Security Council meeting 4128

The President

I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Australia, Bulgaria, Cuba, Germany, Iraq, Italy, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The President

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation to the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The President

Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

I should like to draw attention to document S/2000/319, which contains the text of a note by the President of the Security Council concerning general sanctions issues, by which the members of the Council decided to establish on a temporary basis an informal working group of the Council to develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions.

I now give the floor to Mr. Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

Mr. Prendergast (Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs)

In recent years, Security Council sanctions imposed under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter have become a primary tool of peace enforcement. In a small number of cases, comprehensive sanctions have involved far-reaching trade and other economic measures. In others, sanctions have taken the form of arms and/or air embargoes, targeted travel bans or financial sanctions. However, difficulties in the implementation of sanctions regimes, especially those including economic sanctions, have raised doubts as to their effectiveness. Apart from the fact that measures are not always applied with the necessary determination, their often negative effects on civilian populations and on neighbouring and other affected third States, have made it imperative to consider improvements in their design. The Secretary-General has encouraged steps to make sanctions a less blunt and more effective instrument and has supported efforts to design better targeted measures.

If properly targeted, Security Council sanctions have the potential to play a major role in inducing compliance with resolutions of the Council. They may also be considered an instrument of prevention in those cases where they constitute a barrier to the spread of conflicts. They can restrict the inflow of weaponry and ammunition, as well as access to the hard currency necessary to fund continued fighting, and they can restrain the mobility of targeted individuals and decision-making elites.

Seeking to make its own contribution to the concept of "smart" sanctions, the Secretariat has undertaken a review of lessons to be learned from recent sanctions regimes. This review confirms the need to take steps to protect, in humanitarian terms, the most vulnerable segments of populations from the effects of sanctions, while at the same time sharpening the targeting of sanctions so as to enhance their impact.

The review also illustrates that the effectiveness of sanctions regimes can be improved if they are endowed with a credible monitoring arm, possibly in cooperation with regional or subregional organizations. Moreover, there is a need for the Secretariat to be equipped with the necessary resources and specialized expertise if it is to administer the sanctions regimes effectively. The Security Council and its sanctions committees should be in a position to have available to them, when required, a comprehensive impact assessment of any given sanctions regime. This would make it possible to undertake necessary adjustments to the measures imposed in order to maximize their political impact and to minimize their collateral effects.

As regards the need to minimize the negative effects of sanctions, the Council may wish to consider including provision for humanitarian exemptions in relevant resolutions. The establishment of an appropriate mechanism able to provide the Council with periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of sanctions as well as their humanitarian, socio-economic and political impact may also be considered useful. The issue of the impact of sanctions on third States should be looked at in keeping with Article 50 of the Charter.

The Secretariat has provided substantive support to efforts by Member States to move in the direction of targeted or so-called "smart" santions. In addition to a range of other activities, it cooperated with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union in convening the Copenhagen Round Table, which took stock of lessons learned from the now-terminated sanctions regime in the case of the former Yugoslavia. The report of the Round Table, including its recommendations, was made available to members of the Security Council in document S/1996/776.

A number of conclusions and recommendations can be drawn from the lessons learned by the Secretariat.

First, the Security Council could facilitate the administration and implementation of sanctions regimes by developing greater clarity and uniformity of language and technical terminology in its resolutions. When financial sanctions are imposed, for example, the relevant resolutions could employ technical terms that conform to standard definitions in the global financial sector. Specific suggestions for such terms were developed as part of the Interlaken process organized by the Swiss Government in cooperation with the United Nations Secretariat.

Greater specificity of terms is equally important with regard to arms embargoes. To prevent loopholes that can be exploited by arms traffickers, it would be helpful if Security Council resolutions could specifically prohibit particular types of military equipment, military assistance programmes and military contract services. A registry of dual use technical products and services should be published for each arms embargo case. The registry could be derived from existing databases that have been developed as part of the Wassenaar Arrangement controlling proliferation of conventional arms.

Along with greater precision in technical terms, it would be helpful if Security Council resolutions could also specify criteria for the lifting or suspension of sanctions. By clearly spelling out in all cases the steps required for compliance, the Council would improve the prospects for inducing compliance and encouraging negotiations for the settlement of a dispute.

May I also say that whenever the Security Council imposes sanctions and establishes new sanctions committees, it would be helpful if the necessary resources should be made available. Forgive me for stressing this point, but without the necessary resources it will not be possible to implement and administer such regimes effectively. Budgetary allocations should include provision for securing the technical expertise necessary to conduct investigations or assessment missions and to support the monitoring and enforcement efforts of regional and sub-regional organizations.

Greater transparency and improved interaction with national authorities could further enhance the work of the sanctions committees. The committees have developed cooperative monitoring and enforcement arrangements with relevant regional organizations, such as the OSCE, the European Union and the Economic Committee of West African States (ECOWAS). Such arrangements should be considered with other bodies, when appropriate, with a view to improving the effectiveness of sanctions.

Developing more effective Security Council sanctions policies does require specialized staff to support the sanctions committees. This may seem a statement of the obvious. But I would nevertheless like to place on record that greater technical expertise and enhanced analytical capacity would enable the Secretariat to manage a credible monitoring system, in cooperation with Member States and regional organizations, and periodically to assess the impact of the sanctions measures.

In our view, special attention should, be given to better and more reliable data collection and specific forms of expertise on international finance, arms transfers and commodities such as oil or diamonds. The investigation of sanctions compliance could be aided by the creation of permanent databases and registries on past sanctions violations. It could also be facilitated by direct relations with international financial institutions and regional banking agencies, competent regional inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and also research centres.

May I now turn to the role of Member States. It is important to recall that national authorities bear the responsibility for enforcing sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council. However, Member States do often require advice and assistance in carrying out this responsibility. With the necessary resources, such advice and assistance could be provided, upon request, by the United Nations and by competent regional organizations. The Security Council would encourage State compliance by devoting greater attention to mitigating the negative effects of sanctions on civilian populations and third States. Providing support and inducements for neighbouring States would greatly enhance the potential effectiveness of sanctions.

The Security Council may also wish to consider taking steps to assist Member States, upon request, in developing greater legal authority and administrative capacity for implementing sanctions. Model language that could enable interested Member States to make the necessary adjustments in their domestic laws and regulations to permit compliance with Security Council sanctions was developed as part of the Interlaken process.

The need for greater capacity within States is especially acute with regard to the enforcement of Security Council arms embargoes. The Secretary-General's reports of 1998 and 1999 on the situation in Africa, as well as Security Council resolution 1196 (1998), urged Member States to enact legislation making violations of United Nations arms embargoes a criminal offence. This would be an essential tool for rendering arms embargoes effective.

That the Security Council has recently taken steps to address some of the needs of civilian populations in targeted countries is to be welcomed. The Council is now more inclined towards adopting "smart" sanctions which impose coercive measures on specific decision-making groups while avoiding direct impact on the vulnerable. There is also a widespread recognition of the need to minimize economic and social problems for third States, especially neighbouring States and those States that have significant trade relations with the target.

In our view it is essential that the United Nations system should develop a coordinated and integrated approach designed to minimize unintended consequences on civilian populations and third States. To this end, I would recommend that the Council consider authorizing the Secretariat to dispatch assessment missions to the targeted States and neighbouring countries either before sanctions are imposed or shortly thereafter. The aim would be to assess the likely unintended consequences of the sanctions and to propose measures that the Council and the United Nations system could take to minimize them. Suggestions for humanitarian exemptions and assistance programmes should be included in such assessment reports.

The Security Council may also wish to consider including in its resolutions provisions to address the impact of sanctions on non-targeted States and mitigate Article 50 concerns. Practical assistance arising from Article 50 could be addressed through special arrangements with individual neighbouring States and through donors' conferences to identify possible forms of financial assistance and support for non-targeted States.

In conclusion, may I say that the administration and effective implementation of sanctions regimes require the commitment of adequate resources. The resources to be made available should be weighed against the cost either of using military force or of doing nothing in the face of aggression and other threats to international peace and security. Security Council sanctions can be effective, but they will work only if the United Nations and its Member States are prepared to shoulder additional responsibilities and to develop the necessary capacity to ensure their monitoring and enforcement. Let me, in this context, recall the Secretary-General's appeal to the Millennium Summit, contained in the concluding chapter of his report for the Millennium Assembly, for us to resolve to adopt measures

"to make economic sanctions adopted by the Security Council less harsh on innocent populations and more effective in penalizing delinquent rulers." (A/54/2000 para. 365)

The attention given to this issue, as others I have touched on this afternoon, by Member States in recent years presents us with an excellent opportunity to take up this challenge and to ensure that all sanctions imposed by the Security Council achieve their goals with a minimum of unintended consequences.

The President

I would like to thank Mr. Prendergast for his comprehensive briefing.

Mr. Ahmed (Bangladesh)

Sanctions should remain the last option for ensuring compliance with Security Council decisions for maintenance of international peace and security. It is undeniable that a general feeling of unhappiness prevails about the way sanctions are being applied now. The Council's credibility is questioned if we do not do sanctions right. If they have little effect, or worse, if they continue to have the wrong and unintended effects on the innocent, that makes a strong case for the refinement of sanctions.

It is in this context that we welcome the initiative of constituting a working group for developing recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. We thank the delegation of Canada for its contribution in successfully leading the negotiations for finalizing the terms of reference for the group. We also deeply appreciate the personal interest which you, Mr. President, have shown in the matter.

Bangladesh supports the list of issues that should be taken up by the working group as contained in the draft terms of reference. For us, these issues of concern fall into four general categories. The first is how to design a sanctions regime that would be effective but at the same time would have minimal or no unintended effects. Our understanding is that comprehensive sanctions tend to have more unintended effects, and targeting is essential. The working group has to look into the details of how this general understanding can be translated into individual cases. We have to find more ways to ensure and encourage targeted States and non-State actors to comply. The question of humanitarian exemptions has to be looked into in a much more detailed manner than it has been so far.

The second category is how to strengthen institutional capacity to understand better what works and what does not, as well as to design, implement and monitor the sanctions regime effectively. It goes without saying that the capacity of the Secretariat needs to be strengthened, and here better coordination is useful. Assessments of the impact and effectiveness of sanctions on a regular basis is a must. The sanctions committees need to be energized more with the means to effectively monitor implementation and address alleged violations.

The third category is how to ensure adequate resources. The whole question of assessed or voluntary contributions should be addressed. The answer would not be clear-cut either for one or the other. We have to keep all sources in mind and look for inclusive solutions. If resources cannot be mobilized, the implementation of sanctions regimes will always remain imperfect.

The fourth category is how to involve United Nations Members and other actors more effectively. There is a need to provide United Nations Members with technical knowledge for updating or enacting national legislation and enhancing institutional mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, in particular to prevent illicit arms traffic, impose travel bans and identify violations of financial sanctions. Cooperation among the United Nations, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations would doubtless be useful.

In conclusion, let me say that important work has been done in many of the areas identified in the draft note. The working group would have to work out the details and come up with useful and comprehensive recommendations. It is encouraging to know that the working group would be tapping the expertise and knowledge that exist both within and outside the United Nations system. We look forward to contributing to the work of the group.

The President

I thank the representative of Bangladesh for his kind words.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom)

We appreciate your presence, Mr. President, and your upfront leadership at this meeting.

We could have quite a long exchange about sanctions, but the analysis has been largely completed in the series of excellent seminars and workshops over the past two years and in academic works like The Sanctions Decade by Lopez and Cortwright. So what this session should do is lay the basis for a revised Security Council approach.

The case for the use of sanctions remains compelling. Apart from the threat of or the use of force, they are -- in their full range, from travel bans at one end to comprehensive economic embargoes at the other -- the only coercive measure available to the international community to respond to threats to international peace and security. We need them to bring into line those States and regimes which breach the boundaries of acceptable behaviour, defy the international community and ignore diplomatic efforts.

It is essential for the Council to take the initiative to refine this powerful instrument and improve its effectiveness. The United Kingdom welcomes the decision of Council members to establish a working group to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. Their mandate is a challenging one. The working group should take account of the conclusions and recommendations of the series of seminars. The United Kingdom will not only play a constructive role in the group, we will be prepared, if Council colleagues approach the task in the same spirit, to acknowledge where the Council has underperformed in the past and where sanctions have failed to produce the right results. The Secretary-General said this morning at the International Peace Academy seminar,

"Getting sanctions right has often been a lesser objective than getting sanctions adopted".

We have here an important opportunity to upgrade United Nations effectiveness in the maintenance of peace and security, to deter more powerfully those who are tempted to use force illegitimately to secure their political objectives and to alleviate the damaging side effects among the innocent and the vulnerable.

The United Kingdom will feed its detailed ideas into the working group. Briefly, sanctions regimes adopted by the Security Council should, ideally, present clearly defined and realistic objectives and a clear exit strategy; ensure consistent application by describing clearly the precise scope in terms of goods and services sanctioned; devise a workable mechanism to achieve the objective; provide for regular review of implementation; provide scope for flexibility and graduation up and down the scale in response to the target's reactions; set out effective arrangements for enforcement by all States, but especially neighbours, and take into account the resources and the national legislative action required; and, lastly, devise from the beginning ways of protecting the innocent from unintended consequences while maintaining the intended impact of the sanctions themselves.

There has been much discussion of "smarter" sanctions. I hope that modern technology will be able to help us in the financial arena. I rather suspect that the fox will be able to stay ahead of the hounds in this particular hunt, but it is a vital area. Since money is such a slippery commodity, let us see where we get to with diamonds and with arms. They will be difficult enough, as the case of Angola will show us. Again, the United Kingdom thanks Canada for the leadership it has shown in implementing sanctions against UNITA to provide us with momentum in our wider tasks.

The role of the sanctions committees is, as we have seen, the key. Their chairmen have a particular responsibility, but all Council members have to be prepared to put themselves out in support. We need experienced and energetic help also from the Secretariat, and the General Assembly must be prepared to authorize the resources necessary for a properly equipped and properly staffed sanctions unit headed by a senior officer. The system has to be capable enough to tap into national facilities for information and investigation. In the end, our aim must be to have as effective an international effort on sanctions-busting, including illegal arms flows, as we are beginning to have on drugs, terrorism and money-laundering. Does anyone think that is asking for too much?

I believe that if we invested in such an international capability on sanctions, and if Member States as a whole carried out their obligations in support, the United Nations Charter would be more widely respected in practice and conflicts would occur less frequently. We would all gain.

The President

I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Cunningham (United States)

My Government heartily welcomes this discussion of sanctions policy. Our shared objective should be the design and implementation of effective sanctions regimes that promote desired results. It is our hope that the informal working group on sanctions, which we are establishing today, will help us go in that direction.

Sanctions effectively designed and implemented offer an important instrument for the international community to use to counter threats to international order. They represent an alternative to even more coercive instruments, including military force. We should recognize without apology that sanctions themselves are clearly coercive measures. Neither military intervention nor the application of sanctions are undertaken lightly, nor should they be.

Members of the Security Council have a unique responsibility to promote peace and security. It remains an unfortunate and tragic characteristic of our time that some States, or elements within States, engage in activities that must be countered promptly and aggressively to protect those who are threatened or those who are unable to protect themselves.

We all agree, I think, that sanctions are not an end in themselves. They are a means, recognized in the Charter, of expressing the will of the international community to end unacceptable behaviour. To be effective in forcing behavioural change, sanctions must be credible and enforceable. Sanctions imposed for principally symbolic reasons are unlikely to change the behaviour of the sanctioned entity and may indeed undermine the overall viability of sanctions as an alternative to military force.

Today's discussion and our continuing work will be valuable if they promote agreement that can guide subsequent efforts to design and implement sanctions regimes that address the unique nature of specific threats to international security as they exist in reality. Any overly precise one-size-fits-all structure is destined to fail and will waste valuable resources. To be effective, sanctions regimes must be carefully tailored to the particular situation in which they are to be applied. That said, we can certainly identify a number of principles that will have relevance to any potential application of sanctions.

First, we agree, is the need to anticipate and minimize the unintended impacts of sanctions on elements of the population of the targeted State, on neighbouring States and even on other, far-removed, entities. The complete elimination of unintended impact is an impossible goal and hence not an aspiration that can be met. But the design and implementation of effective sanctions should consider the minimization, management and mitigation of unintended impacts, especially on vulnerable sectors of the population, while acknowledging that they cannot be eliminated entirely.

Next is the need to improve the capacity of the United Nations -- especially the Security Council -- and its Member States to implement sanctions regimes once they are imposed. The Canadian delegation, under the leadership of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Axworthy, and of Ambassador Fowler, has stimulated innovative techniques in this regard, and we commend them for this. The Secretary-General and many others have made very valuable recommendations for improving sanctions implementation, and we look forward very much to working with them. At the same time, the commitment of national authorities to sanctions enforcement is obviously critical. Action by those authorities to address activities by sanctions violators within their borders should have high priority.

Thirdly, as we seek improvements to effectiveness and as we seek to minimize unintended impact, we should keep in mind that sanctions are designed to force an end to behaviours or policies judged to be unacceptable. The goal is compliance, and the requirements should be clear. To be effective, sanctions regimes must clearly enunciate the standards by which alterations to that unacceptable behaviour will be measured. The termination of sanctions should be directly and transparently linked to confirmation of the changed behaviour. In some cases, it may be possible and appropriate to link suspension or relaxation of elements of a sanctions regime to progress towards changed behaviour. In all cases, however, once sanctions have been imposed, it is essential to place the burden of proof regarding their suspension or termination where it properly belongs: on the demonstrated behaviour of the sanctioned entity. Just as sanctions must never be lightly entered into, they should not be terminated due to a lack of resolve, a lack of will or a lack of patience. For down that path lies a more dangerous future for many of the countries represented in this Chamber, a future in which the instruments available to the Council and to the international community are fewer and less credible.

The United States is fully committed to supporting the efforts of the Security Council's sanctions working group, the Secretary-General and others in a serious effort to analyse options, develop guiding principles, and monitor and adjust ongoing sanctions efforts. As that important process continues, we also remain firmly committed to ensuring that the Council retains its ability to act swiftly and with determination to counter current and future threats. The United States will be an active and engaged participant in a genuine effort to strengthen and streamline sanctions policy that supports the ability of the United Nations to meet its Charter obligations to enhance international peace and security.

Mr. Levitte (France)

I wish first of all to thank Mr. Kieran Prendergast for his very precise and specific statement; it constituted the best introduction to our discussion.

It is good that the issue of sanctions is today the subject of public debate in the Security Council. Our debate is an extension of the recommendations of the General Assembly on this issue. It is particularly timely because the question of how best to hone the tool of sanctions to make it more effective is at present the subject of a number of seminars.

The Security Council has imposed sanctions 12 times since 1990, while it had done so only twice before then. Following what some have called the decade of sanctions, the Security Council is justified in attempting to assess the results of this policy and to formulate guidelines for the future.

Sanctions are a legitimate instrument whose use is governed by the Charter. They allow us, when faced with a threat to the peace, to take intermediate measures, between simple political pressure and the use of force. In other words, they allow the Council to demonstrate its determination that its decisions should be enforced, without going so far as to use armed force. It is thus essential to maintain the Council's capacity to have recourse to sanctions when necessary.

When used well, sanctions have proved to be an effective tool for achieving the aims the Council has set for itself. They played a significant role in South Africa's decision to abandon the apartheid regime. The imposition of sanctions against Libya led that country to cooperate with the legal systems of the countries concerned. The sanctions against UNITA contributed to isolating and weakening that movement. The Council is now trying to make these measures more effective and to see to it that they are universally applied. Lastly, for many years sanctions have obliged Iraq to comply with most of the demands stipulated in resolution 687 (1991).

We must nevertheless note that in many cases our Council has experienced failure. In particular, when excessively prolonged, comprehensive sanctions regimes have a human cost that outweighs the benefits the Council can expect. These sanctions are cruel to people and have little impact on leaders. The effects of comprehensive sanctions often run counter to the desired goal and permit leaders of targeted States to tighten their grip over society by virtue of the isolation in which their country is kept and the increased dependence of the population on the existing regime. Finally, these sanctions indiscriminately affect the regime's supporters as well as those trying to oppose it.

Comprehensive sanctions also have a negative impact on neighbouring States, whose cooperation is nevertheless indispensable. Our Council has often deplored the many violations of sanctions regimes. But we must also realize that this phenomenon is partly due to the fact that the economic impact of sanctions on third countries is not sufficiently taken into account. The case of Jordan in 1990 is the only example of a concrete decision by the Security Council to help a country face such difficulties. Too much embargo kills the embargo.

If sanctions sometimes have little effect, responsibility also lies with the institutional arrangements that accompany them, particularly at the United Nations. In this regard, we should consider how the Secretariat and the sanctions committee might do more and better in this area. It is first of all essential for the Secretariat to have the necessary expertise, especially with regard to the arms trade, financial assets and customs work. This requires an increase in its human and financial resources. It should be able to play a real role in making proposals and following up on them. The Secretariat should be in a position to assess the impact of sanctions and the humanitarian situation in targeted countries. It is not normal that after 10 years the Security Council has only scant information on the situation in Iraq.

The way committees work must also be modified. The rule of consensus is paralysing. Nothing in the Charter or in resolutions of the Council requires committees to take their decisions by consensus. The adoption of decisions by simple majority, at least for non-essential questions, could suffice. Transparency is also a concept that sanctions committees too often ignore. Third States and targeted States are not invited to speak before the committees. Measures were planned to that end but have not been applied. Proposals have been made but have been rejected by certain members. Even briefings by representatives of United Nations agencies are often problematic. It is essential that the practice of hearing outside speakers be the norm.

Well-founded criticism of sanctions might lead to an overall questioning of their legitimacy. We want to avoid this development because we believe in the relevance of this tool. So what can be done? France would like to propose three complementary approaches.

First, it would be wise not to use this instrument lightly. Sanctions must remain an instrument reserved for exceptional cases and only after other possibilities for peaceful settlement have been used. Gauging their impact -- especially the economic and social effects -- on civilians should be done systematically. We regret that this practice, which has been repeatedly recommended, has never been implemented. Cases in which the imposition of sanctions is feasible must be strictly interpreted. The measures referred to in Article 41 of the Charter may be used only to maintain or restore international peace and security. For example, we are not in favour of sanctions being applied solely because it is alleged that certain States are not complying with sanctions decided upon by the Security Council. It is obviously imperative that all Member States of the United Nations comply with the sanctions regimes imposed by the Council, which are mandatory; but other, more effective means exist to enforce the Council's decisions. We should avoid increasing the number of sanctions regimes. The United Nations already has the greatest difficulty in securing compliance with those currently in force.

Secondly, we must take care that the measures decided upon are in proportion to the situation and that sanctions are adjusted with regard to developments in the political situations they are supposed to correct. It is therefore necessary to evaluate their appropriateness throughout the time they are in force. No sanctions regime can work if it does not encourage the targeted State to amend its attitude. The logic behind sanctions is not punitive, but rather to provide an incentive. We therefore believe it is essential to define beforehand clear criteria which, once met, would lead to an easing of sanctions. For sanctions to remain a credible instrument, the Security Council, or some of its members, must not give the impression that sanctions will remain in force regardless of the attitude adopted by the State concerned. Although it is indisputable that since 1990 Iraq has complied with some of its obligations, the Security Council has never seriously examined the possibility of reducing the sanctions against this country, although this is provided for in paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991).

Thirdly, the problem of the duration of the sanctions has to be addressed. Some sanctions have not been lifted even though the circumstances that caused them to be adopted no longer exist. Others are no longer applied, without this prompting any reaction from the Council. The credibility of sanctions suffers as a result.

In order to ensure periodically that the tool remains legitimate, sanctions should be decided on for a specific period. There should be a provision that at the end of this period the Council is invited to take a new decision to renew the sanctions. Experience has shown that the international community's support for certain sanctions regimes wanes because keeping them depends on the resolve of a very limited number of Council members. This can only strengthen the intransigence of the target State.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General's penetrating analysis in his millennium report, which I commend, should provide inspiration for the Security Council. The sanctions should be better targeted and be "intelligent". An effort has been made in a number of cases but "unintelligent" sanctions still persist. We hope that the Security Council's informal working group effectively chaired by Canada, which has drafted a code which we fully endorse, will be bolder not only with regard to future sanctions but also for those regimes still being applied.

The President

I thank the representative of France for his kind words.

Mr. Yel'chenko (Ukraine)

I would like to start by expressing our satisfaction at seeing you, Sir, the Foreign Minister of Canada, a country which is a good friend and partner of Ukraine, presiding at a meeting of the Security Council. I would also like to express our appreciation to you and to the Government of Canada for your initiative to hold this important debate on the general issues of sanctions. Let me assure you of the full intention of my delegation to support you in bringing this discussion to a meaningful result.

The question of how to improve the work of the Council in the area of sanctions is not a theoretical one. The increased number of sanctions regimes and, as a result, the growing diversity of their forms and purposes make us take a critical look at the experience gained. Recent studies in this area show that the majority of the sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council during the 1990s have had predominantly moderate to low, or even zero, political effectiveness. The time has come to carry out an analytical review of the existing policy and practices in the field of sanctions, to address specific issues of sanctions management and their effectiveness and to formulate general approaches to future decision-making on sanctions.

Ukraine shares the view that sanctions should not be a substitute for the established and recognized measures used for settling international disputes and resolving conflict situations. We believe that imposition of sanctions should follow, not precede, other peaceful means of settling disputes as provided under international law and the United Nations Charter. Sanctions, however, will and must remain a necessary and an important policy instrument in the hands of the Security Council. As stated in annex II to the well-known General Assembly resolution 51/242 "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace",

"An effectively implemented regime of collective Security Council sanctions can operate as a useful international policy tool in the graduated response to threats to international peace and security."

At the same time, it is important to recognize that sanctions represent extreme measures. In some cases, they can potentially have effects equal to or even more severe than those of war.

These are important considerations that will guide the delegation of Ukraine in further deliberations of the Security Council on this issue. We hope that its outcome will further contribute to an effective and comprehensive approach to sanctions imposed by the Council. We need it if we want to encourage full cooperation and mutual assistance in the implementation and enforcement of sanctions regimes and other measures imposed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. We need such an approach if we really want to minimize unintended effects of Council sanctions on both target and non-target States. And we need it, after all, to mobilize wider support by the whole international community, thus strengthening the powers and the authority of the Security Council and upholding its overriding responsibilities under the Charter.

More than a year ago the Council adopted the note of the President of 29 January 1999 containing a number of practical recommendations to improve the work of sanctions committees. Recently the Secretariat submitted to us information regarding the implementation of these recommendations. It clearly shows that not all of those recommendations, as moderate as they are, have been properly implemented, and there remains much to be done in this direction.

We note that many questions related to sanctions policy have been addressed in a number of forums, including at the non-governmental level. Certain important aspects of sanctions have been dealt with by the General Assembly. A substantial amount of work, including various symposia, seminars and research, has been done outside the United Nations system. One of the most recent examples is the First Expert Seminar on Smart Sanctions organized by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion. This morning many of us had an excellent opportunity to participate, at the initiative of the Canadian presidency, in a very interesting seminar on sanctions organized by the International Peace Academy. All such meetings undertake careful study of the most acute questions related to sanctions planning, management, implementation, et cetera, and produce very useful analytical reports. Nevertheless, this work should also be done in the framework of the Security Council. The focus of these activities should be shifted to the Council to debate and outline general policy in the field of sanctions.

This brings me to another point I would like to make. We need significant technical and administrative improvements within the United Nations system, as well as among Member States, to enhance sanctions management and effectiveness. We believe that this work should start with the Security Council itself. We also consider that unless a constant forum within the Council to address these issues is established, our efforts will remain fragmental and inconsistent.

This was the very idea behind our recent proposal to create a standing Security Council sanctions committee entrusted with the task of outlining the general policy in this field. We believe that such a body would become a most appropriate arrangement for the Council to deal with sanctions -- if not for the immediate, but for a more distant perspective. While recognizing the extent of the practical implications of the implementation of this proposal, we hope that it will remain on the table as one of the open options.

In our view, the work of all Security Council sanctions committees should be assisted by a more substantive expertise on the part of the Secretariat. It should go far beyond the traditional functions of servicing of committee meetings and other procedural aspects. The problem of sanctions is generally recognized as a multidisciplinary issue. It is, first and foremost, an economic issue; it is a political issue, it is a military issue, and it is a humanitarian issue. Consequently, the Secretariat should be expected to provide expertise in all those areas, coupled with a qualified synthesis of all of them. The Secretariat should enhance its capacity to monitor sanctions and carry out analytical functions. This can be done in a number of ways, first of all through strengthening coordination between different parts of the Secretariat, without changing its structure or composition -- for example, holding regular consultations, setting up task forces and working groups, and other ad hoc arrangements; through re-deployment, temporary or permanent, of staff from economic, humanitarian and disarmament units of the Secretariat to the Security Council secretariat; or through creating new posts or units within the Secretariat for these purposes.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate our full support for the decision to establish a working group to address generic sanctions issues. Its mandate, which has been clearly set out in the presidential note adopted under the Canadian leadership, identifies a number of priority areas on which the Council will focus in the following months. We hope that sooner rather than later the work of this group will bring practical results. We look forward to participating in this very important endeavor. In our view, it should result in specific conclusions and recommendations in order to clarify the vision of sanctions.

The President

I thank the representative of Ukraine for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Andjaba (Namibia)

My delegation welcomes you back to the Council, Mr. President, and we would like to express from the outset our appreciation for the important and, in a sense, ground-breaking role you are personally playing in promoting and developing the important issue that we are discussing today. I should also be remiss if I did not acknowledge the important and tireless work being done in this field by the General Assembly, your Government, Sir, and the Governments of Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland and other institutions. Just this morning, we were able to participate in an interesting and educative discussion on the effectiveness of sanctions, which was organized by the International Peace Academy.

Important as the process that we are studying today is, my delegation cannot but have a sense that it is coming almost too late, given the important function that sanctions play in the arsenal of the Security Council in its role of maintaining international peace and security. We firmly believe that as time passes and situations change, so our methods should change. When opportunities present themselves which would allow us to improve our work, we should be vigilant and ready to accept them immediately. At the same time, if things are not working well, we should be bold enough to admit it, and we should also be bold enough to make the necessary changes to improve the situation. Without a continuous and attentive evaluation process, the Council will be found unprepared and unable to effectively fulfil its mandate under the Charter.

As I said earlier, sanctions remain one of the most important tools available to the Security Council in the exercise of its mandate, but the range of sanctions regimes in place today have had mixed effects and results so far. Once the Council decides to adopt measures to impose sanctions, it demands strict compliance by all States to ensure effectiveness. However, deciding whether to continue to enforce sanctions becomes a moral dilemma when the unintended adverse humanitarian impact and the damage and losses caused to third parties begin to outweigh the political goals to be achieved. It is therefore essential that the design of sanctions regimes should rest on a clear policy framework and contain definite and precise conditions for the maintenance or lifting of sanctions. Not so long ago, in this very Chamber, during the discussion on the humanitarian situation in Iraq, the Secretary-General cautioned that, in that situation, the United Nations runs the risk of losing the propaganda battle as to who is responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people -- the Iraqi Government or the United Nations.

My delegation therefore fully supports the establishment of a Security Council working group to develop recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. We strongly believe that all aspects of sanctions should be considered and evaluated by the working group to enable the Council, in the end, to comprehensively address the issue.

Some of the important elements to be considered should include the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat, since its serious and sustained involvement can enhance the effectiveness of sanctions. While it already provides invaluable support to sanctions committees, some areas need to be strengthened. Its staff capacity needs to be dramatically strengthened to enable it to effectively cope with the tasks at hand. Another area is its ability to financially and logistically support visits by Chairmen of sanctions committees to affected regions. These visits have proved to be crucial in efforts to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions. The visits by Ambassador Fowler to southern Africa and Europe are prime examples in this regard.

Furthermore, recommendations with regard to humanitarian assessments before, during and after the imposition of sanctions, to determine the potential humanitarian impact and other negative unintended consequences, should be developed. In addition, practical measures to address the third-party impact of sanctions should be developed. These parties should be heard by the Council under the terms of Article 50 of the Charter, but the solutions should include the provision of special assistance to compensate for economic losses and adverse social impact, if such parties are to be expected to fully cooperate with United Nations sanctions.

The imposition of humanitarian exemptions would also be of significant importance and immediate remedial value. Such exemptions should apply to children, mothers and other vulnerable groups, and take account of religious considerations.

I have highlighted some of the aspects that, in my delegations's opinion, can improve the effectiveness of sanctions. However, history and numerous studies to date have proved that sanctions failures are caused by a combination of a wide range of factors.

Indeed, a review of the implementation of the sanctions against UNITA reveals very limited success, and this situation can be attributed to several factors. The Council will be asking the working group to investigate some of them. In retrospect, it can be seen that, in addition to being intransigent, UNITA deceived the Council many times through lying and false undertakings to abide by its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. In this way, it effectively persuaded the Council not to implement wider sanctions earlier. On the other hand, non-implementation of sanctions by States and individuals presents a huge challenge to the Security Council.

A better monitoring and enforcement regime could have avoided this. Furthermore, a better and more reliable data collection system, earlier in the process, with regard to the huge influence of diamonds on the continuation of the war, could have helped the process. Assistance to Member States in the implementation of sanctions, in this and other sanctions regimes, would also greatly contribute to the effectiveness of sanctions.

Finally, my delegation believes that, with the information and strategies available to us today, the Council can obtain a better and more effective result with the implementation of sanctions. This is even more relevant since we intend to adopt a draft resolution on Angola, hopefully tomorrow, which will be aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of sanctions against UNITA.

The President

I thank the representative of Namibia for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Wang Yingfan (China)

Sanctions, as a measure of coercion made available to the Council by the United Nations Charter, have been increasingly applied by this Organization in recent years, targeting more than 10 countries or entities. Some of these sanctions have managed to have certain effects, while the majority have fallen short of the expected results; in some cases, there have been severe consequences. It is therefore absolutely necessary to review and improve the use of sanctions. China supports the establishment of an informal working group to carry out a review of Council sanctions, to make an in-depth study of ways to improve them and to submit a report on this matter.

In our view, an in-depth study of the question of sanctions should focus on two main priorities. First, the practical effectiveness of sanctions must be enhanced. Prior to adoption, all aspects of the sanctions, in particular their effective monitoring, should be taken into full consideration. During the process of implementation, developments and problems concerning sanctions should be tracked closely and measures should be taken in a timely manner to help Member States to strengthen their implementation capability and to deepen cooperation and coordination between the countries and agencies concerned.

Secondly, we must work out concrete ways and means to address humanitarian consequences created by sanctions which have a direct humanitarian bearing on thousands of innocent civilians. The working group should conduct thorough assessments in this regard and come up with specific and feasible solutions in areas such as the expansion of humanitarian exemptions, prior analysis, retrospective evaluation, the adjustment of sanctions regimes in accordance with real situations during the process of implementation and the establishment of criteria for the suspension or lifting of sanctions.

Past experiences of the Security Council have demonstrated that sanctions may be able to help provide some solutions, but by no means in all cases. The Council cannot neglect the severe humanitarian problems brought about by sanctions. That is why China has consistently maintained that resort to sanctions should not be made easy. Needless to say, sanctions against a sovereign State by any country unilaterally and in the absence of authorization by the Security Council are far from appropriate.

It must also be pointed out that it takes time to address the drawbacks of sanctions. In a note by the President of the Council at the beginning of last year, a number of measures were proposed for improving work in this field. Unfortunately, some measures have not been fully put in place. The working group should really pay attention to the question of how to enhance the efficiency of sanctions committees, including how to optimize their working procedures. Moreover, the working group should seriously consider the valuable suggestions and proposals made by many agencies and scholars, with a view to pooling wisdom and resources.

Mr. Hasmy (Malaysia)

We are very pleased to see you, Sir, presiding over this meeting of the Council on this very important subject. I should like to commend Canada for putting this issue on the Council's agenda for this month in the context of its pursuance of the human security agenda.

While sanctions are not mentioned per se in the Charter of the United Nations, they are certainly a tool available to the Security Council, short of military force, to use against States whose policies and actions constitute a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. This is provided for in Article 41 of the Charter. However, because of the grave, unintended collateral impacts of all-encompassing sanctions, these measures have given rise to serious concern on the part of the international community. The challenge before the Council now is to design sanctions regimes that work effectively with minimal unintended collateral impacts and with the unqualified support of the international community.

We commend the efforts made by a number of countries, such as Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom and Canada, and, of course, the important seminar organized by the International Peace Academy this morning.

Malaysia, as a matter of principle, is against the imposition of sanctions on any country unless the Security Council, after careful consideration, has determined that the State or country in question is indeed a threat to the peace, is committing a breach of the peace or is guilty of aggression which requires the direct, collective response of the international community short of the use of military force. It is Malaysia's conviction that sanctions against a country and people should be resorted to only when all other peaceful measures have been exhausted and have failed. As an instrument of coercion, they should be used with great caution because of their unintended grave consequences to the innocent population of the targeted country. We also believe that before the imposition of sanctions there should be a pre-assessment report on the likely impact of the planned targeted measures. When sanctions are finally imposed, there should be a periodic evaluation of the sanctions and an early comprehensive assessment of their impact. These assessments provide an objective and scientific basis for an overall evaluation of the effectiveness or otherwise of the sanctions imposed by the Council. Such assessments are an invaluable and indispensable tool in assisting the Council to determine the appropriate steps that may be taken in respect of specific sanctions regimes.

In most instances, it has not been easy to effectively implement a sanctions regime except when it serves the particular interests of one or more of the permanent members of the Council -- the sanctions on Libya and Iraq being the obvious cases in point. In these two instances, the sanctions were carried out with almost religious zeal. The recently imposed sanctions on Afghanistan -- or, more specifically, the Taliban -- would be another case in point since, again, without the required pre-assessment of the likely impact of the sanctions, a series of measures were decided upon by the Council through its resolution 1267 (1999) and additional measures, as contained in the presidential statement of 7 April 2000, are now being contemplated.

Sanctions, as provided for in the Charter, are meant to be provisional in nature and should be implemented accordingly -- that is, provisionally and not permanently. Also, in their implementation, serious consideration should be given to exemptions on humanitarian grounds. It is regrettable that more often than not the Council is quick in imposing sanctions but slow in lifting them when the conditions that had prompted the sanctions are no longer in existence. The sanctions on Libya, which were only suspended and not lifted, are a clear case in point. Clearly, if sanctions are to secure the strong support of the international community, it is imperative that sanctions that have served their purpose be formally lifted by the Council.

With the exception of the sanctions on Iraq -- the only existing comprehensive sanctions today -- there is now a clear preference on the part of the Council to impose the so-called targeted sanctions whereby certain elites or groups of individuals or entities are targeted with a view to coercing them to comply with certain stipulated requirements or a general change of behaviour or policy before the sanctions can be lifted. This, clearly, is a more acceptable and humane form of sanctions. However, as in the case of comprehensive sanctions, there should be careful and exhaustive analyses of the likely impact of these targeted sanctions. Among the pertinent questions that should be considered in depth are those of the extent and location of the assets of the targeted elites, the kinds of measures that are likely to have the greatest impact on the intended targets and the positive elements that can be built into the sanctions regime to motivate compliance by the targeted individuals or entity. Conditions for the lifting of the sanctions at the appropriate time should also be incorporated in the sanctions regimes.

Malaysia has serious reservations and will not support the imposition of sanctions beyond a time-frame that is necessary or feasible. This is because experience has shown that sanctions rarely work on the intended target or targets. Instead, they have brought unmitigated suffering on ordinary people. Sanctions directed at an elite or ruling class will have a direct and indirect effect on the population under their control in virtually every aspect of their lives, be it air travel, trade and commerce or other economic activities covered by the sanctions. This is because targeted elites do not live in splendid isolation; they live in societies. Indeed, sanctions sometimes have the unintended effect of entrenching or even strengthening the very targets they were intended to coerce. In the end, it is the innocent, ordinary people living in areas under their control that pay the price, not the intended target or targets. Hence the importance of ongoing assessment of the impact of sanctions, which should be modified if deemed necessary, or even lifted if they prove to be ineffective, so as to spare the people from further unnecessary hardship.

If sanctions are meant to be an alternative to military action, then surely their implementation must take cognizance of and respect the basic principles of international humanitarian law, such as the concept of "proportionality" in the damage inflicted, and the necessary distinction between civilian and military targets. There are also other international conventions and legal instruments that sanctioning authorities cannot simply ignore. In its implementation of sanctions regimes, the Council must demonstrate that every possible effort is being made to avoid violating the basic rights of the general population. That should also apply in respect of non-United Nations sanctions regimes, such as those imposed unilaterally or regionally.

The widespread humanitarian suffering that comprehensive economic embargoes in particular can cause raises the moral question as to whether the Security Council can violate social and economic rights and/or civil and political rights in the pursuit of international peace and security. It is of course recognized that targeted regimes retain the primary responsibility for the continuation or lifting of the sanctions that have been imposed on them and for the well-being of their people. However, this does not absolve the Council of its own responsibility to ensure that the fundamental rights of the population in the target country are respected or preserved. The imposition of sanctions, while legitimate and provided for in the United Nations Charter, must also be humane in implementation, or else it will lose the support of the international community, which is necessary for the effectiveness of the sanctions regime and the credibility of the Council.

A more effective strategy for the use of sanctions should be based on an understanding of why sanctions succeed or fail. The institutional capacity of the United Nations system must be enhanced, including the mechanisms for monitoring and impact assessment, as well as with respect to the technical assistance and specialized expertise which should be made available to the respective sanctions committees. Greater uniformity and consistency are needed not only in Security Council resolutions and the guidelines for monitoring and enforcement provided to Member States and regional organizations, but also in the national legislation and administrative procedures of Member States.

A smart sanctions strategy should be part of a carrot-and-stick diplomacy designed to bring about the negotiated settlement of disputes. Coercive measures, when applied, should be combined with concrete incentives for compliance as instruments of persuasive diplomacy. Targeted financial sanctions, arms embargoes and travel bans offer promise as a means of focusing coercive pressure on decision-making elites while minimizing humanitarian and third-party costs. Such measures are more likely to receive the international cooperation necessary for effective monitoring and enforcement.

The analogy of smart sanctions to smart weapons systems is very apt indeed. While the United Nations talks about comprehensive sanctions as a blunt instrument, the supposedly precise targeting of smart sanctions, like smart bombs, is meant to reduce collateral damage, that ubiquitous term used to refer to unintended targets. Unfortunately, many civilians have become victims of the so-called smart bombs. They are smart to the extent that men can make them so. Let us hope that smart sanctions will perform much better than smart bombs in minimizing the collateral damage on the unintended target: the general public.

Sanctions affect third countries in that they often impose extremely high economic costs on the major economic partners of target States. This aspect of the problem is well recognized in Article 50 of the Charter, but it is very rarely invoked, or if invoked, is seldom seriously addressed. Despite calls from Member States for these costs to be spread equitably, this rarely happens. Assistance to disadvantaged States has been ad hoc and inadequate. It is true that some provisions for third-party compensation have been made, but mostly in those cases where the interests of major powers have been engaged in the pursuit of sanctions, notably in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. No such aid has been forthcoming in the case of the African sanctions regimes. Where little or no assistance is available, the affected States may have no choice but to continue surreptitiously with their traditional economic relationships in order to avoid economic hardship to themselves. On occasion, they do so openly, as was clearly the case with respect to the sanctions regime on Libya, when the Organization of African Unity decided in 1998 to cease complying with the United Nations sanctions directed against Libya.

Prolonged trade sanctions have social costs which are hard to measure and hard to reverse. Furthermore, for a sanctions regime to be effective, there are significant management and enforcement costs involved. The costs to the sanctioning States involve legal innovation and/or reform, the ongoing detailed information-gathering for targeting and impact monitoring, enforcement and providing humanitarian aid. High administrative or transaction costs may also be incurred in planning and implementation monitoring, reporting, coalition- and consensus-building, and so forth. This requires adequate, competent and dedicated human resources, which the Organization often has been reluctant to fund. In some cases the frozen assets of the target country can be used to offset some of the costs. What is clear is that cheap sanctions are unlikely to be effective sanctions. Capacity constraints exist within the United Nations Secretariat and United Nations sanctions committees, as well as within regional groupings of States that impose sanctions and humanitarian agencies operating in sanction-affected countries. These constraints must be addressed.

In examining the question of more effective and humane United Nations sanctions, we cannot but consider the sanctions imposed on Iraq as an example of a sanctions regime that went very wrong. The sanctions imposed on Iraq are the most comprehensive embargo ever devised. The prolonged economic strangulation of that country, combined with the destruction resulting from the Gulf War in 1991, has created one of the worst humanitarian crises of the past decade. This has already been highlighted by my delegation in a recent statement made in the Council. Suffice it to say that these sanctions have had a devastating impact on the people.

By continuing to maintain economic sanctions on Iraq in the full knowledge of its deplorable consequences, the Security Council will continue to undermine the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations, thereby undermining the confidence of the international community in the Council itself. It is time for us to view the matter, beginning with an immediate impact assessment of the decade-long sanctions. Only a comprehensive assessment will be able to tell us in an objective way whether the sanctions on Iraq have been carried out in the right way or what went wrong and what needs to be done in the interest of ending the plight of the ordinary people.

In conclusion, my delegation welcomes the issuance of the note by the President of the Council to establish a working group to develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. Today's debate and the presidential note demonstrate the Council's serious response to the need for a serious examination of the sanctions issue in the context of our time. It is to be hoped that the deliberations of the working group will be able to make in-depth examination of, inter alia, all of the issues identified in the note and to report its findings to the Council by 30 November 2000.

However, as in all cases pertaining to the Council, the findings are not as important as the manifestation of the necessary political will on the part of Council members to follow up on the Council's decisions which will be made on the basis of these findings. I think we are all generally aware and know how to improve sanctions. What remains is political will. Unless there is this political will, this exercise will not mean very much.

The President

I wish to welcome the Secretary-General to the Council Chamber. It is good to have him join us for this very important debate.

Mr. Listre (Argentina)

Allow me first of all to say how pleased I am that the Secretary-General has joined us here in our discussion. I would also like to thank the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Prendergast, for his very thorough and useful report. I also wish to express thanks for the initiative of the President's Government, which has placed particular emphasis on the question of the effectiveness of sanctions.

Within this context, today we will adopt the terms of reference to guide the working group on sanctions contained in the President's note on general issues relating to sanctions. Argentina fully supports that process, which it views not only as valuable but also as very necessary.

From the standpoint of theory, we understand sanctions to be an important element of preventive action that makes it possible without the use of force to express the international community's rejection of a given position or action. Such measures, in keeping with Article 39 of the Charter, are intended to modify the behaviour of a State.

Until recently, this option was more theory than practice, for it had been used on only a few occasions. But in more recent years, the Security Council has resorted to sanctions not only with greater frequency but in respect of a wider range of scenarios. This relatively meagre experience has led in some cases to unexpected results or events.

On 15 March we suggested that the valuable "lessons learned" exercise should be applied in the area of sanctions as it has been in the sphere of peacekeeping operations. We believe that the Council now has the experience necessary to assess systematically the lessons learned and to see how those lessons -- which will emerge with greater clarity when the working group has concluded its deliberations -- can help us in the future. We therefore support the broad terms of reference that will guide the working group. We believe that its conclusions and recommendations must have a meaningful impact on the future role and effectiveness of sanctions.

As we shall be participating in the working group on sanctions, where this issue will be analyzed in depth, I shall limit my statement to a few elements that are of concern to us. Priority attention should be given to the design of sanctions in such a way as to avoid their use being viewed as a half measure -- which would jeopardize their effectiveness and have a considerable impact on the credibility of the Organization. Similarly, greater care in the design of sanctions is crucial if we wish to maximize support from the international community, which is essential for the effectiveness of any measures.

The area of sanctions design includes a vast number of elements, but the first question would seem to be whether the use of sanctions is on the face of it the proper tool in a given case. In that connection there should be a logical connection between the tool and the objective. To that end, pre-assessment is essential to help determine whether the expectations and goals are objective and reasonable. Throughout a sanctions regime, continued periodic assessments will be necessary to determine whether or not the conditions continue to exist for attaining the objective or whether it is necessary to redesign the sanctions.

In our view, the various measures enumerated in Article 41 of the Charter are intended to modify the behaviour of a State and are not of a punitive nature. We must therefore avoid the perception that the measures themselves or their unintended effects are of that nature. In such cases we must consider the possibility of alternative measures.

Against that background, we support the definition of objective criteria for the lifting of sanctions in the same resolution that establishes the sanctions. This is of particular importance because it is directly related to the long-term perception of the legitimacy of the sanctions.

A level of effectiveness will be ensured by the complete implementation of the measures in a sanctions regime. Even though the implementation of any resolution lies with Member States, every effort must therefore be made to encourage such implementation.

Here, the Secretariat and the sanctions committees have a significant role to play.

The question of implementation is related also to the formulation of measures. While the text of each resolution is the result of a unique political process, it is necessary to try to unify the terminology of these resolutions with a view to promoting implementation, including the use of clear and unequivocal terms that require no interpretation. Here, the working group should bear in mind the views expressed today by Mr. Prendergast.

We know that a lack of effective monitoring machinery can cause a sanctions regime to be ineffective. We need only recall the sanctions against UNITA, something we shall be considering at tomorrow's meeting.

Along with monitoring, we believe that greater dissemination of information could contribute to effectiveness; greater awareness of the purpose of the sanctions and the measures can, inter alia, promote their effective implementation. This is particularly true for targeted sanctions. We also feel that targeted sanctions are a tool that should be used to avoid a major impact on the civilian population and to minimize unintended effects.

But we know that for targeted sanctions to be truly effective there must be a greater commitment from the international community and more intensive monitoring or verification. Without those basic ingredients, effectiveness will be seriously compromised.

The planning, implementation and monitoring of sanctions regimes requires the availability of sufficient human and economic resources. To that end, sanctions specialists should be included in the Secretariat. If sanctions are to be a tool of which the Organization can make use in the future, they must be adapted and fitted to its needs. The cost is relatively low when compared with the other options.

We believe that there will be greater observance of sanctions if the measures adopted are endorsed by the international community; if the measures can be implemented; if compliance is ensured through a monitoring mechanism; if there is an attempt to diminish unintended impact, including through an appropriate mechanism for humanitarian exceptions; and if the active cooperation of the countries of the region is secured.

On the other hand, sanctions will be violated or ineffective if the measures are viewed as excessive, unjust or punitive, or if non-compliance does not entail consequences.

I wish in conclusion to express my delegation's entire commitment to the coming work of the working group; we hope that its conclusions and recommendations will meet the expectations expressed at this meeting.

Mr. Scheffers (Netherlands)

Allow me first to thank you, Mr. Axworthy, for the important Canadian initiatives on United Nations sanctions. These have joined sanctions-related initiatives by other countries, and the time has indeed come to undertake a more in-depth review of the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions under the present international circumstances, circumstances in which humanitarian considerations are taking centre stage in our ongoing debate on issues of international peace and security.

The representative of Portugal will make a statement on behalf of the European Union later in this debate. The Netherlands fully associates itself with that statement, and I will therefore limit myself to a few brief comments on this subject.

I wish here to commend the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Prendergast, for his comprehensive introduction, which rightly touched on all aspects relating to sanctions.

We believe that the imposition of sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter remains an indispensable tool of international diplomacy, both in preventing armed conflicts and in directing conflict situations towards a peaceful settlement. Therefore, if sanctions are to be an effective political instrument, they must be applied swiftly and with resolve.

However, sanctions cannot be viewed as an instrument in isolation. They must be part of a broader strategy aimed at bringing about factual changes in behaviour by the targeted State or entity. Sanctions are to serve clear goals. While sanctions should therefore not be used as a blunt instrument, we should not lose sight of the fact that sanctions are coercive measures under Chapter VII, with an inescapably wide range of consequences -- and I must add, just a few steps, or even only one step, short of military intervention in line with Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

Whenever the Security Council is considering the imposition of sanctions, the guiding principle should be that each sanctions regime is tailored to the actual situation. Sanctions are not meant to punish nations or peoples as such, but to exert strong pressure on the elites with decision-making powers. However, it cannot be ruled out that the population and the economy in general will suffer as well.

That is why -- especially in the case of comprehensive sanctions and of general trade embargoes -- humanitarian exemptions are imperative. Given the need for swift action when it comes to imposing sanctions, the Netherlands believes it would not be wise to adopt a policy of protracted pre-assessment or impact reporting. In the view of the Netherlands, a better course of action would be to make available, within the United Nations Secretariat, further high quality and varied expertise in order for the Security Council to be offered well-considered and swift advice on possible options for action. Once sanctions are in place, the humanitarian and economic impact could and should be monitored continuously and closely. Also, clear procedures for adjusting exemption regimes must be in place.

When speaking about United Nations sanctions we generally have comprehensive sanctions in mind. As a matter of fact, sanctions regimes are much more diverse. The Security Council has imposed arms embargoes, flight bans, travel bans and financial sanctions. All but one of the current sanctions regimes are in fact targeted and focused on specific groups of people or economic activities and do not harm the general population as such. Although not all of them have been effective, the Libya sanctions regime produced the desired results.

It seems superfluous to state, but for sanctions to be successful, sanctions regimes must be enforced. Absence of enforcement will lead to undermining the authority of the Security Council and of sanctions as a policy instrument. As stated in the International Peace Academy study, sanctions often suffer from poor design, loose commitment from Member States, inadequate monitoring and lax enforcement. Sanctions committees should therefore play a key role in enforcing the sanctions entrusted to them.

It is with great appreciation that my delegation has followed closely the Angola sanctions Committee, which, under effective Canadian chairmanship, is now well on the way to producing significant results in fighting violations, and is breaking new ground in the process. Tomorrow's open meeting will surely testify to that.

Following up earlier steps of January 1999, the Security Council should indeed now consider further improvements, in particular to strengthen enforcement capabilities. One could think of more effective communications with Member States as one improvement. Furthermore, Member States should be assisted in administering sanctions, especially in the fields of arms embargoes and financial sanctions. A feasibility study should be undertaken on how the United Nations Secretariat can become more effective in supporting and administering sanctions. A strengthened Secretariat will also be able to offer valuable assistance in the pre-assessment period.

In conclusion, the Netherlands wishes to pay tribute to a few States that have actively sponsored studies on "smarter" sanctions, notably Germany and Switzerland. Canada has also made a recent valuable contribution, in collaboration with the International Peace Academy. We believe enough food for further thought and concrete proposals are at our disposal that will tremendously assist the Security Council in redefining elements of its sanctions policies. It will therefore not come as a big surprise that the Netherlands strongly supports the decision to establish on a temporary basis an informal working group of the Security Council on sanctions. Its terms of reference are sufficiently broad to examine how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions from all perspectives.

The President

I with to thank the representative of the Netherlands for his kind words addressed to the Canadian delegation.

Mr. Ben Mustapha (Tunisia)

I would first of all like to welcome you once again, Mr. President, and to thank you for having organized this meeting to consider a question that is at the heart of the work of the United Nations and that of the Security Council in particular, namely, the issue of sanctions imposed by the Organization. This discussion comes at a crucial time in the history of the Organization, which in entering a new millennium has left behind a decade that some have not hesitated to describe as the "sanctions decade". The practice of imposing sanctions during the 1990s provided many lessons, because of both the multitude of sanctions regimes established and the unprecedented scope of some of those sanctions.

It is true that we have today reached a juncture where it is time to take stock of the past and consider the future with regard to recourse to sanctions. Sanctions are clearly an instrument that has been made available to the international community by the Charter, an approach halfway between peaceful settlement and coercive action to impose a solution to a problem or crisis that poses a threat to international peace and security. However, since the end of the cold war the United Nations has had much more recourse to sanctions than it had before. Nine sanctions regimes are now in force, and their implementation is monitored by an equal number of Security Council committees.

Among the international community there is a consensus today that there needs to be some adjustments in the way sanctions are now used. This is to be done to obtain two essential goals: first, to gain a real awareness of the impact of sanctions on the civilian population of the target country, neighbouring third countries or other important economic partners and, secondly, to improve the effectiveness of sanctions.

Particularly in the light of the experience of the last decade, we are now aware of the immensity of the difficulties and the suffering endured by civilian populations of target countries. We know that those consequences may even include humanitarian tragedies and the blockading of the entire economy of a targeted country as a result of the imposition of a wide range of sanctions over many years. The example of Iraq is very instructive in this regard. For 10 years now that country has been under the harshest and most comprehensive sanctions regime ever imposed. This situation cannot continue. We are also aware of the enormous impact of the imposition of a sanctions regime on the immediate economic neighbourhood, as well as on international economic and commercial partners.

In addition to the Security Council, the General Assembly has also deliberated on this issue. We all recall that this culminated in September 1997 with the consensus adoption of resolution 51/242, which pointed the way for the introduction of a variety of revisions and improvements to refine the use of the sanctions tool available to the Organization. We think the solutions advocated at the time by the General Assembly still have currency and relevancy.

Numerous discussions have been organized outside the Organization on this issue. Those various forums have decidedly given momentum to what now appears to be the necessary reform of the use of sanctions. It is in this context that we welcome the initiative taken by the Security Council, under the leadership of your country, Mr. President, to engage in an in-depth discussion of the question of sanctions as a whole. That work is to be entrusted to a Security Council working group.

In view of the varied work carried out and the discussions that we have mentioned, we think that the Council should base its future work on sanctions on the following guidelines.

First, with regard to the conceptual framework of any implementation of a sanctions regime, a certain number of principles should be stressed, namely: keeping recourse to sanctions as a final step, after all means of peaceful settlement have been exhausted, pursuant to Chapter VI of the Charter; delineating clear objectives of the measures to be imposed; establishing clear conditions for the lifting of sanctions and for their suspension, while suspension should not take the place of lifting of sanctions -- here we are mindful of the case of Libya, where sanctions are still legally in force although the country has complied with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions; providing for the gradual lifting of sanctions depending on the attainment of the goals sought; envisaging as much as possible the imposition of targeted sanctions; and that sanctions are not an end in themselves, a point which has been made by previous speakers, and therefore should be combined with other political means as part of a comprehensive strategy to attain the political goals outlined by the Security Council.

Secondly, we think that everything should be done to limit the humanitarian impact of the planned sanctions on civilian populations. The impact has to be evaluated ahead of time, before the sanctions are imposed. Evaluation has to be carried out periodically during the implementation of the sanctions regime in order to provide the necessary adjustments to it. In this context, a series of exemptions should be provided for ahead of time in the resolutions that impose the sanctions. This is the case for the provision of basic humanitarian goods -- medicines, foodstuffs -- and other exemptions that are necessary for religious or other reasons.

Thirdly, there is the impact on third countries. Notwithstanding Article 50 of the Charter, which recognizes the right of all countries to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution to economic problems encountered as a result of the imposition of sanctions on the target country, there is still no effective mechanism to compensate for losses suffered by third countries.

As the responsibility for the implementation of sanctions is the collective responsibility of the international community, it is entirely logical for the costs of implementing sanctions to be borne by the international community as a whole, and not just by a small number of States, which happen to be the neighbours of the target State or their economic partners. The idea of setting up a compensation fund has already been put forward in the General Assembly, and other ideas have been formulated, such as special compensatory measures. All of these ideas are interesting as we look for a specific solution to the real problems of third countries affected by sanctions. We think that the institutionalization of some appropriate compensation procedure is still necessary.

Fourthly, turning now to the working methods of the sanctions committees, we need to identify other improvements here to strengthen transparency in these committees, to improve their relationships and their communication with other Member States and with international organizations. Visits by the chairmen of the sanctions committees to the regions concerned are also to be encouraged -- and the case of Canada comes to mind, and the visit made by Ambassador Fowler -- in order to investigate all aspects of implementation of the sanctions regime on the ground, including by gathering first-hand information about the impact of sanctions and their results, and the difficulties encountered in applying them.

Fifthly, we need to devote the resources necessary to give the United Nations Secretariat the necessary technical and administrative means to enable it to carry out the follow-up of the implementation of sanctions regimes decided on by the Security Council.

In a word, we need to remove from sanctions any punitive connotation, any idea of reprisals against peoples, and make sure that they do not become a systematic obstacle to development, in particular for the countries in the south which suffer from the backlash of sanctions. International peace and security are indivisible. They certainly cannot be achieved by keeping entire peoples under the yoke of suffering and under-development, which themselves generate instability and tension.

These are the few comments I wanted to make on behalf of my country. We believe that the working group which we have just set up should get down to work as soon as possible.

Mr. Ouane (Mali)

Mali is pleased that this important question of sanctions is being considered at an official meeting of the Security Council today under your presidency, Mr. Minister. My delegation is also grateful to the delegation of Canada, in particular to Ambassador Robert Fowler, for having taken the initiative for such a meeting, which provides us with a useful opportunity to have an open and constructive dialogue on the general question of sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Similarly, I wish to express my thanks for the contributions made by Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Switzerland and other countries, following the General Assembly, to the drafting of reports and studies dealing specifically with the various aspects of sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

As we know, sanctions have increased over the past decade. In point of fact, during that period the Security Council has set up more sanctions regimes than throughout its recent history. At present, nine sanctions regimes are in force. Although sanctions are a means provided for in the United Nations Charter, enabling the Security Council to ensure its decisions are applied, they are far from universally supported. Nor have they enabled the Security Council to ensure respect for its resolutions.

The vast and considerable experience acquired over the past 10 years could help the Security Council in its future decisions. In this context, I wish to touch on several issues which in the view of my delegation deserve priority consideration in the Council.

First, my delegation wishes to highlight the relevance of using sanctions as a means of establishing peace and of maintaining international peace and security. In point of fact, the imposition of sanctions should be carried out in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter on collective security, after all attempts at a peaceful settlement provided for in the Charter have been exhausted. In other words, sanctions should never be imposed in the pursuit of individual national interests. The imposition of sanctions should meet a single objective, namely, serving the international community on whose behalf the Security Council has received a mandate to respond when international peace and security are threatened.

Secondly, we believe that the international community must learn from a decade of sanctions imposed by the United Nations. In fact, the experience of the Security Council in this area has revealed a number of shortcomings, as well as serious related consequences, in particular in the humanitarian sphere. We feel that the Council must further consider the negative effects of short-, medium- and long-term sanctions.

As the Secretary-General pointed out in paragraph 25 of his report on the causes of conflicts and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, sanctions can cause suffering for unintended victims, in particular the must vulnerable strata of society, namely children, women and the elderly. Similarly, comprehensive economic sanctions often have a considerable negative impact on the development capacity and activities of targeted countries.

Thirdly, we feel that greater use should be made of targeted sanctions and that particular attention should be given to their unintended effects. In this respect my delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Council to set up an informal working group and entrust it with drafting general recommendations on provisions to be taken to strengthen the effectiveness of Security Council sanctions.

Fourthly, Mali believes that it is extremely important to determine the duration of sanctions regimes. When considering this question, we should bear in mind the goal being pursued and the need to avoid needless suffering for the civilian population. Sanctions often have considerable negative effects on the development capacity and development activities of targeted countries, as well as on those of neighbouring countries and others. We must pursue efforts to reduce as far as possible the secondary effects of sanctions, in particular as they relate to the humanitarian situation.

In this regard, humanitarian assistance should be provided speedily and impartially. Measures should be envisaged to reduce, as far as possible, the suffering of the most vulnerable groups, while bearing in mind the urgent situations that may emerge, such as massive refugee flows.

In order to deal with the harmful humanitarian and economic consequences of sanctions, we should seek the assistance of concerned international institutions and regional and intergovernmental organizations with a view to assessing vulnerabilities and humanitarian needs in targeted countries at the time when sanctions are imposed and, afterwards, at regular intervals.

Fifthly, my delegation believes that the sanctions committees should, at every stage in the application of sanctions regimes, monitor the humanitarian effects of sanctions on vulnerable groups, including children, and provide, where required, exemption mechanisms to facilitate the provision of aid and humanitarian assistance. In this regard, the task of humanitarian organizations and competent United Nations bodies must be facilitated in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and the recommendations made in the note of the President of the Security Council (S/1999/92) of 29 January 1999.

In conclusion, I should like to say that, given the experience that has been gained in this field, Mali welcomes the ideas contained in the millennium report of the Secretary-General (A/54/2000) relating to targeted sanctions and aimed at minimizing the impact of sanctions on the civilian population.

The President

I thank the representative of Mali for the kind words he addressed to the Canadian delegation.

Miss Durrant (Jamaica)

The use of sanctions by the Security Council to influence the behaviour of States, individuals and non-State groups has in many instances provided a viable alternative to the use of military force in the maintenance of international peace and security. The history of Security Council sanctions over the past decade has clearly demonstrated that while such measures have achieved success in a number of cases, in others the desired objectives have not been achieved. If the Security Council is to maintain sanctions as a credible instrument, we must take concrete steps to ensure that we get sanctions right, rather than impose flawed regimes which may be either ineffective or unenforceable.

It is in this context that my delegation expresses its appreciation to you, Mr. President, and to the Canadian delegation for convening this open meeting to discuss general issues relating to sanctions, which, if they are to be effective, require the adherence of all States Members of the United Nations.

We also wish to recognize the work already done by the General Assembly and by the Secretary-General, and thank Under-Secretary-General Prendergast for his introduction of the subject this afternoon. We also wish to express our appreciation to those Governments and institutions which have analysed the effectiveness of existing sanctions regimes and have presented recommendations for consideration by the Council. My delegation is therefore pleased to support the establishment of the informal working group on sanctions, which will develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions.

One issue of particular concern to my delegation is the need for the humanitarian impact of sanctions to be considered when designing sanctions regimes. We believe that sanctions must not be a blunt instrument, but must exert pressure on targeted Governments and groups, rather than inflict suffering on innocent civilians and vulnerable groups, particularly women, children and the elderly. Provisions must be made for promptly revising sanctions to remove or reduce their impact on civilians, and they must always take into account universal human rights standards and international human rights instruments. Additionally, appropriate conditions and guidelines for humanitarian exemptions and adequate delivery of humanitarian aid must be included, as appropriate.

In addition to reducing the impact on civilians, every effort must be made to minimize the impact of sanctions on neighbouring States. Without the support and cooperation of neighbouring States and major trading partners, it is hardly likely that sanctions will achieve their desired result.

In order to ensure that non-targeted States or individuals are not adversely affected, and to ensure their cooperation, the Security Council, with the assistance of the Secretariat, must ensure advance assessments of the potential impact of sanctions on the non-targeted States. The Council must also monitor and assess the specific needs and problems of these States with a view to ensuring appropriate assistance and adjustments to sanctions regimes where required.

The importance of enhancing Security Council policy-making and sanctions design has been recognized. Critical to this process, we believe, is the need for greater clarity in Security Council resolutions, allowing sanctions provisions to be more precise, thus eliminating doubt as to the respective responsibilities of parties and avoiding subjective interpretations to suit narrow, national political interests. We also believe that there is a need for clear criteria in such resolutions for the lifting or suspension of sanctions. This is in keeping with General Assembly resolution 51/242, which calls upon the Council to provide for imposing sanctions that may be partially lifted when targeted groups comply with given requirements or to provide for the lifting of sanctions progressively as targets are achieved, so that parties under sanctions derive some benefit from compliance.

We all agree that sanctions cannot be an end in themselves, but, rather, must be a means to an end. If sanctions are designed to resolve conflicts rather than to inflict punishment, they must be established with clear objectives, provisions for regular review and precise conditions and time-frames for removing them. Another critical element in improving the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions is that of enhancing our capacity effectively to monitor and enforce these measures and of assisting Member States in their capacity to implement sanctions. Clear guidelines and instructions, as well as possible technical and financial assistance to Member States and regional bodies to assist in compliance with sanctions regimes, can clearly improve the process.

We also need to devise practical strategies for assisting Governments in developing the means for more effective sanctions implementation, given that some Governments lack the capacity to do so due to structural deficiencies, including their inability to introduce appropriate national legislation and to adopt monitoring measures.

Arms embargoes are perhaps the most common measures used by the Security Council in seeking to maintain peace and security. They are also one of the most frequently violated sanctions regimes. As we have seen from past experience, arms embargoes affect a number of actors in the financing and sale of and trafficking in arms. The 1998 report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict in Africa (S/1998/318) called on Member States to make violations of United Nations embargoes a criminal offence in their domestic laws. We agree that this will be an essential tool in making these embargoes effective. However, the Council, in its working group, must address the question of harmonization of penalties to ensure that they are effectively applied.

The Security Council should also use all means at its disposal, including the use of investigative commissions, to find and report on violations of embargoes and the sources of finance. The traffickers and supplier nations must be held to account. If we remove the source of funding from the purchase of arms we will remove the overriding incentive for violations of the embargo and, in this regard, we have an excellent example in the work of the sanctions Committee in the sanctions against UNITA, which we will address tomorrow.

Too often the resolutions approving sanctions regimes lack clarity and specificity with regard to the identification of weapons and military services that are to be prohibited. This deficiency in arms embargoes must also be corrected. The capacity of the United Nations to monitor, enforce and report on violations of arms embargoes must also be enhanced. Sanctions committees must be given the necessary tools to carry out this work.

Having said this, sanctions can be effective only if there is the necessary political will. In one case analysed by the International Peace Academy, it was pointed out that the decision to impose a specific arms embargo seemed to reflect the desire by the Council to do something, however modest, in response to the particular worsening crisis. According to the Academy's analysis, it also reflected the minimum consensus that could be achieved within a divided Security Council. Without an effective means of enforcing the arms embargo, and faced with an obvious lack of enthusiasm among the major Powers for implementing more forceful sanctions, the sanctions committee was powerless to do anything about the lack of compliance.

In addition to reforms and policy-making, improving the effectiveness of sanctions requires the enhancement of internal institutional mechanisms within the United Nations system, including the development of a more effective monitoring capacity within the Secretariat, adequate staffing, streamlining of procedures and harmonization of guidelines in the working methods of the sanctions committees, visits by sanctions committees, technical expertise and support, and improved cooperation with regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions. The note of the President of the Council of 29 January 1999 contains recommendations which still have to be acted upon.

It is important that the working group devise a method for the Security Council to work with the General Assembly to ensure that there is the necessary budgetary support to support the Secretariat and the Security Council in the implementation of sanctions regimes.

In conclusion, my delegation looks forward to participating actively in the working group, and again we wish to express our appreciation to the President and the Canadian delegation for the leadership shown on this issue.

The President

I thank the representative of Jamaica for her kind words.

Mr. Gatilov (Russia)

Mr. President, I am happy once again to welcome you to this important meeting of the Security Council initiated by the Canadian delegation.

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the discussion in the Security Council of the entire range of questions relating to the problems of sanctions. Recently there has been much greater interest in this subject both in the United Nations and in international academic, social and political circles. Various forums, one of which was the seminar organized today under the aegis of the International Peace Academy, are actively considering questions relating to the implementation of the sanctions restrictions decided upon by the Council, and new mechanisms are being proposed to make sanctions truly "smart", supremely targeted and aimed precisely against those responsible for creating a threat to peace and security.

In this connection, we welcome the establishment of an informal working group of the Security Council whose mandate includes analysing the entire range of the problems of United Nations sanctions. On the basis of this analysis, practical recommendations can be elaborated for the Council to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions, to monitor their implementation and to reduce the humanitarian and other undesirable consequences of their impact.

Sanctions remain a powerful weapon of the United Nations in its efforts to maintain international peace and security. This instrument requires extremely careful handling and must have a solid legal basis.

Sanctions are the final step when all other peaceful means of settlement have been exhausted. An absolute condition for their imposition is a determination by the Security Council of the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Sanctions must have clear goals and a clear time-frame. They must be regularly reviewed, and they must be accompanied by concrete, clear conditions for their termination or their suspension as United Nations decisions are complied with. When imposing sanctions, the humanitarian limits must be outlined and the likely consequences calculated for third countries and the civilian populations of the targeted State, above all for the most vulnerable groups.

It is important that the restrictions established be commensurate with the magnitude of the threat or the breach of international security. Any sanctions must be subordinate to the search for a long-term political settlement and must reflect strategic goals in the area of maintaining peace and security. What is inadmissible is the use of sanctions to overthrow or change the legitimate Government or existing political regime in the targeted country. Sanctions must be imposed not to punish a State, but to compel it to change its conduct and to encourage it to comply with the demands of the Security Council.

Today's realities require, as a matter of urgency, that we take into account factors such as the link between sanctions and the observance of human rights, the views of international humanitarian, including non-governmental, organizations and the need to adjust sanctions regimes according to the humanitarian situation in the targeted State, the elaboration of practical ways and means to prevent negative side effects of sanctions for third countries, including within the context of Article 50 of the Charter.

Unfortunately, quite often when imposing and implementing or lifting sanctions, biased approaches prevail. Partly this is demonstrated in attempts to give a broad interpretation of the language of certain previous positions taken by the Security Council. In a number of cases, the urgent lifting of sanctions is delayed, new criteria are artificially introduced by setting various additional trial periods and control periods, and complex mechanisms for monitoring and accountability are established. In other cases, these mechanisms either do not work and no attention is paid to this, or they are not even created. This practice of double standards, apart from its negative impact on the fate of millions of entirely innocent people, does serious damage to the authority of the United Nations as well.

Within the work of the informal working group of the Security Council, we will be strongly advocating an unbiased evaluation of current experience and agreement on recommendations that should enhance the effectiveness of sanctions while at the same time eliminating the many shortcomings of a host of current sanctions regimes. We also will definitely try to see to it that members of the group fully take into account the work that has already been done and is still being done on this topic within the General Assembly and in other United Nations bodies.

In this connection, we draw attention to a document produced by the Russian Federation in the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. That document sets out the main conditions and standard criteria for imposing and implementing sanctions and other coercive measures. Its aim is to focus attention on concrete elements of sanctions practice that require priority consideration. Russia is prepared to work together on all of these problems both in the Security Council and in ot