General Assembly Session 59 meeting 48

The Acting President

The General Assembly will continue its consideration of agenda item 14, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Members will recall that the General Assembly concluded debate on this item this morning.

We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/59/L.18. Before giving the floor to the speakers in explanation of vote before the vote, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Kim (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

I am going to make a statement on behalf of my delegation on our position on the draft resolution entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

First, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and is not a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea broke away from IAEA in the early 1990s because the Agency had abandoned the principle of equity, reducing itself to a political tool of the super-Powers; and last year the Democratic People's Republic of Korea withdrew from the NPT in order to defend the supreme interests of the nation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has no relations with either IAEA or NPT, and it is irrelevant for IAEA to report on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in its annual report.

Second, the draft resolution entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" is aimed at misleading the public regarding the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula in order to exert pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The IAEA is crying that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is continuing its non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. Japan is claiming that the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a threat to peace and security in Northeast Asia, while the United States nuclear weapons deployed on the Japanese islands and targeted at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea serve peace and security. In addition, certain other countries are saying that the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the NPT and its nuclear programme are challenges to the non-proliferation regime.

However, all those arguments are based on the reversed logic of putting the cart before the horse, intentionally turning away from the intrinsic nature of the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula is the direct outcome of the hostile United States policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is a political and military question to be settled between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America. If the United States had not brought nuclear weapons onto the Korean Peninsula, and if the United States had not threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the nuclear issue and the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from NPT would not have cropped up.

From the Agency's approach to the recently exposed secret nuclear experiment of South Korea, we have become even more aware of the injustice and double standards of the IAEA and of certain other countries that feign concern over the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula. How can we count on them regarding questions of the supreme interests of the State? My delegation thinks that if IAEA and certain member countries really care about resolving the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula, they should shake off their prejudice, look at the question squarely, and urge the United States to give up its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

As for the uranium enrichment programme, which is mentioned in the report, it is a fabrication of the United States created in order to lay the blame for the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula at the feet of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The allegation that a secret uranium enrichment programme exists, like the pre-emptive strike strategy, is characteristic of the United States in its self-righteousness, unilateralism and bellicosity. Figuratively speaking, the former is based on the logic that if you repeat lies, they will become truth, while the latter is based on the assumption that if the pedestrian across the street looks like he is going to strike you, you strike him. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is maintaining a high level of vigilance against that kind of mentality and manoeuvring of the United States.

The United States aggression towards Iraq teaches us a grave lesson. The United Nations inspection team, lead by the IAEA, searched the whole territory of Iraq for nearly 10 years, including the presidential palaces, but did not give any confirmation that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. The United States, clinging to that, invented the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and thus justified its war of aggression against Iraq.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has already made it clear that, if the United States renounces, in a practical manner, its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the nuclear threat, it is willing to scrap its nuclear deterrence accordingly. It is the consistent position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to hold fast to the ultimate goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to settle the nuclear issue peacefully through talks and negotiations.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, based on this point of view, will vote against the draft resolution, because it is not intended to contribute to resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

The Acting President

As you know, we have already heard the only speaker in explanation of vote before the vote. The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/59/L.18. Before proceeding to take action on the draft resolution, I would like to announce that, since the introduction of the draft resolution, the following countries have also become sponsors of A/59/L.18: the Philippines and Nicaragua.

The Acting President

Several representatives have requested to exercise the right of reply. May I remind members that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and five for the second and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Kitaoka (Japan)

Japan would like to exercise the right of reply to the statement in explanation of vote made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In his explanation, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said that the United States nuclear weapons were targeted at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That is totally untrue. As the only nation that has suffered the scourge of the atomic bomb, Japan is fully committed to the renunciation of the option of possessing nuclear weapons under relevant international treaties, including, inter alia, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and has consistently maintained its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not manufacturing them and not allowing them to enter Japan.

Mr. Chun (Republic of Korea)

I would also like to exercise the right of reply to the statement of the representative of North Korea. My delegation rejects the North Korean representative's characterization of the nuclear experiments conducted by some scientists in my country. As we have made clear on a number of occasions, including during the general debate of the General Assembly in our Foreign Minister's statement, those experiments were isolated laboratory-scale research activities that a few scientists conducted on their own for purely scientific purposes. They have nothing whatsoever to do with a weapons programme.

Furthermore, even though the Republic of Korea maintains the sixth largest civil nuclear industry in the world and depends on nuclear energy for 40 per cent of its supply of electricity, we do not have any enrichment or reprocessing facilities. We do not have any clandestine nuclear programmes as the North Korean delegate has alleged.

Despite the compelling economic imperative to reduce our dependence on imported nuclear fuel, we maintain the policy of voluntarily abstaining from the possession of enrichment or reprocessing facilities solely in the interests of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Scientific research for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is a fundamental right that all parties to the NPT are guaranteed under article IV of the treaty.

Although the experiments previously referred to should have been conducted with the proper authorization of my Government and been reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a timely manner, the amount of nuclear material involved is too trivial to have any relevance to proliferation. Moreover, the disclosure of those research activities resulted from my Government's political determination to accept the new safeguards standards set forth in the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement, under which we declare all our past nuclear activities down to the level of scientific experiments involving milligram units, and we thus have rectified any inadvertent reporting lapses. Therefore, there should be no doubt left whatsoever regarding my Government's firm commitment to nuclear non-proliferation norms, and we are providing full cooperation with the IAEA to rectify any past reporting lapses.

Finally, if North Korea does exactly as we have done, and accepts the highest standards of nuclear transparency, much of the international concern about North Korea's nuclear programme will be resolved.

Mr. Kim (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

First, I am going to reply to the Japanese representative. The Japanese representative, and Japan generally speaking, tries very hard to cover up its ulterior motives with its three principles or by referring to Japan's sacrifices from that nuclear bomb attack. Actually, Japan, while approving the three principles, allows nuclear weapons of the United States to come and go through Japanese ports. Also, on the Japanese islands there are many United States military bases that are targeted against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Japanese representative cannot cover up all that reality.

Second, as for the South Koreans, I told the truth. The South Koreans have done this secret experiment and we know that they have tried to develop nuclear weapons since the 1970s. And this experiment, which was recently disclosed, was done in the 1980s. How can we trust their commitment to the international community?

Mr. Chun (Republic of Korea)

I do not want to enter into a prolonged debate on nuclear issues or the allegations raised by the North Korean delegate in this forum. However, my delegation wishes to make the point that we find it absurd that the most egregious and determined proliferator known to the world is abusing this session to present a grossly distorted and exaggerated allegation about my country's nuclear research activities, which have, as I said earlier, no relevance to proliferation at all. What North Korea has to do first is dismantle its nuclear weapons programme entirely and accept the highest safeguard standards set forth by the additional protocol before it can consider itself qualified to criticize other countries' peaceful nuclear research activities.

Mr. Kim (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Our nuclear programme is already well known to the world. So, we are now trying to solve this with the United States. This has come up because of the United States hostile policy of nuclear threat. As for the South Korean nuclear programme, it had not been known until recently. I think it is very dangerous since they are boasting of having the sixth largest developed nuclear facilities. To this day it is not known how dangerous it is. Ours is known. South Korea's is unknown.

Mr. Kitaoka (Japan)

Japan will not repeat our point because our message is very clear and is understood by 99 per cent of the membership of the United Nations.

The President

May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 14?

Mr. Hamburger (Netherlands)

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro and the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

We are discussing today the ninth and final report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Guatemalan peace agreements. In addition to summarizing political developments during the past year, the report seeks to assess the overall progress in consolidating the peace. The evaluation comes at a critical juncture for Guatemala. The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) will close after 10 years, during which its presence has been essential to the implementation of the accords. The departure of MINUGUA will thus mark the beginning of a new and necessary phase of the peace process. It will now be completely up to national actors to assume responsibility for the unequivocal implementation of the peace accords and to ensure adequate funding.

Over the past two years, MINUGUA has already phased down its operations and carried out a transition strategy designed to build national capacity. The efforts were not only directed at key State institutions, such as the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, but also at civil society organizations likely to remain engaged in peacebuilding efforts in the future.

The strategy also sought to guarantee adequate follow-up for priorities relating to the peace accords by the United Nations system in Guatemala. In that light, the European Union would be in favour of a further United Nations presence to strengthen the Government in its efforts to improve the human rights situation. In this respect, the establishment of an office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights would make an important contribution. Impunity and threats to human rights activists by clandestine and illegal groups also need special attention.

As is stipulated in the report, MINUGUA used the final period to reinforce the peace agenda with the new authorities, which took office in January 2004. The Mission produced a comprehensive set of policy recommendations and reviewed them with senior Government officials, governors, mayors, legislators, justice officials and leaders of civil society. During his visit to Guatemala in May 2004, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Sir Kieran Prendergast, underscored to those actors that the peace accords should remain Guatemala's basic blueprint for development. The European Union would like to add its voice to that message.

Meanwhile, continued support by the donor community is important. The contributions made over the years by the Group of Friends to the Peace Process and by the members of the Dialogue Group have been invaluable. While expressing gratitude for those contributions and for the support for MINUGUA over the years, the European Union hopes that we will all remain engaged with peace accords-related projects and remain in a close political dialogue with the Guatemalan Government.