| Date | 22 February 2001 |
|---|---|
| Started | 15:00 |
| Ended | 20:00 |
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The situation in Angola Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2000/1225).
| President: | ![]() | Mr. Ben Mustapha Tunisia |
(The Presidency changes each month to the next member in alphabetical order) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Members: | ![]() | Mr. Ahsan Bangladesh |
![]() | Mr. Shen Guofang China |
![]() | Mr. Valdivieso Colombia |
![]() | Mr. Levitte France |
![]() | Mr. Cooney Ireland |
![]() | Miss Durrant Jamaica |
|
![]() | Mr. Kassé Mali |
![]() | Mr. Neewoor Mauritius |
![]() | Mr. Kolby Norway |
|
![]() | Mr. Lavrov Russia |
![]() | Ms. Lee Singapore |
![]() | Mr. Krokhmal Ukraine |
|
![]() | Mr. Eldon United Kingdom |
![]() | Mr. Hume United States |
|||
Adoption of the agenda
The situation in Angola
Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2000/1225)
The President
I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Mozambique, Namibia, Portugal, Romania, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo and Zimbabwe in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
On behalf of the Council, I welcome the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda.
The President
In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola.
There being no objection it is so decided.
I invite Mr. Ryan to take a seat at the Council table.
The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.
Members of the Council have before them a note by the President of the Security Council transmitting a letter dated 21 December 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, enclosing the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, document S/2000/1225.
I now give the floor to Mr. Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola.
Mr. Ryan (Chairman of the Security Council Committee)
In my capacity as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, I wish to express my thanks to you, Sir, for arranging this meeting of the Council in open format.
The situation in Angola continues to be of concern to the United Nations membership as a whole and to the international community. It requires the attention and scrutiny which this meeting of the Council permits. We are here to discuss the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism, which has been presented to the Council pursuant to resolution 1295 (2000). I should like at the outset to welcome the presence of the Minister for External Relations of the Republic of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda. I also wish to extend my appreciation and admiration to my Canadian predecessors, who chaired the Committee for the two years before I assumed this position. Their work was widely commended. It has also had, I believe, a wider, beneficial knock-on effect. Its dynamic, its sharply focused character and its persistence in dealing with the hard realities thrown up one by one in the specific case of Angola have impacted significantly upon the ongoing wider debate within the United Nations regarding our sanctions policies, both in general and in specific cases.
I speak today as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), rather than in my national capacity. Ireland will not be making a national statement today and associates itself fully with the statement which Sweden, the Presidency of the European Union, will be making on behalf of the Union.
Following the adoption last April of resolution 1295 (2000), the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, established on 11 July, 2000, a Monitoring Mechanism consisting of five experts. It is important to recall that the decision to establish the Mechanism was taken by the Council after its consideration of the report of the Panel of Experts on Angola Sanctions (S/2000/203). It was clear to the Council that the ongoing realities of the situation required systematic, sustained further action. For this reason, the Monitoring Mechanism was established. The Mechanism was mandated to collect additional relevant information and to investigate relevant leads relating to ongoing violations of resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998). It was also charged with investigating any relevant leads initiated by the Panel of Experts.
Four of the five members of the Mechanism -- Ambassador Juan Larraín, its Chairman, Ms. Christine Gordon, Mr. James Manzou and Mr. Ismaila Seck -- are here at the Council table. Ambassador Lena Sundh is in Africa on official duties. They are to be commended for the commitment and diligence they have demonstrated in discharging a complex task characterized by frequent apparent intractabilities.
The Mechanism commenced its work on 20 July and submitted its report to my predecessor on 21 December last. It had earlier submitted to the Committee, on 23 October, its interim report. Its members visited 19 countries in connection with their agenda, which evolved directly from the report of the Panel of Experts. In conducting its work, the Mechanism employed only the strictest evidentiary standards in its investigations. It also allowed the right of reply to all those against whom allegations concerning sanctions violations had been made. These exemplary procedures further enhance the authority and transparency which, I believe, characterize the report before us.
Following the submission of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) forwarded the report to the President of the Security Council on 21 December to enable its circulation for the information of all the States Members of the United Nations. Subsequently, the Committee undertook detailed analysis of the report of the Mechanism at meetings which I convened on 16 and 26 January last, and the Committee then decided to recommend today's meeting of the Security Council.
The work of the Mechanism had two points of departure: first, the report of the Panel of Experts and, secondly, the current situation on the ground in Angola. As regards the report of the Panel of Experts, the Mechanism focused its efforts on four main areas which the Panel had exposed as susceptible to sanctions-busting. The first area -- arms and military equipment -- is detailed in parts II, III, IV and V of the Mechanism's report. The second area -- UNITA representation and travel and residence outside Angola of senior UNITA officials and their adult families -- is detailed in part VIII. The third -- the role of transport in the violation of the sanctions against UNITA -- is detailed in part IX. The fourth -- sanctions on diamond trading and financial assets -- is detailed in part X.
Based on its findings, the Mechanism has made a number of specific recommendations in all four areas. These are contained in part XI, paragraphs 228-243, of the final report. I would draw the particular attention of the Security Council to these recommendations and to further recommendations contained in paragraphs 224 and 244-245. I would also draw the attention of the Security Council to the conclusions drawn by the Mechanism, which are contained in part XII, paragraphs 246-254.
Resolution 1295 (2000) expresses the intention of the Security Council to review the situation regarding the implementation of the measures contained in resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998) on the basis of information provided, inter alia, by the Monitoring Mechanism. Today's meeting provides us all with an opportunity to take stock in this regard. The Mechanism's recommendations range from the general to the highly specific. What is clear about all of them is that they require action by the United Nations, by individual States and by the international community. It is also clear that effective response to and action on these recommendations will require committed and sustained engagement not only by the Security Council and the United Nations system -- including, for example, the International Civil Aviation Organization -- but also and essentially by certain organizations outside the United Nations system.
If the international community is to implement effectively the recommendations contained in the report, it will require persistence and financial resources. I am confident that, collectively, we possess and will demonstrate such resolve. The history of sanctions against UNITA has been and continues to be an incremental one. Beginning in 1993 and continuing today, we have worked to put into place, piece by piece, the crucial elements of a regime that would undermine and, over some time, eradicate UNITA's capacity to pursue violently its political objective -- an objective on which the people of Angola have adjudicated democratically.
The Security Council resorts to a sanctions regime only in prescribed, restricted circumstances when it has exhausted all other available approaches. Sanctions regimes, by their character, also require careful judgement, in addition to tenacity, to make them work effectively and to keep them on target. The Council has recently done innovative work on sanctions issues, not least in developing mechanisms such as experts' panels and monitoring mechanisms. This new thinking has breathed a renewed sense of capacity into some intractable cases which had hitherto been regarded as close to the outer edge of our collective capacity, if not beyond it. We have reached this point only recently, as was correctly noted by Minister Miranda in this Chamber last April. However, progress -- real progress -- on the most difficult cases requires not only good new thinking; it also requires, essentially, good, old-fashioned ingredients, including political will and determination, preparedness to stay the course for as long as it takes and a direct engagement with all involved States, international organizations, agencies and individuals. All these ingredients, new and already familiar, are needed in full measure over the next phase and for as long as it will take in upholding the sanctions regime against UNITA.
A particularly important aspect of the work of the Panel of Experts and the Monitoring Mechanism is the clear evidence of the involvement of the same people, as well as the same organizations and corporations, in two at least, and very probably more, of the major conflicts in Africa with which the Council is presently preoccupied. The Angola case history and the work of the Monitoring Mechanism have directed a sharp, investigative beam into hitherto largely uninspected but highly organized and active networks, driven for the most part by State, commercial or personal greed for profit, regardless of the cost in human lives and misery. This monitoring work, together with the wide publicity the various reports have received, will, if we reiterate our determination and match it with sustained cooperative action, encourage very careful reflection by any States, organizations and individuals, whoever they may be, who might hitherto have considered it safe to seek to derive financial gain from these conflicts or who, at Government level, might be tempted to turn a blind eye towards the now largely identified profiteers, whether within or externally connected into their jurisdictions.
Against this background, it should be noted that the United Nations presently lacks the necessary permanent capacity for following up on the findings of the report of the Panel of Experts and of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism. In this connection, it should also be noted that, for now, the Monitoring Mechanism has been granted a limited extension of its mandate. In the case of UNITA, it will clearly be necessary for the Council to maintain the effectiveness of the sanctions regime until the established objectives of the resolutions concerned are achieved.
The United Nations sanctions regime against UNITA is working. This is the result of sustained efforts over time on the basis of the Security Council's decisions and, flowing from them, the work of the established Monitoring Mechanism and the cooperation of involved States and relevant organizations. It is now much more difficult and more expensive for UNITA to conduct business with the suppliers of essential materials. Crucially, and largely because of our incremental progress, it is riskier and less attractive for State and commercial suppliers to engage in business with UNITA.
In my role as Chairman I will work in a positive, forward-looking manner to convince all concerned that they can and must end their assistance to UNITA -- assistance that is in defiance of the will of the international community. Determination and financial resources will be required to implement the Mechanism's essential recommendations. However, the challenges that they pose and their cost do not diminish their absolute necessity. An effective, monitored sanctions regime will, over time, remove any international support for politically motivated violence in Angola.
With the Council's support, the Committee will work closely with all States, international organizations, agencies and individuals to erode systematically UNITA's remaining military capacity. Our ultimate objective is to bring closer the day when all the people of Angola, 1 million of whom have lost their lives in this 30-year war, will be freed from the threat of violence and will be able to work together in peace to rebuild their country.
The President
I should like to ask Mr. Larraín and other members of the Mechanism to kindly take their seats behind Ambassador Ryan.
Mr. Hume (United States)
The United States would like to welcome Foreign Minister Miranda back to the Security Council for this important meeting.
Today the United States is pleased that Portuguese Ambassador Monteiro will speak for us in his capacity as coordinator of the troika of observer States to the Lusaka Protocol. The United States subscribes fully to the statement that he will make and would like to take this opportunity to thank him for his outstanding service here, both to his country and to this Organization. We wish him well on his next assignment and look forward to welcoming his successor.
Mr. Levitte (France)
At the outset, I would like to welcome here the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, as well as the members of the Mechanism to monitor sanctions against UNITA, in particular its Chairman, Ambassador Juan Larraín. May I also pay tribute to the new Chairman of the Committee on sanctions, the Ambassador of Ireland, to whom I wish every success in his new duties.
France fully agrees with the views that will be expressed in a few moments by the Ambassador of Sweden on behalf of the European Union regarding a conflict that has lasted too long and whose catastrophic humanitarian consequences we have all seen: 300,000 deaths in the past 10 years, 3 million displaced persons today and every day more victims, especially from anti-personnel mines.
As I did last month during the open debate of the Security Council on the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, I would like once again to emphasize the importance that France attaches to the holding of real debates that are transparent and open to all regarding reports that in some way or another make accusations towards States. Since the effectiveness of any sanctions regime depends first and foremost on the determination and capacity of States to implement it, it is essential that each one be able to put forward its views in a constructive dialogue. I welcome the fact that today we are able to have such a discussion on the report of the Mechanism to monitor sanctions against UNITA.
France welcomes the rigorous work done by Ambassador Larraín and his team. They have endeavoured to follow a strict methodology with regard to evidence, cross-referencing information sources and respecting the right of response of protagonists, States, organizations or individuals that have been the subject of accusations. The report also has the major advantage of attempting to describe problems in arms-trafficking and diamond-trafficking linked to sophisticated organized crime networks, comprehensively and in all their complexity, without simplifying or glossing over the difficulties and the responses.
The work of the Monitoring Mechanism shows that violations of sanctions are continuing. It is encouraging, however, to note that the sanctions have, at least in part, achieved results. The military capacity of UNITA has been considerably weakened, and the organization has hardly any territorial bases left in the country itself. Several thousand rebels have given themselves up to the legitimate authorities in order to take part in the process of pacification and national reconstruction and in the implementation of the Bicesse and Lusaka Protocol agreements. There is no doubt that the sanctions-monitoring process has, under the authority of the Committee, yielded results by helping to maintain and to intensify the pressure on Jonas Savimbi and his movement.
We must continue to find concrete means that will help to enhance the effectiveness of measures against UNITA and to dismantle diamond-, oil- and arms-trafficking networks, as well as transport networks and networks for the falsification of documents -- be they false identity papers or forged end-user certificates for arms exports. These networks, with the complicity of some and by taking advantage of the weakness of others, continue to fuel the conflict and hold back progress towards a genuine process of national reconciliation and a lasting return to civil peace.
In this context, France attaches particular importance to two of the recommendations of the Monitoring Mechanism.
First, there is a need regularly to update the list of UNITA leaders and their family members to whom States must refuse entry into their territory. In this connection, I welcome the imminent publication of an updated list by the sanctions Committee. This is a necessary instrument for States to be in a position to implement the sanctions effectively.
The second recommendation, which I should like to emphasize, is the importance of the establishment, as soon as possible, of a system -- monitored by the Security Council -- for the certification of Angolan diamonds, as well as a system for licensing buyers. In the same vein, France supports the establishment of an overall certification system for diamonds and welcomes the encouraging results of the international conference held in Windhoek last week on conflict diamonds. We want to be able to submit a draft convention to the Sixth Committee at the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly next fall.
Above and beyond these two recommendations, France notes with great interest all of the proposals -- most of which are extremely relevant -- put forward by the Monitoring Mechanism. However, I should like recall the position of France on the question of secondary sanctions. Clearly, it is not enough to highlight sanctions violations; we must also find the proper means to put an end to them. But for this purpose, rather than doling out punishment, we must help States, regional organizations and the other actors involved -- such as companies and professional organizations -- to implement the measures taken by our Council and to ensure compliance with them.
As my delegation had the opportunity to note previously, during an earlier debate on Angola last April, we believe that only a constructive, instructive and unified approach can, in the long term, ensure the success of sanctions and fulfil their objective of completely isolating UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. Only that approach will allow us to force them to comply with their obligations and their commitments for national reconciliation and a return to peace.
Imposing secondary sanctions against countries that are believed to have violated sanctions is the wrong response to a genuine problem. As we have had the opportunity of stating on several occasions, sanctions, in order to remain relevant and credible and retain their political force, should be used in a limited manner, as provided for by the Charter. They should be limited to cases in which there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. An increase in sanctions regimes would, furthermore, result in practical management problems that would be difficult to resolve.
I should like to conclude this statement by making a comment and putting forward two proposals.
First, there are obvious parallels between the report of the Monitoring Mechanism and that of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, with regard both to the observed sanctions violations and to the recommendations made to remedy them. This similarity is due, inter alia, to the sources that are fuelling the conflict: a rebel movement supplied thanks to arms trafficking, itself fed by revenues from illicit diamond trafficking and supported by sophisticated transport and intermediary networks.
Quite logically, the same weaknesses are apparent in the sanctions provisions regarding organized crime and the merchants of war. We note the same violations. Victor Bout and his company, Air Cess, are at the heart of sanctions-busting operations. No less than seven pages of the report of Ambassador Larraín are devoted to him. This comparison of the two conflicts leads me to put forward two proposals, which we have submitted to the Security Council.
First, we have in mind a plan to create a permanent mechanism for monitoring sanctions and illicit traffic in valuable raw materials involved in conflicts. Such a permanent mechanism would allow us to gather in one location the necessary expertise to cross-reference data systematically and to formulate comprehensive recommendations.
Secondly, and in a more targeted manner, we would propose that we ask States to undertake inquiries and, if need be, to take the appropriate administrative and judicial measures against the activities of merchants of war such as Victor Bout, who are internationally acknowledged to be primarily responsible for sanctions-busting operations.
Ms. Lee (Singapore)
I join the other members of the Council in welcoming Foreign Minister Miranda of Angola to today's debate. I also take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Ryan for his excellent presentation on the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism established under resolution 1295 (2000) in relation to the sanctions against UNITA. We look forward to the written addendum to the final report from the Mechanism under its extended mandate, pursuant to resolution 1336 (2001).
I would like also to thank the previous Chair of the resolution 864 (1993) sanctions Committee, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker of Canada, for his contribution towards the issuance of the report. His countryman, the Permanent Representative of Canada before him, was a hard act to follow. However, Ambassador Heinbecker rose to the occasion admirably, and carried on the fine tradition set by Ambassador Robert Fowler in the report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1237 (1999) on Angola document S/2000/203, which was the mother of all name-and-shame reports.
The five members of the Mechanism, ably led by its Chairman, Ambassador Juan Larraín, also included Ambassador Lena Sundh, Ms. Christine Gordon, Mr. James Manzou and Mr. Ismaila Seck; they truly deserve our thanks for producing an excellent report. Like those of the recent report (S/2000/1195, annex, enclosure) of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolution 1306 (2000) on the situation in Sierra Leone, chaired by Mr. Martin Chungong Ayafor -- the Ayafor report -- the findings in the report of the Mechanism are sobering. Once again, the illicit trade in diamonds was shown to be the cornerstone of the edifice which fuels conflict, this time in Angola. The well structured network that has been set up for this illicit trade in diamonds could almost be admired for its precision and success, were it not for the fact that the creation of that network has been paid for in the blood of the peoples of Angola and of the other countries of the region.
The war in Angola has now entered its fifth decade. In the Mechanism's report, it was noted that the network of structures used by the União Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)
"in their turn, profit from conflicts, the trade in illicit arms and diamonds, and, not least, ... the transport of such illicit merchandise". (S/2000/1225, annex, enclosure, para. 23)
It was also noted in the report that
"The people and companies involved in these kinds of activities are instrumental in facilitating war and armed conflict". (Ibid.)
Clearly, the arms and diamonds industries have spawned a very profitable war economy, such that the diamonds industry, which was the resource for the arms, has in turn generated an arms industry to protect the diamonds. It is a stalemate that has a high price: violence for economic control.
In the case of Angola, however, there is some good news: the inroads the Government has made into territory previously held by UNITA -- for example Moxico province -- together with the effect of the sanctions on the illicit diamond trade, which is the main source for UNITA's guerrilla activities, have brought about a diminishment of UNITA's war capacity. Hence the importance of maintaining the sanctions against UNITA.
We are here today to review the recommendations of the Mechanism on the effectiveness of the implementation of the many sanctions against UNITA and to consider appropriate action against the sanctions-busters. The Mechanism's report acknowledges that the sanctions have curtailed UNITA's ability to wage war. It also emphasizes the continued need for their imposition, identifies various instances of violations and makes recommendations for the strengthening of the sanctions regime.
A significant part of the report focuses on the circumvention of restrictions on UNITA's official representation abroad and on travel by its officers. Although a number of Angola's neighbouring States and West African States have been identified as States involved, the circumvention has been attributed more to the use of front organizations and to the insufficiently updated list of persons subject to restrictions maintained by the sanctions Committee and by the Secretariat. Loopholes in the European Schengen Agreement's regime have also been identified.
In the case of the diamonds sanctions, modes of circumvention similar to those being used in the Sierra Leone sanctions as described in the Ayafor report appear to have been used to conceal the true origin of diamonds from UNITA mines. These include the potential loopholes found in the Swiss tax-free zones. However, a serious allegation was made in paragraph 181 of the Mechanism's report: that well known clients of De Beers are knowingly buying rough diamonds from UNITA. This and other questionable methods uncovered by the Mechanism require further investigation as to the validity of the findings.
On the issue of sanctions-busting, the report mentions some familiar names. On the use of aircraft for sanctions-busting, Victor Bout has been identified as a key player, as has Air Cess. The countries named in the report as being the countries of origin for arms exports to UNITA, and those accused of complicity in permitting the forging of end-user certificates for arms imports, should address the issues raised in the report.
What is most disturbing in the Mechanism's report are the common criminals described in it, namely Victor Bout, Fred Rindel and the European network connection -- they are "common" because they appear to be the same individuals named in the Ayafor report for activities linked to the trade in illicit diamonds and arms in relation to Sierra Leone.
If sanctions-busters continue to be "rewarded" and not punished for their acts, the damage will not be limited to the exploitation of the resources of Angola. It will undermine the credibility of the United Nations itself, because the sanctions imposed against UNITA are one of the tools of the Security Council for carrying out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As stated in the conclusions of the Mechanism's report,
"Peace in Angola will also have an important impact in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Sierra Leone". (para. 252)
Angola is a country that has a tremendous potential for overcoming the ravages of the conflict with UNITA. It is time to work for genuine and comprehensive peace in Angola.
Miss Durrant (Jamaica)
My delegation joins previous speakers in welcoming the presence among us today of the Foreign Minister of Angola, His Excellency Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, and in thanking the Permanent Representative of Ireland, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), for his presentation of the comprehensive report contained in document S/2000/1225. My delegation's appreciation goes to Ambassador Juan Larraín and to the other members of the Monitoring Mechanism for the excellent quality of their work. Their activities, and those of the sanctions Committee and of the earlier Panel of Experts, broke new ground in regard to the use of sanctions by the United Nations.
Jamaica welcomes the report of the Mechanism as another step towards the effective implementation of the sanctions against the União Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) aimed at expediting the end of the long-running conflict in Angola.
We are heartened by the observation in the report that UNITA's procurement of arms and fuel has clearly diminished, due in part to the reluctance of States and individuals to engage in business as usual lest the connection be established between UNITA and themselves. This is a direct result of more effective monitoring of the sanctions and of the strategy of "naming and shaming" to expose sanctions violators. If this is done consistently and with equity, it will prove to be a powerful disincentive for sanctions violators to continue their activities.
In this regard, we reiterate our call for the Security Council to seriously consider the establishment of an ongoing capacity to monitor the implementation of sanctions, as well as to study their unintended consequences.
The Monitoring Mechanism is a good example of what can be accomplished if sanctions are monitored effectively. However, we need to go further. By institutionalizing the monitoring of sanctions, we would ensure that the requisite expertise and methodology are applied for the duration of sanctions regimes: from conception to execution to termination. We would be able to ascertain what has worked in the past and what is likely to work in the future. We could make sanctions regimes more incisive and targeted.
My delegation is supportive of the broad thrust of the recommendations contained in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism relating to arms and military equipment, travel and representation, diamonds and finance, and transport. I wish to comment on some of the recommendations.
We are particularly supportive of the recommendation to implement a certificate of origin scheme for the export of diamonds. There are many countries in the region with fragile economies, heavily dependent on legitimate exports of diamonds, and these can ill afford the dislocation caused by disputes arising from uncertainty as to the source of their diamonds. A certificate of origin scheme would go a long way in ensuring the legitimate source of exported diamonds.
In the same vein, we support the establishment of a licensing system for diamond buyers to complement the certificate of origin scheme. If these measures are adopted simultaneously, it may prove unnecessary to record the characteristics of diamonds from each mine. We recognize that this kind of cataloguing may prove onerous for some countries, and there remains uncertainty about the dependability of the current technology to be employed. We therefore believe that the efficiency of the technology needs to be assured before this method can be used to adjudicate the origin of diamonds.
Arms exporting countries should also strengthen their system pertaining to arms exports, in particular by verifying the authenticity and country of issuance of the relevant documents. The standardization of the format of end-user certificates would greatly assist authorities to authenticate that weapons imported into the region reach the intended buyer. The problem of the proliferation of small arms will be solved only when arms exporting countries agree to the establishment of a database for the export of their weapons, which will allow for greater transparency in the use of small arms.
The countries of the region have recognized the need to work together to prevent the transhipment of weapons through their territory, and we commend them in this regard. The international community may also wish to give full support to the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States moratorium and the Southern African Development Community action plan for the control of light weapons.
The international community cannot be satisfied until UNITA's ability to wage war is completely degraded. We wish to commend the Government of Angola for the steps it has taken to focus on the economic and social development of the people in the areas under its control. But we recognize that their efforts have been hampered by UNITA's continued activities in areas where it is still able to operate.
In addition to improving the efficiency of the sanctions on UNITA, we must respond to the pressing humanitarian and developmental needs of the people of Angola. My delegation commends the ongoing work of all humanitarian agencies that have persevered in the face of tremendous difficulties in order to assist the people of Angola. We also commend the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa, Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, for their tireless efforts to bring peace to the people of Angola and for the steps taken to improve relations between the United Nations and the Government of Angola.
In regard to the humanitarian situation, I wish to note that the World Food Programme has emphasized that its operations this year will succeed only in places where the security situation has improved and where targeted beneficiaries have been provided with sufficient arable land and agricultural supports such as tools and seeds. The programme for this year shifts its emphasis from emergency relief to encouraging greater self-reliance among the communities currently dependant on food aid for survival. In this regard, it is clear that the activities of agencies such as the World Food Programme have been made possible by the spin-off effects of the work of the Monitoring Mechanism and its predecessors.
In the final analysis, the measures and recommendations of the Monitoring Mechanism will be effective only if all Member States adhere to the terms of the sanctions regimes. Those who violate sanctions need to realize that by so doing they help to perpetuate violence and uncertainty in the lives of the majority of Angolans and put at risk the ability of the Angolan people to chart their own destiny and to put an end to the 30 years of conflict.
Mr. Eldon (United Kingdom)
It is extremely good to see you here today, Mr. President. A welcome also goes to the members of the Monitoring Mechanism, and thanks go to Ambassador Ryan for his very useful and comprehensive introduction to the debate.
It is right that the Council should be having this open debate today. The length of the speakers list alone testifies to the growing interest in the situation in Angola both in and outside the Council.
As the representative of Sweden will say later in the debate on behalf of the European Union -- a statement that we fully support and subscribe to -- we are all anxious to see a lasting peace in Angola and an end to the dire humanitarian and economic situation in the country, which itself has caused horrendous suffering and has contributed to instability in the whole region. More effective sanctions must be an important element of a solution. The pressure on Savimbi must be maintained.
But there is also much to do in terms of development, governance and dialogue among the people of Angola. We very much welcome the initiative taken by the Secretary-General in asking Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, his Special Adviser for Africa, to take a special interest in the situation in Angola. We call on all parties to the conflict to make every effort to assist him in his task. We look forward in particular to Mr. Gambari's next visit to Luanda later in the year, and we hope he will have a warm, fruitful and open-minded reception.
The remainder of my statement will focus on sanctions and the report of the Monitoring Mechanism. The United Kingdom very much welcomes the report. The Mechanism has worked hard and methodically over the past few months to produce a detailed document. Its findings on continuing violations of the United Nations sanctions against UNITA are extremely disturbing. The United Kingdom greatly welcomes the Mechanism's endorsement of a concept of a global certification scheme for rough diamonds.
Let me emphasize our strong support for last year's General Assembly resolution on conflict diamonds, which the United Kingdom co-sponsored, and our commitment to participating fully in international efforts to take this important work forward as a matter of priority. We want to see a simple, workable international framework in place at an early date, one which protects the legitimate diamond trade and enhances its reputation while dealing a deathblow to the illicit trade.
We note the Mechanism's recommendation that a continuous system of sanctions monitoring should be in place. We would support the creation of a dedicated capacity within the United Nations Secretariat to assist the sanctions committees and the Security Council in their work to ensure maximum effectiveness and implementation of sanctions. If there is to be a permanent monitoring mechanism, as Ambassador Levitte has suggested, it is vital that it should be properly resourced and staffed, with expertise in monitoring, implementation and enforcement. We have put forward proposals for the creation of a database of alleged sanctions violations and a database of experts who can advise the Secretariat on all aspects of sanctions, including the specific areas I have just mentioned.
We also fully support the Mechanism's recommendations that the sanctions Committee should continually update the list of senior UNITA officials and adult family members. It goes without saying that for this measure to be effective, it will be necessary for the Government of Angola to provide regular information to the Committee, to expand the list and to remove the names of those who appear on the list but have committed themselves to the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.
As others have said, the report usefully identifies a number of individuals and companies involved in sanctions violations, and a number of countries from whose territories such violations are taking place. The United Kingdom will look very seriously at any hint that United Kingdom citizens and companies might be involved in violating sanctions, and will investigate fully where necessary. We would urge other Member States to do the same and to ensure that violation of United Nations sanctions is a criminal offence in their domestic legislation.
We are alarmed by the malign role played by individuals such as Victor Bout in the illicit arms-supply chain. His name, for one, seems to crop up again and again. We call on the Governments of all Member States to ensure that their territory is not being used as a base for the operations of such people. As I have said before around this table, there should be no sanctuary for sanctions-busters.
In conclusion, the United Kingdom welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1336 (2001), extending the Mechanism's mandate for a further three months. We call on members of the Mechanism to use this time to probe further into all aspects of sanctions-busting. It is important in this context to identify specific instances of possible sanctions violations. The Mechanism must leave no stone unturned to focus the international spotlight on the dark and murky world of sanctions-busting.
Mr. Valdivieso (Colombia)
I would like to welcome your decision, Mr. President, to include this open debate on the Council's programme of work. I would also like to join other delegations in welcoming the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda. I would also like to thank Ambassador Richard Ryan of Ireland for presenting the report of the Experts of the Monitoring Mechanism, whose Chairman, Ambassador Juan Larraín, along with three other members of the Mechanism, honour us today with their presence.
An open dialogue on this issue is extremely useful to the Security Council because it gives us a chance to follow up the implementation of sanctions and to hear the views of countries accused in the report, while making all States aware of their responsibility to abide strictly by the sanctions regime under discussion.
The report of the Monitoring Mechanism suggests that the sanctions imposed on UNITA have reduced its capacity to wage war, but it warns us that we must remain alert due to that organization's great regenerative capacity. The sanctions regime against UNITA has some very unique characteristics: it is eight years old, involves six types of sanctions, is directed against a non-State actor and requires technical and professional monitoring. In the light of the recommendations made by the report of the Monitoring Mechanism, allow me now to make a few comments on each of these characteristics.
First, the fact that the sanctions have been in place for eight years is a telling sign of the rebel group's ability to survive, of the relative degree of commitment to the regime demonstrated by States, and of Angola's porous borders. It is sufficient to mention here that the network of arms traffickers and aircraft operators employed by UNITA is a legacy bequeathed by the protagonists of the cold war. Furthermore, a regional economy prospering in the shadow of the conflict has developed in areas bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia.
Secondly, the report gives us broad recommendations on the six types of sanctions, namely, those covering arms, oil, travel by leaders, flights, diamonds and finances. Although we support most of the recommendations, we would like to state explicitly our support for the following recommendations in particular.
Arms-exporting countries should be requested to institute effective controls on their exports to conflict areas, especially those under import moratoriums or Council sanctions.
An international certificate-of-origin system should be established for rough diamonds in order to keep conflict diamonds off the market.
National standards should be developed to impose sanctions on aircraft operators and pilots linked to the illicit transport of arms. This should be based on a list drawn up by the United Nations of firms, people and aircraft involved in that type of activity.
Thirdly, with regard to Angola, sanctions are directed against UNITA, a non-State actor, and not against the Government of Angola. In other words, the threat to international peace and security comes from an armed organization, not a State, that has not complied with the peace agreement it had promised to respect. This sort of situation requires well-oriented working methods within the Council, as well as firm action by States against structures providing political, military, economic and propaganda support to the organization.
With regard to violations, for example, some success has been achieved by the method of publicly "naming and shaming" the perpetrators of violations. The Monitoring Mechanism suggests to the Council the possibility of imposing sanctions on Governments that violate sanctions. We believe that doing so would run the risk of proliferating such measures, operating selectively and politicizing the sanctions regime -- something that could affect the credibility of the system itself. However, we would like to hear alternative ideas from other delegations on this matter.
Fourthly and lastly, I would like to make a comment on the technical knowledge required to improve the monitoring of sanctions against UNITA. We believe that the Council took a great step forward with the establishment in 1999 of the Panel of Experts, whose recommendations have supported the work of the sanctions Committee and of the Monitoring Mechanism. We are now considering the need to commission an investigation of UNITA's financial assets so as to reduce its ability to acquire arms. It is clear that a study of that nature requires technical knowledge, a great deal of experience and advanced technology.
We have two concerns, however. First, such a study runs the risk of leading the Council to gradually depend on outside bodies to monitor the sanctions regime. Secondly, it might reduce States' responsibility to carry out their own financial investigations and apply penal or administrative sanctions, as necessary. In particular, it could reduce the responsibility of States that are able to provide know-how, experience and advanced technology.
As a result, my delegation supports the proposal to set up a permanent monitoring mechanism for sanctions within the Organization. That would reduce the number of expert groups and increase the pressure to adopt national legislation against the violation of sanctions imposed by the Council.
I should like conclude by saying that it is crucial for States to firmly assume their responsibility for implementing sanctions. Without such cooperation, Council action would be ineffective, and the system would lose its credibility, in Angola as well as in other conflict areas in the world.
We would like to encourage the members of the Monitoring Mechanism to continue their work to promote international peace and help the people of Angola, the main victim of this long conflict. We would like to offer the Chairman of the sanctions Committee, Ambassador Ryan of Ireland, our best wishes for the success of his activities during his forthcoming visit to various African countries.
The President
I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Rwanda in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
Mr. Lavrov (Russia)
I would like to associate myself with the words of welcome to the Minister for External Relations of Angola and with the words of gratitude extended to Ambassador Richard Ryan for the statement he made at the beginning of our discussion.
As one of the observer States for the implementation of the Angola peace process, Russia, like the United States, fully associates itself with the statement to be made today by the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations, Ambassador António Monteiro, on behalf of the troika.
I should like to add briefly that we believe that the current sanctions against UNITA are the most effective instrument available for applying pressure, on behalf of the international community, on the combat wing of UNITA, headed by Savimbi. We are also convinced that peace in Angola can be restored only on the basis of the principles of the Lusaka Protocol. Together with other colleagues, we welcome the productive work carried out by the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA, under the leadership of Ambassador Juan Larraín, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1295 (2000). The report submitted to the Security Council will no doubt help to increase the effectiveness of sanctions against UNITA.
Russia, both in its national capacity and as a member of the troika, will promote concrete steps designed to ensure that all the members of the international community scrupulously observe Security Council sanctions against UNITA. This pertains, first and foremost, to those States neighbouring Angola. We will consistently pursue a policy to strengthen the effectiveness of such a regime and to enhance the United Nations Monitoring Mechanism, which has performed well.
Mr. Shen Guofang (China)
The Chinese delegation welcomes Mr. Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, who is present with us today. We would like to thank the Ambassador of Ireland for his introductory statement in his capacity as Chairman of the sanctions Committee. The Chinese delegation would also like to thank the Monitoring Mechanism for its outstanding work under the leadership of Ambassador Larraín.
The question of Angola has been on our agenda for a long time. The security and humanitarian situation remains grave, and it is seriously affecting peace and stability in the region. UNITA, headed by Savimbi, must bear the primary responsibility for this. China supports the Council in taking effective measures to enhance sanctions against UNITA so as to compel it to return to the peace process as soon as possible.
The Council's sanctions against UNITA have effectively contained the growth of its military strength, weakened its capacity to wage war and achieved other notable results. At the same time, it should be noted that UNITA, through transnational criminal networks, is still engaged in the illegal trade in diamonds and weapons and in related financial activities, such as money-laundering. Furthermore, UNITA is taking advantage of the loopholes in the regulation mechanisms of certain countries and regions, and it is continuing its activities in violation of the sanctions. In view of this, the Security Council should step up its work, formulate policies and further enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions against UNITA.
The final report of the Monitoring Mechanism provides a very detailed account of its investigation into, and an analysis of, the implementation of the sanctions in the areas of oil, weapons, travel, financial activities and diamonds. It proposes enhanced measures and targeted recommendations. China believes that the Council should seriously study and implement the recommendations contained in the report and thereby enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions against UNITA.
In conclusion, we call on all countries to truly implement the relevant resolutions of the Council and actively cooperate with the Monitoring Mechanism.
Mr. Kassé (Mali)
I should like first of all to welcome the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, who is with us today. I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this very important open meeting today in order to allow Ambassador Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, to present the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA. We would also like to thank Ambassador Ryan for his noteworthy statement, as well as the members of the Monitoring Mechanism for the work that they have accomplished. We congratulate them.
The Monitoring Mechanism concerning Angola has proved to be very useful, and we can now say that the sanctions imposed against UNITA have seriously undermined its ability to wage war on a large scale. This result should encourage us in our resolve to strengthen sanctions against UNITA as well as to strengthen the current sanctions control and monitoring system so that we can obtain better cooperation from States.
The final report that we are considering today covers the second stage of work of the Monitoring Mechanisms on Angola Sanctions and contains recommendations on specific areas on which I wish to comment.
First, my delegation believes that arms-exporting countries should strengthen their arms exports regimes in order to allow for better verification of the authenticity of relevant documentation and the issuing country. We feel that the responsibility for the proliferation and illicit distribution of small arms in Africa also resides with producing and transporting countries.
We support the proposed mechanism to improve the provision of end-user certificates necessary for arms purchases. We also encourage the establishment of a system for rapid information exchange and for verifying the validity of end-user certificates. An exhaustive inventory of firms involved as intermediaries for arms imports and exports would also contribute to improved awareness of those involved in that important aspect of sanctions.
For its part, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) recently renewed its moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa. We reiterate the appeal launched to the international community to support ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in their efforts to control the movement of light weapons. We also believe -- as stressed by the ECOWAS ministerial delegation at our meeting of 12 February -- that improving air surveillance, so as to give the States of the region the means to control their airspace in order to reduce and curb illicit arms trafficking, should be taken into account.
Secondly, we are in favour of extending the diamond certification system. Countries without the financial and technical resources necessary to implement the certificate of origin scheme should be assisted as soon as possible in establishing it. We also feel that a broader mechanism covering precious objects would have the advantage of allowing us to have a clear strategy with respect to all sanctions-busters. We also support the Kimberley process, the ultimate aim of which is to establish a standardized diamond certification system.
Thirdly, with respect to secondary sanctions against States that violate measures adopted against UNITA, my delegation feels that we can impose sanctions only once we have exhausted all other recourses and means at the Council's disposal. We welcome the idea of creating a follow-up system for the implementation of sanctions. While waiting to learn more about such a mechanism, we believe that any such system should cooperate fully with regional organizations, without which it will be very difficult to implement and properly follow up the implementation of sanctions. The opinions of regional organizations in this field should be taken into account.
Fourthly, my delegation welcomes the cooperation established between the Monitoring Mechanism and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS and some of its member States, which has allowed us seriously to address the issue of UNITA travel and representation in ECOWAS territory. We strongly encourage the continuation of this cooperation, which was long sought by ECOWAS.
We must keep in mind that UNITA's financial network remains the weak link in our Mechanism. Like others, my delegation is aware of the critical need to shed light on this issue and is determined to move forward in this area in order to put a definitive end to UNITA's military capacity. We believe that any approach to this important matter requires the full cooperation of States, especially those possessing the most advanced technology and the technical means necessary to expose UNITA's funds and financials assets.
I cannot conclude without stressing once again the need for the enhanced cooperation and total support of the United Nations and the international community for the preventive and peace-oriented efforts of the subregional organizations, such as SADC and ECOWAS, which are heavily involved in conflict management and without which it will be very difficult, despite the measures already undertaken, to achieve the peace we all long for.
Mr. Kolby (Norway)
My delegation joins others in welcoming the Foreign Minister of Angola to this meeting. We also thank Ambassador Ryan for his presentation.
Norway commends the Monitoring Mechanism for its thorough work and welcomes its report and recommendations on improving adherence to the sanctions regime against UNITA. The report is a vital follow-up to the adoption of resolution 1295 (2000). We welcome this opportunity to discuss the report in an open meeting, thus publicly focusing on the issues of arms and diamonds as they relate to the conflict in Angola. Before I go into specifics, allow me to make some general comments.
In Angola, every effort must be made to bring the peace process back on track. This includes supporting the Government's initiatives to implement the Lusaka Protocol, such as the amnesty law and the efforts to reintegrate former UNITA soldiers into Angolan society. Equally important is support for the various peace initiatives recently taken by the Angolan churches and civil society.
In the past, Jonas Savimbi and UNITA have demonstrated their ability to rebuild their forces. The Monitoring Mechanism describes how Savimbi set up his diamond activities to pay for rearmament. It further describes the importance to UNITA of petroleum and petroleum products and the significance of UNITA's representation abroad in relation to continued warfare. In light of the report's conclusion that the sanctions are hurting UNITA's ability to wage war, the need for continued sanctions is obvious. Obvious, too, is the need for improved implementation of the sanctions regime.
As we see it, finding a solution to the protracted conflict in Angola, as well as in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, represents two of the most important challenges facing the Security Council at present. In this connection, Norway encourages the Government of Angola to play a constructive part in the ongoing and revitalized process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We have carefully studied the recommendations included in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism. First, let me stress the importance of the general responsibility of Member States to implement the obligations laid down in the Security Council resolutions establishing sanctions. It is unfortunate that the United Nations sanctions measures are not fully followed up, as is evident from the present report and the earlier report of the Panel of Experts. Strict compliance with the sanctions by all Member States is needed in order to demonstrate to UNITA that it must fully comply with the Lusaka Protocol.
The illicit trade in arms, drugs or diamonds nurtures devastating conflicts in many parts of the world. The Monitoring Mechanism's report describes serious cases of illicit trade in diamonds and arms, contrary to the sanctions regime against UNITA. The report provides useful suggestions about how each State may further improve its implementation of the sanctions. These suggestions should be thoroughly considered.
The Government of Angola and other state authorities have taken important steps to gain control of the flux of illicit diamonds. However, more efforts are needed in order to provide increased transparency and accountability in the control of the trade in diamonds. As we recently said during the Council's open debate on sanctions related to Sierra Leone, Norway supports the idea of establishing a standardized global certification scheme for diamonds as soon as possible and we co-sponsored the General Assembly resolution of 1 December 2000 on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict.
Much remains to be done in order to strengthen the control systems in connection with the export and import of arms. The use of end-user certificates is essential in this regard. It is also important to ensure that documents are of such a quality that they cannot easily be misused or falsified. Close cooperation between Governments is necessary in order to allow for the effective exchange of information needed for verifying the validity of end-user certificates and other documents. A general improvement with regard to the circulation of small arms would help improve the security situation for both the civilian population -- including a huge number of internally displaced persons -- and humanitarian workers in Angola.
We welcome suggestions from the Southern African Development Community sectoral committees on how to control the movement of petroleum and petroleum products in the region. Specifically, the report has already made a positive contribution by encouraging African countries to comply with the sanctions regime regarding travel and representation by UNITA members.
Norway shares the concern of the Monitoring Mechanism that the Security Council resolutions on sanctions against UNITA are being broken with impunity. Through its recommendations, the report raises the question of imposing secondary sanctions. I will use this opportunity to make some general comments on the issue of secondary sanctions. We believe that we should exert caution with regard to this important but difficult issue. The need for thorough documentation before introducing secondary sanctions would entail complex assessments. Norway is of the opinion that secondary sanctions may only be imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on the grounds that non-compliance with the sanctions regime, either in itself or as part of a State or an entity's conduct, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
In order to make existing and future sanctions more effective, we find that the recommendation regarding the establishment of a general mechanism for monitoring the implementation of sanctions deserves serious consideration.
In conclusion, I would like to underline the importance of a concrete follow-up of the report and its recommendations. Norway will fully cooperate to this end. In this connection we are also glad that the Mechanism's mandate has been extended, and we are looking forward to seeing the results of the continued work.
Mr. Krokhmal (Ukraine)
My delegation welcomes the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola as he participates in the Security Council's meeting. We also would like to thank Ambassador Ryan, Chairman of the sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), for the important statement he made earlier today. The report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA is a well-prepared study that sheds light on the network of support for the activities of UNITA. We believe that the report, coupled with the investigation of UNITA's financial assets, is an important step in the right direction in disclosing the sources fuelling the conflicts in Africa.
We already had an opportunity to provide our views on the report at the meetings of the Angola sanctions Committee, so today I would like to comment on some of the most important points of that document.
My delegation informed the Committee about the visit of the Mechanism, headed by Ambassador Juan Larraín, to Kiev in September last year and expressed the satisfaction of the Government of Ukraine with the results of that visit. It is particularly encouraging that the Chairman of the Mechanism shared our positive assessments and also expressed his satisfaction with the exhaustive information provided by the Ukrainian authorities. As the members of the Mechanism stressed during the meeting in Kiev, the current export control system of Ukraine is an effective one and is consistent with international standards in this area. This, in fact, was confirmed in the report of the Mechanism.
I would especially like to express our satisfaction with the transparent and effective methods of work demonstrated by the Mechanism. Its representatives were able to check with responsible governmental bodies any relevant information and drew their conclusions taking into account the responses received from those concerned. My delegation strongly believes that the same approach should be pursued by any monitoring body to ensure a high level of cooperation with the States concerned and to help them undertake prompt and careful investigations and corrective measures if necessary.
After the visit my Government prepared additional information in response to the query of the Monitoring Mechanism and formally notified the Mechanism as to the results of that investigation.
After providing the additional information, as well as documents on illegal activities of some arms brokers, we are continuing to look into possible links of Ukrainian legal and physical persons with those disclosed by the Mechanism. As soon as we get any substantial data, we will immediately provide the relevant information to the Mechanism. Let me also take this opportunity to provide assurances of the willingness of the Government of Ukraine to undertake most careful investigations into alleged violations of sanctions against UNITA and to cooperate to this end with the Monitoring Mechanism.
Referring to the provisions of the report regarding the lack of familiarity of some Eastern European arms-producing countries with the official documents of the countries concerned, I would like to report that all deliveries of weapons and dual-use goods can be carried out in Ukraine only after the authenticity of end-user certificates is verified and political approval is received from the relevant export control body in the cases of such deliveries to the regions of special concern.
At the same time, we recognize the need to strengthen the existing mechanisms in the arms-importing countries and welcome the proposals to improve them in order to deter and prevent forgeries. Ukraine also sees a need to put in place systems to allow for the speedy exchange of information and verification of the validity of end-user certificates. The recommendation of the Mechanism concerning development of a register of brokers dealing with the import and export of arms also deserves our support.
Considering that UNITA representatives and senior officials abroad play a crucial role in assuring the continued existence and advancement of UNITA's political and military objectives and in maintaining its financial networks and assets, we believe that this matter should be followed up by the Mechanism with particular attention. We agree that the relevant requirements of Security Council resolution 1127 (1997) regarding travel restrictions on UNITA representatives should be fully implemented, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations under any other international agreements.
As far as the recommendations of the Mechanism on diamonds are concerned, we consider them as useful terms of reference. My delegation recognizes the need for improvements in the field of diamond certification and believes that national certification systems should meet the internationally agreed minimum standards. We note, however, that these issues are also being debated in other forums, and we consider that the relevant recommendations of the report should be reviewed in light of the developments and decisions to be taken within the Kimberly process. At the same time, I wish to stress that preventing the access of UNITA to world diamond markets must remain a priority task.
My delegation is in favour of strengthening control on aircraft operators to prevent them from circumventing sanctions. And I would like to inform the Council that Ukrainian authorities have already adopted legislation regulating the leasing of aircraft for the transport of weapons and military equipment. Apart from that, the legislation provides for criminal and administrative penalties for violations of the established regime of export and transport of weapons.
The de-licensing of pilots could be considered as an appropriate measure to ensure compliance with Security Council sanctions. While the adoption of such measures remains the sovereign prerogative of each Member State, the Security Council has an important role to play in encouraging States to take strong action with respect to sanctions violations.
In conclusion, I wish to reiterate my delegation's support for the activities of the Monitoring Mechanism in ensuring strict compliance with Security Council measures against UNITA and its readiness to provide any necessary assistance and information to that end.
Mr. Ahsan (Bangladesh)
Let me join previous speakers in welcoming to this meeting Foreign Minister Miranda of Angola. My delegation would like to commend you, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting. This gives us an opportunity to exchange views on the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against UNITA. We thank Ambassador Ryan for his presentation of the report earlier in this meeting. We also want to express our deep appreciation to Ambassador Juan Larraín, Chairman of the Monitoring Mechanism, and the team he leads for their valuable work.
Last April, the Security Council adopted resolution 1295 (2000) on the basis of the recommendations of the report of the Panel of Experts established by Security Council resolution 1237 (1999). The Panel was mandated to investigate violations of the sanctions, identify the violators and propose ways and means to make the sanctions more effective. It left some unfinished business, such as leads not investigated for want of time. In addition, the Monitoring Mechanism was also mandated to investigate any additional leads relating to allegations of violations of the measures and to collect additional relevant information. These tasks were aimed at improving the implementation of the measures imposed against UNITA.
Bangladesh welcomes the report, which is well-structured, with supporting information. We find that the method of work adopted by the Mechanism was suitable to the task. We are particularly happy that a strict evidentiary standard has been employed and that the views of concerned quarters have been reflected, as appropriate.
We have examined the Mechanism's recommendations with interest. In doing so, we see value in keeping in mind the recommendations of the Panel, as appropriate. Our comments, therefore, will focus on seeing where the Mechanism has advanced the cause.
In the area of the illegal arms trade, the work done on reviewing the export and import procedures of concerned countries, on current practices in the issuance of end-user certificates and on the uncovering of forged ones, as well as the profiling of firms or brokers involved in the export and import of arms, merits our appreciation. The latter, however, remains unfinished and should be a key task for the Mechanism in future. We cannot overemphasize the need for concerned States to strengthen legislation relating to the export and import of arms and to check for forged end-user certificates. The system of issuance of such certificates should be made more secure, and a mechanism should be set up to facilitate the verification of their authenticity by authorities in arms-exporting countries.
The issue of transport naturally arises when discussing illegal arms trafficking. The report vividly brings out the nefarious activities of individuals and the countries that collaborate with them. We support the recommendations relating to tighter controls on aircraft registration procedures and agree that aircraft used in sanctions-busting should be de-registered and their pilots de-licensed. Obviously, enforcement will be up to the concerned Governments.
The report argues that with the loss of secure areas inside Angola, UNITA increasingly has resorted to using its representatives abroad to maintain contact with dealers and to manage its external relations as a whole. The Mechanism found UNITA structures in certain European, Western and southern African countries as well as in the United States. While it is encouraging to note that most such countries have formally ended UNITA representation on their soil, UNITA continues to have a presence in some identified countries, using non-governmental organizations as fronts. Clearly, these actions are designed to circumvent the sanctions, and the States concerned have an obligation to prevent this.
Owing to their long stay in certain countries, some UNITA representatives have acquired nationality or permanent resident status there, along with rights that allow them to continue their activities and travel abroad. One problem identified by the report in this area is a conflict that appears for the member States of the Schengen Agreement -- a conflict between their national obligation to allow their nationals free movement across their borders and the international obligation flowing from the relevant Security Council resolutions. We believe that a way must be found out of this situation, in consultation with the concerned States. It has also been reported that travel documents issued by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been used by UNITA representatives. We believe that a regularly updated United Nations list of senior UNITA officials and their adult family members forms the basis for action to be taken by Governments for effective implementation of the sanctions relating to the ban on travel and on UNITA representation abroad.
The people of Angola have for a very long time lived in an unreal world, characterized by a great wealth of natural resources, contrasting with poverty and despair. Angola's diamonds have bred only suffering for its people and sustained the one of the longest-lasting conflicts in the world. In the report, the Mechanism, inter alia, traces the history of UNITA's diamond mining and its linkage to different phases of its military capability. The report also establishes details on the rough diamond export mechanisms that UNITA employed and the role that certain neighbours and individual brokers played in it. On the other hand, considerable statistics are provided in its follow-up on the Panel's work on diamond centres. However, the Mechanism realized that UNITA was able to hide most of its trade from the official statistics maintained in these centres. This necessitates the tracking of the origin of rough diamonds.
The Mechanism suggested that devising a global certificate of origin regime would resolve much of the problem of illicit diamond smuggling and protect the legitimate diamond industry. Supporting measures such as licensing diamond miners and buyers, profiling production from mines and recording the characteristics of diamonds from each mine will be required to settle disputes regarding the origin of diamonds. The Angolan single channel buying system (ASCorp) is a laudable effort towards this end. On the other hand, the standardization of statistics and custom codes by diamond centres will be useful for monitoring the movement of diamonds.
The work of the Mechanism helped to further enhance the Council's understanding of the ways and means employed by those violating the sanctions. It has become apparent that there remains some unfinished business that the Mechanism will have to address. Notwithstanding the ongoing nature of the process, we believe that it is vitally important to focus on tasks that should help close the loopholes and make the sanctions against UNITA more effective. On this understanding of its remaining tasks, we agreed to the three-month extension of the Mechanism's mandate. Before doing that, however, we were constrained to raise the issue of fair and equitable representation. We found it difficult to accept that no candidate from Asia was proposed for inclusion in the Panel of Experts or in the Mechanism.
The weakest aspect of the United Nations quest to curb UNITA's capability to wage war remains the funds and financial network. We believe it is important for the Council to have an insight into these matters in order to ascertain the extent to which they support UNITA's continued war efforts. Due to the technical nature of the work of tracing UNITA's assets and financial resources, the Committee agreed to the commissioning of a private firm for a feasibility study.
The report of the study and the need for further work are currently under active consideration in the sanctions Committee with a view to taking a decision. There may be a need to strike a balance between desirability and feasibility. The work of both the Panel and the Mechanism brings to the fore the issue of continuity in monitoring the implementation of sanctions. We welcome that in principle, and we look forward to further consideration of it in the Council.
We believe that no regime of sanctions can be effective unless Member States and all other relevant actors fulfil their obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. While we urge all concerned to act accordingly, the larger goal of bringing back peace and stability to the people of Angola should not be lost sight of. The international community has to guard against the appalling prospect of that people enduring a no-war-no-peace situation for an indefinite period, compounding the humanitarian crisis. Such situations are often left at the doorstep of the international community for resolution. That is why, alongside sanctions, a process of peaceful resolution of disputes and of genuine national reconciliation is what we encourage. The responsibility for this fully rests with the players at the national level. The work of the United Nations and of other humanitarian actors is essentially aimed at facilitating such a process in Angola, not at achieving a military solution.
Mr. Neewoor (Mauritius)
I would like first of all to thank Ambassador Richard Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, for his presentation of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions (S/2000/1225) this afternoon. We know how seriously Ambassador Ryan has been working since he took over the chairmanship of the Committee on Angola in January this year, along with the other members of his Committee, for the early examination by the Security Council of the report and the recommendations of the Monitoring Mechanism.
In the same breath, I wish to express our thanks to the former Chairman of the Angola Committee, Ambassador Paul Heinbecker of Canada, for his very able stewardship of the Committee last year. We take this opportunity to pay tribute to Ambassador Heinbecker's predecessor, Ambassador Robert Fowler, whose vision and dedicated work laid the foundation for the important work of the Monitoring Mechanism. We are very pleased to welcome Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, in our midst today.
My delegation has taken careful note of the report of the Monitoring Mechanism, and we fully endorse that report as well as all the recommendations of the Monitoring Mechanism. We are confident that the recommendations will help make a further dent in the capacity of the União Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) to acquire arms and logistics paid for through illegal exploitation of Angolan diamonds in order to wage war against the Angolan people, war which over so many years has inflicted so much misery on the population of Angola, has brought about a humanitarian disaster and has retarded the development process of the country.
We have no doubt that Mr. Jonas Savimbi knows full well that he cannot achieve a military victory in Angola. The reverses he has suffered recently are clear evidence of that. The only alternative open to him if he wishes to be a serious stakeholder in the political life of Angola is to renew his commitment to the Lusaka Protocol and to participate in its implementation.
The fact that Mr. Savimbi persists in waging civil war is a clear indication that his motive is other than to serve the cause of peace and stability and the well-being of the Angolan people. Indeed, it seems that it is the lure of Angola's diamond resources that principally motivates him.
Mr. Savimbi and UNITA have been a bad influence elsewhere in Africa. The misery the people of Sierra Leone are enduring is also attributed to the lure of diamonds and to the looting of the mineral and other natural resources of their country. We also know of the similar situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore, the destabilizing role of Liberia in Sierra Leone and Guinea has its motivation in taking advantage of conflict diamonds. It is reprehensible indeed that the greed of a few in Africa and elsewhere should cause so much suffering to so many people in the African continent. That cannot be allowed to continue.
The nefarious trade in conflict diamonds involves not only sellers, but buyers as well, in addition to other greedy beneficiaries who supply rebel forces with weapons paid for with blood money from the sale of conflict diamonds. It also involves many unscrupulous elements in the air and sea transport trade. The nexus includes not only private individuals and business persons but, in certain instances, even political leaders who allow their territories to be used as transit points for the movement of illegal arms and fuel to forces of senseless rebellions, all for the personal rewards they reap in the process. This is done with impunity, in violation of sanctions regimes established by the Security Council.
The Monitoring Mechanism, like the panels on Sierra Leone and on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed the leads and came up with very credible conclusions in that regard. We in the Security Council must go beyond the "naming and shaming" system to impose appropriate sanctions against those found guilty of complicity in sanctions-busting.
We strongly support the recommendations on setting up a global certification scheme for the diamond trade, as this would help make clear the difference between legal and illegal diamonds in that trade. We urge weapons exporting countries to further strengthen their control of arms exports in order to prevent their arms from reaching the forces of rebellion and destabilization against legitimate Governments. We also support strong action, as mentioned in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism, against aircraft, ships and persons in the transportation industry involved in busting embargoes on arms shipments. In this regard, in order that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can assume the responsibility for surveillance in the southern African region as proposed by the earlier Panel, we call upon the international community to provide the necessary financial and technical support to SADC without further delay.
Finally, we urge the countries where UNITA elements have sanctuary, and from which they provide support for the sinister designs of UNITA, to exercise stronger control over the activities of such elements so that the use of their territories does not constitute a factor in UNITA's perpetuation of the sterile conflict in Angola.
We warmly commend the Chairman and the members of the Monitoring Mechanism for all their work and their comprehensive report. My delegation supports France's proposal for the establishment of a permanent monitoring mechanism for all sanctions regimes and for sanctions-busting in particular. In the meantime, we support the extension of the Mechanism mandate for another three months.
The President
(Tunisia)
I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Tunisia.
I wish to welcome once again Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola, and express our happiness at having him among us, especially since I met him several times before in the context of the excellent bilateral relations between our two countries.
I wish to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Ryan, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, for his commendable efforts to secure effective sanctions against UNITA. We also welcome Ambassador Larraín and the other members of the Monitoring Mechanism, and we commend the efforts Ambassador Larraín is deploying as Chairman of the Monitoring Mechanism established pursuant to resolution 1295 (2000).
The armed conflict in Angola, which has gone on for a long time, is a source of grave concern to the entire international community. We emphasize once again that the responsibility for the continuation of this conflict in Angola lies squarely with UNITA and its leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, who refuses to fulfil his commitments and obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and to comply with Security Council demands. The effective implementation of the sanctions imposed on UNITA is one of the most important means of deterring UNITA and forcing it to desist from threatening peace and security in Angola and the entire region. Indeed, the efforts deployed by the Monitoring Mechanism enriched the first report submitted by the Panel of Experts to the Security Council on 15 March 2000, particularly because of its depth, solid arguments and compelling evidence of sanctions violations. The Monitoring Mechanism, in our view, whose mandate is set forth in relevant Security Council resolutions, supports the objective that the international community is seeking in this regard.
In this regard, we welcome the emphasis placed by the Mechanism on important aspects related to the comprehensive strategy to destroy UNITA supply sources, to limit its movements through its representation abroad and its network of officials and associates, to put an end to its acquisition of illicit arms and to pursue and dismantle all the international networks that, directly or indirectly, support UNITA efforts.
Regarding illicit trade in diamonds, one of the primary sources of funds for the rebel movements in Africa in general and in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular, we welcome the Monitoring Mechanism's recommendations relative to strengthening the certificate-of-origin system, which could focus on all international dealers in this field, emphasizing not only the secondary channels, which are no less dangerous in this respect, but also the States and the transnational corporations that deal in this commodity and that we think stand to benefit most from the illicit trade in diamonds.
The sensitive nature of the Monitoring Mechanism mandate obliges the Mechanism to carefully analyse and sift the information it receives, especially information related to the imposition of sanctions on States. In this respect, we believe it is essential to fully investigate and consider the principle of premeditation in the violation of sanctions imposed against UNITA. This, in our view, is important, particularly since most of the African countries cited in the report lack adequate means to monitor diamonds and arms in transit to UNITA.
Therefore, even though these countries remain fully committed to abiding by the sanctions imposed against UNITA, they may find themselves technically unequipped to deal with the diamond and weapon smugglers, whose capabilities exceed those of many countries, particularly African countries. It therefore becomes essential that we initiate dialogue with these countries to help them develop their monitoring capabilities so that we can limit UNITA's activity. This is a collective responsibility and a primary objective.
My delegation expresses its hope that the publication of some elements contained in the report will raise the awareness of the international community so that it will fully comply with the sanctions, implement them effectively and deploy all efforts to close all loopholes and to break supply lines to UNITA, in order to force it to fulfil its commitments.
In conclusion, on behalf of my country, I wish to welcome the Mechanism's recommendation that the Security Council consider the establishment of a system that will enable the continuation of sanctions monitoring. We also welcome the extension of the mandate of the Mechanism for three more months.
I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.
The next speaker inscribed on my list, whom I welcome once more on behalf of the members of the Security Council, is Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations of Angola.
Mr. Miranda (Angola)
Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on behalf of my Government, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate last month's President, Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani.
At this meeting, convened to discuss the second report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions established pursuant to resolution 1295 (2000), I wish to congratulate Ambassador Richard Ryan, and through him, the Republic of Ireland, on his election to the chairmanship of the sanctions Committee. We firmly believe that Ambassador Ryan and his team will undertake their mandate with the same commitment, dynamism and political courage as the team led by Ambassador Paul Heinbecker, whose work at the helm of the Committee deserves our appreciation and recognition.
Since their adoption, and despite continued reports of violations, the sanctions against the armed wing of UNITA, led by Mr. Savimbi, have proved to be a fundamental tool to persuade members of that organization to abandon the path of war and embrace the peace accords. The primary impact of the sanctions is clearly reflected in the significant reduction of the military capacity of the rebels. In addition to the internal measures taken by my Government -- in particular those measures in the political and military fields with a view to restoring order and State authority throughout our national territory -- the sanctions have left no other way out for the military wing led by Mr. Savimbi than to embrace the path of reason. Otherwise, history will judge him.
Events today are very clear to everyone. The number of former rebels joining the efforts for the national reconciliation and reconstruction of Angola is increasing daily. They are adhering to the amnesty law recently passed by the Angolan Parliament, which was initiated by President José Eduardo dos Santos. Accordingly, Angola today is experiencing a climate of greater political, military and economic stability. It has evolved gradually, which permits us to face the future with confidence and optimism.
It is in this context that my Government continues on the path of political and economic reform. It is currently engaged in creating conditions that will permit the next general elections to be held in the second half of the year 2002.
The report of the sanctions Committee submitted for discussion today enjoys the full support of my Government. It brings to light clear evidence of what the Fowler report has already stated and of what members of the Council have denounced and strongly condemned here in this Chamber. It is important that this investigative work continue; and for that reason we support the decision of the Council to extend the mandate of the Mechanism established under resolution 1295 (2000).
Despite the fact that systematic violations of sanctions are declining, some countries and entities continue to challenge the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the armed wing of UNITA and in the interest of peace in Angola and in the entire southern and central African region. We note with particular concern the involvement of the networks of organized crime operating in direct support of rebels in Angola. Given this situation, it is imperative that the Security Council reinforce the sanctions Monitoring Mechanism. It should also adopt concrete measures to combat the scourge of transnational organized crime networks in Africa today.
The United Nations and the international community must apply pressure to persuade the rebels to follow the path of peace, and should also consider strengthening the sanctions, as provided for in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1295 (2000). It is equally important that members of this body consider imposing measures against countries that continue to facilitate propaganda activities in favour of the armed wing of UNITA.
My Government supports completely the recommendations contained in the report and hopes that the members of this body will incorporate these measures in the decision to be taken next April.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to direct a word of appreciation to Ambassador Juan Larraín and his team of Experts for the quality of the report submitted to the Council. It is the product of a painstaking, in-depth and impartial investigation, and will surely contribute to the application of more effective sanctions so that peace and stability can take hold in my country.
The President
On behalf of the members of the Security Council, I should like to thank the Minister for External Relations of the Republic of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda. I would kindly ask him to convey our appreciation to the Government of Angola for its efforts to restore peace and stability in that country.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Burkina Faso. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
Mr. Kafando (Burkina Faso)
Before getting to the point of my statement, I must pay tribute to you, Mr. President, for the seriousness, competence and spirit of self-sacrifice with which you are so honourably carrying out your difficult responsibilities as President of the Security Council. Like your predecessor, Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani, to whom we would like to reiterate our sincere congratulations, you have brought your own style to your mission by essentially giving pride of place to such issues of major interest as the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Western Sahara, as well as to the problem of peace-building and the question of relations between the United Nations and regional organizations. I need not dwell on the quality of relations between your country and mine, Mr. President. Those relations have always been quite excellent.
This meeting of the Security Council is being held to consider the final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA. As we know, some of the report's conclusions concern my country. After reading the report carefully, it did not seem to us absolutely necessary to go into great detail or to indulge in any sort of polemics. We would therefore simply like to take note of the report, as we did with regard to the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone -- especially because we feel everything has been said through our various exchanges with the United Nations.
In order to clarify matters for the Council, it may be worth highlighting the fact that my country has worked harmoniously and in close cooperation with the Panel of Experts led by Ambassador Juan Larraín. The team itself can certify that during its two visits to Burkina Faso it carried out its activities with full independence and without any obstruction or hindrance. By working in that way we wanted to show and attest to the fact that our decision to cooperate fully with the United Nations was not taken lightly but was a genuine commitment on our part to help to resolve not only the question of Angola but all other crises that seriously compromise international peace and security.
Furthermore, that commitment has been supported by a series of concrete measures undertaken by the Government of Burkina Faso as a guarantee of its good faith and full readiness to cooperate.
Indeed, immediately after the appearance of the first report on Angola, an inter-ministerial committee was set up by presidential decree to follow up on sanctions against UNITA, with the express mission "to work towards the follow-up and implementation of United Nations sanctions against UNITA".
Article 1 of the order implementing that decree bans the entry into Burkina Faso of any Angolan nationals who are not on official mission under instruction from the Angolan Government. On the basis of a list of names provided by the United Nations, article 2 of the order prohibits the entry of 83 UNITA officials. Subsequently, again on the basis of a list provided by the United Nations, a further order added six more UNITA officials to the initial list of undesirable persons. This refutes the claims in paragraph 95 of the report. The suggestion that, despite the steps taken by the Government, certain UNITA officials are still in Burkina Faso, remains in the realm of hypothesis.
Other measures that I could mention include the governmental communiqué of 12 March 2000, firmly condemning UNITA; the decree of 27 October 2000 banning, throughout the territory of Burkina Faso, transactions in precious stones and metals that originate in conflict zones; and the creation of a high-level authority to monitor the import and use of arms by the Government of Burkina Faso, which is under the supervision of the United Nations. Furthermore, I have had the opportunity to study the report (S/2000/1195) on Sierra Leone, which also refers to that monitoring mechanism, which was greatly welcomed and hailed as exemplary. I should like to thank those friendly States that have expressed their readiness to help us in its implementation and functioning.
I have undertaken a minor exercise that has led me to form an idea of the number of countries referred to in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism: those that are clearly implicated and those that are referred using the subtle euphemism, "sensitive" countries, of which there are about 40. If we add to that observation the judgement of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone -- a judgement that, by analogy, can be equally applied to the case of Angola -- it should not be so easy to accuse any particular country. Indeed, in paragraph 165 of the report in S/2000/1195, the experts state that
"Throughout its work, the Panel was struck by the widespread breaking of Security Council sanctions on both weapons and diamonds."
Consequently, instead of continuing to accuse certain Member States, the Security Council, as the guarantor of international peace, should, with the cooperation of regional and subregional organizations and based on lessons drawn from the two reports, on Sierra Leone and on Angola, organize better monitoring of the traffic in diamonds, arms and related materials. We believe that the suggestions made by the Panel of Experts are worthy of interest.
The Security Council, through resolution 1336 (2001) of 23 January 2001, decided to extend for three months the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism. We are not against this, a priori, but we remain convinced that other investigations are pointless as long as we do not set up a permanent international mechanism that could guarantee continuous monitoring for follow-up of sanctions as decreed by the Security Council. In its final recommendation, the Panel of Experts came to the same conclusion, a point which many speakers have made here.
Burkina Faso fervently hopes that this recommendation will receive the closest attention.
In conclusion, I should like, on behalf of my country and my Government, to pay tribute to the Security Council for its foresight and wisdom in the exercise of its work.
The President
I thank the representative of Burkina Faso for his kind words addressed to me and to my country.
The next speaker inscribed on my list is our former colleague in the Security Council, the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.
Mr. Heinbecker (Canada)
I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this important meeting on the report of the Monitoring Mechanism on the sanctions against UNITA.
We warmly welcome the return to this Chamber of the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. João Bernardo de Miranda, and I should like to thank him for his earlier comments to us. His presence here is entirely appropriate. At issue is nothing less than the Council's commitment to the people of Angola. Also at issue is the credibility of the Security Council -- indeed, of the United Nations itself -- that is, all of us.
The members of the Monitoring Mechanism, under the leadership of Ambassador Larraín, are to be commended for the excellent and detailed report (S/2000/1225) that they submitted to this Council. Theirs is extraordinarily difficult work. They have done it well, with dedication and professionalism, despite the often frustrating disregard for their work by the apparently paralysed United Nations bureaucracy. All of us -- this Council and the Organization -- are in their debt.
The findings of the Monitoring Mechanism are entirely consistent with those of the Panel of Experts on Angola. Each report corroborates the other, despite having been prepared by separate groups of experts, appointed through different processes.
Mr. Heinbecker (Canada)
The report of the Monitoring Mechanism provides welcome reading insofar as it demonstrates that progress is being made and that some Member States -- Belgium and Bulgaria, for example -- have taken serious steps to correct the deficiencies identified by the Panel of Experts. The Governments of Belgium and Bulgaria, and the other Governments that have made a genuine effort to improve the implementation of the sanctions against UNITA, are to be commended. The purpose of sanctions enforcement monitoring is not to punish, but rather to ensure that the sanctions in question are being applied, that behaviour is being changed and that loopholes are being closed.
We also welcome the Monitoring Mechanism's conclusion that "there is no doubt that the sanctions... are hurting UNITA's ability to wage war" (S/2001/1225, para. 250).
The report provides distressing reading, however, insofar as it demonstrates that a small number of Member States have not been respecting the decisions of this Council regarding UNITA. Indeed, it is of particular concern that one Member State was cited not only by both monitoring bodies on Angola, but also by the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone -- that is, by three separate, independent groups of experts. Such action by a Member State constitutes a challenge to this Council and to this Organization, and therefore to us all.
In resolution 1295 (2000) of 18 April 2000, which was adopted unanimously, this Council formally expressed
"its readiness ... to consider appropriate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in relation to States it determines to have violated the measures" (res. 1295 (2000), para. 5)
against UNITA. An initial decision in this regard was to have been taken by 18 November, but that deadline was missed because of delays in the appointment of the Monitoring Mechanism, which we all remember. It is crucial, in our judgement -- both to the credibility of the Council and to the realization of the objectives for which the sanctions were imposed -- that this difficult decision be taken soon. In cases where the Council's decisions are deliberately flouted, the Council must not shrink from an appropriately vigorous response.
In our view, the imposition of secondary sanctions targeting the sanctions-busters is an entirely appropriate option to consider. Sanctions violators are well aware of their responsibilities and of the potential consequences of evading them.
Other options for Council action might include a requirement for States deemed to be in violation of the sanctions to report regularly to the Council on steps taken to comply with them. This could be supplemented by periodic visits to those States by delegations of Council members to ascertain that the remedial steps are adequate and have in fact been taken. The point is that violators should be censured by the international community until they comply with Security Council-imposed and internationally accepted standards of behaviour.
Resolution 1295 (2000) also took up the majority of the recommendations contained in the Panel of Experts' report and provided a blueprint for further action in each of the areas covered by the sanctions regime. When fully acted upon, these stand to further degrade UNITA's capacity to wage war by reducing its revenues, increasing its costs and choking off its supply.
Significant progress has been made in some of these areas -- for example, on conflict diamonds -- under the leadership of South Africa and other southern African producers, with the participation of the United Kingdom and other countries. The diamond industry has taken impressive preliminary measures of its own to reform its operations. These must be consolidated and built upon if the industry is to live up to its promise as a true partner in eliminating conflict diamonds.
Action in other areas is underway, including with regard to the implementation of arms embargoes. There will be a conference of experts convened by Canada and Hungary in the coming months and one by Switzerland on financial sanctions. The appointment by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity of an ad hoc committee to evaluate the implementation of resolution 1295 (2000) is especially welcome. We look forward to the committee's report, due this month. The Southern African Development Community is also seized at the ministerial level in the implementation of resolution 1295 (2000). That, too, is very welcome.
More remains to be done, by no means in Africa alone. The full implementation of resolution 1295 (2000) should be a priority for the Council. So, too, should be the early implementation of the additional recommendations contained in the report of the Monitoring Mechanism -- recommendations that we believe to be both realistic and achievable. The report of the Monitoring Mechanism emphasized new areas requiring Council attention, most notably the roles of arms brokers and air transport companies in sanctions violations.
In the course of our work as Chair of the Angola sanctions Committee for the past two years, the Canadian Government became absolutely convinced that enforcement monitoring is necessary if targeted sanctions are to work. Quite simply, if the Council is not willing to monitor and enforce its sanctions, there is no point in pretending to impose sanctions or in retaining them. The world can recognize fraud when it sees it. "Let's-pretend" sanctions make the world safe for perpetrators and tarnish the reputation of the United Nations. We therefore welcome the Council's decision to extend the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism, if only for three months, as evide
