Security Council meeting 3514

The President

I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Hungary, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Romania and Ukraine in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The President

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

In view of the lateness of the hour, I intend, with the concurrence of the members of the Council, to suspend the meeting at 1.30 and resume it at 3.15.

The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/1995/271, which contains the text of a letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

Members of the Council will shortly have before them document S/1995/275, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

I should also like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following other documents: S/1995/261, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/262, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/263, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/264, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1995/265, letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

The first speaker is the representative of Ukraine. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine)

Mr. President, first of all let me congratulate you on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. I should like to express my gratitude to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, for his skilful and fruitful guidance of the work of the Council last month.

From our point of view, it is deeply symbolic that the delegation of Ukraine should have the opportunity to be the first to make a statement at the meeting of the Security Council devoted to the issue of the provision to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of security assurances.

As is well known, Ukraine acceded to the NPT after thorough and sometimes heated discussions in the Parliament and in the country as a whole of all aspects of our participation in the Treaty and, above all, of the consequences of accession to the NPT for the security of Ukraine. The agreement upon the quadripartite document on the provision to Ukraine of guarantees of its national security on the part of the United States of America, Great Britain and Russia and the unilateral statements on the matter by France and China were the principal factors and that had a key role in the Ukrainian Parliament's decision in favour.

We believe that the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the NPT, which was signed in Budapest on 5 December 1994, can form the basis for elaborating a universal, legally binding document on assurances. It is clear, nevertheless, that some provisions of this Memorandum, reflecting as they do the unique situation in Ukraine, cannot serve as a precedent in all cases. We consider the draft resolution as a first step towards eliminating the contradictions that exist between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Member States of the NPT on the problem of assurances.

At the same time, we welcome the confirmation by the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council of their commitments to place on the Security Council's agenda, as a matter of urgency, the question of assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to draft and adopt decisions aimed at supporting victims of such actions with all the necessary assistance.

We appreciate the fact that the draft resolution takes into account the concern felt by the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States over the possible catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons against them, which would entail huge loss of life alongside the material and financial losses. This concern is taken into account in the provision that has been determined to the effect that the Security Council will recommend proper procedures concerning compensation to victims of aggression in accordance with the norms of international law. We should also like to draw Council's attention to the fact that these procedures should be extended to third countries that suffer as a result of actions by an aggressor.

Let me express some specific considerations regarding the substance of the issue under discussion.

We pay tribute to the realism demonstrated by the nuclear-weapon States, which have promulgated negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in their unilateral statements. Nevertheless, in our view, it would be better if these assurances could be given in the form of a joint declaration. This would, on the one hand, unify the scope of the assurances given; on the other, it could strengthen the psychological and political authority, as well as the efficiency, of such assurances. It is obvious that differences in the substance of the nuclear sections of the military doctrines of the permanent members of the Security Council, to our regret, blocked agreement on such a format of the document.

We believe that the significance of the negative assurances given now by the nuclear States could be substantially strengthened if they were supported by the tools to monitor their implementation.

Given the fact that only five States are officially recognized now as nuclear Powers, one can assume that the nuclear security assurances are ultimately directed at the nuclear nations, to deter each other. It is therefore logical to come to the conclusion that additional security assurances for the non-nuclear States would be the nuclear States' mutual commitment not to use nuclear weapons first. This, in turn, would lay a solid foundation for the multi-objective system of measures to strengthen trust between other nations. There can also be added the renunciation of the unanimity principle when dealing with issues in the Security Council on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The reaffirmation by the nuclear States of their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world would be a key stabilizing element of such a system. An exceptionally positive role in this regard could be played by the commitment of the nuclear States to pursue the speediest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, as well as the drafting and signing of an agreement on the prohibition of the production and accumulation of fissile materials for military purposes. In this framework, the international community should also rely on the immediate ratification by the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of agreements resulting from SALT II, as well as subsequent urgent steps towards nuclear disarmament and other nuclear States' joining in this process as soon as possible.

We hope that the Security Council's adoption of this draft resolution on security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will play a positive role in achieving a decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty at its 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The President

I thank the representative of Ukraine for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Hungary. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Molnár (Hungary)

It gives me great pleasure to be at this table today and to see you, Sir, presiding over the Security Council. Let me offer you my congratulations and wish you continued success for the remainder of your term in office. Allow me also to thank you and the other members of the Council for the opportunity to present Hungary's views concerning the important issue on the agenda.

I do not intend this morning to set out the full range of Hungary's views on the main issue, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on which the international community has been focusing its attention for some time. Our Foreign Minister will do that soon -- in fact, exactly a week from today -- in the general debate of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Instead, I wish to make but a few comments on a major step taken by five States -- the five permanent members of the Security Council -- as well as on the draft resolution which they have submitted and which the Council is expected to adopt today.

This statement is not the first a Hungarian delegate has made before the Security Council on the same subject. Twenty-seven years ago, when for the first time my country held a non-permanent seat in the Council, the Hungarian Permanent Representative stated:

"The provisions of the draft resolution do constitute an important step in applying the Charter to the realm of nuclear weapons that could not have been foreseen at the time the Charter was drafted. By adopting the draft resolution before us the Council will contribute to a large extent to the meaningful implementation of Charter provisions to maintain peace and security all over the world. It provides for immediate action on the part of the Security Council and, above all, its nuclear-weapon-State permanent members. The draft resolution puts a potential nuclear aggressor in a position where he must be aware that his actions will be resisted effectively and immediately." (S/PV.1431, para. 39)

Nobody would deny that the world has dramatically changed in the 27 years since the meeting of the Security Council was convened to act on that draft resolution. For example, the draft before the Council today has been placed before it not by three, but by all five permanent members, and the difference goes far beyond mere numeric quantifications. Hungary therefore welcomes this draft resolution as a most significant step forward in providing security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all the five nuclear-weapon-States which are also Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This step is not only a step forward; it is also a step of great historic significance. For the first time, the permanent five, acting in a most welcome manifestation of unity, are offering positive assurances in a Security Council draft resolution, and, also for the first time, they have elaborated measures, including the restoration of international peace and security, which the Council would take in the catastrophic event of nuclear aggression.

Nuclear aggression is, most unfortunately, not yet a forgone option. It is still a possibility -- maybe a remote possibility, but still a contingency. Contrary to all reasonable expectations and all the major historic changes of recent years, a non-nuclear-weapon State may still find itself the subject of aggression, or the threat of aggression, involving nuclear weapons.

That is why Hungary, a small non-nuclear-weapon country, appreciative of meaningful action, attaches great importance to the security assurances thus given. We feel that the draft resolution will provide us, as it does all other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, with genuine guarantees. In addition, the draft resolution, by virtue of expressing a unity of intent by the five nuclear-weapon States, introduces a powerful element of deterrence against nuclear aggression or blackmail.

Before concluding this statement, I also wish to pay tribute to the declaration made in Geneva on 6 April before the Conference on Disarmament by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States concerning the provisions of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We find it reassuring that those four permanent members of the Security Council clearly indicate that the draft resolution which is soon to be adopted is not the end of the road.

We are, therefore, ready to record the forthcoming resolution as a positive development and thus a most significant milestone in the effort to address in a serious and action-oriented manner the important issue of averting the dangers of a nuclear conflict.

The President

I thank the representative of Hungary for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of India. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement now.

Mr. Shah (India)

Mr. President, I should like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. Your acknowledged diplomatic skills and experience are particularly reassuring as we consider today a matter of fundamental importance to all nation-States.

While maintenance of peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council in the United Nations, preservation of national security is the primary responsibility of all governments of States Members of the United Nations. For those of us who are committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a debate on the question of security assurances against nuclear weapon attack is a welcome development, even though my delegation is sceptical about the motivation which has prompted this debate today.

Today's debate takes us back to June 1968, when the Security Council adopted resolution 255. The nuclear-weapon Powers were then canvassing for signatures to the proposed Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Today, in a repeat of history, they are canvassing for votes for indefinite extension of the NPT. It is particularly disheartening that in this post-cold-war age, which provides the ideal opportunity for achieving complete and genuine nuclear disarmament, all that the most powerful countries in the world can think of are half measures aimed at preserving the balance of terror on the one hand and power by nuclear weaponry on the other.

May I recall that, when resolution 255 was passed by the Security Council in 1968, India was a member and abstained in the voting on the resolution. At the 1433rd meeting of the Security Council, India's permanent representative had said,

"I should like to emphasize that any security assurances that might be offered by nuclear-weapon States could not and should not be regarded as a quid pro quo for the signature of a non-proliferation treaty." (S/PV.1433, para. 107)

He added,

"The basis for any action by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is the Charter of the United Nations. Any linking of security assurances to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would be contrary to its provisions, because the Charter does not discriminate between those who might adhere to a particular treaty and those who might not do so." (ibid., para. 108)

He further clarified that, while the permanent members of the Security Council have a special obligation and responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, they are:

"... precluded from adopting a discriminatory approach in situations involving the security of States, including that arising from the threat or the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States." (ibid.)

In the debate 27 years ago, many countries supported the logic of this approach. Ambassador Bérard of France stated, in this room:

"My Government reiterates that the real problem is that of the elimination of atomic weapons; the nations of the world will not receive the guarantees of security to which they are entitled until the nuclear powers agree to embark upon the road towards nuclear disarmament and until they reach that goal." (S/PV.1430, para. 51)

Ambassador Kuznetsov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated:

"The fact is, the nuclear weapons will still not disappear with the conclusion of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation; the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war in the world will remain even against non-nuclear-weapon States." (ibid., para. 10)

I recall these categorical views of the important nuclear-weapon States so that this body can dispassionately judge the utility of the kind of security assurances that have now been offered.

Twenty-seven years later, I must reiterate that what my distinguished predecessor stated then is equally true today. In my delegation's view, it is the clear responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States that are also permanent members of the Council to go to the assistance of any State that is threatened with or is the victim of nuclear attack, and not merely those that might be signatories to the NPT.

At the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the international community decided to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is permissible under international law in any circumstances. This was an initiative taken primarily by the non-aligned countries, which do not possess nuclear weapons. India supports this initiative, and maintains that use of nuclear weapons would cause such indiscriminate suffering and destruction that it is contrary to the rules of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

It is said that those who ignore the lessons of history are condemned to re-live them. Twenty-five years after the NPT came into force, there are today many more nuclear weapons placed in more countries than in 1970. Unless the international community acts, and acts quickly, to commit itself to the elimination of nuclear weapons, 25 years hence there will be more nuclear weapons, in more countries, than there are today, despite the extended NPT. What we should be debating today is not an interim measure to preserve the balance of terror as a sop to the security concerns of a category of non-nuclear-weapon countries, but a universal treaty commitment for time-bound destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons; that is, if the nuclear-weapon Powers are serious about indefinite security for all.

Despite General Assembly resolution 49/73, adopted overwhelmingly, the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has not been re-established during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. While that must clearly be our priority, it is unfortunate that we are today discussing a draft resolution, to be passed by the Council, which is discriminatory, is riddled with ifs and buts and falls short of the requirement for a binding international legal commitment.

It bears repetition to say that the only security against the threat or use of nuclear weapons is a binding international legal convention on the elimination of nuclear weapons. Half measures, such as the draft resolution presented by the permanent five, which attempt to offer security assurances to a certain category of countries are no substitute for permanent security and, in fact, may give a wrong message. One would hope that by offering a draft resolution of this kind, the nuclear-weapon States are not telling the non-members of the NPT that they, the nuclear-weapon States, are free to use nuclear weapons against them, because this would have implications which are too frightening to contemplate.

Let me reiterate that India is firmly committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. India will not subscribe to the NPT so long as it is a discriminatory Treaty whose objective is not to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons so much as to prevent proliferation of nuclear-weapon countries. India will continue to pursue, both in the United Nations and outside, its unrelenting efforts to work towards non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons, even if yet another discriminatory and non-universal resolution emerges from the Security Council at the end of this debate.

The President

I thank the representative of India for his kind words addressed to me.

The President

The President wishes to state that when he calls for the resumption of the meeting at 3.15 p.m., he means 3.15 and not 3.40. The President wishes to express his gratitude to those members of the Security Council who were here on time.

The next speaker is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Kharrazi (Iran)

Mr. President, at the outset, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. I am confident that you will guide the proceedings of the Council during the current month effectively. I should also like to express our appreciation to the Permanent Representative of China for the excellent manner in which he conducted the deliberations of the Council during the month of March.

The Security Council is meeting today to discuss a subject of paramount importance to the security of the entire international community. The continued production, stockpiling and testing of nuclear weapons by nuclear Powers endanger the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, which believe that the only effective security assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. It is regrettable to note that not only have the nuclear-weapon States refused to undertake a programme of action for nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework, with a target date, but they have also chosen not to finalize a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is the considered view of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that, pending the achievement of universal nuclear disarmament, effective measures should be taken to ensure the security of these States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT believe that nuclear-weapon States should extend the negative security assurances granted to the States Members of the Tlatelolco Treaty to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. These assurances must be in the form of a negotiated, legally binding international instrument, with, inter alia, the addition of a protocol embodying legally binding nuclear security assurances to be annexed to the NPT. The Group of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT in the Conference on Disarmament, including my delegation, have presented a draft protocol on the issue, which is an important step towards strengthening the Treaty. Anything short of that would not allay the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Bearing in mind that any act of aggression involving the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security, it is incumbent upon the Security Council to take immediate measures under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in the event of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT. These measures should include action on the part of the Members of the United Nations, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, individually or collectively, to suppress aggression. In other words, besides providing technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance to the victims of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, the Security Council should be prepared to use all necessary means in defence of the victims in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The draft resolution before the Council, while inviting Member States to act in the case of the use of nuclear weapons in the form of positive security assurances, lacks a clear reference to the core of the problem -- that is, the negative security assurances. Regrettably, following the demise of the cold war, some permanent members of the Security Council continue to refrain from committing themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Moreover, this draft does not go beyond the very limited scope of resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, except as regards the wording concerning technical assistance to the victim of a nuclear accident similar to the Chernobyl incident, not a victim of a threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The current draft before the Council clearly lacks the following essential principles: first, a prior determination that threat or attack by nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security; secondly, a trigger mechanism to ensure a Security Council response to threats or attacks by nuclear weapons.

The non-nuclear-weapon States have renounced the nuclear option in return for the fulfilment of the commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, including the provision of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through an international legally binding instrument. The nuclear-weapon States should uphold their commitments so that the NPT and the non-proliferation regime can be strengthened.

Undoubtedly, the present endeavour will help create an atmosphere conducive to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As an original signatory of the NPT and as a Party that has fully complied with all its obligations under NPT and IAEA safeguards, the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to acting in tandem with other peace-loving countries in this regard.

The President

I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Romania. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Gorita (Romania)

Allow me first to congratulate you warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the high responsibility of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. Your well-known diplomatic skills give us full confidence for the success of the Council's work this month.

I should also like to express our appreciation for the way in which the Permanent Representative of China conducted the work of the Council last month.

The draft resolution on security assurances to be adopted today by the Security Council is an important political initiative of particular relevance to the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Indeed, progress in the direction of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons will facilitate the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, paving the way for an indefinite extension of the NPT and thus contributing to international peace and security.

It is a matter of satisfaction that the search for a solution to the problem of security assurances, which were basically negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, did not set the United Nations, with its considerably enhanced role and credibility in maintaining international peace and security to one side. During the course of the negotiations and consultations in the Conference on Disarmament and other forums, Romania came out in favour of the idea of the Security Council's confirming, on a broader basis, the commitments originally undertaken by three nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

The new geopolitical realities prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in terms of what could now be called the absence of a "nuclear umbrella", make us, like other Central and Eastern European nations, particularly sensitive to the idea of enlarged and consolidated security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. That is why we particularly appreciated and encouraged last year's initiative by the United States and other nuclear Powers to review their policies on providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States for the purpose of reaching a coordinated and common position on this important topic.

The draft resolution presented today to the Council for adoption addresses concerns in the security assurances area in terms of both negative and positive assurances for the NPT's non-nuclear-weapon member States. It is an effort towards a comprehensive and effective approach to a very complex issue that deserves appropriate acknowledgement and appreciation.

We consider that the Security Council draft resolution, together with the declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States circulated as official documents of the Council, bear significant political weight. Such collective security assurances, offered for the first time by all five nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Security Council, are an important step in the right direction that cannot be underestimated. By adopting the draft resolution before it, the Security Council will offer additional incentives for universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and for a decision in favour of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT.

Allow me to express our appreciation to the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council for their initiative. We hope that the draft resolution on security assurances will be adopted by the Council unanimously.

The President

I thank the representative of Romania for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt)

Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of office. The delegation of Egypt is confident that your able leadership will benefit the Security Council in its deliberations on this important issue.

I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, the Permanent Representative of China, for his commendable contributions during the month of March.

The Permanent Representative of Indonesia will be speaking shortly on behalf of the non-aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We have seen his text and my delegation shares his views.

This meeting of the Security Council is of the utmost importance. What is really at stake is the ability of the Council to discharge its primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter, in its Article 26, specifically confers upon the Security Council the crucially important task of formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. The elaboration and adoption of credible security assurances would fall squarely within the ambit of the mandate assigned to the Council.

When the General Assembly was debating the adoption of the NPT in 1968, Egypt's Permanent Representative stated in unequivocal terms that the non-nuclear Powers that signed the Treaty without a firm guarantee from the major nuclear Powers would be undermining and even jeopardizing their very existence as sovereign States.

It is relevant to recall that the Charter was conceived and concluded before the advent of the nuclear era; hence, the perils of the nuclear age were unforeseen and perhaps unimagined by the authors of the Charter. This explains the absence of measures commensurate with the qualitatively higher threats posed by nuclear weapons to international peace and security. The advent of the atomic bomb fundamentally altered the nature of the world in which the United Nations would have to function, modified the attitude that had been expressed in the Charter towards disarmament, and firmly established the elimination of nuclear weapons as the primary concern of all endeavours pertaining to the survival of life on our planet.

In this context, it was imperative politically and even psychologically to assign the highest priority to attaining general and complete disarmament. It was also for the purpose of preserving peace and security in the world that efforts were directed at limiting the possibilities of nuclear confrontation. Only the five permanent members of the Security Council were exempted from the ban on obtaining nuclear weapons. In return, non-nuclear-weapon States were to be offered guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them.

It is indeed regrettable that, 25 years after the entry into force of the NPT, it has not yet acquired universality. General and complete disarmament remains a faraway and even an elusive objective. Moreover, the NPT relies for its implementation on the strict application of comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which are themselves inadequate and need to be strengthened, updated and improved. Consequently, the nuclear-weapon States have a definite obligation to demonstrate to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that their security will not in any way be endangered by the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and to extend genuine protection and assistance in the event that this security is threatened.

A brief survey of the genesis of the concept of security assurances is in order. When negotiations began on elaborating a treaty to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s, many States held the view that a clause on both negative and positive security assurances must form an integral part of any such treaty. Indeed, the Egyptian delegation has consistently strived, throughout the years, to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States would be adequately protected. As far back as October 1967, during the negotiations for the elaboration of the NPT, Egypt submitted, at the 18-nation Disarmament Committee, a draft article to be incorporated in the proposed text of the NPT. Notwithstanding the initiative by Egypt and many other non-nuclear-weapon States, the efforts to incorporate a security assurance in the text of the NPT were unsuccessful. The NPT was finally adopted by the General Assembly in May 1968 without a clause on security assurances. One month later, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) was adopted in conjunction with unilateral declarations by three nuclear-weapon States. However, resolution 255 was from the very outset defective and disappointing. It was widely considered inadequate, since it did not extend genuine security to non-nuclear-weapon States, nor did it and the accompanying declarations add anything new to what had already been provided for in the Charter.

In point of fact, resolution 255 failed to demonstrate any effective element of deterrence to a would-be aggressor or to provide protection to a victim of aggression. Nor did it indicate the scope and nature of assistance to be provided to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT that fell victim to a nuclear attack or threat of such an attack. The unilateral declarations issued at that time by the three nuclear-weapons States were, in essence, statements of intent with no binding assurances to provide for their application or to prevent their withdrawal. They stated that nuclear aggression would create a qualitatively new situation but, in effect, did not provide any corresponding, qualitatively new procedures, over and above the provisions of the Charter itself, for dealing with such a grave threat.

In light of these shortcomings, non-nuclear-weapon States continued to strive for more effective, more comprehensive and more binding assurances for their security. To this end, Egypt became the first to submit proposals, to the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT and the Conference on Disarmament in 1990, to update the substance of resolution 255 by expanding the nature and scope of application of security assurances, and by ensuring that they are enunciated in an international instrument, of a legally binding nature, that would ensure a response by the Security Council to any attack or threat of attack against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT. Egypt's record confirms that its position on security assurances has throughout been both consistent and persistent.

Today, as the Security Council ponders the adoption of a new resolution which aims to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and as we are about to embark, next week, on the process of reviewing the NPT and securing its preservation in the most suitable manner, we must also remind ourselves that any system of security assurances must be measured -- and measured carefully -- on the basis of its effectiveness and its credibility. This is the spirit in which my delegation approaches the question of security assurances.

Security assurances, to be worthy of the name, must be designed and structured in such a manner as to cover the exigencies of our contemporary world and at the same time anticipate the developments of the future. They must meet the security needs of the world not only for today but also for tomorrow. Until the NPT becomes universal, the danger of proliferation will steadily increase with the passage of time. With this premise in mind, my delegation, in its consideration of the proposed resolution, is guided by four basic principles: credibility, deterrence, protection and assistance. I shall address each of these elements.

Firstly, credibility. Any resolution must capture and accurately reflect the magnitude of the nuclear threat which, as I said earlier, was unforeseen and unimagined by the authors of the Charter. Any distinction between a nuclear threat and a conventional threat must be amplified in no uncertain terms.

Under paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter,

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State ..."

Accordingly, whenever a State threatens another with conventional weapons, the Security Council is duty-bound to take effective collective measures for the removal of the threat and the suppression of the aggression, as stipulated in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Charter. This Charter injunction, as we all know, addresses conventional weapons, be they cannons, bullets or missiles, or even bows, arrows and spears.

The Council's response must draw a clear distinction between the nuclear and the conventional threats. Failure to distinguish can only undermine the credibility of the whole edifice. Experience has shown that it is no easy matter to repress a conventional armed attack. A conventional attack, however, has a limited scope; it does not entail the total destruction and massive annihilation that a nuclear one does. When a conventional attack occurs, one can swallow a response confined to "bringing the matter to the attention of the Council" and to "seeking Council action to provide necessary assistance". But a threat or use of nuclear weapons to wage war should unleash the collective security system, set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, in order to repel the aggression.

Moreover, attention must be drawn to a most grave factor, namely, the fact that the Council's response to a nuclear threat is subject to the regular voting procedure provided for under the Charter, specifically in the provisions of paragraph 3 of its Article 27, which pertains to the concurring votes of the five permanent members. The magnitude of the unprecedented and unparalleled devastation nuclear weapons can cause necessitates a degree of automaticity if credibility is to be conferred. Therefore, it should be clearly spelled out that a nuclear threat shall be deterred and that the victims shall be protected, assisted and defended in a clearly defined manner commensurate with gravity of the nuclear threat.

The rationale and philosophy of the draft resolution under consideration are based on the assumption that the potential nuclear threat is not expected to come from any of the permanent five, which have solemnly offered not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

The draft resolution therefore is directed toward a threat emanating from a non-NPT party or perhaps an NPT party which violates its NPT obligations and develops nuclear weapons. This fact poses a legitimate question: why is this important draft resolution "vetoable"? It is our considered view that this particular draft resolution should undoubtedly be beyond the scope of application of the veto in order to ensure its credibility.

The second element is deterrence. If the resolution is to have any deterrent effect on a would-be aggressor, it must contain an explicit reference to the fact that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and shall automatically trigger an immediate response by the Security Council in conformity with Article 39 of the Charter and in a manner consistent with the substance and the spirit of the relevant Articles of Chapter VII. The effectiveness of the deterrent hinges on spelling out the precise dimensions of the response of the Council.

The third element is protection. The element of genuine protection must also be clearly enunciated in the form of a mechanism for enforcement of the security assurances which would indicate the mandatory action to be adopted by the Council to redress a situation where a non-nuclear-weapon State was the object of a nuclear attack or threat of an attack. It is axiomatic that the magnitude in the degree of devastation and destruction by nuclear weapons necessitates a proportionate elevation of the Security Council's response. It has to be abundantly clear that the territorial integrity and the political independence of any non-nuclear-weapon State, as well as the survival of its population, will be guaranteed as a matter of right and not as a recognition of an interest -- whether or not we term it legitimate -- to receive security assurances.

The fourth and last element is assistance. It is imperative to clarify and specify the scope and nature of assistance and compensation to be provided to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that is a victim or object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. In this context, it should be recognized that assistance must be comprehensive and reparation mandatory. The draft resolution has expanded the technical assistance aspects. It remains silent, however, on the political remedial assistance needed to defend the victim.

However, in our view, the draft resolution before us contains three positive elements: It is endorsed by all the permanent members of the Council. It addresses the element of technical assistance in a more comprehensive manner than resolution 255 (1968), albeit in voluntary language. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 invite Member States of the United Nations to provide assistance to any State that is victim of an act of aggression by nuclear weapons and recognize the right of any such victim to compensation from the aggressor. These are definitely positive elements and represent a welcome improvement on resolution 255 (1968).

We are not, however, persuaded that the formula in the joint draft resolution before us offers the non-nuclear-weapon States all that can now be devised, or even all that is due, to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In all candour, the draft falls short of the general expectations.

In this context it is appropriate to point out that at the 1991 session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure the Non-Nuclear States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Egypt submitted a paper on security assurances which sought to update and enhance resolution 255 (1968) and called for the initiation of a process of collective or individual consultations on security assurances. That was five years ago. Unfortunately, current efforts by the five members of the Security Council to update resolution 255 (1968) have completely bypassed any dialogue with the non-nuclear-weapon States, which are the prime beneficiaries and the constituency for security assurances, and have thereby resulted in a draft resolution which addresses only one of the foregoing elements, namely assistance -- as if the Security Council's role in this matter is not to anticipate a nuclear threat but, rather, to expect a nuclear accident similar to the one in Chernobyl.

In the light of what I have said, it is evident that the draft resolution now before the Council lacks the following essential principles: first, a prior determination that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security; secondly, a trigger mechanism to ensure Security Council response to threats or attacks by nuclear weapons; thirdly, a commitment by the Security Council, as stated in the Charter:

"to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace".

I have expressed Egypt's position on the substance of the draft resolution. Allow me now to touch very briefly on the time factor.

It is obvious that the timing of the submission of the draft resolution has a certain significance. The rush of the sponsors to secure its adoption one week before the start of the NPT Review and Extension Conference no doubt aims at tilting the balance towards their most preferred outcome for the Conference.

Thus, the Security Council is scheduled to vote today on a most important draft resolution with a direct bearing on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all non-nuclear-weapon States, without allowing adequate time for broad consultations between all the concerned parties.

In point of fact, due to the far-reaching consequences of the draft resolution, its adoption should have been preceded by wide-ranging consultations and even a reasonable period of sober reflection.

However, one cannot help but wonder whether the adoption of such a draft resolution by the Security Council would suffice to dispel the wide scepticism about its credibility, which will have detrimental repercussions on the future success of the Treaty as a whole. This is not to suggest that the Security Council is not the right forum to enunciate such assurances. On the contrary, it is perhaps the course dictated by the Charter. However, it is self-evident that the crux of the security assurances is, and will remain, not who issues the assurances but what their contents are.

In conclusion, my delegation appreciates the efforts exerted by the sponsors to improve the text of the draft resolution. We must stress, however, that the draft resolution before us should not represent the end of the road, but rather the beginning. We noted with appreciation the statement of the Permanent Representative of France in the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995 that the draft resolution

"constitutes a first in many respects, and ... reflects our intention to meet the expectations of the international community globally, collectively and specifically." (S/1995/264, annex, p. 3)

In our view, the only global, collective and specific assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. My delegation therefore does not subscribe to the view that the draft resolution provides the non-nuclear-weapon States with the required and long-awaited credible security assurances to which they are entitled as a result of their renunciation of the nuclear option.

In point of fact, the adoption of this draft will not in any way strengthen the NPT regime. As it stands today, the draft is, regrettably, insufficient in both form and substance.

The President

I thank the representative of Egypt for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Algeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Lamamra (Algeria)

It is a great pleasure for me to express to you, Sir, the Algerian delegation's and my own warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. I am delighted that the important deliberations today are being led by a distinguished diplomat who is quite naturally attentive to all the dimensions of the question under consideration.

I would also like to express to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of China, our deep appreciation for the manner in which he conducted the Council's proceedings last month.

Lastly, I should like to express the Algerian delegation's support for the statement that will be made by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia on behalf of the non-aligned countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We have taken note of the contents of that statement with satisfaction.

The Charter of the United Nations affirmed forcefully, among its cardinal principles, the commitment of the States Members of the Organization to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. The Charter also stipulated, as the primary purpose of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security through

"effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace".

These references, drawn from the key legal instrument that establishes the order of contemporary international relations, are particularly relevant when the threat or use of force and acts of aggression may involve nuclear weapons whose destructive capacity threatens the very existence of the human race. These references are also relevant in explaining the nature and the scope of the security assurances which, on the initiative of the permanent members of the Security Council, in their capacity of nuclear-weapon Powers, it is envisaged are to be granted to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The current debate is undoubtedly timely, and we are grateful to those who initiated it for having seen the need for the Security Council resolutely to heed the aspirations of the peoples of the United Nations and to try to make its contribution to dealing with the global challenges that affect mankind's future because of the threats they pose to international peace and security. This debate is all the more timely since it is taking place after the international community has fully entered into a qualitatively new stage born of the disappearance of the bipolar and conflictual structure of the world, and on the eve of the Review and Extension Conference of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The question of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States is part of the overall problem of the maintenance of international peace and security in relation to nuclear disarmament. That is why this question has always been at the very heart of the concerns and proposals of the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, whose member States have consistently affirmed the need for negative security assurances, enshrined in a binding international legal instrument, while rightly emphasizing that the true assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of this type of weapon. From this standpoint, the initiative of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, which is moving in a promising direction as regards positive guarantees, contains -- because of the deliberately modest status given to the initiative proposed to the Council and because of its scope, which is limited to an updating of resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, which Algeria was not able to support when the Council adopted it -- shortcomings which have significantly reduced its historic role at a time which is conducive to conceptual and operational breakthroughs in this field.

Many of the additions and improvements that the non-aligned countries suggested to the sponsors of the draft resolution under consideration were inspired by the twofold legitimate hope of making this exercise a successful example of partnership in identifying the needs and designing the appropriate responses, and of ensuring that the text to be adopted will constitute a solid base of effective and irrevocable commitments undertaken in solidarity by the nuclear-weapon States, with the full adherence of the States that are the beneficiaries of those commitments. It is in particular a question of placing the draft resolution firmly in the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter and of drawing the legal implications from this, with a view to establishing a system of positive security assurances organized around the three principles of deterrence, assistance and compensation, which would be set under way by the automatic and unconditional action of the Security Council.

Since it does not reflect factors which are unassailably true, since it does not incorporate elements which determine the very effectiveness of the assurances envisaged, this draft resolution objectively falls far short of the coherence required by this undertaking and of the expectations of the international community in this respect. In this context, the Security Council's awakening to a pressing issue that is part of the adaptation of international relations to the circumstances of the next century will not, unfortunately, bring about the healthy break with the restrictive and weak approaches to controlling the course of history which have too often been characteristic of the political management of the atomic age.

Just as history proves that every weapon invented by man has come to be used, it is very widely held that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is a factor for insecurity. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has undeniably played a stabilizing role in respect of horizontal proliferation, vertical proliferation -- which has developed in its shadow and which devours colossal sums of money -- is fuelled by doctrines of deterrence and other balance-of-terror theories, all of them based on a logic of confrontation. The post-cold-war period should be able to free political will of past inhibition and sluggishness, to encourage a profound renewal of strategic thinking, establishing the obsolescence of the military uses of the atom, giving a decisive impetus to nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and ensuring the promotion of a new concept of human security based on economic prosperity and social well-being. That would be the best way to keep the Charter promise to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to protect those generations from the madness that made mankind strive to acquire the means to guarantee its own destruction.

The President

I thank the representative of Algeria for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Kamal (Pakistan)

I would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council and to thank you and the other members of the Council for giving me the opportunity to speak on the subject of negative security assurances.

The issue of negative security assurances has been addressed by the General Assembly over the last several years. The General Assembly has consistently maintained that there is an urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such arrangements would best be in the form of an international convention of a legally binding character. The Conference on Disarmament agrees, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, but has not been able to agree on the nature of a common formula which could be included in such a convention.

The General Assembly has therefore appealed

"to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". (General Assembly resolution 49/73, para. 3)

Considering the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention, the General Assembly recommended that

"the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (ibid., para. 5)

During the last General Assembly session those recommendations were reiterated in resolution 49/73, which was adopted by a vote of 168 in favour, none against and only three abstentions.

The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, during their Tenth Summit Conference, held in Jakarta in 1992, also emphasized the significance of a multilateral and legally binding convention to adequately address the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. The non-aligned Foreign Ministers reaffirmed that position in May 1994 in Cairo. They stated that

"security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons"

and

"called on the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an internationally binding convention". (S/1994/894, annex, para. 54)

Only unconditional guarantees of a legally binding character can effectively address the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negative security assurances which are conditional could be subjected to varying interpretations and to selective implementation. Linking security assurances to certain criteria would militate against the objective of providing assurances on a universal basis. Also, relying on a subjective decision-making process for extending security assurances could result in arbitrary and selective application of those assurances. Security assurances should become operational whenever there is any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also needs to be ensured that the provisions of security assurances are in full conformity with the United Nations Charter -- especially Article 51 -- which provides that the Security Council shall act, without discrimination, whenever international peace and security is threatened.

Pakistan believes that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters, provides the most appropriate forum for the consideration of the issue of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such consideration should result in the conclusion of an international instrument that provides unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. For this it is essential that the Conference on Disarmament should establish an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances, and that this ad hoc committee should be provided with a negotiating mandate for the conclusion of an international instrument of a legally binding character as early as possible.

Pakistan has consistently advocated that all non-nuclear-weapon States be provided with credible and effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We will continue to cooperate in achieving this objective.

The President

I thank the representative of Pakistan for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Malaysia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Razali (Malaysia)

The Malaysian delegation would like to recall with appreciation China's presidency of the Security Council in March. We also express our confidence, Sir, in your presidency this month.

The Malaysian delegation requested to participate in the debate today to share our views on this very important issue. Let me state it bluntly: we believe, over the long run, in a time-bound period, in the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the only definitive assurance we can live with. Until this can be achieved, any assurance, whether positive or negative, whether given jointly or severally, will merely constitute an interim measure.

Malaysia and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement have consistently called for assurances in the context of a legally binding international instrument from the nuclear-weapon States, pending the attainment of the objective contained in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Regrettably, there have been no results.

It should be recalled that disagreement over this issue was one of the reasons for the failure of the two NPT Review Conferences, in 1980 and l990, to adopt Final Declarations. This is ironic given the fact that the nuclear-weapon States have agreed to such a binding instrument in the protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South America.

Now that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT is just a week ahead, the nuclear-weapon States seem to have realized that they have to do something about this long-standing obligation. Their solution has been to submit a draft resolution on positive security assurances and to make individual declarations on negative security assurances. This initiative can best be described as too little too late, an effort whose motives are patently clear. The draft resolution deals exclusively with positive security assurances and says nothing regarding negative security assurances beyond taking note of the fact that all five nuclear-weapon States have given such assurances, either individually -- as in the case of China -- or collectively -- as in the case of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia.

The positive security assurances envisaged in the draft resolution do not break new ground. The draft includes elements which are already covered by the Charter and in resolution 255 (1968). The only new element in the draft that is different from resolution 255 (1968) concerns the elaboration of the types of assistance that the Security Council might offer if a non-nuclear-weapon State is the victim of nuclear aggression. This does not offer us any comfort, as the language used is weak and, in the event of a nuclear attack, no assistance would be able to undo the irreversible death and destruction.

The draft resolution before the Council should have included language committing the nuclear-weapon States to take action, in the event of a threat of the use of nuclear weapons, to suppress that threat. The relevant paragraphs which should address this issue are weak and so vague that they can be interpreted in several different ways. My delegation has worked with the Caucus of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to introduce amendments to the draft to address this concern, but the proposals of the NAM Caucus were not accepted.

My delegation would like to remind the Council that obligations such as coming to the assistance of non-nuclear-weapon States in the event of aggression are already stipulated by Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter, regardless of the types of weapons used. Aggression is aggression, and to discriminate against States non-Parties to the Treaty in giving assistance on the basis of the type of weapons used is against the fundamental provisions of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

My delegation also cannot support the inclusion of operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution. This paragraph sidesteps the question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons because it justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in cases of "self-defence". Given the fact that all the nuclear-weapon States are also permanent members of the Security Council, and that the Council has the power to determine whether or not a threat is an act of aggression or of self-defence, the assurance contained in the draft is at best questionable, if not hollow political expedience. In essence, in no way can Council substitute that assurance for an obligation assumed under a treaty, especially a Council where many political factors and imperatives are brought to bear.

The NAM Caucus, on behalf of non-nuclear-weapon States, had tried to propose language that addressed our concerns on this matter. We note with appreciation that some of those proposals have been accommodated in the draft. However, our concerns to the effect that the draft resolution should affirm the belief that the only sure assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the elimination of nuclear weapons and that, pending that objective, such assurances should take the form of a legally binding instrument, were rejected. Accordingly, the draft resolution in its present form does not satisfy our call regarding security assurances. Nevertheless, we welcome the transfer of a preambular paragraph of the penultimate draft to the operative part as its paragraph 8 and the acknowledgement in the new last operative paragraph that the issue raised in the draft resolution remains a continuing concern of the Security Council.

My delegation had studied the individual statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States and contained in documents S/1995/261, 262, 263, 264 and 265. Of the five, only the declaration by China contains the position that the non-nuclear-weapon States had envisaged, which is straightforward and contains no conditions. The declarations by all the other four nuclear-weapon States contain specific conditions. They also say nothing on the question of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. More importantly, they fail to address the question of nuclear disarmament, which is closely linked to the question of assurances.

That the five declarations vary in terms of structure and content and remain devoid of legal force does not provide any measure of comfort at all. They amplify the need for an internationally negotiated, legally binding instrument whereby all the nuclear-weapon States would be obligated to apply the same provisions and meet the same conditions. My delegation must conclude that the five declarations do not provide a high degree of confidence.

My delegation is committed to the need to implement fully all the provisions of the NPT. This is particularly important, since the Treaty cannot be improved upon. Any amendment to the NPT, as reflected in paragraph 2 of its article VIII requires, among other things, the concurrence of all five nuclear-weapon States. In other words, the nuclear-weapon States already have a veto. Strict adherence to the letter of the Treaty, therefore, is the only guarantee that we will be able to prevent proliferation and move decisively towards nuclear disarmament.

Having said this, my delegation would like to state here that we are equally concerned about proliferation and unregulated access to nuclear materials. We are still hopeful that, despite the clear discrimination in the NPT, improvements can somehow be made which could influence the small group of countries that are not party to it.

Finally, the draft resolution is at best a first step towards the institution of a legally binding instrument. The adoption of this draft by the Council cannot absolve the nuclear-weapon States from their obligation to negotiate complete nuclear disarmament, in addition to fulfilling the commitments elaborated above.

The President

I thank the representative of Malaysia for the kind words he addressed to me.

The President

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia)

Allow me to begin by expressing my delegation's congratulations to you, Sir, upon your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are convinced that your diplomatic skill will guide the Council effectively.

My delegation would also like to express its sincere appreciation to Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, the Permanent Representative of China, for the excellent manner and wisdom with which he presided over the work of the Council.

It is a distinct honour and privilege for me to deliver this statement on behalf of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. We have noted with appreciation the endeavours made by the nuclear-weapon States to meet the legitimate security concerns of the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States by submitting the draft resolution as well as by issuing separate statements.

We believe that those statements contain some elements that deserve our careful consideration, especially on the eve of the convening of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The non-aligned countries continue to believe that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the assurances of 1978 fall short of providing adequate security assurances and therefore need to be supplemented. Nor do the unilateral pledges contained in the statements of 6 April 1995 by themselves create the necessary confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used: such declarations leave ample room for subjective interpretations. There is also the danger that, in certain circumstances, especially after the initiation of hostilities, such assurances may be unilaterally withdrawn. They therefore do not meet the security needs of non-nuclear-weapon States since they were not multilaterally negotiated, are unverifiable and conflict with each other. Above all, they do not offer legitimate, reasonable and binding assurances to meet the valid concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States.

To the non-aligned countries, nuclear issues are of world-wide significance because of the global reach of nuclear weapons. It is a truism that there is no protection against the use of nuclear weapons, which can be triggered by technical malfunction, political misjudgment or by miscalculation. The consequences of their use cannot remain limited, and there is no way to contain them within predetermined national or even regional boundaries. In addition to the human cost, the ecology of the world would be severely affected and its infrastructures shattered.

We are therefore encouraged that there are signs of a positive change in the approaches adopted by the nuclear-weapon States on this crucial issue at this crucial juncture. In this context, we welcome the individual declarations made by them last week as well as the draft resolution submitted by them now before us. These endeavours, in our view, reflect concerted and serious efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to assuage the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States to ensure their security. However, they do not meet the long-standing demand of the non-aligned countries for legally binding commitments to enhance their security. Such a demand is fully consistent with the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to Disarmament, held in 1978, as well as with the resolutions adopted by the Assembly since 1979 which have emphasized the urgency of seeking an agreement for a binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear nations against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This issue was also accorded priority in all four NPT Review Conferences.

The declarations of last week made by the nuclear-weapon States contain inherent weaknesses and deficiencies, as they are unilateral and non-binding. Because security can never be assured on the basis of hortatory declarations, and because of the threat that continues to be posed by the very presence of vast nuclear arsenals, the non-aligned countries regard security guarantees in a binding international convention without any loopholes as the legitimate right of all non-nuclear nations. In the context of an unacceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities as between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries, the NPT parties that have renounced the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons have a legitimate right to unconditional and legally binding assurances. For without such iron-clad guarantees, the non-aligned countries would remain under the threat of nuclear weapons, or suffer their actual use, and they are therefore committed to a common formulation incorporated into a legal instrument.

Hence, it is deeply regrettable to note the lack of tangible progress in the Conference on Disarmament despite concerted efforts by the Group of 21 since 1979. It was the expectation of the non-aligned countries Parties to the NPT that the improved international political atmosphere and achievements in the field of disarmament, as well as greater military openness and transparency, had provided a qualitatively new environment for a fresh appraisal of this question. Yet, despite widespread support for an international convention for security guarantees, a consensus on a common formula or approach has continued to elude us due to the maintenance of established positions and the reiteration of existing unilateral assurances.

It is in this context that Parties to the NPT that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement have considered the draft resolution now before us. We have noted with appreciation that it contains some of the proposals advanced by the Non-Aligned Movement caucus. It rightly reiterates the importance of the NPT to the global community and calls upon the States parties to comply fully with their obligations, in particular with Article VI. It recognizes the legitimacy of the demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States for security assurances, and calls for appropriate measures to safeguard their security. And it contemplates the initiation of measures to counter aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons and seeks to render necessary assistance to victims of such aggression.

We regret, however, that the draft has failed to acknowledge the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to unconditional security assurances in an international convention. Furthermore, it remains to be asked how a veto-bound Council could conceivably stem aggression committed by a nuclear-weapon State and take appropriate measures against that State. Another lacuna in the draft resolution is the failure to include the Non-Aligned Movement's proposal that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT constitutes a threat to international peace and security and necessitates immediate measures on the part of the Council, in conformity with Article 39 of the Charter and consistent with the substance and spirit of the relevant Articles of Chapter VII. This failure has rendered actions and measures envisaged in the draft insignificant.

It is against this backdrop that the non-aligned countries Parties to the NPT have doubts concerning the purported significance of security assurances in the form of a resolution by the Security Council, however solemnly proclaimed and well-intentioned. Such assurances, to be credible, must be reinforced by a firm commitment to non-use of nuclear weapons and renunciation of such strategic doctrines; this would offer an immediate and more satisfactory solution to the universal quest for security. We therefore believe that more far-reaching action will be needed to ensure the security of all nations. None the less, we recognize that the draft resolution constitutes an initial step towards a legally binding international instrument which should be broader in scope and multilaterally negotiated. It will only be useful if the nuclear-weapon States pursue this objective and ensure its ultimate consummation. Its successful outcome could further strengthen the non-proliferation regime and also constitute an important step in the broader process of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Fulci (Italy)

Since this is the first time that I have spoken in the Council under your presidency, Sir, allow me first to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of such an important duty, which we are sure you will be able to discharge with your usual, well-known efficiency and effectiveness, and also with your good sense of humour.

I think this is also an excellent occasion for me to express once again my delegation's heartfelt thanks to our distinguished and very good friend, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing of China, for the exemplary way he presided during last month over the work and activities of the Council, and also the way in which he represented us in Haiti on 31 March.

After a long and difficult negotiation, the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have agreed on a document on security assurances, which is now before the Security Council. The Italian delegation is pleased to note that, for the first time in history, the five nuclear-weapon countries are acting jointly on this issue, and are giving a positive response to the aspirations and requests of a great many non-nuclear-weapon States.

Italy very much hopes that the process that bore these first positive fruits, on the eve of the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, can continue and expand in the future. We are convinced that a further strengthening of the security assurances will contribute positively to international peace and security, to the benefit especially of all the countries that have signed, and are fully complying with, the NPT.

May I also underline the political implications of the fact that, for the very first time, positive and negative security assurances are both contained in the same document, moving in the direction of the expectations and requests of numerous members of the international community.

Even if the specific unilateral commitments of the five have not been harmonized -- which would have been preferable, of course -- we have duly noted the national declarations on security assurances made public in recent days. We deem it significant that they were announced concurrently and simultaneously.

The draft resolution before us contains new, progressive elements on the type of assistance to be provided in cases of the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. We welcome this development.

The draft resolution also adds to the progress made in Geneva, with regard to both the comprehensive banning of nuclear testing and the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes.

My Government believes that this initiative will help create the premises needed to make a decision on extending, indefinitely and unconditionally, the NPT at the upcoming New York Conference. Moreover, this new step moves in the same direction as the achievements of recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, of which START I and START II are the main, but not the only, examples.

The President

I thank the representative of Italy for his particularly kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Cárdenas (Argentina)

My delegation wishes to express the following views in connection with the important draft resolution on security assurances on which the Council is about to vote.

The progress achieved on disarmament and non-proliferation since 19 June 1968, when this body adopted resolution 255 (1968), has been both significant and decisive.

Today we are considering a new draft resolution on security assurances. It constitutes a commitment to establishing effective measures and arrangements to guarantee the non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by those possessing them.

This new draft resolution -- along with the recent unilateral declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, which are closely, directly and perhaps even causally linked to the draft resolution -- will contribute to the consolidation and strengthening of hope in the international community, and will even generate newer and greater hopes, as we go through an effective process of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States will be making a firm commitment to providing broader security assurances, both positive and negative: they will have committed themselves, on the one hand, to taking certain specific actions and, on the other hand, to refraining from other actions.

It should be stressed that this draft resolution will be in keeping with what was initially established in this regard in Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, in our opinion, that Protocol is more in line with the needs of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The draft resolution is linked to an understandable historical aspiration on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Through the draft resolution, those countries will receive new security assurances from those possessing nuclear weapons.

Unlike what happened with regard to resolution 255 (1968), with the adoption of the draft resolution under our consideration, the five permanent members of the Security Council will have offered -- for the first time, as we have already stated -- a set of positive and negative assurances to those signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons.

This draft resolution, the significant advances being made in the Conference on Disarmament and the unilateral declarations of security assurances that I have mentioned can be considered milestones -- very important ones, in our view -- marking paths begun in 1968.

My delegation welcomes the opportunity to reaffirm the Security Council's important role of jurisdiction and assistance in respect of this issue.

The adoption of the draft resolution before us will also encourage hopes for a forthcoming indefinite and unconditional extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is one of the main pillars of peaceful coexistence in our times. With such an extension, nuclear disarmament can become a reality of the twenty-first century, and the cause of peace will thus be strengthened. We therefore welcome this action.

Mr. Gambari (Nigeria)

My delegation would like to congratulate you warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council for the month of April. We are convinced that under your leadership the Council is in excellent hands. We would also like to thank Ambassador Li Zhaoxing of China and members of his delegation for their skilful guidance of the work of the Council during the month of March.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which came into force in 1970, represents a responsible mix of rights and obligations on the part of Member States parties to the Treaty. To a large extent, it is an unequal Treaty, which, however, has continuing implications for the maintenance of international peace and security.

As a product of the cold war, the Non-Proliferation Treaty seeks to prevent both the horizontal and vertical spread of nuclear weapons. It seeks to pursue nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In doing so, it embodies the hope that the benefits of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes will be made accessible and available to States parties, particularly the developing countries among them, as a positive contribution to their socio-economic development. The cold war is now over, and no time is more propitious than the present to pursue the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT, particularly as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty. The continuation of the Treaty must reside in the full and effective implementation of both the spirit and the letter of that Article.

With the creation of a differentiated form of membership, the NPT was bound to be discriminatory. However, it has continued to attract increased membership -- and with good reason, in our opinion -- with the result that the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty is now a viable and feasible proposition. This is just as well.

We cannot but reiterate, however, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has served the international community well. We must therefore seek to strengthen it.

In return for a renunciation of the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapon States expected, inter alia, credible assurances from the nuclear-weapon States that they would not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against them. To all intents and purposes, this is legitimate.

It was this concern of the non-nuclear weapon States and their insistence on the need to be provided with such security guarantees that induced the adoption of resolution 255 (1968). That resolution recognized, inter alia, that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council and, above all, its nuclear-weapon-States members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Resolution 255 (1968) was considered ab initio unsatisfactory. Only three of the nuclear-weapon States gave some form of positive security assurances. It did not commit the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to any specific form of action in defence of a non-nuclear-weapon State which is a victim of nuclear attack or aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons.

The present draft resolution, which builds on resolution 255 (1968), enjoys the support of the five nuclear-weapon States. We commend in particular the unconditional security assurance given by China in its own national declaration contained in document S/1995/265 of 6 April 1995. This is a positive development. Be that as it may, it is the firm and principled view of my delegation that what is desirable, in the circumstance of the inequities in the NPT and the disparities in the implementation of the various provisions of the Treaty by the two sides to the bargain, is that negative security assurances should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding instrument. Such an instrument, which should be negotiated multilaterally, must have as its starting point the obligation of "no use, no first use" of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty -- the kind of obligation contained in the Chinese national statement to which I referred earlier.

In other words, there must be a clear commitment by all the nuclear-weapon States -- not some of them -- not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Since the non-nuclear-weapon States accepted the Treaty provisions not to develop or to acquire nuclear weapons, they should in return be assured in Treaty form that they will not be victims of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The insistence on such a quid pro quo is both legitimate and fair, and therefore cannot be side-stepped much longer.

Although we have in the spirit of consensus agreed to go along with the adoption of the present draft resolution, which had been put forward in anticipation of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, we do so without enthusiasm. Therefore, we must place on record our disappointment that the present draft resolution fails to prescribe clearly defined and specific action to be taken in the case of aggression with nuclear weapons, the specific obligations of nuclear-weapon States, the specific form of assistance to be provided by the Council as a duty, rather than as a request from a victim State, and the action to be taken by the Council should the aggressor be a nuclear-weapon State which is also a permanent member of the Security Council. The draft resolution also fails to commit all members of the Council to the necessity of adopting in the immediate future negative security assurances in a legally binding instrument.

The assurances in the present draft resolution, as drafted, need to be further clarified if they are to inspire the necessary confidence which non-nuclear-weapon States can live with, and if they are not to be a mere set of measures whose efficacy could be undermined by varying interpretations of Member States. There must also be a set of assurances which Member States would be unable to withdraw from fulfilling, especially during hostilities, on account of what may be claimed as national interests. My delegation looks forward to a set of guarantees that would not be vulnerable to the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council. Nigeria has always believed, and continues to believe, that the best assurances against nuclear annihilation is the complete elimination of these weapons.

The President

I thank the representative of Nigeria for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. Martínez Blanco (Honduras)

On behalf of my delegation, may I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are convinced that under your leadership the work of the Council will be successful.

I also wish to express our appreciation to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of China, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing for having conducted the work of the Security Council in March with skill and effectiveness.

My delegation would like first of all to say that it agrees with the comments made by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia on behalf of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that belong to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

Avoiding nuclear war and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons have been, and should remain, priorities of the international community in the maintenance of international peace and security. None the less, achieving these objectives is now more difficult than in the recent past because political and economic circumstances following the cold war have opened up different paths to proliferation for those States with the financial and technical capacity to design, acquire or produce nuclear weapons. Their acquisition by such States, and their possible acquisition by groups within States, and then the use or threat of use of these weapons, is a danger to international peace and security. It is therefore today more necessary than ever before to make every effort and commitment against nuclear proliferation. All peace-loving States must commit themselves to these efforts.

My delegation considers that in the attainment of these objectives, as well as in international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of undeniable importance, and that therefore there should be universal adherence to it. None the less, we believe that the support that the non-nuclear-weapon States give to these initiatives, through their adherence to them or through their participation in regional arrangements or systems, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, should not be considered as a gift to the nuclear-weapon States. The fact that States parties to the Treaty renounce the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons has implications for their own security, since they give up their right to deter an attack or the threat of an attack by nuclear-weapon-States.

That is why, until the ultimate goal of the total elimination of these weapons is achieved, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have the legitimate right to be given assurances that the weapons will not be used against them. In order to obtain recognition of this right, a matter of vital interest to their security, the non-nuclear-weapon States have been endeavouring since the very negotiation of the NPT, and through the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to obtain security assurances that are internationally acceptable -- in other words, commitments that are legally binding. Thus far, there have only been negative security assurances, in the form of unilateral statements that do not have the binding force of an international instrument, or positive security assurances through a resolution of the Council. One example was the adoption of resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, which did not specify what action should be taken in the case of nuclear aggression, and which did not specify whether the Security Council needed to obtain prior consent from the non-nuclear State which had been attacked. For this reason, these security assurances were of limited value.

My delegation understands that the draft resolution now before the Council attempts to make the positive security assurances more credible and more universally acceptable by broadening them, in that it defines the assistance to be provided to a non-nuclear State party to the NPT subjected to aggression involving nuclear weapons; establishes the intention to take appropriate measures to compensate it for damage caused by the aggression; and contemplates possible immediate collective action by the nuclear-weapon States members of the Council, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

My delegation recognizes that the present draft resolution and the unilateral statements recently made by the members of the Security Council that are nuclear-weapon States on new security assurances could contribute to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to dispelling the fears engendered by the ambiguous and undeclared nuclear policies of certain States against their regional neighbours. In this respect, my delegation hopes that the adoption of this draft resolution will help resolve the differences in the Conference on Disarmament that have so far prevented the conclusion of effective international instruments on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, something that has been advocated since 1968 by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

Lastly, my delegation feels that the most effective guarantee that can be provided against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament itself, under effective international control. In the meantime, the security assurances being offered to non-nuclear-weapon countries, be they positive or negative, can be understood only as temporary measures towards the attainment of that objective.

The President

I thank the representative of Honduras for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Henze (Germany)

Since this is the first time I have spoken at a formal meeting of the Security Council, I should like to start my remarks by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. Your experience and your abilities are widely recognized, and you have already demonstrated that you intend to use them in the interests of our work.

At the same time, I should like to thank Ambassador Li for his work as President of the Council in March. He guided our deliberations with his well-known skill and intimate knowledge of the procedures of this body, to the benefit of our common efforts.

Germany welcomed the offer by the five nuclear-weapon States to extend negative as well as positive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and particularly their intention to submit a draft resolution to the Security Council to this end. Such an undertaking meets the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States and sends a positive political signal with a view to extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally at the forthcoming Conference of the States parties to the NPT -- an objective that Germany, itself a non-nuclear-weapon State, has persistently pursued for a long time.

So far, the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States regarding security assurances have been of a heterogeneous character: different with regard to the number of declaring States, different in scope, different as to the group of States to which they apply, different in timing and context. We therefore consider the draft resolution that has been submitted to be an important step towards a common position of all nuclear-weapon States, as well as a reinforcement of their already existing commitments.

In our view, progress consists mainly in the fact that now, for the first time, all nuclear-weapons States are sponsoring a formal commitment to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, and that both negative and positive security assurances are addressed in one and the same draft resolution of the Security Council. With regard to positive security assurances, we note that, also for the first time, options for action to be taken by the Security Council are specified in detail. This is important in the light of the fact that since the end of the cold war the emphasis of the debate has shifted from negative to positive security assurances.

Germany is of the opinion that even after a new draft resolution of the Security Council -- the one on which we are about to vote -- has been adopted, the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States must remain on the international disarmament and arms control agenda. It therefore supports the reinstitution at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, while this year's session is still going on, of the Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances. The aim of a multilateral agreement on security assurances must not be abandoned.

For all those reasons, Germany supports the draft resolution that has been submitted and will therefore vote in favour of it.

The President

I thank the representative of Germany for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Legwaila (Botswana)

I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. A well-deserved tribute goes also to Ambassador Li of China for the efficient manner in which he led the Council during the month of March.

We agree with everything said by the Chairman of the Non-aligned Movement in his statement. He spoke on our behalf. But we have deliberately decided to repeat what he said -- not everything, of course -- in order to drive the message home.

The delegation of Botswana appreciates the efforts made by the permanent members of the Security Council regarding nuclear security assurances. We consider the draft resolution before us to be a noteworthy contribution towards the adoption of further measures to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States to safeguard the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We also consider the separate statements made individually by each nuclear-weapon State regarding negative security assurances to be a significant gesture of goodwill towards meeting the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Like others, we wish these statements were all categoric in committing these States to the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. We most appreciate the fact that at least one of the statements came close -- but only close -- to meeting all our concerns. The rest, I am afraid, are nothing more than statements of good intentions -- solemn as they are. The road to protection against nuclear weapons is not paved with good intentions.

It is the understanding of my delegation that the draft resolution before us is not being presented on a quid pro quo basis relative to the issues before the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is our hope that this draft resolution is intended to help and/or influence, positively, the deliberations in the Conference. While fully cognizant of the importance of this draft resolution, my delegation remains convinced that the assurances it offers non-nuclear-weapon States should have been a clear and unequivocal statement of intent on the part of nuclear-weapon States on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In fact, it would have been even more reassuring if the present draft resolution had come in the form of a legally binding international instrument. The separate statements we referred to earlier on negative security assurances made by the nuclear-weapon States would thus form part of such a legal instrument, which could then be annexed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The non-nuclear-weapon States have contributed immensely to the maintenance of international peace and security by deciding to forgo the development, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons. The world is today a relatively safer place to live in thanks to their vision and generosity. Their decision to forgo the right to have nuclear weapons in their defence capabilities should be matched by a more positive recognition by the nuclear-weapon States that they have a right to protection against the use of such weapons. This is the barest minimum required as a true confidence-building measure amongst non-nuclear-weapon States that forgoing possession of nuclear weapons was not a miscalculation which will leave them perpetually vulnerable to the threat of these weapons.

In fact, non-nuclear-weapon States should also be asking for protection against the use of nuclear weapons even in the case of a conflict between nuclear-weapon States, because the fallout would affect them all in the same way. It is therefore only fair that the non-nuclear-weapon States should expect to be met half way by their partners in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that enjoy the privileged monopoly of possessing nuclear weapons. They have given up the sovereign right to acquire these weapons for the sake of world peace and stability. Their concerns should therefore be accorded serious thought and understanding. Their right -- and I emphasize "right" -- to seek and receive protection must be recognized.

My delegation very strongly holds the view that in the final analysis the ultimate assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of those weapons. We are hopeful that Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will remain a constant reminder to the nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under the Treaty.

The President

I thank the representative of Botswana for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Li Zhaoxing (China)

At the outset, Sir, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of this month's presidency of the Security Council. I am convinced, given your rich experience and wisdom, that you will guide the Council's work to success. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank all members for their assistance and cooperation during my presidency last month.

The Security Council will be adopting today a draft resolution on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. This is the result of the joint efforts of all countries. It will contribute to the maintenance of world peace, security and stability, and will facilitate the realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The Chinese delegation welcomes this development. However, we are of the view that the draft resolution soon to be adopted is only one step towards the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument providing assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We still have a lot to do for the conclusion of such an international instrument. China is ready to join the rest of the international community in a continued effort to that end.

I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate the position of the Chinese Government on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

First, complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons to usher in a nuclear-weapon-free world is the fundamental guarantee for ridding all countries of the threat of nuclear war. China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and has proposed that a convention on the complete prohibition of such weapons be concluded in the same way as the Conventions banning chemical and biological weapons.

Secondly, it is the due right of non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire security assurances to free themselves from any nuclear attack or nuclear threat. Pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, which is a practical and feasible me