General Assembly Session 59 meeting 47

The President

I invite Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to introduce the report of the Agency for the year 2003.

Mr. ElBaradei (International Atomic Energy Agency)

Every year brings new challenges and opportunities, and the past 12 months at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been no exception. The outlook for nuclear power is evolving, with increasing attention to its benefits as an environmentally clean source of electricity, but with concerns remaining related to waste disposal, safety and security. Nuclear applications in human health, agriculture and other fields are increasingly contributing to global sustainable development initiatives and the Agency has redoubled its efforts to support those initiatives by improving the efficiency and extending the reach of its Technical Cooperation Programme. Global cooperation in matters of safety and security has resulted in sustained improvements overall, but there is still much to be done. In the area of verification, the Agency's activities remain at the centre of efforts to curb nuclear proliferation and we have continued to prove our ability to implement objective and credible safeguards, but the international community still faces a number of difficult challenges and has intensified its focus on how to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Today, I welcome this opportunity to review with you some of the Agency's work in each of these areas.

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of civilian nuclear power. With 439 nuclear reactors worldwide, nuclear energy continues to account for about 16 per cent of the world's electricity production, keeping pace with the steady growth in the global electricity market.

Near-term growth in nuclear capacity remains centred in Asia and Eastern Europe owing to a combination of factors, including the rise in demand for electricity, the existence of a well developed industrial infrastructure in those regions and the lack of indigenous alternatives in some countries.

Over the longer term, it is clear that the need for sustained human development will require a substantial investment in energy generation in the coming decades. Given its capacity for emissions-free electricity generation, nuclear energy has strong potential as a reliable baseline energy source. However, the degree to which nuclear energy is used will be shaped by the way a given nation balances the risks associated with a nuclear accident against other risks -- such as air pollution or energy dependence. Clearly, not every country shares the view that improvements in the cost-effectiveness and safety performance of nuclear power warrant its revival. Those are matters of complexity and legitimate debate and IAEA will continue its efforts to provide comprehensible, accurate information to ensure that the benefits and risks of nuclear technology are clearly and fairly understood.

IAEA also continues to encourage and stimulate technological innovation related to power reactors, research reactors and other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, in order to address concerns related to safety, proliferation and waste disposal. More than 20 IAEA member States are currently involved in projects related to new reactor and fuel cycle designs.

Regarding the long-term management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, progress continues to be slow, but steady. More than 50 countries now have spent nuclear fuel, including fuel from research reactors, stored in temporary sites awaiting disposal or reprocessing. At the Stockholm International Conference on Geological Repositories held in December 2003, experts agreed that the majority of technological issues have been satisfactorily addressed, but that social issues -- such as public acceptance and political endorsement -- are still problematic. IAEA has been assisting many of its member States in developing nuclear waste management and disposal strategies and I am pleased to report a renewed interest in multinational approaches to spent fuel management and disposal.

A major part of the IAEA's scientific and technical work involves the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology in a variety of fields. Many of those applications are proving important tools for social and economic development. An excellent example is the application of nuclear technology to one of the basic elements in human survival: the food supply chain. Over the past four decades, the use of isotopes and radiation in food and agricultural research and development has yielded rich results: there are now millions of hectares of higher-yielding crops all over the world; disease-resistant plants, developed with radiation-induced mutation, provide economic benefits worth billions of dollars every year to the world's farmers; improvements in livestock production and health have been realized; and the control and eradication of many insect pests has been made possible through radiation sterilization techniques.

Another crucial factor in development is access to safe drinking water -- a basic necessity unavailable to more than one sixth of the world's population. Isotope hydrology is being used in a broad variety of IAEA projects to map underground aquifers, detect and control pollution and monitor the safety of dams.

Another key area of IAEA work relates to human health, including our efforts to combat the growing cancer threat in the developing world. Of the estimated 260 million new cancer cases expected in the next 20 years, approximately 175 million will require radiation therapy, and 100 million of those will be in developing countries that have neither the resources nor the expertise to deal with that impending crisis. The Agency has been working with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners to provide the training, expert missions and equipment needed to support national and regional cancer therapy programmes. But the size of the problem far outstrips our resources, and we have launched the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) to attract additional funding and resources from both governmental and non-governmental sources.

The IAEA's technical cooperation programme provides roughly $80 million of assistance per year in these and other fields and is a principal mechanism for implementing the Agency's basic mission: "Atoms for Peace". As more developing countries become member States, the number of countries that benefit from assistance under the technical cooperation programme continues to grow. This year, we have an all time high of 111 member States participating in national, regional and interregional projects. To ensure the effectiveness of technical cooperation strategies, the IAEA secretariat develops thematic plans to highlight nuclear technology benefits in key areas, assists States in developing individually tailored country programme frameworks and ensures strong government commitment to technical cooperation projects before they are launched. And we continue to build and expand partnerships with other international organizations and development partners, in some cases drawing on their technical expertise to enhance the impact of a nuclear technique.

The safety and security of nuclear activities around the globe remain key elements of the Agency's mandate. Nearly two decades after the Chernobyl accident, it is gratifying to see that the Agency's efforts have been of tangible and sustained benefit, including: our emphasis on defence in depth, risk management and international cooperation; our concerted drive to upgrade facilities with older design features; our assistance to developing member States in establishing a solid radiation protection infrastructure; our emphasis on safety and security in transport; and, particularly in recent years, our dual focus on strengthening physical protection at nuclear facilities and enhancing the security of nuclear material and radioactive sources worldwide. Considerable progress has been achieved through those efforts. Nevertheless, the need to maintain an effective and transparent global nuclear safety and security regime remains a matter of high priority.

The development and adoption of legally binding international agreements has proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing safety worldwide. Since the Chernobyl accident, four safety-related conventions have been concluded under the IAEA's auspices. The so-called early notification and assistance conventions serve to enhance international preparedness for, and response to, nuclear and radiological emergencies. The Convention on Nuclear Safety commits States parties to operate their nuclear power plants in accordance with international benchmarks designed to maintain a high level of safety. And the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management seeks to ensure that spent fuel and radioactive waste is managed and disposed of in a manner that will protect people and the environment from radiological and other hazards. However, many States are not yet party to these conventions, and certain key areas of the nuclear fuel cycle are still not subject to conventions.

The process towards strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) has made some progress. In July, at the request of the Government of Austria and 24 co-sponsoring States, I circulated proposed amendments to the CPPNM to all States parties. The aim of those amendments, as proposed, is to extend the scope of the Convention to cover nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, not only in international transport and storage but also in domestic transport, storage and use, as well as protection against sabotage of nuclear material and facilities used for peaceful purposes. While consultations are ongoing to resolve a few outstanding issues, it is my hope that we can convene a diplomatic conference early next year to amend the Convention and expand its scope. This is an important part of our efforts to enhance protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism.

The Agency promotes the acceptance of the entire corpus of IAEA safety standards as the global reference for protecting people and the environment against nuclear accidents and the harmful effects attributed to radiation exposure. We are making good progress on the revision of those standards and on filling in the remaining gaps in coverage. The establishment of regional safety networks -- such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network and the Ibero-American Radiation Safety Network -- will also promote the use of international safety standards and the sharing of expertise on a more regional basis.

The IAEA's safety review and appraisal services assist member States in the application of Agency safety standards and provide useful feedback on their effectiveness. While those services originated predominantly in the field of nuclear installation safety, they now extend to cover many areas of radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety as well. We are still assisting some member States with safety upgrades at older installations with design vulnerabilities. As more member States consider the extension of licences for nuclear power reactors, we are also giving increased attention to services that can identify and address equipment ageing and relevant operational issues. And as we work towards the global acceptance of IAEA safety standards, safety reviews will be integrated into fewer categories and focused increasingly on the review of national self-assessments.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the IAEA moved swiftly to conduct a thorough review of its existing programmes related to preventing acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The Agency has sought to develop a comprehensive plan for upgrading nuclear security worldwide. Our work since that time has been focused on measures to guard against thefts of nuclear and radioactive material and to protect related facilities against malicious acts.

Agency efforts to help member States improve their protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism are continuing at an exceptionally fast pace on multiple fronts. In a relatively short span, much work has been completed on assessing the security needs of member States and providing necessary training. For example, since September 2001, working in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa, we have conducted more than 50 advisory and evaluation missions and convened more than 60 training courses, workshops and seminars. The IAEA also has strengthened its cooperation on nuclear security issues with other international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, Interpol, Europol, the Universal Postal Union and the World Customs Organization, as well as the European Commission.

We have made significant progress in many aspects of nuclear security, but much remains to be done. While significant work remains on the development of international legal instruments, as well as relevant guidelines and recommendations, the greatest emphasis is now being placed on addressing equipment needs and other tangible improvements and on helping States take the steps needed to make their nuclear security programmes sustainable and self-reliant.

The IAEA has also been assisting member States in ensuring that their radioactive sources are safe and are either secured within their own countries or shipped back to suppliers. Information in the Agency database on illicit trafficking makes it clear that a market continues to exist for obtaining and using radioactive sources for malicious purposes. We have been working with many countries to identify and secure sources that are the most vulnerable and at the highest risk. Those assistance efforts have been given high priority, and we expect the volume of those efforts to increase.

The verification challenges that the Agency has faced in the past year further underscore the importance of the Agency's role in combating nuclear proliferation and the urgency of providing the Agency with all the necessary means to perform its verification responsibilities in an effective and credible manner.

The IAEA's verification activities are designed to provide assurance that nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In the early 1990s, after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear-weapon programme in Iraq, the international community committed itself to providing the Agency with the authority to strengthen its verification capability, using a mechanism referred to as the additional protocol to provide assurance not only that declared nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful purposes, but equally important, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist.

Since my report last year, the number of States with additional protocols in force has increased appreciably, from 36 to 60. This broader authority, however, is still far from universal. One hundred thirty-three States remain without an additional protocol in force, and 42 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons still have not even fulfilled their article-III obligation to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. I strongly urge all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements and additional protocols at an early date.

The situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to pose a serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since December 2002, the Agency has not performed any verification activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and cannot therefore provide any level of assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material. We have continued to emphasize the need for a comprehensive settlement of the Korean crisis through dialogue that addresses all the underlying issues, and it is my hope that the six-party talks will lead to such a settlement. I trust that any future settlement will ensure, inter alia, the return of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that the Agency will be given the necessary authority and resources to be able to fulfil its verification responsibilities in a credible manner.

The Agency's verification activities in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya over the course of this year have confirmed that, for many years, the country pursued an undeclared nuclear programme which aimed at enriching uranium and which included the receipt of nuclear weapons design documents. Over many years, Libya failed to meet many of its obligations under its safeguards agreement. However, last December, Libya renounced its programmes for nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, Libya has signed and implemented an additional protocol and has actively cooperated with the IAEA's efforts to verify its renunciation of its former nuclear-weapon programme. Our assessment to date is that Libya's declarations of its past nuclear related activities appear to be consistent with the information available to, and verified by, the Agency. Further investigation is still needed, however, in order for the Agency to verify the completeness and correctness of Libya's declarations of its nuclear activities. We will continue to pursue those questions as part of our routine inspection activities in Libya.

The IAEA has continued to devote considerable attention to the implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the IAEA Board of Governors has adopted several resolutions relevant to Iran's former undeclared nuclear programme and its failure, over an extended period of time, to meet many of its obligations under its safeguard agreement. The Board has urged Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully with the Agency in the verification process. Since February 2003, when the IAEA started its verification of Iran's undeclared programme, the Agency has made steady progress in understanding its nature and extent. Last December, Iran signed an additional protocol and has been acting as if the protocol were in force, pending its ratification. Iran's earlier interactions with the Agency were regrettably marked by the provision of information that was at times changing, contradictory and slow in coming, a situation that led to repeated expressions of concern by the Board. Iran's cooperation since that time, however, has improved appreciably. IAEA inspectors have been provided access to requested locations, and Iran has provided information requested by the Agency -- although in some cases Iran's response has continued to be slow.

As a result of the Agency's investigations, some issues have reached the point where any further follow-up needed will be carried out as part of routine safeguards implementation. One issue remains central to understanding Iran's nuclear programme, namely, the extent and nature of its uranium enrichment activities. Additional investigation is still ongoing, and I expect to be able to provide a comprehensive report on progress to the IAEA Board of Governors later this month.

As of November of last year, the Board of Governors has also asked the Agency to monitor Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities. However, Iran has reversed some of the suspension measures initially undertaken in November 2003, and the Board has called on Iran to again suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities as a confidence-building measure. I have continued to stress to Iran that, in light of serious international concerns surrounding its nuclear programme, it should do its utmost to build confidence through these voluntary measures. I have also asked Iran to pursue a policy of maximum transparency, so that we can bring the outstanding issues to resolution and, over time, provide the required assurance to the international community. This is clearly in the interest of both Iran and the international community and should lead to a dialogue among all interested parties with a view to reaching a comprehensive settlement of all the underlying issues.

The IAEA's mandate in Iraq under various Security Council resolutions still remains in effect. As I reported to the Assembly last year, at the time the Agency was asked to cease its Security Council verification activities in Iraq in March 2003, we had found no evidence of the revival of nuclear activities prohibited under relevant Security Council resolutions. Naturally, the international community is reassured that these findings have since been validated. Security Council resolution 1546 (2004), inter alia, reaffirmed the intention of the Council to revisit the mandate of the Agency in Iraq. I hope that the Council will soon provide guidance on the future of that mandate. It is clearly important to bring the whole question of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to closure as early as possible and for the Agency to resume the necessary verification and monitoring activities in Iraq as soon as the security situation permits, particularly in view of the dual-use items that have been under IAEA custody in Iraq that would be susceptible to misuse.

Pursuant to the mandate given to me by the IAEA General Conference, I have continued my consultations with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East and on the development of model agreements. Once again, I regret to report that I have not been in a position to make progress on those fronts.

The General Conference has also asked me to organize a forum on the relevance of the experience of other regions with existing nuclear-weapon-free zones -- including confidence-building and verification measures -- for establishing such a zone in the region of the Middle East. Based on my consultations with States of the region, including during my recent visit to Israel, I intend to organize such a forum early next year, and further consultations are in progress towards that end. I earnestly hope for this forum to be the beginning of a much-needed dialogue among States of the region on a security structure that would undergird efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement in the region.

The recent experience of the IAEA in verifying undeclared nuclear programmes has yielded a number of important lessons that are worth noting in this context. Perhaps the most important lesson is that verification and diplomacy, used in conjunction, can be effective. When inspections are accompanied by adequate authority, aided by all available information, backed by a credible compliance mechanism and supported by international consensus, the system works. The Iraq experience demonstrated that inspections -- while requiring time and patience -- can be effective, even when the country under inspection is providing less than active cooperation.

Perhaps the most disturbing lesson to emerge from our work in Iran and Libya, however, is the existence of an extensive illicit market for the supply of nuclear items, which clearly thrived on demand. The relative ease with which a multinational illicit network could be set up and operated demonstrates clearly the inadequacy of the present export control system, which relies on informal arrangements that are not only non-binding, but also do not include many countries with growing industrial capacity and do not provide for any systematic sharing of information with the IAEA.

A related lesson involves the accessibility of nuclear technology. The technical barriers to mastering the essential steps of uranium enrichment and, for that matter, to designing weapons, have eroded over time, which inevitably leads to the conclusion that the control of technology, in and of itself, is not a sufficient barrier against further proliferation. This also leads to the important conclusion that ways and means should be found to better control the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle -- namely, the production of enriched uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium.

The concept of multilateral control or oversight over proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle has been the subject of many studies and initiatives over the years. Recent non-proliferation and security challenges make it important and appropriate, however, that we revisit this subject. Several months ago, I appointed a group of senior experts to look into various options for multilateral control. The group plans to submit a report next March on the results of its study.

In addition to the various components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that, as I mentioned, need strengthening -- including better control over sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, increased efforts to secure and protect nuclear material and facilities, a more inclusive and integrated export control system and the need for all States to conclude additional protocols -- I should stress the importance of working collectively to address the sense of insecurity and instability that persists in many countries and regions. It is instructive that nearly all nuclear proliferation concerns are in areas of longstanding conflict and instability.

As we proceed, it is important, in my view, to recognize both the value and the limitations of the IAEA verification role. While the Agency can work effectively to bring to closure questions of compliance with legal and technical requirements, the long-term value of these efforts can only be realized to the extent that they are supported and reinforced by other components of the non-proliferation regime, such as export controls and compliance mechanisms.

Equally, and perhaps more importantly, these efforts should be followed by the necessary political dialogue among concerned States to address underlying issues of insecurity and to build confidence and trust.

This overview of the past year highlights achievements and challenges in all areas of Agency activity and reflects the dynamic nature of our programme in anticipating and responding to change. Whether a specific activity contributes to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, to enhancing the transfer and application of nuclear technologies, or to ensuring safety and security in their use, our commitment is always to respond to the needs and priorities of our member States.

I would like to conclude by expressing my continuing gratitude to the Government of Austria, which has now served for over four decades as a most gracious and welcoming host to the IAEA.

The President

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada to introduce draft resolution A/59/L.18.

Mr. Laurin (Canada)

As the representative of Canada, and on behalf of the Chair of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), I am honoured to introduce draft resolution A/59/L.18 on the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The following countries, along with Canada, are sponsors of the text: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

Since the document was first circulated, the following have joined the list of sponsors: Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, South Africa, Thailand, Ukraine, United States of America and Venezuela. I hope that the new sponsors can be incorporated into the list before we adopt the draft resolution before us.

I also wish to thank the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for the statement he has just made, which supplements the information contained in the Agency's annual report. All of this highlights the scope and importance of the results achieved by the Agency over the past year.

Mr. Laurin (Canada)

The draft resolution before the General Assembly this year is consistent with the format adopted last year. It reflects an attempt to further rationalize our work and that of our colleagues in Vienna, while preserving the essence of the message that the General Assembly's adoption of the draft resolution sends to the international community.

In this year's draft resolution we note the exact dates and list the relevant resolutions and decision adopted by the Agency's General Conference at its 48th plenary meeting in September, retaining the substance of lengthier resolutions adopted in the past.

The draft resolution and the annual report give a detailed account of activities in areas of specific interest. So as to focus the attention of the Assembly on the most significant activities of the Agency, the draft resolution does not refer to resolutions adopted at the most recent IAEA General Conference related to budgetary or procedural issues. This means that, of 17 resolutions adopted, only seven substantive resolutions are mentioned. Also mentioned is the sole decision adopted by the General Conference. In operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would take note of the decisions and of each of those resolutions that relate to one of the three pillars of the Agency's activities, namely, nuclear safety, technology transfer and verification of peaceful use.

In closing, I would like to note that all the decisions and resolutions adopted at the most recent General Conference were a result of the constructive efforts of IAEA member States and were adopted by consensus in Vienna. I also wish to thank Member States for the broad support that this new approach and the text of draft resolution A/59/L.18 have received over the course of the informal consultations that Ambassador Hall chaired in Vienna, which resulted in broad and solid consensus. The consultations we have been holding over the past week in New York have also revealed widespread support for the initiative. At the time, we asked Member States present in the consultations not to reopen issues already negotiated and agreed upon in Vienna.

At this stage, I would like to repeat the appeal to all States and to express the hope that draft resolution A/59/L.18 will be adopted by a broad majority and, if possible, by consensus.

Mr. Hamburger (Netherlands)

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The Candidate Countries Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia, the Countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

Mr. President, allow me first of all to thank Mr. Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), for his statement on the report of the IAEA activities in 2004.

The EU commends the secretariat of the IAEA and its Director General for the excellent work done by the Agency and for the importance of the results achieved last year. EU member States welcome the outcome of the forty-eighth IAEA General Conference, held in Vienna from 20 to 24 September 2004, and the resolutions and decisions that were adopted at the Conference.

EU member States are sponsors of the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA (A/59/L.18) and fully support its content. The draft resolution reflects broad agreement among IAEA member States and is the result of consultations held in Vienna. In that regard, we commend the efforts of the Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors and hope that the present draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

I should like to touch briefly upon a few elements of the role of the IAEA within the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and its contributions to that regime, as illustrated by the report (GC(48)/3) submitted to the Assembly under the provisions of the annex of General Assembly resolution 1145 (XII), and transmitted by the note by the Secretary-General contained in document A/59/295.

The EU continues to regard the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and as the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT. The EU believes that a nuclear non-proliferation regime of universal character, supported by a strong system of international safeguards, is an essential prerequisite for collective security. In recent years, challenges to the Treaty and to the non-proliferation regime have highlighted the necessity of full compliance and the need to work actively towards universal adherence. In that regard, the EU will continue its efforts to maintain the authority and integrity of the Treaty.

The international safeguards system of the IAEA is an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is a technical instrument in support of the political goal of sustaining an environment in which there can be the peaceful use of nuclear energy without the diversion of nuclear material or the concealment of nuclear material and of nuclear activities directed to nuclear weapons. In that context, EU member countries recognize the continued need for a properly funded safeguards system that is both effective and cost-efficient and that is therefore credible, robust and complied with.

The universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and of their additional protocols are prerequisites for an effective and credible safeguards system. In particular, the measures contained in the Additional Protocol are crucial to strengthening the ability of the IAEA to detect possible undeclared nuclear material and activities and to provide assurances regarding the absence of such activities. The EU therefore regrets that the number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols currently in force continues to be well below expectations. The EU urges those States that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force their respective safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

The NPT confers a set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights on States parties. Full compliance with the Treaty and with the obligations deriving from it is of fundamental importance. Therefore, the EU reiterates the IAEA's specific calls for compliance. The challenges to compliance with the safeguards agreements must be addressed in a manner that upholds the integrity of the Treaty and the authority of the IAEA safeguards system, including through referral by the IAEA to the Security Council as appropriate.

The EU attaches the utmost importance to a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. Although safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on this issue is indispensable. Nuclear safety is a permanent concern of the international community, and its continuous improvement should be the aim of all IAEA member States. The EU commends the Director General and the secretariat of the IAEA for continuing to help member States during the past year to establish and maintain a stringent nuclear security framework for nuclear installations and materials.

Finally, the fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction deserves a specific reference, as it represents a challenge of paramount importance to the international community. EU member States strongly support all appropriate measures aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although the primary responsibility for the necessary nuclear security rests with member States, the IAEA clearly has an essential role to play in preventing and combating nuclear terrorism. In that respect, we look forward to cooperation between the IAEA and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

In conclusion, we all live in an increasingly interdependent world in which we must ensure our own security and safety and those of one another. That certainly holds true for nuclear security and safety. By the same token, all of us have an obligation to continue to ensure and enhance access for everyone to the benefits of nuclear knowledge, technology, equipment and materials. The IAEA -- with its central and indispensable role as the competent authority to help provide, guarantee and verify nuclear safeguards and safety and as the initiator and facilitator of cooperation in the area of nuclear technology -- remains uniquely placed to advance that goal. In view of that fact, the EU reaffirms its full support for the IAEA and is pleased to sponsor the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA, now before the Assembly.

Mr. Da Rocha Paranhos (Brazil)

We, the countries members of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) -- Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay -- and the associated States Bolivia, Chile and Peru, reaffirm our active and constant commitment to the international community's objectives of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, guaranteeing the right of all States to develop research to produce and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In that connection, we emphasize the efforts of the international community to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system, thus contributing to increased transparency and mutual trust. At the same time, we consider it necessary to continue to work to achieve a cost-effective verification mechanism with a high degree of technical quality and credibility. We understand that strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be in keeping with the preservation and consolidation of multilaterally negotiated international norms.

We welcome the new members of the IAEA and call for the development of a consensus that would include the greatest possible number of countries to help create an atmosphere of trust and legitimacy with regard to decisions. Moreover, we recognize the importance of the Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials as an essential stimulus for the coordination of national and international efforts in that area.

In conclusion, we wish to point out that the joint accountability and control system implemented by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials continues to establish parameters for cooperation between the Republic of Argentina and Brazil.

Mr. Hu Xiaodi (China)

First of all, I would like to thank Director General ElBaradei for his detailed report on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the past year. We are glad to see that, with the joint efforts of the secretariat and all member States, the Agency carried out plenty of work during the past year and made remarkable achievements. We wish to congratulate the secretariat on those achievements and hope that, with the support of all member States, the Agency will continue to play an active role in the fields of promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of China's accession to the IAEA. In the past 20 years, the Chinese Government has actively supported the IAEA in its activities of promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, as mandated by the Statute.

In the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, China has enjoyed extensive cooperation with the Agency and other member States in achieving fruitful results. As of 2003, China dispatched more than 2,000 people to other member States for training and scientific visits, and also received more than 1,200 expert visitors through the Agency's Technical Cooperation (TC) programmes.

In the meantime, China has made voluntary contributions of $13 million, in addition to other contributions in kind, to the Agency. China has also provided other member States with technological personnel training for more than 2,000 people, and organized more than 200 meetings of the Agency. Through participation in the Agency's TC programmes, China, as a developing country, has not only made progress in the development of nuclear power at home, but has also made appropriate contributions to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the region.

In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, China strongly supports the Agency's efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards regime. In 2002, China ratified the Additional Protocol to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards, being the first among the five nuclear-weapon States to do so. In 2003, the Chinese Government published a white paper entitled, "China's Non-Proliferation Policies and Measures", which systematically describes China's non-proliferation policy and practices, reflecting China's determination and sincerity with regard to non-proliferation.

In March 2004, China made a political commitment to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Since then, China has implemented that commitment through the promulgation of relevant laws and regulations, thus establishing a national regulatory system.

In May 2005, China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Moreover, China has lent support to and played a constructive role in the amendment process of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It is our hope that States parties will reach a consensus on the amendments at an early date, so that a diplomatic conference on the amendments can be convened. China will continue to play a supportive role and participate in the Agency's activities.

Now I would like to briefly introduce China's position on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear issue, and the Iran nuclear issue. The Chinese Government has shown great concern for the peace and stability of North-East Asia. We have all along advocated that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized and that the peace and stability of the North-East Asia region should be maintained through dialogue and peaceful consultations. While addressing the nuclear issue, the legitimate security concerns of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should also be addressed.

For that reason, China has been actively engaged in promoting peace and facilitating talks. China has hosted three rounds of the Six-Party Talks, which established the objectives of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and peaceful settlement through dialogue. The Six-Party Talks have already entered the stage of substantive negotiations and it is fair therefore, to say that they have achieved positive results. Continuation of the talks and working to start a new round of the Talks at an earlier date are in the interest of all parties concerned; this also represents the common wish of the international community.

We should also not lose sight of the fact that the issue concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is complex. We hope that all parties will remain patient and sincere and will show flexibility. China will adhere to its objective and just position and will continue its efforts, together with the international community, to reach a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

On the Iran nuclear issue, China stands for an appropriate resolution -- within the framework of the IAEA -- through dialogue and consultation. We hope Iran will continue its comprehensive cooperation with the Agency so as to clarify all the outstanding issues and ratify the Additional Protocol as soon as possible. All parties should encourage Iran to continue to adopt measures conducive to enhancing trust and clarifying doubts.

China supports all diplomatic efforts to resolve the Iran nuclear issue at an early date, and is ready to keep in touch with all the parties in that regard. It is our wish and belief that, with the concerted efforts of all parties, the Iran nuclear issue could be resolved properly within the framework of the Agency. Such a result is not only in the interest of all parties concerned but also conducive to the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan)

Let me begin by expressing our appreciation to a dear friend, Mr. ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for presenting the Agency's annual report. The Agency continues to perform a commendable role under the dynamic stewardship of Mr. ElBaradei, contributing to peace and security and socio-economic development in an increasingly complex and challenging international environment. Pakistan assures Mr. ElBaradei and his team of our full support.

We agree with the Agency's assessment that global socio-economic development needs will require a large increase in the supply of energy in the coming decades. The role of nuclear energy will be crucial in supplying part of that requirement, especially in view of its environmental friendliness and its sustainability, which is needed for development, especially in the developing countries.

The Agency has projected a 20 per cent increase in global nuclear requirements until 2020. We note with interest, that most of that increase will be required by Asia since out of 31 reactors currently under construction worldwide, 20 are located in Asia and 19 of the 28 reactors to be connected to the grids are in the Far East and South Asia.

The pace of construction of the reactors could be further increased if States were not subjected to undue restrictions. With innovative technologies, safe nuclear power plants are a reality and can be constructed in energy-deficient developing countries. In that regard, the IAEA's role in the transfer of safe technology to developing countries has assumed added significance. We hope that the Agency will formulate a comprehensive policy towards that end.

The Government of Pakistan attaches the highest importance to the Technical Cooperation Programme of the Agency, as it offers unique opportunities to the developing countries for prosperity and economic growth with the availability of easy and affordable sources of energy. In view of Pakistan's limited fossil fuel resources and the need to achieve a balance between the risks of industrial pollution and our economic growth, we consider nuclear-power generation as an indispensable element of our national energy strategy. For over 30 years, Pakistan's two nuclear power plants, KANUPP and CHASNUPP, have enjoyed an excellent operational and safety record. The existence of a reliable infrastructure relevant to the nuclear power plants has enabled us to commence work on another nuclear power station -- CHASNUPP II.

Pakistan's future nuclear-power-generation activities will not be confined to the installation of more power plants, but extend to the utilization of some of those facilities for powering desalination plants. As a result of collaborative efforts with the IAEA, a desalination unit at KANUPP has been in service since 2000, producing about 450 cubic metres of fresh water per day through the desalination of sea water.

The Agency has also played a commendable role in the health sector -- especially in the treatment of cancer and tuberculosis. In the agricultural sector, too, innovative technologies have helped in the protection of crops and in enhancing agricultural productivity. A sustained effort would be required to allocate more resources to the IAEA to carry out further research work in the health and agriculture sectors, which could immensely reduce hunger, disease and poverty in the world.

Pakistan is also applying the nuclear sciences to the development of health and agriculture and the reclamation of wasteland. We appreciate the growing cooperation between the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the IAEA in this field. This year, Pakistan established its thirteenth nuclear medical centre and is working on setting up five more such centres, including the country's first positron emission tomography diagnostic facility in Pakistan.

In agriculture, our centres continue to evolve new crop varieties. We have established five demonstration farms to utilize salinity-affected lands. Pakistan is also interested in playing a substantive role in the international effort to promote the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) so that Pakistan can benefit from the safe, cost-effective and proliferation-resistant nuclear power plants of the future.

We are highly sensitive to the safety and security of our nuclear installations, particularly as we are extending our nuclear-power-generation capacities for economic development. Pakistan has successfully established a strong safety culture in its nuclear activities. We are diligently adhering to the principles of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which Pakistan signed at the time of its inception. We have further strengthened security measures around our nuclear installations to avoid any possibility of sabotage or of the illicit acquisition of or trafficking in nuclear material. We will continue our active participation in the Agency's initiative to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We are desirous of an early conclusion of the deliberations on the Convention, and hope that that important instrument will establish more comprehensive obligations globally regarding the physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as of nuclear facilities. We have, however, made it clear that any provisions in the new Convention which can be construed as legitimizing attacks on nuclear facilities are against international law and morality. This issue requires a satisfactory solution.

As part of our efforts to augment the safety and security of nuclear installations and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Pakistan has undertaken additional measures. These include, first, effective steps, in cooperation with the international community, to eliminate an underground proliferation network which had its tentacles in two dozen countries. We have cooperated closely with the IAEA in that endeavour and urge others concerned to do likewise.

Secondly, Pakistan has adopted wide-ranging measures to ensure foolproof security for its nuclear and strategic assets. Four years ago, we established a Nuclear Command and Control Authority, which is responsible for Pakistan's nuclear and strategic assets. Those assets are vital for our strategic deterrence posture. There is no question of their falling into the wrong hands. Thirdly, in 2001 we created a nuclear regulatory authority for the safe operation of civilian nuclear plants. Fourthly, since 2000 Pakistan has been elaborating legislation to implement its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Finally, last month Pakistan's parliament promulgated a comprehensive Export Control Act to deal with nuclear and biological weapons, material, goods, technologies, equipment and their means of delivery. Salient elements of our new law include a prohibition on the diversion of controlled goods and technologies, including re-export, trans-shipment and transit; licensing and record-keeping; export control lists; and penal provisions of up to 14 years imprisonment and a fine of 5 million rupees. We are confident that there will be no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from Pakistan.

The safety and verification aspects of the IAEA's mandate remain important pillars of the Agency's work. The Agency has initiated action with regard to the safety of nuclear materials. There is a need to focus attention on securing "orphan" sources of such materials which are in immediate danger of falling into the wrong hands. The Agency's report highlights this aspect, and we fully agree with the remedial measures suggested in that regard.

As regards the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system, Pakistan believes that the maintenance of a proper balance between the promotional aspects and safety- or security-related concerns in all of the Agency's functions is essential. We believe that States must fully comply with their respective safeguards obligations. At the same time, the Agency's safeguards should not be used to serve partisan political objectives. Its verification regime will be able to remain credible only if it is applied on a non-discriminatory basis, as stipulated in the Agency's statutes. Cooperation and greater understanding is required among all the States members of the Agency so as to advance its mandate on the basis of impartiality, equity and professionalism.

The Agency's role should be consistent with its statutes. Proposals for reform should be within the scope of the Statute. The IAEA is not an investigative agency. It cannot be asked to perform tasks which are beyond the scope of its Statute or not approved by its membership. Any reform in the Agency should be non-discriminatory and inclusive and take into account the differentiated nature of the obligations of its member States. Finally, such reforms should not undermine the balance between the promotional role of the Agency and the safety- or security-related concerns involved in its functions.

We all have great expectations of the IAEA in the promotion of the socio-economic development of member States. The Agency's technical cooperation requires a reassessment of its current framework whereby it can render assistance to member States on non-discriminatory and equitable basis. Apart from ensuring balance between the promotional aspects and verification, safety- and security-related functions, the following measures could help in enhancing its contribution to socio-economic development: first, the preservation of its technical nature and the prevention of the politicization of its agenda; secondly, a greater emphasis on the technical cooperation activities of the Agency and its contribution to the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses and technology transfers to developing countries; thirdly, the allocation of larger and more assured resources for technical cooperation activities, technology transfer and training facilities for developing countries; and, fourthly, the greater involvement of developing countries in the design and implementation of technical cooperation projects and increased outsourcing to developing member States for its Technical Cooperation Programme.

Ms. Martina (Ukraine)

On behalf of my delegation, I would like to thank Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his statement on the main developments in the Agency's activities during 2004. Ukraine commends the secretariat of IAEA and its Director General for the excellent work done by the Agency, as well as for the important results achieved over the past year.

I would also like to extend our welcome to the new members of the Agency: the Republic of Chad, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Togolese Republic.

Fifty years ago the United Nations General Assembly adopted its landmark resolution 810 (IX), entitled "International cooperation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy", which called for the establishment of the IAEA. Today, when the risk of nuclear proliferation has changed and increased, we have no other choice but to use our best efforts to further strengthen the activities of the Agency to ensure that nuclear technologies developed for peaceful purposes will not be misused for non-peaceful activities.

Ukraine underscores the significance of the safeguards system and the importance of the work done by the Agency to implement the safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We fully endorse measures envisaged by the Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreements. As of today, the preparatory activities for the ratification of the Additional Protocol, signed by Ukraine in 2000, have been completed and ratification is expected very soon.

As regards unresolved compliance matters, Ukraine welcomes the historic decision by the Libyan leadership to give up its weapons of mass destruction programmes and to cooperate closely with the international community to that end.

Ukraine recognizes the inalienable right of Iran to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the same time, we support IAEA efforts aimed at providing credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Ukraine hails the signing by Iran, in December 2003, of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement and hopes that that fact -- along with further active cooperation of the Government in Tehran with IAEA -- will help remove concerns over Iran's nuclear activities.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to cause concern. Ukraine shares the conviction that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should relinquish its nuclear ambitions, resume its cooperation with IAEA and return to compliance with its obligations under the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement without delay. We support an early settlement of the crisis by political and diplomatic means, which we do not believe are exhausted. Ukraine hopes that the multilateral dialogue on that issue will be continued.

We are confident that security and proliferation challenges can only be met successfully by multilateral cooperation. Ukraine considers that the NPT is an exceptionally important global instrument to that end. Ukraine is fully committed to the NPT and will continue its efforts to maintain the authority and integrity of the Treaty.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of Ukraine's accession to the NPT. There is no doubt that Ukraine's landmark decision to relinquish its nuclear capability and to accede to the Treaty contributed significantly to the enhancement of the international non-proliferation regime and to global security.

Ukraine welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which calls on all Member States to enact effective domestic controls to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We highly appreciate the IAEA's readiness to assist States in implementing that resolution.

A strategy to counter nuclear terrorism should cover all types of risk, including the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists or their production of various kinds of nuclear explosives from either nuclear or radioactive material. All possible measures have to be taken in order to provide proper protection against malicious acts on facilities or transport containers housing nuclear or radioactive materials.

In that context, Ukraine supports urgent measures to strengthen multilateral control over the nuclear fuel cycle and to improve the safety and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. We welcome the creation by the IAEA Director General of a group of experts tasked with developing better approaches to control the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle and we look forward to the results of its work.

Ukraine considers the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as one of the key instruments for preventing nuclear proliferation and the risk of nuclear terrorism. We reiterate our support for finalizing the ongoing process of amendment of the Convention as soon as possible.

The newly revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources is another important landmark instrument. We call upon all IAEA member States that have not done so to adopt and implement the Code of Conduct without delay.

Ukraine strongly supports IAEA activities to reinforce national programmes to identify, secure, recover and facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and other high-risk radioactive materials. For Ukraine that issue is of special importance, taking into account the significant amount of fuel-containing masses in the destroyed fourth power unit at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the radioactive material present in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. IAEA participation in resolving those problems, as well as international assistance within the framework of bilateral and multilateral projects, should be adequate to solve the complex range of issues presented by the "Shelter" object and the Chernobyl exclusion zone.

Ukraine has filed its national report for the third Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety to be held in 2005. The report clearly demonstrates our progress and achievements in the field of nuclear safety over past years.

For Ukraine, 2004 has been a year marked by two outstanding events: the commissioning of new power units at the Khmelnitska and Rivnenska nuclear power plants. I would like to express our gratitude to all the international institutions that have made valuable contributions to the completion of the units' construction, undertaking numerous research projects and expert examinations and elaborating the necessary recommendations to that end. Today, we can certify that the two new power units conform to the highest level of design safety standards of all the units currently operating in Ukraine.

We consider implementation of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme to be the cornerstone of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are pleased to see the IAEA secretariat continuing its efforts to improve the Programme's effectiveness and efficiency through evaluations, audits and process reviews. Agency activities in the field of nuclear sciences and applications in the non-power sector also contribute significantly to sustainable development.

In conclusion, Ukraine notes the importance of placing greater emphasis in the Technical Cooperation Programme for Europe on issues of safety and security, radiation and transport safety, management of radioactive waste, national health programmes, environmental issues and problems related to decommissioning of nuclear power plants or their life extension, which remain priorities for my country within the framework of technical cooperation with the Agency.

Mr. Devamany (Malaysia) --> -->

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