Security Council meeting 4714

The President

As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of March, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Mr. Joschka Fischer, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, for the leadership he provided in presiding over important deliberations of the Council during the preceding month.

I should also like to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council to His Excellency Mr. Gunter Pleuger, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, for his service as President of the Security Council for the month of February 2003. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Pleuger for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the Council's business last month.

The President

I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Iraq, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The President

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Blix to take a seat at the Council table.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. ElBaradei to take a seat at the Council table.

I welcome the presence at this meeting of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2003/232, which contains a note by the Secretary-General, transmitting the twelfth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.

I should also like to call the attention of members of the Council to a letter dated 3 March 2003 from Malaysia addressed to the President of the Security Council, document S/2003/246.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, and Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I give the floor to Mr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.

Mr. Blix (Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission)

For nearly three years, I have been coming to the Security Council to present the quarterly reports of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). They have described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The twelfth quarterly report (S/2003/232, annex) is the first that describes three months of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalized 10 days ago, and a number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today's statement will supplement the circulated report on these points in order to bring the Council up to date.

Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties -- and certainly far fewer than those that were faced by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.

Some practical matters which were not settled by the talks that Mr. ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002) have been resolved at meetings which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones have been overcome. That is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from friction but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.

American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures, and we expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close-area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, which have agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.

Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new documents of this type have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq's declaration of 7 December 2002 did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results. When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for, it is, above all, credible accounts that are needed -- or the proscribed items, if they exist.

Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons who may have relevant knowledge and experience may be another way of obtaining evidence. UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its records, and they are among the people whom we seek to interview. In the past month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons who may be relevant sources of information, in particular persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons and proscribed missiles in 1991.

This provision of names prompts two reflections. The first is that, with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.

The second reflection is that, with relevant witnesses available, it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations which allow us to be confident that the testimony provided is given without outside influence. While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials -- so-called minders -- or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals have been asked for private interviews, of which 10 have accepted under our terms -- seven of them during the past week.

As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed-processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities has so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.

Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for remotely piloted vehicles. A number of sites have been inspected, with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in that area.

There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of weapons of mass destruction. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground-penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage have been found so far.

I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high-quality information about sites to inspect than twice as many expert inspectors to send.

On 14 February I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively little tangible progress to note; hence the cautious formulations in the report before the Council.

As of today, there is more. While the Iraqi side tried to persuade us during our meetings in Baghdad that the Al Samoud 2 missiles that they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items must be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament -- indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed. However, I must add that the report I have today tells me that no destruction work has continued today. I hope that this is a temporary break.

Until today, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles -- including four training missiles, two combat warheads, one launcher and five engines -- have been destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme. Two "reconstituted" casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete. The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile. More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq has already declared, and some will require further study and discussion.

There is a significant Iraqi effort under way to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons that were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site that was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs, comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments have also been found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow a determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400-type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving forward and may yield results.

Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.

With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to weapons of mass destruction, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. That appears to be in response to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.

What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged in the light of how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.

Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated "immediately, unconditionally, and actively" with UNMOVIC, as required under operative paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions that I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following. The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in attaching these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.

It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives that are now being taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some longstanding open disarmament issues can be seen as active or even proactive, these initiatives, three to four months into the new resolution, cannot be said to constitute immediate cooperation, nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome, and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.

Members of the Council may relate most of what I have said to resolution 1441 (2002), but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions of the Security Council. The quarterly report before members is submitted in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created UNMOVIC, but also continues to guide much of our work. Under the timelines set by that resolution, the results of some of this work is to be reported to the Council before the end of this month. Let me be more specific.

Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to "address unresolved disarmament issues" and to identify "key remaining disarmament tasks", and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month, as required.

UNMOVIC, UNSCOM and the Amorim panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues that were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points but has analysed the data behind it and data and documents since 1998 to compile its own list of unresolved disarmament issues, or, rather, clustered issues. It is the answers to these issues that we seek through our inspection activities. It is also from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify key remaining disarmament tasks. As noted in the report before members, this list of clustered issues is ready.

UNMOVIC is required to submit only the work programme with the key remaining disarmament tasks to the Council. As I understand, several Council members are interested in the working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, and we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this working document -- which may still be adjusted in the light of new information -- members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, to which members usually refer. Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of issues.

I should note that the working document contains much information and discussion about the issues that existed at the end of 1998, including information that came to light after 1998. It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of a paucity of information. Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programmes have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programmes and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document does contain suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled.

Let me conclude by telling members that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work programme that resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement; it will also describe the various subsystems that constitute the programme -- for instance, for aerial surveillance, for information from Governments and suppliers, for sampling and for the checking of road traffic.

How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can, and is, to be immediate, disarmament and, at any rate, the verification of it, cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither Governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that, in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament, to give confidence and to sound an alarm if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.

The President

I thank Mr. Blix for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. ElBaradei (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency)

My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions.

When I last reported to the Council, on 14 February, I explained that the Agency's inspection activities had moved well beyond the reconnaissance phase -- that is, re-establishing our knowledge base regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities -- and into the investigative phase, which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant to disarmament: whether Iraq has revived, or attempted to revive, its defunct nuclear weapons programme over the last four years.

At the outset, let me state one general observation, namely, that during the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi sites, industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late 1980s, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment. At only a few inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and manufacturing have the facilities been improved and new personnel taken on. This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is of course of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme.

The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites, including 21 that had not been inspected before. In addition, IAEA experts have taken part in many joint inspections of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA.

Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The three operational air samplers have collected weekly air particulate samples from key locations in Iraq that are being sent to laboratories for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and material sample analyses have been received from the relevant laboratories.

Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2,000 kilometres over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons factories, truck parks, manufacturing facilities and residential areas.

Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel, at times with individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged meetings with key scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's past nuclear programme. The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews, even when conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA's preferred modalities, with a view to gaining as much information as possible -- information that could be cross-checked for validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our assessment of areas under investigation.

As the Council may recall, when we first began to request private unescorted interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews and on keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, upon our insistence, individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without escorts and without taped records. The IAEA has conducted two such private interviews in the last 10 days, and hopes that its ability to conduct private interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside Iraq.

I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities for conducting interviews to ensure that they are conducted freely and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the best way to ensure that interviews are free. We therefore intend to request such interviews shortly. We are also asking other States to enable us to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those States.

In the last few weeks Iraq has provided a considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminium tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnet-production capabilities and its reported attempt to import uranium. I will touch briefly upon the progress made on each of those issues.

Since my last update to the Council, the primary technical focus of IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of centrifuges. For that purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of international centrifuge-manufacturing experts.

With regard to aluminium tubes, the IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq's attempts to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminium tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that those aluminium tubes were sought for rocket production. Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use those 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse-engineering of rockets.

The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of those rockets was well documented. Iraq has provided copies of design documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and supporting data and samples. A thorough analysis of that information, together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted purchases and intended usage of the 81mm aluminium tubes, as well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerances.

Drawing on that information, the IAEA has learned that the original tolerances for the 81mm tubes were set prior to 1987, and were based on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets in Iraq's possession. Initial attempts to reverse-engineer the rockets met with little success. Tolerances were adjusted during the following years as part of ongoing efforts to revitalize the project and improve operational efficiency. The project languished for long periods during that time and became the subject of several committees, which resulted in specification and tolerance changes on each occasion.

Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's efforts to import those aluminium tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme. However, this issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated.

With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets -- or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets -- for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme, I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of 12 different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for centrifuge magnetic bearings.

In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line, for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet occurred, and Iraqi documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel indicate that this contract will not be executed. However, they have concluded that the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of view. In addition, the training and experience acquired by Iraq in the pre-1991 period makes it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will therefore continue to monitor and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for enrichment centrifuges.

With regard to uranium acquisition, the IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from the Niger in recent years. The investigation was centred on documents provided by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between the Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001.

The IAEA has discussed these reports with the Governments of Iraq and of the Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took place. For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with the Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including the Niger, in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of the Niger, and to compare the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.

Based on a thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents -- which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and the Niger -- are, in fact, not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to efforts by Iraq illicitly to import nuclear materials.

Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear programme have arisen from Iraqi procurement efforts reported by a number of States. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure commodities and products, including magnets and aluminium tubes, have been conducted in contravention of the sanctions controls specified under Security Council resolution 661 (1990) and other relevant resolutions.

The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation, and further verification will be forthcoming. In fact, an IAEA team of technical experts is currently in Iraq. It is composed of customs investigators and computer forensic specialists, and it is conducting a series of investigations, through inspections at trading companies and commercial organizations, aimed at understanding Iraq's patterns of procurement.

In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear weapons -- the most lethal weapons of mass destruction -- inspections in Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little over three months ago -- and particularly during the three weeks since my last oral report to the Council -- the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated.

First, there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as having been reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.

Secondly, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.

Thirdly, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even if Iraq had pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question.

Fourthly, although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.

As I stated earlier, the IAEA will naturally continue further to scrutinize and investigate all of these issues.

After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear-weapon programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities, making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution 1441 (2002) and all additional tools that might be available to us, including reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope to continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our mandate.

I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its cooperation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I hope that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of its cooperation.

The detailed knowledge of Iraq's capabilities that IAEA experts have accumulated since 1991, combined with the extended rights provided by resolution 1441 (2002), the active commitment by all States to help us fulfil our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi cooperation -- should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related capabilities. However credible this assessment may be, we will endeavour -- in view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification process, and particularly in the light of Iraq's past record of cooperation -- to evaluate Iraq's capabilities on a continuous basis as part of our long-term monitoring and verification programme, in order to provide the international community with ongoing and real-time assurances.

The President

Before giving the floor to Council members, I wish to recall the understanding we have reached, namely that all participants will limit their statements to no more than seven minutes, in order to enable the Council to work efficiently within its timetable.

I now call on His Excellency Mr. Joschka Fischer, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany.

Mr. Fischer (Germany)

I would like to congratulate His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Guinea on his assumption of the presidency of the Security Council, and I thank him for the kind words addressed to me and to the German presidency of last month.

I would also like to thank Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei for their briefings on the quarterly report. Both can count on Germany's full support.

The aim of the international community remains the complete disarmament -- and only the disarmament -- of Iraq to finally eliminate the international threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. That is what all the relevant Security Council resolutions state.

What is at stake now is the unity of the international community. We have taken a forceful stance in our common fight against international terrorism. We fight together against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We stand united in our condemnation of the Iraqi regime. Where we have different views is on our strategy of how to achieve the effective and total disarmament of Iraq. The Security Council must not spare any effort to find a joint approach to attain our common goal.

The briefings by Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei have made clear once more that Iraq's cooperation with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not yet fully meet United Nations demands. Baghdad could have taken many of its recent steps earlier and more willingly. In recent days, cooperation has, nevertheless, notably improved. That is a positive development, which makes it all the less comprehensible why that development should now be abandoned.

There is real progress to be noted on the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions in all fields. In the sphere of missile technology, there has been clear progress. Thus, Iraq informed the inspectors of its Al Samoud missiles. After examination by UNMOVIC, it was established that their range was too long. After Mr. Blix had set for the regime in Baghdad a deadline for their destruction, Iraq began to destroy the missiles within the prescribed time frame. That is important progress. It shows that peaceful disarmament is possible and that there is a real alternative to war. That positive development also shows that Hans Blix's approach of giving the regime in Baghdad concrete time frames is successful. This method also ought to be used for other unresolved problems.

As far as Iraq's nuclear potential is concerned, we can note great progress. Mr. ElBaradei has just confirmed that. The accounts presented by Iraq are plausible and verifiable. Cooperation on inspections is good. The IAEA is confident about reaching final conclusions soon.

Turning to biological weapons, there has also been progress in individual spheres; for example, in the excavation of many R-400 aerial bombs which are now being assessed by UNMOVIC. Baghdad has announced the presentation of a comprehensive report on open questions in the field of biological and chemical weapons. The interviews with Iraqi scientists are now taking place without monitoring or recording. Preparations are being made to conduct interviews abroad.

France, Russia and Germany presented a memorandum to the Security Council on 24 February proposing a tough regime of intensive inspections (S/2003/214, annex). On the basis of those proposals, the inspections should be stepped up and accelerated. For that to happen, each remaining problem has to be specified and priorities have to be set. A time frame should thereby be prescribed for every single problem.

Therefore, Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei should present us with a detailed, comprehensive working programme that clarifies how they and their teams intend to tackle the complete disarmament of Iraq, as called for by the United Nations. It is very important that that working programme be presented to the Security Council without delay. We would like to hear today a statement by the inspectors on the remaining key disarmament issues in the cluster report that has been drawn up.

The inspections cannot go on forever. The aim of disarming Iraq has to be pursued energetically and systematically. The Iraqi Government has to fully cooperate with the inspectors. But given the current situation and the ongoing progress, we see no need for a second resolution. Why should we leave the path that we have embarked on now that the inspections, on the basis of resolution 1441 (2002), are showing viable results?

The Security Council is now meeting for the third time within a month at ministerial level to discuss the Iraq crisis. This shows the urgency we attach to the disarmament of Iraq and to the threat of war. The crisis in Iraq troubles our Governments. It troubles the people in our countries. It troubles the entire region of the Near and Middle East. Precisely because the situation is so dramatic, we have to keep firmly reminding ourselves what a war would mean, what the endless suffering it would bring to countless innocent people and what catastrophic humanitarian consequences it would entail. Are we really in a situation that absolutely necessitates the ultima ratio, the very last resort? I think not, because peaceful means are far from having been exhausted.

The Security Council faces -- in fact, we all face -- an important decision, probably a historic turning point. The alternatives are clear: the disarmament of Iraq by war or its disarmament by exhausting all peaceful means. The risks of a military option are evident to us all. There is good reason to believe that the region would not become more stable, but rather more unstable, through a war, and, what is more, that in the long term international terrorism would be strengthened, not weakened, and that our joint efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict would be hindered.

Then there is the alternative. If we succeed in implementing the effective and complete disarmament of Iraq with peaceful means, we will improve the framework conditions for a regional process of stability, security and cooperation, based on the renunciation of the use of force, on arms control and on a cooperative system of confidence-building measures.

Resolutions 1441 (2002) and 1284 (1999) point a clear way forward for the Security Council. They have to remain the basis of our action. The progress of the last few days has shown that we have efficient alternatives to war in Iraq. By taking this path, we will strengthen the relevance of the United Nations and the Security Council.

The President

I thank the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany for his kind words addressed to me.

I call now on His Excellency Mr. Farouk Al-Shara', Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Mr. Al-Shara' (Syria)

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      object = u'\n\t<p id="pg010-bk02-pa01">Allow me at the outset...ievement of international peace and security.</p>'
      reason = 'ordinal not in range(128)'
      start = 6223