General Assembly Session 57 meeting 47

The President

I should like to inform representatives that, following consultations regarding agenda item 39 on the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and taking into account General Assembly decision 56/410 of 26 November 2001, it is proposed that the General Assembly decide to postpone consideration of this item and to include it in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session.

May I take it therefore that the Assembly, taking into account decision 56/410, wishes to defer consideration of this item and include it in the provisional agenda of the fifty-eighth session?

The President

The General Assembly will consider sub-item (d) of agenda item 21, "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan"; and agenda item 37, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security" and draft resolution A/57/L.13/Rev.1 entitled "Open-ended panel of the General Assembly on 'Afghanistan: one year later'".

The idea of organizing a panel discussion on Afghanistan as an interactive dialogue with interested Member States has received overwhelming support from many countries concerned, including the Security Council members, the neighbouring countries and many influential States, such as Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, just to name a few.

This panel discussion is also very closely intertwined with my own efforts as the President of the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly to revitalize its meetings.

These were the reasons that I decided to link this panel, scheduled for 18 November, with this year's plenary session on Afghanistan, to be held on 6 December. I do strongly believe that the panel discussion can enrich this year's commemoration of the first anniversary of the Bonn Conference and could lead the United Nations to specific conclusions in terms of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, thereby providing new recommendations for future United Nations activities in this domain.

To achieve these goals, I ask you to be prepared for such a discussion. What I envisage as very important are our attempts to find out what were the lessons learned by the United Nations in Afghanistan. The panel should also give us an opportunity to see the consequences of the decisions adopted by the United Nations and to find out if these decisions were properly implemented. What are the results that these decisions helped us to achieve? Should we modify our humanitarian activities and economic assistance in Afghanistan? What else needs to be done in order for us to achieve United Nations goals in Afghanistan sooner and more effectively? I do truly hope that we will be able to meet these criteria.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Secretariat.

Mr. Chen (Under-Secretary-General, Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Management)

Under operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/57/L.13/Rev.1, the General Assembly decides to convene, on 18 November 2002, an open-ended panel on Afghanistan, which will have two consecutive sessions, one from 9 to 11 a.m., and the other, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/57/L.13/Rev.1, no additional expenditure would be required, since the open-ended panel would be convened on a date and time when the plenary would not be in session. The related meeting servicing costs would be met, therefore, from overall resources earmarked for the meetings of the plenary.

The President

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/57/L.13/Rev.1.

May I take it that the Assembly decides to adopt draft resolution A/57/L.13/Rev.1?

The President

The General Assembly has thus concluded this stage of its consideration of sub-item (d) of agenda item 21 and agenda item 37.

Mr. Singh (India)

At the outset, let me compliment the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on its completion of 45 years as a unique multidisciplinary international organization, functioning to fulfil its mandate to the satisfaction of all its stakeholders. The Agency is a unique professional body in the area of nuclear science and technology, with the ability and wherewithal to provide solutions to various issues concerning all of us. The Agency has not shied away from adding new dimensions to its activities, while at the same time maintaining a careful balance among all its statutory activities.

The World Summit on Sustainable Development recently concluded its work in Johannesburg. The threat to our global climate due to increasing carbon dioxide emission is even more evident than in the past. Notwithstanding the important role of renewable and other clean energy technologies, and given the magnitude of this problem, there can be no doubt that nuclear power is an inevitable option at the present state of development of advanced energy technologies and can meet the development aspirations of a large fraction of the world's population, while at the same time conforming to the criteria of sustainability. It is ironic that, in spite of its large energy potential, with the capability of meeting sustainable worldwide energy needs without any real or significant environmental impact, the unfounded misconceptions about nuclear energy still dominate and have impeded sustainable development.

At the present juncture, one sees nuclear power simultaneously witnessing stagnation, renaissance and growth in different parts of the world. During the 1990s, the gross generation of nuclear electricity in Asia grew by 63.7 per cent, and the availability of global nuclear energy increased from 73 per cent to over 82 per cent, which is equivalent to adding 33 gigawatts of new generating capacity.

There is growing activity to extend the lives of existing nuclear power plants. This exercise is equivalent to building new reactors in those countries. An integrated view of technology, safety, safeguards and the newly emerging scenario with respect to nuclear terrorism is, however, necessary to find holistic answers that can eliminate the barriers to large-scale development of nuclear power in a sustainable manner.

Recognizing the important role of nuclear power in meeting long-term energy needs, India has accorded high priority to the self-reliant development of nuclear power in the country. This has enabled a strong indigenous capability in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Presently, construction on eight more reactors is in progress -- the largest number of reactors currently under construction in any country. These units include six pressurized heavy water reactors of indigenous design and two 1,000 megawatt units being set up in cooperation with the Russian Federation. Construction on all projects is progressing in advance of their respective schedules.

Our 14 operating nuclear power reactors have together registered an impressive 85 per cent average annual capacity factor during the past year and, at the same time, have maintained an excellent safety record. In line with keeping our commitment to the preservation of the environment, most of the operating power plants have also obtained Environment Management System (EMS) ISO 14001 certification.

Mr. Singh (India)

We will reach a total nuclear capacity of 6,680 megawatts by 2008, and we intend to achieve 10,000 megawatts by 2012 and 20,000 megawatts by 2020. In order to achieve that objective, given the nuclear resource profile available within the country, we have also carried out considerable work on the design and development of a plutonium-uranium-oxide-fuelled, 500-megawatt prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam. While the pre-project activities for construction of that reactor are already in progress, we will soon launch the main project.

The expansion of our nuclear power programme is being appropriately supported by the opening of two new uranium mines in Jharkhand State in India. We have also undertaken pre-project activities for the commencement of uranium mining at three more sites. In addition, we have taken significant steps, including reducing specific energy consumption in heavy water production and compressing the construction schedule, so as to make nuclear power even more competitive. In fact, the Indian track record on export controls and fulfilment of its international obligations has been exemplary, to the extent that India has been described as a classic non-proliferator.

While the Indian programme is designed to cater to the country's long-term energy needs, the recent awareness of the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on the global climate has necessitated expeditious large-scale development of nuclear power in India. External additionalities in the nuclear power sector, for which there is a large market in India, could help that process further. However, our efforts to accelerate the development of nuclear power as a sustainable means of producing the clean energy needed to meet the development aspirations of one sixth of humanity are faced with the restrictive export policies of certain countries. It is common knowledge that India's nuclear programme is unique by virtue of its indigenous and comprehensive capabilities, and therefore any proliferation concern over external supplies to India is unfounded. Making external additionalities in nuclear power development in India subject to such irrelevant and unfounded concerns will only increase the dependence on fossil fuel, resulting in damage to the global environment.

Our atomic energy programme has accorded top priority to safety in all its activities and has kept pace with needs, accompanied by the expansion of the nuclear power programme and by the utilization of nuclear technologies for research, health, agricultural and industrial purposes. We have gained close to 200 reactor-years of operating experience, with a good track record in maintaining the safety of operating personnel, of the public and of the environment. Needless to say, safety cannot be divorced from technology. However, it is unfortunate that, in practice, technologies continue to be denied to us, even for systems important to safety.

The IAEA's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) is a most appropriate and timely measure and will help to overcome barriers to the growth of nuclear power for global sustainable development. We are convinced that such technological solutions are the need of the hour and that they provide superior, cost-effective and comprehensive alternatives to the current segmental approach of dealing separately with technology, safety and safeguards. We have taken an active part in that programme, which the Agency is implementing through extra budgetary resources, and we have also provided cost-free experts. We feel that the time has come for the Agency to absorb the INPRO programme into its regular budget.

We are glad that the Agency responded promptly to the need for nuclear security following the tragic events of 11 September 2001 by, among other things, setting up an Advisory Group on Nuclear Security. We should eliminate any possibility for terrorists to exploit the potential of using nuclear material and radioactive sources, particularly for blackmail. Although the prime responsibility for the security and safety of nuclear and other radioactive materials and of nuclear facilities rests and must rest with States themselves, the Agency's additional activities can contribute meaningfully to protection against nuclear terrorism. As it does so, we should ensure that it does not add unduly to the sense of apprehension that exists in many quarters concerning the safety of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

India has acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which reinforces its commitment to international instruments against terrorism in general and against nuclear terrorism in particular. More than four decades ago, we in India established strict measures for the physical protection of nuclear material during its use, storage and transport. A multidisciplinary expert group at the highest level ensures that the appropriate measures are implemented in that regard. Such measures are being appropriately upgraded through technological advancements. In addition, an internal physical protection advisory service exists. We have a specially designed human resource development programme to train personnel at various levels for that purpose.

The orphan sources in many countries have been a cause of concern. We have collaborated with the Agency in providing indigenously developed equipment, including an aerial gamma-survey system, and the services of our experts for a ground and aerial survey to search for orphan sources in Georgia.

We are glad that the Agency is dealing with the issue of knowledge management. The gaining of nuclear knowledge in certain parts of the world is an important challenge. The nuclear knowledge pool in India is very large and is expanding in consonance with the rapid growth of the country's nuclear energy programme. One of the challenges that must be addressed by all of us who are engaged in nuclear technology development is to promote a knowledge-based holistic approach across the entire spectrum of the technology-society interface. Further, the linkage among society, industry and the national programme must be visible to college students so that they recognize that there are challenges that need solutions and are motivated to find them. We need to distinguish knowledge transfer from technology transfer, which has obvious constraints that arise out of the commercial context. Knowledge, on the other hand, is enhanced by sharing it with worthy scholars who can sustain the process and also with those who can use it to find new solutions of societal interest.

I must emphasize that any technology will have its associated problems. However, the solutions to such problems also lie in technology. In the evolution of civilization, there have been several examples of technology allowing the enhancement of the quality of life. In the process, some new issues of concern arose; however, such issues were satisfactorily resolved through the further application of technology. We have seen that in the context of energy, transportation, material processing, food, human health and many other areas of human endeavour. Technological empowerment is thus the need of the hour. Continuity of nuclear knowledge and empowerment through nuclear technology to promote global peace and prosperity are our collective responsibility, and we can fulfil that responsibility through the unique organization of the IAEA.

Mr. De Alba (Mexico)

The Mexican delegation wishes to express its appreciation to Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to all the Agency's staff for their excellent work throughout the year in order to accomplish the many tasks assigned to them by Member States and to confront new challenges with limited financial resources.

The report of the IAEA's activities in 2001 duly reflects the Agency's achievements in promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies and the transfer of those technologies to the developing countries, as well as its efforts to improve the effective regime of nuclear safety and an efficient verification system.

Mexico welcomes the recent approval by the IAEA General Conference of the admission of Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan and the Seychelles to membership of the Agency, thus broadening the universal commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are also pleased by the advances made in the strengthening of safeguards, particularly with the approval of a conceptual framework for integrated safeguards and the implementation of those safeguards on a priority basis in an effective and cost-efficient manner.

As regards physical safety and security, Mexico shares the international community's concerns about measures to strengthen the Agency's work aimed at combating and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism. We welcome the progress made to date through the adoption of an action plan to combat nuclear terrorism and through the establishment of a Nuclear Security Fund through voluntary contributions. In this context, and in order to update harmonize views, Mexico is actively promoting the inclusion of ideas and definitions adopted in other international instruments with respect to the definition of illicit conduct; cooperation in judicial matters and extradition; and the development of a draft protocol to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, a fundamental instrument for strengthening measures to prevent a terrorist act against nuclear materials and installations.

We also recognize the Agency's efforts to improve the quality and impact of the Technical Cooperation Programme through the development of better projects in keeping with national priorities and with enhanced socio-economic impact, promoting the optimal use of national and regional capacities. Mexico welcomes the request made by the IAEA General Conference to Mr. ElBaradei that enhanced efforts be made to improve external contracting or subcontracting mechanisms so as to strengthen technical cooperation among developing countries.

Mexico is very pleased by the Agency's progress, in particular with respect to the promotion of food security, the management of water resources and improved human health. These are clear illustrations of the use of nuclear science and technology in support of sustainable development. Mexico welcomes the application of sterile insect technologies because of their considerable effect on human, animal and plant health, with special emphasis on their technical and economic viability. Mexico also believes that it is important to recognize the success of the application of isotopic techniques to the sustainable management of water resources.

We believe that safety and security are among the top priorities in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy. Mexico participated in the second review meeting of contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, at which we submitted our national report. That report was welcomed by the contracting parties, as it reflects the smooth functioning of the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant and the proper implementation of the Convention's provisions through our National Commission of Nuclear Safety and Safeguards, Mexico's nuclear regulatory agency.

Finally, Mexico attaches great importance to the culture of security and, above all, prevention, as reflected in the Agency's 2001 report, in which reference is made to the seminar on self-assessment training for a culture of safety and security, held under IAEA auspices at the Laguna Verde plant in June 2001.

Mr. Hidayat (Indonesia)

I would like at the outset to express our appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his introduction of the Agency's report and the comprehensive statement highlighting its role and activities.

The report portrays a wide range of scientific challenges and how these are sought to be met through safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is gratifying to note that the Agency has continued its invaluable contributions through the strategy of a unified approach to providing technical assistance, safety measures and verification mechanisms. We are hopeful that its role in these endeavours will be further strengthened in the future for the benefit of all States, especially the developing countries.

My delegation wishes to emphasize the importance of promoting a framework of confidence and cooperation within which the transfer of nuclear technology and materials for peaceful purposes can take place, as they play an important role in catering to the requirements of national development. This is essential even for countries that are endowed with abundant natural resources, both current and potential.

Energy has played and will continue to play a principal role in promoting economic and industrial growth, as well as improved human well-being. However, the substantial increase in global energy consumption in the coming decades, which is foreseen in the Agency's report, will be driven principally by the developing world, especially in Asia, and it cannot be met through resources that are finite. Hence, in our view, nuclear energy remains a strong option offering a sustainable energy future.

In some countries of the Asia-Pacific region, nuclear power is already an important contributor to electricity generation and its role is projected to expand in order to support overall economic growth in the region. This calls for enhanced technical cooperation to facilitate the sustainable development of the developing countries. It is therefore gratifying to note that the transfer of nuclear science and technology to those countries through cooperative programmes -- especially in areas such as food and agriculture, fighting disease, managing water resources and ensuring environmental protection -- continues to be a principal objective of the Agency.

Indonesia has steadily supported the role of the IAEA in assisting States parties to launch projects within the framework of peaceful uses of nuclear energy based on each country's choices and decisions and the principle of sustainable development. Those activities have facilitated a multiplicity of functions, most notably the optimal utilization of resources, the planning and implementation of nuclear power projects, monitoring their performance, plant reliability and improving technical skills.

According to the report, in the field of health, nuclear techniques have much to offer in the diagnosis and control of non-communicable diseases. New tools have also come to be utilized for combating infectious diseases. Nuclear and related biotechnologies can also facilitate the achievement of food security and address problems relating to malnutrition that afflict a large segment of people living in the developing world.

As far as the aforementioned endeavours are concerned, we gratefully acknowledge the Agency's role, among others, in organizing a regional technical cooperation project on nutritional studies with the participation of Indonesia and other members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, which also have availed themselves of the Agency's nuclear safety review services and assistance.

The question of ensuring a high level of nuclear safety and security continues to be of critical importance to the international community. An attack on a nuclear power plant or other nuclear installation could result in a massive release of radioactive material with its attendant consequences. Such a dire prospect has been further heightened by nuclear terrorism, which represents a potent danger to global peace and security. The spectre that those weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists demonstrates the priority that all nations must accord to that complex and interrelated issue.

My delegation is, therefore, gratified to note, in that context, that the IAEA is already engaged in a wide range of activities pertinent to combating nuclear terrorism, including nuclear safety cooperation among relevant organizations and member States, programmes to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, as well as other radioactive sources, and providing advisory services against theft and sabotage.

Currently, the Agency is also considering expansion of the scope and reach of its safety and security services and undertaking a review of existing guidelines and conventions to ensure that they are comprehensive and effective. Meanwhile, the establishment of internationally agreed standards of safety of nuclear installations, the coordination of efforts at the national, regional and global levels and the fostering of information exchange have become imperative.

The Agency's safeguards work as a worldwide system of monitoring and inspection of nuclear materials remains indispensable. States parties to the NPT and member States of the IAEA have addressed the question of deficiencies through the "93 plus 2" programme of enhanced safeguards and have negotiated an additional protocol, to which Indonesia has been one of its early adherents.

The aforementioned programme extends the reach of the Agency's inspectors beyond declared activities, requires Governments to provide extensive information on research and industrial activities, as well as on imports and exports of dual use technologies, and provides the Agency with a comprehensive profile of a country's nuclear activities, enabling IAEA to draw conclusions about its future intentions.

In conclusion, my delegation recognizes the important role of the IAEA as an information source and as a substantial contributor to sustainable development. That has become essential in the context of expanding nuclear programmes in Asia. Innovative projects are under way in many countries, under the Agency's auspices, that will identify promising technologies.

As in the past, the IAEA, within limited resources, has ensured the effective implementation of a programme that made a constructive contribution to the needs and interests of the developing nations. It also has played an important role in assisting those countries in improving their scientific and technological capabilities.

Mr. Santiago (Brazil)

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the countries of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) -- Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay -- and the associated countries Bolivia and Chile.

I reiterate our satisfaction at seeing that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to be a centre of excellence in promotional and security activities. Our countries appreciate the relations they have with the Agency and, thus, we congratulate Director General Mohamed ElBaradei on his efficient guidance of the secretariat.

The technical cooperation activities promoted by the IAEA have a positive impact on aspirations for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That is why our countries stress the need to maintain a balance between the Agency's three main pillars. We attach great importance to the potential of technical cooperation, one of the Agency's pillars, for supporting developing countries in the various areas of applying scientific and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

We highlight in particular a new IAEA-supported technical cooperation project designed to exploit and manage water resources related to the Guarani aquifer system, involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, aimed at expanding and preserving drinking water resources.

Along other lines, our countries consider positive the linkage of the IAEA with other multilateral spheres, particularly with the World Summit on Sustainable Development. In that context, we recall the project entitled Brazil: profile of a country in the development of sustainable energy, developed for the Summit by a committee of experts, in which IAEA technical personnel also participated.

We currently share the concern for the need to strengthen efforts carried out by the Agency to contribute preventing the possibility of terrorist acts against nuclear installations or their use of radioactive material. In that regard, we express our readiness to cooperate in efforts to confront that threat.

We encourage the IAEA secretariat to develop initiatives aimed at improving the level of security of nuclear installations, reactors and the fuel cycle, as well as at issuing updated standards. We recognize that important progress has been made in the area of establishing security standards.

We support in particular the development of the programme to improve the culture of security, for which our country is already serving as headquarters for related activities. We also appreciate the great value of the services of assessment, review and diagnostic missions related to nuclear security.

Similarly, and taking into account the fact that the MERCOSUR countries and Bolivia and Chile attach special importance to the secure transport of radioactive material, we recognize the progress made through IAEA General Conference resolutions and the effort made jointly by the member States and the secretariat during 2001 regarding the revision of relevant regulations, as well as action aimed at their effective incorporation by transport organizations.

We also observe with satisfaction that more countries are using Transport Safety Appraisal Services assessment missions in implementing the Agency's transport regulations. We highlight in particular the event that took place this year in Brazil.

Our countries commit themselves to active participation in the 2003 International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material.

The recent IAEA General Conference, held in September, concluded with the adoption of a significant consensus on that subject. We hope that the 2003 International Conference will achieve a similar level of understanding and dialogue.

With regard specifically to the progress made by the secretariat in defining comprehensive safeguards, we believe that efforts should be intensified, not only for greater effectiveness, to prevent budgetary pressures that produce imbalances in the exercise of the Agency's statutory functions, but also for greater efficiency in verification activities.

In this regard, we also encourage the Agency to step up its positive interaction with other verification bodies, such as the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which has been operating for 10 years. ABACC has been carrying out its verification activities, within its area of application, with great success. We believe that it is a great example of transparency and we hope that its current cooperative relationship with the IAEA will be intensified.

Finally, with regard to the regular budget, we believe that any possible increases in contributions should take into account the balance among the three basic pillars of the Agency, as well as the specific economic situation of our countries. The economic situation in our region prevents our countries from taking on heavy contribution burdens.

The Acting President

We have heard the last speaker in the debate on agenda item 14.

I call on the representative of Kuwait who wishes to speak on a point of order.

Ms. Al Mulla (Kuwait)

I would like to invoke rule 74 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to call on the Assembly not to take action on the amendment contained in draft resolution A/57/L.17.

In making this statement, my delegation is following the precedent set last year by the representative of Australia, as the Chairman of the Board of Governors at the time. In view of the intensive and exhaustive process of consultations, which took place in Vienna and here in New York, and which resulted in broad agreement on the current text of the draft, it is the wish of the sponsors that the draft resolution be adopted as it stands.

The request for the motion is also based on the following considerations. First, the amendment contained in draft resolution A/57/L.17 refers to the announced acceptance by Iraq of the unconditional return of inspectors. That matter has already been addressed in the preambular part of draft resolution A/57/L.14. Secondly, the latter part of the amendment refers to an issue that has not been taken up by the Agency. The attention of delegates is drawn to the fact that the draft resolution relates to the work of the Agency. Thirdly, the text of the latter part of the amendment does not reflect in any way the language of resolution GC(46)/RES/15, as adopted by the General Conference of the Agency last September. Indeed, members of the Agency are in general agreement that the language in the draft resolution should faithfully reflect the language used in the resolutions of the General Conference.

Ms. Al Mulla (Kuwait)

The representative of Iraq had the opportunity to submit amendments during the consultation process in Vienna. This was done in an open-ended meeting, but there was no support for the amendment submitted at that time for the reasons that I mentioned earlier. In New York, the representative of Iraq again presented the amendment in draft resolution A/57/L.17, and an appeal was made for its withdrawal. As the appeal was not heeded, we have had to resort to a motion that no action be taken. It is with regret that we do so. The motion is not meant to deny any Members the right of expression. It is meant to facilitate the adoption of the draft resolution as it stands. We appeal to all Members to support the motion that no action be taken.

The President

The representative of Kuwait has moved, within the terms of rule 74 of the rules of procedure, that no action be taken on the amendment contained in document A/57/L.17. Let me remind members that rule 74 reads:

"During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. In addition to the proposer of the motion, two representatives may speak in favour of, and two against, the motion, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote."

Does any representative wish to speak?

I give the floor to the representative of Iraq.

Mr. Salman (Iraq)

My delegation regrets that there has been a request for a motion that no action be taken. This would prevent a Member State from expressing its views in a way that reflects the simple truth, as expressed by the Secretary-General. We also regret that such practices are being tolerated in the General Assembly. The General Assembly was not founded to rubber stamp to draft resolutions presented to it, but to ensure that Member States can fully exercise their rights, as enshrined in the Charter, thus ensuring the transparency and credibility of this organ.

Before action is taken, therefore, I would like to ask delegations to consider the outcome of their vote in setting a precedent on the future role of the Assembly. I kindly request the sponsors to reconsider their position. I would also like to remind Member States that the Charter provided for the right of substantive voting so as to ensure that Member States have the tools to present their positions on matters dealt with in the General Assembly. Taking this into account, I would like to request delegations, regardless of their positions with regard to the amendment that has been introduced, to vote against the motion for no action for the sake of transparency and for the credibility of this organ.

The President

I shall now put to the vote the motion submitted by the representative of Kuwait that no action be taken on the amendment contained in document A/57/L.17.

The President

Since the motion for no action has been adopted, no action will be taken on the amendment contained in document A/57/L.17. We shall therefore proceed to take a decision on draft resolution A/57/L.14.

I shall call on those speakers wishing to speak in explanation of vote before the vote.

Mr. Jon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will reserve time to speak before the end of the discussion on this item, in order to explain its views and position on the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula, in response to the statements made by several delegations this morning. Because of the statements made, we cannot support the draft resolution. We will vote against draft resolution A/57/L.14.

Mr. Salman (Iraq)

With regard to the decision on the recent motion, my delegation has no other choice than to ask for a separate vote on the twelfth preambular paragraph for the following reasons. First, it does not welcome Iraq's decision of September to allow the unconditional return of the inspectors and the agreement with the Director-General of the IAEA on the practical arrangements needed for the inspections. Secondly, it introduced new language that is meant to accommodate political aims that will serve aggressive policies, taking into account that such language was not included in last year's resolution, before Iraq's decision to allow the inspectors to return. Thirdly, it does not refer to Iraq's cooperation since 2000 with the IAEA in carrying out its mandate according to the safeguards agreement. Having said that, I ask delegations to vote against the twelfth preambular paragraph.

The President

We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote before the vote. Before proceeding, I would like to announce that since the introduction of the draft resolution, the following countries have become cosponsors of draft resolution A/57/L.14: Armenia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Jordan and Switzerland.

A separate vote has been requested on the third preambular paragraph, the twelfth preambular paragraph, operative paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 10 of draft resolution A/57/L.14. Are there any objections to those requests? As there are none, we shall proceed accordingly.

I now put to the vote the third preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/57/L.14. A recorded vote has been requested.

The President

I shall now put to the vote the twelfth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/57/L.14. A recorded vote has been requested.

The President

I shall now put to the vote operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/57/L.14. A recorded vote has been requested.

The President

I now put to the vote operative paragraph 10 of draft resolution A/57/L.14.

The President

I now put to the vote draft resolution A/57/L.14 as a whole.

The President

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes on the resolution just adopted.

May I remind representatives that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Gosal (Canada)

Canada voted in favour of resolution 57/9, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

While the resolution is, in fact, a report on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s activities for the last year, the report, unfortunately, does not reflect the most recent developments that have occurred, especially in regards to reports on the admission by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea about its undeclared uranium enrichment programme. It is for this reason that Canada does not believe that the thirteenth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 11 accurately reflect the situation, which has evolved as of today.

However, we acknowledge that the resolution was drafted on the basis of consensus and that it only reflects developments which occurred up to 20 September 2002. It was on the basis of that consensus that Canada was able to continue to accept the language found in those paragraphs. However, we would like to note that Canada will continue to support the IAEA's efforts to address these issues as quickly as possible.

With respect to the resolution as a whole, we believe that a shorter, more focused text that does not attempt to summarize the General Conference's work should be considered in the future.

Mr. Wu Haitao (China)

China has consistently supported the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and appreciates the activities and achievements of the Agency in the past year. The Chinese delegation therefore voted in favour of resolution 57/9 on the report of the IAEA.

The Chinese delegation wishes to explain its position on the nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula. First, the principled position of the Chinese Government on this issue has not changed. We have always believed that the process of denuclearization, peace and stability on the Korean peninsula should be maintained. Secondly, concerned parties, on the basis of equality and mutual respect, should implement in good faith agreements reached. Thirdly, We stand for a peaceful solution of related issues through dialogue and consultation.

Mr. Shringla (India)

India, a founding member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), attaches the highest importance and value to the objectives of the Agency. Since resolution 57/9 pertains to the activities of the IAEA, we voted in its favour.

Nonetheless, we have considerable difficulty with the third preambular paragraph. The language of that paragraph appears to link adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the freedom to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Article II of the Statute of the IAEA, which must guide all our deliberations on the activities of the Agency, calls on the Agency to

"accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world".

Further, the Statute stresses the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. The purpose of these provisions of the Statute of the IAEA is obviously to encourage the unfettered access of member States to the peaceful uses of atomic energy without any discrimination whatsoever, albeit with appropriate safeguards.

The IAEA Statute predates the NPT and, besides, the Agency has not been designated as a Secretariat of the NPT. The Agency merely implements its safeguards for different member States in accordance with their agreements, and the concept of safeguards itself predates the NPT. The NPT is not an equitable treaty. Also the provisions of article VI of the NPT should not have been fulfilled by the nuclear weapon States. Therefore the NPT should not be used for discriminating between members of the IAEA. By inferring that adherence by itself to the NPT, on which my Government's views are well known, would imply access to peaceful uses of atomic energy, the resolution deviates from, and in fact derogates from the objectives enshrined in the statute of the IAEA. We have, therefore, been constrained to call for a vote on preambular paragraph 3 and I have voted against it.

Mr. Govrin (Israel)

During the negotiations on this resolution in Vienna, Israel made no secret that while supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) annual report, it had reservations regarding certain paragraphs of this resolution, including operative paragraph 10. Israel stood ready to discuss the language of this paragraph and proposed alternative suggestions, but unfortunately, to no avail. Therefore, as it did last year, Israel lamentably had to vote against operative paragraph 10 of this resolution.

Israel believes that the language of operative paragraph 10 is clearly inconsistent with the consensus that was reached over the past eight years in the IAEA General Conference on the resolution entitled "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East". Israel strongly opposes the attempt to use the IAEA annual report in order to change the meaning of this consensus resolution. I would like to remind representatives that the consensus on the resolution was difficult to establish in the first place and it has been maintained by preserving a delicately balanced text that all parties could accept.

Operative paragraph 10 of the resolution on the report of the IAEA interrupts this balance. Taking certain issues out of the overall context, while ignoring other elements of the consensus language, is bound to jeopardize the spirit of consensus and will ultimately harm the credibility of the resolutions of the IAEA General Conference.

For this reason Israel voted against operative paragraph 10 of this resolution. Israel has nevertheless supported the resolution as a whole out of recognition of the IAEA's important role, especially when it comes to dealing with challenges to international security in the nuclear domain. Israel can only hope that next year, this unfruitful process of negotiations on this resolution will be avoided.

On behalf of the State of Israel I would like to take this opportunity to commend the IAEA Director General for presenting the annual report of the Agency to the General Assembly.

Mr. Chaudhry (Pakistan)

I have taken the floor to explain Pakistan's position on the draft resolution entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" as contained in document A/57/L.14. My delegation has abstained on preambular paragraph 3 and operative paragraph 5.

The language of preambular paragraph 3 links the right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We have always maintained that this preambular paragraph on technical assistance should refer to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Statute only. Since Pakistan is not a party to the NPT, we cannot accept any commitment on its behalf.

Our second concern is the operative paragraph 5, on comprehensive safeguards, which we consider discriminatory and an attempt to keep developing countries from acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In our view, the IAEA's role is to facilitate technical safeguards and not indulge in taking political decisions. However, our policy for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy has enabled us to vote in favour for the resolution as a whole.

The President

We have now heard the last speaker in explanation of vote after the vote. A representative has requested to express the right of reply. May I remind Members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to ten minutes for the first intervention, and five for the second one, and should be made by the delegates from their seats.

I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. Jon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to state its position on the so-called nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in response to the statements made by the delegation of Denmark, who spoke on behalf of the European Union, and the delegations of Japan, Australia, the United States and South Korea.

My delegation would like, first, to point out that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is not a question to be dealt with at the United Nations or the IAEA, in view of its origin and substance. Solutions of any issue should be based on an objective and impartial analysis of the essence of the issue, while looking for realistic ways and means to address it.

The IAEA submits every year its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly that contains stereotyped and unrealistic contents on the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The unilateral and coercive debate that is undertaken, as we see today, does not in any manner assist in arriving at a proper solution.

The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula originated when the United States massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity, threatening the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Against the background of the then-prevailing international political environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States raised the so-called nuclear doubt about our country with the aim of destroying us. This issue is, in essence, a product of the hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, therefore, should be resolved between the two countries.

In 1994, the Agreed Framework was signed between the two countries in order to address the nuclear issue, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been implementing it in good faith. If the Agreed Framework were to be implemented, it would automatically follow that the safeguards agreement would be carried out.

Under the Agreed Framework, we froze the nuclear facilities considered by the United States as its concern. We continue to maintain the freeze and have completed the storage of spent fuel. Thus, we have long ago carried out our obligations under the Agreed Framework. However, the United States is not carrying out any of its obligations under the Agreed Framework. Under article 1 of the Framework, the United States is obliged to provide light water reactors to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the year 2003 in return for the freezing by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of graphite moderated reactors and their related facilities.

Eight years have passed since we froze our nuclear facilities, but the United States has only recently started the ground concrete tamping for the light water reactor. Prospects for construction of the light water reactor are very bleak. That will only result in our suffering an annual loss of 1,000 megawatts in 2003, when the first light water reactor was scheduled to be completed, and in 2004, when the second light water reactor was scheduled to be completed. Thereafter, we will suffer an annual loss of 2,000 megawatts.

Under article 2 of the Framework, the two sides are obliged to move towards full normalization of their political and economic relations. Over the past eight years, however, the United States has persistently pursued its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has maintained economic sanctions against it. The United States has gone so far as to list the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as part of the "axis of evil".

Under article 3 of the Framework, the United States is obliged to give formal assurances to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the United States has put our country on its list of targets for a pre-emptive nuclear strike.

Under article 4 of the Framework, and in paragraph 7 of its confidential minutes, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is to allow nuclear inspections only after the delivery of essential non-nuclear components for the first light water reactor unit, including turbines and generators, is completed. But the United States has already come out with a unilateral demand for nuclear inspections and even carries on a campaign to apply pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, misleading international opinion into thinking that we are violating the Framework.

Those are the prevailing circumstances surrounding the so-called nuclear issue. Under those circumstances, what is really the concern expressed by those countries in their statements? Is it their concern at seeing the self-defensive capability to cope with the direct threat and annihilation policy of the largest nuclear power? Is it their concern that we do our utmost to defend the sovereignty and the right to existence of our nation and people? Is it their concern at witnessing opposition to high-handed behaviour and a way of thinking based on power supremacy in international relations?

The fact that the United States lists our country as a part of an axis of evil and as a target for a pre-emptive nuclear strike constitutes an open challenge to that country's obligations under the Agreed Framework. This amounts to the declared nullification of the Framework.

Because the United States has adopted the policy of launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike against our country, it has violated the basic spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It has also made a dead letter of the inter-Korean joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The number one violator of the NPT is, in fact, the United States. That is the reality which is ignored. It is unrealistic and unfair at this point to unilaterally urge implementation of the safeguards agreement.

Since the United States threatens by force the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as never before, politicizing the question of a pre-emptive nuclear strike, and since the fate of the Agreed Framework is at the crossroads between life or death, we have recently put forward a proposal for concluding a non-aggression treaty between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This reflects the will and desire of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to end the grave situation on the Korean peninsula and to safeguard the peace and security of Korea and North-East Asia.

We urge the United States to give our proposal further serious consideration. It is a most reasonable and realistic proposal for resolving the nuclear issue against the backdrop of the prevailing situation in Korea. However, we note that the Bush administration rejects our proposal for a non-aggression treaty and, instead, insists that we first scrap our so-called nuclear weapons programme. Rejection of the proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty would mean that the United States has the intention of attacking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a small and divided country, values its sovereignty and right to existence more than life itself and regards the removal of threats to its sovereignty and the right to existence as the criteria for settling all issues concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

We make it clear that the insistence of the United States that we first scrap our nuclear weapons programme constitutes a direct threat to us, and it should be kept in mind that this will inevitably spark a new clash. If this is the case, we are compelled to exercise our power and are prepared to cope with that kind of situation.

My delegation draws the Assembly's attention to the fact that the United States has abruptly taken up the nuclear issue at the very point in time when relations between North and South Korea and between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are developing positively.

It should be noted that one of the reasons why the United States abruptly raised the nuclear issue is to interrupt the progress in relations between North and South Korea and between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Now the United States is trying to create an atmosphere of pressure for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through its so-called policy coordination with its allies. In this regard, we particularly urge the countries neighbouring Korea not to follow blindly the United States policy on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is necessary to have second thoughts: such blind action might do harm to themselves.

The President

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States.

Mr. Michaels (United States)

The United States has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. We have no plans to place nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. We welcome a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula. Finally, we have no plans to attack North Korea. We seek a peaceful resolution to the tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

The President

I understand that the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has asked for a second intervention in exercise of right of reply. Let me remind the representative that the limit is five minutes.

Mr. Jon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

If the United States wants in earnest the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and its vicinity, it should cease its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a full reflection of the pursuit by the United States of its unilateral interests in North-East Asia. As long as the hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea persists, a second and third nuclear problem might arise at any time, which the United States sees as necessary, and peace and security of the region would remain as elusive as ever.

The President

May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 14?

The President

I give the floor to the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to introduce draft resolution A/57/L.15/Rev.1.

Mr. Kusljugi (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

I should like to announce that, since the publication of draft resolution A/57/L.15/Rev.1, the following countries have become sponsors: Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Singapore, Sweden and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

There has not been a session of the General Assembly since 1992 on whose agenda my country has not been an item, which indicates that it has been a major international problem. It is regularly discussed in the context of the annual reports of the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and several other annual reports. It is considered during Security Council meetings, and resolutions concerning it are prepared and adopted annually.

I should like to remind the Assembly why my country has been a major international problem for so long. On 22 May 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a member of the United Nations family. By that time, it was clear that the civilian population would be the main victim of the aggression against the new Bosnian State, since the first atrocities had already occurred. We in Bosnia and Herzegovina had expected that the international community, represented in the United Nations, would react decisively and quickly to prevent the further suffering of civilians. Unfortunately, we waited for such action by the international community for more than three years. Instead of taking resolute action to stop the war, the international community decided to intervene with a peacekeeping force -- the United Nations Protection Force -- and to provide humanitarian assistance.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was called a problem from hell, practically unsolvable. Indeed, we in Bosnia and Herzegovina were living in hell from 1992 to 1995, but we did not think that the problem was unsolvable. We knew that the root cause of the war was the reappearance of extreme nationalism and aggression against the Bosnian State, with the objective of destroying Bosnian multi-ethnic society and of creating ethnically "pure" territories. We knew that the war had been planned and ignited outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. We knew that the root cause of the conflict was not a historic and ancient hatred among Bosnia's ethnic groups, as enemies of the new Bosnian State claimed. Unfortunately, at the time, many in the international community did not understand or have the necessary determination to stop the war and to prevent further atrocities. Recent trials at The Hague have proved that they were wrong, and we hope that the international community has learned a lesson in Bosnia.

However, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have paid a painful price for that lesson. The price paid by the Bosnian people is well known: more than 6 per cent of them were killed or are missing, and more than half were displaced. The worst European war crimes since the end of the Second World War were committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the country's physical infrastructure and economy were destroyed. Dark symbols of the suffering of the civilian population were ethnic cleansing, detention camps, systematic mass rape, torture, besieged cities and, finally, the darkest page in human history, the genocide in the United Nations "safe area" of Srebrenica. Despite all that, recent developments in my country show substantial progress in the process of rebuilding a multi-ethnic, democratic, sustainable and modern Bosnia and Herzegovina that will be fully integrated into European structures.

I am pleased to announce, as we enter the second decade of our full membership in the United Nations, that Bosnia and Herzegovina will soon no longer be on the agenda of United Nations bodies. The draft resolution on behalf of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina that is on the agenda today -- the last one in a 10-year sequence -- provides an overall picture of the current situation and of progress achieved over the past year, and it contains recommendations for action in the near future.

In general, there has recently been significant progress in the stabilization and normalization of the situation in my country. That is a result of the joint efforts of Bosnia's authorities and of representatives of the international community. In the past year alone, Bosnia and Herzegovina fulfilled the necessary conditions to become a member of the Council of Europe and joined that body; met the requirements of the road map in order to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union; successfully prepared and organized general elections for the first time in its post-war history; promptly participated in global efforts against terrorism; developed the State Border Service to its full capacity and substantially reduced illegal migration; further improved bilateral relations with its neighbouring countries, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; signed bilateral free trade agreements with the countries involved in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe; and reduced its military assets and established the Standing Committee on Mi