost thinking of the strengthening of the Ministry of Interior and of the Afghan police, the latter of which lags seriously behind the army. This could affect security on the ground, the respect for rule of law, the fight against corruption and our counter-narcotics and border control efforts. The implications could thus be very significant. I know that the new Minister, who has previously successfully built two ministries, is dedicated to doing his utmost and will approach this task also with great determination.

The changes in the Ministry of Agriculture must also be used to inject new energy into boosting agricultural production and to help us to avoid serious and frequent shortages of food and stimulate economic growth. It is an area that we, the international community, have neglected for too long; and the price of such neglect is too high. Over the last few days, the United Nations has already been working with the Afghan Government and key partners on the ground to determine how we can use this opportunity to address our common priorities.

The third positive development is that the latest statistics for drug production show a mixed picture, but with some important positive trends. The overall production area has been reduced by 19 per cent, and the number of poppy-free provinces has gone from 11 two years ago to 13 last year and to 18 this year. And further can progress can be made here. Today, poppy cultivation is not an Afghanistan-wide phenomenon, but rather a phenomenon limited to a number of provinces, primarily in the south, and particularly, of course, Helmand, which accounts for the vast majority of the production. At this stage, we must do our utmost to consolidate this progress and make sure that, next year, more -- and not fewer -- provinces are poppy-free. As I have said previously, that is achievable.

If we make good use of these positive trends in critical areas, then the overall impact could also be very significant. I am cautiously -- I repeat, cautiously -- optimistic that we can start replacing the current negative atmosphere with an atmosphere of greater confidence in what we are all doing. That is important for the Afghan people, and it is important for the public in donor and troop-contributing countries as well as for the international community as such.

There is one other priority that has to be urgently addressed. The humanitarian challenges are serious and increasing. First and foremost, we may soon be facing a serious food shortage. Again, I would urge donors to ensure that the requirements of the joint appeal launched by the Afghan Government and the United Nations in July are covered, so that food and other assistance can be available to those who are the most vulnerable.

Let me draw the Council's attention to another important priority for the United Nations, for the Afghan Government in particular, for the Afghan authorities and for us all. A week ago, the election process started with the first phase of voter registration. Despite delays in the opening of some voter registration centres, due to logistics, communication and security issues, 90 per cent of the registration centres were open this week. Together with the Afghan authorities, we are monitoring the situation closely to overcome operational challenges and to do our utmost to ensure a safe and credible registration process.

A part of our mandate is to ensure better civil-military cooperation. I believe that, today, we have a better relationship with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) than we had half a year ago. It is a relationship based on respect for each other's distinctive mandates. We have worked together closely on the election process, which is now under way. We work better on humanitarian issues, where a set of guidelines have been agreed upon to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered in an impartial way, respecting humanitarian principles. We work together on human rights issues, not least to avoid civilian casualties as a result of the use of force. It is my hope and belief that the current work in this area will have a positive impact on the ground, and I am convinced that a clear and independent United Nations voice in this area is of benefit to all, and that a good and constant dialogue with the military forces is essential. My recent and very constructive conversations with key military leaders confirm that impression.

However, when we talk about civilian casualties, I should add something fundamental here. When we speak about this topic, we must all remember that the clear majority of such casualties are caused by the insurgency. The increased use of asymmetric attacks has also led to a significant increase in civilian victims, and such attacks must be firmly condemned.

As part of our civilian-military cooperation, we have also elaborated an integrated approach under civilian leadership. The challenge will be to translate this strategy into practical policies. And in this respect I would like to make one comment that I consider to be of great importance. To me, a comprehensive approach is not first and foremost a question of how to organize our efforts in a post-operational landscape; it is about how we allocate our overall civilian and military resources to produce optimal effects on the ground. Today, a growing amount of civilian resources is allocated to conflict provinces to support military operations. I understand that, and I understand the logic that countries need to demonstrate that where they fight they must also build. But the result could easily be that more and more of us adopt a province-based perspective. We must avoid a donor-generated fragmentation of Afghanistan. There must be a balance. That is my appeal.

Civilian resources will inevitably have a limited impact where and when the conflict is most intense. At the same time, a number of provinces and districts are in the balance. A number of provinces have seen progress that must be urgently consolidated. But they receive very modest resources. And these are provinces that could be stabilized and where progress could be consolidated with limited means and limited civilian economic resources. But the effect would be tremendous. That view is shared by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Costa. And let me add that, without a balanced and equitable distribution of resources, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, to which we have all committed ourselves, cannot be implemented.

There is today much talk about reconciliation. I have always believed that a solution to the conflict in Afghanistan will depend on the continued and robust presence of military forces but that the solution in itself will ultimately be a political solution. However, we must avoid speaking of reconciliation in a way that does not reflect the complexity of such a process and does not fully respect the lead and the ownership of the Afghan Government. A policy of engagement will be required. It must be led with strength and confidence by the Afghan Government, based on the constitution and the other achievements we have made so far, and it must be supported by a strong and confident international community. The United Nations stands ready to assist in such a process, in accordance with the mandate given to us in Security Council resolution 1806 (2008).

Finally, I have a few words about the work of the United Nations Mission. It is still a small mission in need of qualified staff to fulfil its mandate. We have asked for a significant increase in staff and in budget, and I appeal to all Council members for their support. However, I am more concerned about the quality than the quantity of the staff. At the present stage, we need a number of people with very specialized qualifications within aid effectiveness, agriculture, et cetera. I am grateful for the many offers that made been made, but I also ask for understanding for the fact that the regulations we have to respect in this building make it difficult to respond as positively and as quickly as we would have liked. There is a need for all of us to find creative solutions within existing regulations that enable us to meet specific requirements quickly.

With regard to the substance of our work after Paris, we have set up a new and more results-oriented consultation machinery, and it is starting to work. We have worked with the Afghan Government to establish an implementation structure for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. We have worked with international donors to obtain the clarity we have sought in the important social outreach programme of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, where discussion has gone on for many months and delayed important efforts. We have worked with the Afghan Government to strengthen institution-building and to move toward a more professional civil service.

Over the past few days, as I mentioned, our efforts have been concentrated on the need to build support around the new ministers who are about to take up their functions. We are addressing critical issues of data collection in order to monitor and improve aid effectiveness.

Some have asked where I would like the United Nations Mission to be six months from now. So let me mention some achievable targets: to agree with donors on specific criteria to measure aid effectiveness, such as the amount of money spent through the core budget; appropriate mechanisms to provide orchestrated support to the Afghan National Development Strategy; the equitable nationwide distribution of resources; the percentage of resources spent in Afghanistan in opposition to resources being spent in donor countries; and the level of resources spent to build Afghan capacity. None of these are new; they are all Paris commitments that we have all undertaken.

Second, we must establish one databank instead of many, allowing the Afghan Government and the United Nations to track resources spent through provincial reconstruction teams, development agencies and non-governmental agencies. That is critical for transparency and aid effectiveness. Today, the United Nations and, even more important, the Afghan Government do not know how many resources are going into the country or what they are being spent on. That must be corrected.

Third, we must set up a mechanism for joint audits, enhancing accountability on each side.

Fourth, we must strengthen the recently established Government mechanism for combating corruption.

Fifth, we must agree on a plan as to the kind of police we want -- because we are not even there yet -- how we should train them and how we should equip them, and then we must start implementing that plan.

Sixth, as I have stated, we must put discussion behind us with regard to the Afghan social outreach programme and start implementing it.

Seventh, we must develop a design for agricultural reform that enables all of us to follow the same priorities and to maximize the impact of the resources available to us.

Eighth, we must solidify the Pakistani-Afghan relationship within a wider regional confidence-building framework.

I have often talked about a political surge. By that, I do not mean to minimize the importance of military forces, but it is important to focus on how to give the political dimension of our work greater prominence. The issues that I have mentioned belong to the political agenda, where we have to seek a surge.

I hope that we can all work together on that agenda. We will do our best to coordinate, but coordination does not depend on mechanisms; it depends on commitments and the implementation of commitments. That is the main challenge: to take commitments seriously. We will do our work, and I trust that we will have the Council's full cooperation.

The President

I thank Mr. Eide for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the representative of Afghanistan.

Mr. Tanin (Afghanistan)

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