General Assembly Session 57 meeting 46

The President

I hope that we can conclude consideration of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency today, including an important vote on the draft resolution. I would now like to invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei to present the report of the agency for the year 2001.

Mr. ElBaradei (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency)

Since the establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we have been dedicated to the achievement and promotion of a vision "Atoms For Peace" -- on the one hand, the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, with the aim of their eventual elimination, and on the other, the sharing of safe and secure nuclear technologies in peaceful applications that benefit humankind. I will speak briefly today about the IAEA's progress in working toward those goals.

The urgent need for sustained human development will clearly necessitate increases in the supply of energy in the coming decades. Nuclear power continues to be a significant contributor to the world's electricity supply, and is the only source that can provide electricity on a large scale with comparatively minimal impact on the environment. In 2001, nuclear power supplied 16.2 per cent of the world's electricity, up from 15.9 per cent in 2000. This increase was mainly due to continuing improvements in the management of nuclear power plants.

With regard to the construction of new plants, Asia and Eastern Europe remain the centres of expansion. At the beginning of 2002, 17 of the 32 nuclear power plants under construction globally were in four States -- China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea -- with the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe accounting for an additional 10 units. Some important developments have also taken place recently in Western Europe and North America. The United States Government is committed to work with the nuclear industry to have a new nuclear plant operating in this country before the end of the decade. This would be the first decision to build a new nuclear plant in this country since the 1970s. In May, the Finnish Parliament ratified the Government's favourable decision-in-principle to build a fifth nuclear power plant. This is also the first decision to build a new reactor in Western Europe in 15 years, and contrasts with past decisions in Belgium, Germany and Sweden to phase out nuclear energy.

In the light of this renewed interest in nuclear power, a key challenge for the industry will be to prove that available new designs address the often-expressed concerns about nuclear power. Work is being carried out on many new designs that aim to produce electricity at an enhanced level of safety and with improved economic competitiveness. Some designs include additional goals, such as producing potable water at minimal cost, incinerating long-lived radioactive waste and reducing plutonium stockpiles.

The IAEA continues to encourage technology development and innovation, for example, through its International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). INPRO is currently working with both developed and developing countries to understand and define the requirements of future potential users of nuclear power, in areas such as safety, non-proliferation, waste disposal, infrastructure capabilities and economics.

With respect to the management and disposal of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste -- a major point of public concern with respect to nuclear power -- I am pleased to report that some important progress has taken place in the past 12 months. In the United States, the President and the Congress approved have already the selection of the Yucca Mountain site as a repository for high-level waste and spent fuel. Sweden has begun geological investigation of candidate sites for a spent fuel repository. Thus, together with Finland's decision last year to go forward with a deep disposal facility near the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, it is likely that by the end of the next decade, one or more high level waste repositories will be in operation. This is essential to gaining public acceptance and confidence through demonstrating that technologically and environmentally sound waste disposal solutions exist and are actually working.

Late last year, the Agency launched a new initiative to assist member States in their efforts to move forward with the disposal of high-level and long-lived radioactive wastes through a "network of centres of excellence" for training and for demonstration of disposal technologies in underground research facilities. This network, built initially around facilities made available by the Governments of Canada and Belgium, has now expanded to include underground facilities in Switzerland and the United States. To date, 19 developing member States have indicated an interest in training scientists through the network.

Nuclear technologies in many areas other than nuclear power provide preferred solutions -- and sometimes the only solutions -- to economic and social problems. As the Agency reported at the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development, of the more than $500 million worth of technical cooperation provided by the IAEA in the last ten years, more than 800 projects, valued at over $200 million, have specifically supported Agenda 21 priorities such as land and agriculture, human health and fresh water. I would point out that one of the conclusions of the Summit emphasized the need to ensure capacity building, and the transfer and use of modern technology as a prerequisite for development. The IAEA is contributing energetically to this effort.

Many of the IAEA's developing member States have given high priority to the introduction or upgrading of radiotherapy services. Radiotherapy is used with curative or palliative benefit for over 50 per cent of cancer patients in industrialized countries. However, fully two thirds of global tele-therapy equipment serves the populations of these countries while the remaining one third is stretched among the remaining 5.5 billion people. We expect, therefore, that requests for assistance will increase, especially given our recent successes in initiating radiotherapy programmes in developing member States such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Mongolia, Namibia and Uganda.

Tsetse flies, along with the sleeping sickness they transmit to humans and the ngana disease they transmit to livestock, create a significant burden on rural populations across sub-Saharan Africa, not only in terms of direct health effects but also by restricting the use of draft animals in crop production. The IAEA supports the efforts of African member States to implement their tsetse eradication campaign across the continent through the expanded application of the radiation-induced sterile insect technique. Mali has begun preparation for releasing sterilized tsetse flies over an area of 2,500 square kilometres, and Ethiopia is constructing a factory for sterile tsetse production that will supply a similar project over a 5,000 square kilometre area.

The use of isotope hydrology to manage water resources is continuing to gain recognition through IAEA technical cooperation projects in 40 countries around the world. Isotope hydrology is being used in Latin America and elsewhere to map underground aquifers for improved groundwater management and has been used in Asia for investigation of, and recovery from, contamination events. In addition, we are exploring uses of isotope hydrology to assist in river basin management and, based on our successful experience in Venezuela in isolating and correcting dam leakage, we are working with multiple teams under the African Regional Cooperative Agreement to assess the leakage and structural integrity of dozens of dams across Africa.

Radiation is used regularly in an extensive array of industrial applications, ranging from the sterilization of medical products to the surface treatment of sheet metal and piping to enhance corrosion resistance. Radioisotopes are used to map and enhance the productivity of oil fields in the Middle East and elsewhere, and for troubleshooting in various operational aspects of petrochemical complexes. In the Republic of Korea, an electron beam facility is being used to enhance the treatment of waste water from a dye complex.

These are only a few of the ways in which the IAEA is using nuclear technologies to support development goals, by working closely with, and responding to, the needs and priorities of our member States.

Safety in nuclear activities around the globe is vital to the continued sustainability of nuclear technologies. While safety is primarily a national responsibility, it is equally a legitimate international concern. A nuclear or radiological accident, like other environmental accidents, respects no boundaries. It is satisfying, therefore, to note that nuclear safety continues to improve at power plants worldwide. Still, more work needs to be done, and the need for a more effective and transparent global nuclear safety regime continues to be a high priority for the IAEA.

The development and adoption of legally binding norms has proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing safety worldwide. The Early Notification and Assistance Conventions are long established. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management has been in force for over a year. And in April, the IAEA hosted in Vienna the Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. However, many States are not yet party to those conventions, and certain key areas of the nuclear fuel cycle are still not subject to conventions.

The continuing evolution of a comprehensive body of safety standards, together with assistance in their implementation, is another key component of the global safety regime. In the mid-1990s, the IAEA undertook a systematic, rigorous effort to overhaul its entire corpus of standards. The resulting new standards are of the highest calibre, representing current international best practices, and should be viewed as being universally applicable.

Safety standards are only effective, however, when applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services -- which range in focus from operational and radiation safety to safety culture and regulatory review -- use Agency standards as a baseline, assist member States in their application and provide important feedback on their effectiveness. Those safety services provide support and share valuable insights, and I continue to urge all member States to use them.

Many member States express concern over the risks involved in the transport of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive material. Work is continuing on refining IAEA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material. Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) missions, which help transporting countries to assess their effectiveness in applying IAEA transport standards, were carried out in Brazil and the United Kingdom this year. A TranSAS mission will be carried out in Turkey early next year, and preliminary discussions are under way with the Panamanian authorities for a possible mission that would include appraisal operations in the Panama Canal. It is important that member States -- particularly transporting countries -- make use of this valuable service. Naturally, the Agency will continue its efforts, in cooperation with all concerned, to enhance all aspects of transport safety. At an international conference next year, we will provide a forum for all interested member States to discuss these transport safety issues in a comprehensive manner.

Although the responsibility to counter potential acts of nuclear terrorism rests primarily with individual States, international cooperation is essential. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the IAEA moved swiftly to conduct a thorough review of its programmes related to preventing acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism and to develop a comprehensive plan for upgrading nuclear security worldwide. The plan supplements national efforts in areas such as the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; the detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, such as illicit trafficking across borders; and improved control of radioactive sources.

The plan is now being implemented on all fronts. Peer reviews have been carried out to assess physical protection at nuclear power plants and other facilities. Workshops and training courses have been held to help Governments assess the threats to their nuclear facilities, raise their standards of security, improve control of nuclear and radioactive material, upgrade their border monitoring and prepare response plans for nuclear and radiological emergencies. We have also sent missions to Afghanistan, Georgia and Uganda to assist in recovering radiological sources that went astray or were not adequately protected. And in mid-June, a partnership was established between Russia, the United States and the Agency to locate and secure powerful radioactive sources that were lost or abandoned during the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. In parallel, we are also working towards global adherence to a strengthened Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

Effectively upgrading security to protect against nuclear and radioactive terrorism will require a sustained, multi-year effort. We will continue to work vigorously with Governments to reduce our vulnerability to nuclear terrorism.

The universalization, consolidation and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including concrete steps to reduce the number of, and dependence on, nuclear weapons, are more important than ever for the continued credibility of the regime. As reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA verification continues to play a critical role in ensuring the health and vitality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The IAEA's verification activities are designed to provide assurance that nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In the early 1990s, after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, the international community committed itself to give the Agency the authority to strengthen its verification capability, specifically, its ability to provide assurance not only that declared nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful purposes, but equally or more important, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist.

This broader authority is, however, still far from universal. Regrettably, 49 States have yet to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to bring safeguards agreements with the IAEA into force, and, since 1997 -- when the Model Additional Protocol was adopted -- only 28 such Protocols have entered into force. This is clearly not a satisfactory situation -- far from it. Without safeguards agreements in force, the Agency cannot perform any verification activities or provide any assurance of non-proliferation. And, for States without additional protocols, the IAEA rights of access remain essentially the same as in the pre-Iraq days. The Agency can provide the required assurances only if we are given the corresponding authority.

Since December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to implement Security Council-mandated verification activities in Iraq. The inspection activities that came to an abrupt halt at that time had successfully thwarted Iraq's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons programme by destroying, removing or rendering harmless all of Iraq's facilities, equipment and material relevant to nuclear weapons production. In the intervening four years, we have continued to use satellite monitoring and to conduct other analytical work. However, no remote analysis can enable us to reach conclusions without thorough on-site inspections.

With the adoption last Friday of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), we are now preparing to resume our inspection activities in Iraq as early as next week, when the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and I are expected to lead an advance team of inspectors to Baghdad. In my view, the success of inspections in Iraq will depend on five interrelated prerequisites: first, immediate and unfettered access to all locations and sites in Iraq and full use of the authority provided to the inspecting organizations by the Security Council; secondly, timely access to all sources of information, including all information available to States; thirdly, unified and full support by the Security Council throughout the inspection process; fourthly, preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspection process, free from outside interference; and fifthly, active cooperation from Iraq, with a sustained demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent and to assist the inspecting organizations in fully carrying out their missions. I appeal to the Government of Iraq to provide its full cooperation, and appeal to the international community to give the inspections all the required support. I hope and trust that, with such cooperation and support, we should be able to effectively discharge our mandate.

Since 1993, the IAEA has been unable to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Owing to a lack of access to information and to sites, we continue to be unable to verify that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has made a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards under its NPT safeguards agreement. Recent reports have suggested that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has, in addition, been working on an undeclared programme to produce highly enriched uranium. We have promptly asked the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to confirm those reports, and we have expressed the need to discuss, at a senior level, that and all other issues relevant to compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its obligations under the NPT safeguards agreement. We have yet to receive a response.

Pursuant to the mandate given to me by the IAEA General Conference, I have continued to consult with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East and on the development of model safeguards agreements that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. I regret to report that I have not been in a position to make any progress in the implementation of that important mandate of direct relevance to security in the Middle East. As before, I shall continue to exert every effort within my authority and, I trust, with the cooperation of all concerned, to move those discussions forward.

Earlier this year, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and of the United States signed a treaty in Moscow to further reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 and 2,200, respectively, by the end of 2012 and agreed to remove additional amounts of fissile material from military use. Also, at their June Summit, the Group of Eight heads of State established a Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and made a commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the next 10 years to fund, inter alia, the disposal of excess weapons-origin fissile materials. Those are important steps that, it is hoped, will be followed by others, generating momentum in moving forward the stalled nuclear arms control agenda.

I should mention that preparatory work has been largely concluded at the initiative of Russia and the United States to submit nuclear material released from their military programmes to IAEA verification in order to provide assurance that they are irreversibly removed from those programmes. It is now up to Russia and the United States to indicate timing, modalities and the types of material that they are ready to submit to IAEA verification.

This brief overview of some of the IAEA's activities makes it clear that the scope of our work continues to expand. Yet, for 15 years, despite steadily growing responsibilities, the regular budget of the Agency has been essentially frozen. That policy has resulted in inadequate levels of financing for most of our areas of work. A primary example is in the safeguards area. With the chronic and corrosive degree of underfunding of that programme and a continually expanding mission, we are coming close to being unable to provide credible safeguards. For the IAEA to fulfil its obligations and high priorities -- while continuing to maintain an appropriate balance between development and other statutory activities, as directed by Member States -- an increase in the level of resources for the next biennium is inescapable.

This overview of IAEA activities over the past year reflects a continuing evolution in all our areas of work and, I believe, the dynamic nature of our programme in anticipating and responding to that evolution. The Agency continues to play a key role in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are shared globally, that nuclear activities are conducted safely, that nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities are adequately protected and that a credible inspection regime exists to verify compliance with non-proliferation commitments. Naturally, our ability to effectively perform those functions depends on the commitment and support of Member States, which I trust will continue to be forthcoming.

Let me conclude by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Government of Austria, which for more than four decades has continued to be a most gracious and welcoming host to the IAEA.

The President

I thank the Director General for his introduction of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I now give the floor to the representative of Kuwait to introduce draft resolution A/57/L.14.

Ms. Al Mulla (Kuwait)

On behalf of Kuwait and in my capacity as Chair of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/57/L.14 on the report of the IAEA. The draft resolution is sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Kuwait, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Slovakia and Spain. Since the issuance of document A/57/L.14, the following delegations have become sponsors: Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

This draft resolution underlines the vital role being played by the IAEA in the collective effort to promote sustainable development and global peace. I would like to thank the Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for the statement he just made, in which he highlighted the major achievements and activities of the IAEA over the past year.

By this draft resolution, the General Assembly recognizes the importance of the work of the Agency in promoting the further application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in implementing and strengthening safeguards system, ensuring and promoting safety standards, including the safe transport of radioactive materials, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, improving nuclear security and protecting Member States from nuclear terrorism.

The draft resolution being introduced today is the outcome of an extensive and exhaustive process of open-ended negotiations and consultations. We started this process following the conclusion of the IAEA General Conference session, on 20 September 2002. The consultation process was guided by the following considerations.

First, the aim was to produce a draft resolution of a substantive nature. As the work of the IAEA increasingly gains international attention and recognition, members of the IAEA were of the general view that a substantive text was warranted. Secondly, we needed to keep the content of the draft resolution close to the language and substance of resolutions adopted last September by the General Conference of the IAEA so as to avoid reopening already agreed text for further debate here in New York. Thirdly, we attempted to gain broad support among delegations for the draft resolution.

I am pleased to report that, with the help of IAEA member States and with the constructive spirit shown throughout the consultation process by all parties, we reached agreement on the draft resolution. Agreement was possible thanks to the understanding of delegations and their common concern to address the totality of the IAEA's work. This was done after difficult compromises had been reached on several crucial issues and after a great investment of effort and time. At the conclusion of the negotiation process in Vienna there was a general understanding among delegations that the current text would not be unraveled or renegotiated here in New York. I renewed my appeal to Member States to support that understanding during consultations last week here in New York.

As members know, the IAEA works by consensus. That tradition has become known as the spirit of Vienna. It is encouraging to see that, notwithstanding their differences and divergent positions on important issues, Member States continue to make every effort to preserve that tradition. This undoubtedly contributes to the efficient and professional performance the Agency is known for. It is my sincere hope and the hope of Member States that this constructive approach will be maintained here in New York. Therefore, we hope that the draft resolution will be adopted in the same spirit, preferably today.

The President

Now I give the floor to the representative of Iraq to introduce an amendment contained in document A/57/L.17.

Mr. Salman (Iraq)

My delegation is honoured to present its amendment (A/57/L.17) to the draft resolution entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" (A/57/L.14), introduced to the Assembly today. The text of the amendment contains a factual statement quoted from a letter of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, dated 16 September 2002, addressed to the President of the Security Council, document S/2002/1034, which informed the Council of Iraq's decision to allow the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions.

Last year, the paragraphs related to Iraq in the draft resolution presented to the General Assembly on same item called upon Iraq to accept the return of the inspectors. This year, we note that, instead of welcoming Iraq's decision to allow the unconditional return of the inspectors, new language has been introduced to the twelfth preambular paragraph that contradicts the language contained in previous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and that reflects political aims rather than technical realities.

My delegation sought to participate last week in any discussions on the draft resolution in order to try to contribute its amendments and explain its position to interested delegations. But it faced the decision of the sponsors that the text would not be open to discussion. In the light of that fact, my delegation has decided to present this factual quotation as an amendment, fully benefiting from the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations giving Member States the right to express their views about matters before the General Assembly. My delegation strongly believes that the words of the Secretary-General will enrich the text and will contribute to providing it with the needed balance.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan)

It is a great pleasure for me to extend our gratitude to Mr. ElBaradei for presenting the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the year 2001. The report is reflective of the dynamic leadership he has provided to the Agency's staff and of their endeavours in promoting the peaceful application of atomic energy.

Being a founding member of the IAEA, Pakistan has always upheld the goals and objectives of the Agency. The IAEA's role in the process of economic development through the enhanced contribution of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is universally acknowledged.

As rightly projected in the IAEA report, the global electricity demand is likely to triple in the next 50 years. Such a demand cannot be fulfilled by fossil fuel alone, which would impose an unacceptable burden on natural resources and on the environment. Keeping in view the present growth of the world's population, which is likely to double in another 50 years, reliance on fossil fuel will not be possible.

Therefore, the only other proven and sustainable option is the use of nuclear energy. We feel that opposition to nuclear power, despite its good safety record and environmentally friendly character, is either based on misunderstanding or is a deliberate tactic to deny this technology to the developing countries.

Technology, safety and verification remain the three pillars of the IAEA's mandate. The IAEA has been assigned important responsibilities for verification and monitoring, and we believe that these responsibilities should be fully discharged. However, the IAEA must not lose the balance which is required between the various facets of its mandate and functions.

Unfortunately, one finds disparities in the application of the IAEA principles and standards, especially with regard to the developing countries. Despite their adherence to safety norms, they are denied access to the latest technologies relating to nuclear energy. Undue restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology for energy, health and agricultural purposes are bound to affect the economic and social development of the developing countries.

We have also carefully studied the report of the Director General on nuclear security, "Progress on Measures to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism". We have taken careful note of the recommendations concerning nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists. We hope and trust that this will never happen. Precautionary measures should be taken by the States which possess nuclear materials, facilities and technology. But the instruments of terror can be unexpected, as we discovered on 11 September. The IAEA should address real concerns regarding so-called nuclear terrorism. It should not be used to serve partisan political objectives. The global focus should not be allowed to be shifted from the priority goal of complete nuclear disarmament by all States.

The crucial relationship between peace, economic growth and technology cannot be overemphasized. Economic growth is synonymous with the availability of easy and affordable sources of energy. Pakistan's limited hydro fossil fuel resources are insufficient to cater to an ever-increasing demand for energy. Therefore, nuclear generation is an indispensable element of our national energy strategy. We are encouraged by the recent positive shift in attitudes towards nuclear energy at the international level. The Agency's report for the year 2001 predicts even better prospects for nuclear power.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan)

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