General Assembly Session 55 meeting 64

The President

I should like to draw the attention of representatives to the fourth report of the General Committee, document A/55/250/Add.3, concerning a request by Equatorial Guinea for the inclusion in the agenda of an additional item, "Observer status for the Economic Community of Central African States in the General Assembly".

In the report, the General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that an additional item entitled "Observer status for the Economic Community of Central African States in the General Assembly" should be included in the agenda of the current session.

May I take it that the General Assembly decides to include in the agenda of the current session this additional item?

The President

The General Committee further decided to allocate the additional item to the Sixth Committee. May I take it that the General Assembly decides to allocate this item to the Sixth Committee?

Mr. Simonovi (Croatia)

In the past seven years, my delegation has spoken on this agenda item many times, in several forums, including in plenary meeting. Most recently, our President, Stjepan Mesi, together with an overwhelming majority of Millennium Summit participants, expressed our unwavering commitment to see the reform and expansion of the Security Council through. Today, Croatia has taken the floor just to re-register this long-standing commitment of our delegation.

The matters of equitable representation, credibility, democratic conduct and, thus, the effectiveness of the Security Council, remain the top priority of this Organization. Why? Because the Council lacks credible representation, is threatened by an erosion of both legitimacy and effectiveness and continues to suffer from some arcane and non-transparent working methods. Therefore, we hold that the Council must be enlarged in both categories of membership in order to reflect the changes that have taken place in international affairs, and that its working methods must further be democratized and made accountable.

We support the creation of five new permanent seats, of which two should be allocated to the industrialized and three to the developing countries. We believe that responsible involvement in international affairs at the regional and global levels, as well as a demonstrated capacity and willingness to shoulder related duties, including financial ones, should be important selection criteria. Regarding possible rotation in the permanent posts, it is entirely up to the regions to come up with their own arrangements, provided that each Member State consents to such an arrangement of its own free will. With respect to the allocation of non-permanent seats, we hold that, of four such seats, one should go to Africa, one to Asia, one to Latin America and the Caribbean and one to the Eastern European region.

Croatia favours the abolition of the veto. If, however, political realities preclude the evolution of the decision-making process in the Security Council in such a direction, we support, as a fall-back position, the reduction of the veto power and the use of the so-called double veto. In the interim, Croatia holds that all permanent members should have the same rights and obligations. We impress upon the permanent members, however, the need to demonstrate their awareness of the widespread unpopularity of the veto, and thereby show their respect for the democratic majority that holds that unfavourable view of the veto.

Regarding the numerical threshold of Security Council expansion, Croatia has been on the record for some time now as favouring expansion up to 24 seats. Croatia holds that the issue of periodic review must be a part of the reform package, because it provides a democratic mechanism to enforce accountability. Likewise, the Council's methods must further be democratized. In this regard, we wish to commend some past and current Council members for advancing transparency and innovative working formats during their respective presidencies; but there is still a long way to go.

Mr. Macedo (Mexico)

On 12 September, during his introduction to this Assembly of his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General referred to the issue of reforming the Security Council, saying that

"the minority, often a very small minority, should not withhold its consent unreasonably". (A/55/PV.10, p. 2)

Mexico fully agrees with the Secretary-General's statement. Over seven years of deliberations within the Working Group, we have seen how two very small minorities have blocked our progress.

The first minority is made up of the "pretenders" to a permanent post in the reformed Security Council. The countries that dream of acquiring this privilege are very few, but their ambitions to power have frustrated the attempts of the vast majority to build a more democratic and representative Security Council.

The second minority is even smaller. It is made up of the current five permanent members of the Security Council which, clinging to antiquated structures that have been overtaken by reality, are opposed to limitations to the immense powers conferred on them by the Charter, which are anachronisms at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Mexico is deeply committed to reforming the Security Council and has been for more than 20 years. We are eager for a comprehensive reform that not only increases the number of Council members to reflect the increase in the membership of our Organization, but also modifies its working methods and, especially, its outdated decision-making mechanism. Our heads of State and Government committed themselves to this far-reaching reform in the Millennium Declaration, when they decided

"to intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects". (resolution 55/2, para. 30)

Mexico does not favour the status quo. Far from assuming a passive stance with regard to the process of reforming the Security Council, my delegation has presented concrete proposals regarding both its enlargement and its decision-making methods. We have been creative, seeking at all times to foster the democratic values of equality, justice and transparency. Unfortunately, our attempts have been met with the intransigence of the small minorities that have kept the reform hostage to their ambitions or privileges.

In 1995, Mexico submitted to the consideration of the Working Group a plan to enlarge the Security Council in which, fully respecting the principle of the sovereign equality of States, only the number of non-permanent members would increase. The Mexican proposal, which remains relevant, has not even been considered by the Group. Later, in 1996, my country presented concrete amendments to seven Articles of the Charter, seeking to limit the right of veto to those issues for which it was designed -- measures adopted under the provisions of Chapter VII. The intransigence of the five permanent members has not allowed our amendments to be carefully studied.

It is ironic that the Security Council, the most visible organ of the United Nations, should be the least democratic part of an Organization that was established on the basis of the legal equality of States. The very existence of permanent members with special privileges goes against this fundamental principle of international relations. We cannot allow the ambitions and desire for power of a few to weaken it further.

Mr. Macedo (Mexico)

We will not tire of insisting on the need to limit the privilege of the veto. The five permanent members must listen to the voice of reason and accept that some of their prerogatives have become obsolete and offensive within the current international environment. We again strongly urge them to show flexibility. Sooner or later, they will have to accept that the General Assembly can take decisions without having to wait for the Council to recommend them. The reform must necessarily regulate the ability of one country to prevent the Organization from acting on peacekeeping issues.

Democracy is not achieved by increasing the number of the privileged. Democracy is not achieved by stressing inequalities. Democracy is not achieved by exacerbating the class system. Democracy is not achieved by granting special status to the powerful. Democracy is not achieved by committing injustices.

On the contrary, democracy is built by promoting conditions of equality. Democracy is based on justice. Democracy seeks the well-being and the participation of the majority.

As the Secretary-General states in his recent report on strengthening democracy,

"democratization has taken root as a universal norm and practice at national and local levels." (A/55/489, para. 28)

Mexico believes that the moment has come to apply the same criteria to the institutions of the United Nations.

States that wish to become non-permanent members of the Council would achieve their aspiration by participating in one of the most representative democratic practices, that is, the electoral process under conditions of equality. Increasing their number would encourage democracy, giving to all the opportunity to accede to the Council, promoting alternation and allowing the will of the majority to triumph every year.

The very institution of permanent membership was a response to a historic need in circumstances that, thankfully, have been overcome. The current permanent members were not elected. Rather, they arose from the configuration of power that was born in Yalta and confirmed in San Francisco. Once the majority confirmed their privileged status, they have never been subjected to the electoral process. They got there and will never leave. The pretenders nurture the same hope. Were their dream to become reality, they would not have to compete democratically ever again. How can democracy be discussed on these terms?

In recent months, we have heard a veritable litany of numbers. We have been told, for instances, that many countries support enlarging the Security Council. This does not and should not surprise us. All the Members of the United Nations -- all of them -- believe that the membership of the Council must be enlarged to correspond to the increased number of States that make up our Organization. Consensus already exists on this point. The difference lies in the way to bring this about; the devil is in the details, as popular wisdom holds.

We have also been told that a majority supports enlarging both categories of membership, but, even by the most optimistic calculations of some of the pretenders, the number of countries that have voiced this opinion barely reaches 70. In any arithmetic system, 70 is barely one third of 189, very far from the 126 established under resolution 53/30. How can we talk about a majority in these circumstances?

It is also necessary to recognize that the way in which these apparently convincing numbers have been presented can lead to confusion. Those who want us to believe that they are in the majority seem to forget that, for example, although it is true that the African States have declared their support for enlarging both categories, none has done so in blanket terms. Rather, their support is based on the conviction that two of the new permanent posts will be assigned to Africa. Would they maintain the same position if they were not given the two seats they seek?

The role and the interests of the various regional Groups cannot be ignored. It would not be acceptable to attempt to impose on any of them arbitrary solutions that do not enjoy their support.

The Working Group created by the General Assembly in 1993 is the appropriate forum within which this issue should be debated. The Assembly's mandate is clear: to seek a general agreement that grants legitimacy, credibility and stability to the exercise of reform.

We must not lose patience. Seven years of deliberations have demonstrated, not the ineffectiveness of the Working Group, but the political sensitivity and difficulty of the exercise. We must not forget that the 1965 reform, which, by the way, was very modest in scope, actually took a greater number of years. Now our goals are more ambitious: to transform the Security Council into a more democratic, representative and transparent organ. To set peremptory and arbitrary deadlines will only harm our efforts. The reform will take place when we reach a general agreement in the Working Group as requested by the Assembly, neither sooner nor later.

On the other hand, the Working Group has been able to make significant progress on issues related to the working methods of the Security Council. Thanks to the efforts of the Group, the members of the Council have agreed to open up their deliberations, and to act in a more transparent fashion. We welcome these developments, and we reiterate that we cannot relax our efforts until we obtain an institutionalization of the measures adopted in order to provide us with legal certainty.

Mexico will continue to endeavour to design a more democratic Security Council, in which the voice of all is heard equally; a representative Security Council, which correctly reflects the current membership of the United Nations; a transparent Security Council that operates in the public spotlight and not within dark conclaves; a legitimate Security Council, whose decisions take into account the aspirations of the international community and, finally, a responsible Security Council accountable to the General Assembly, from whose members it derives its authority. In the search for such a Council, the Assembly can count on the enthusiastic participation of my country.

Ms. Wensley (Australia)

It is sometimes easy over the course of long and sensitive negotiations to lose sight of the fundamental objectives and the common interests that we are striving to achieve. Parochial interests can become entrenched and negotiating dynamics can assume a life and a rationale of their own, to the detriment of substantive progress. Regrettably, after seven years of work in the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council reform, this is the point that we appear to have reached.

Reform and expansion of the Security Council is our common interest. It is driven by our common concern to restore the representative nature of the Council, to improve its effectiveness and to shore up its credibility, authority and legitimacy.

Australia is not unrealistic about the difficulties of these issues. They are inherently complex and political in nature. Considerable national interests are at stake. But like any negotiation of this importance, flexibility, compromise and an eye to the wider common good will be critical if a balanced package of reforms is to be agreed. After seven years of intensive work in the Open-ended Working Group, it does seem to us that the basic contours of a reform package can be discerned. There are, certainly, differences over the details. But on each of the key issues, something close to general agreement is emerging. These include: first, expansion in both categories of membership, allowing for five new permanent members from both developed and developing countries, and a comparable number of new non-permanent members; secondly, restraints on the use of the veto, leading over time to limiting its application to decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter, and ultimately to its abolition; thirdly, an ongoing process of reform of the Council's working methods to improve the transparency and inclusiveness of decision-making, while preserving the Council's prerogative to conduct its proceedings in camera where this is justified by the sensitivity of an issue. Clearly, substantial and welcome progress has been made in this area in the last two years. Fourthly, a review of new arrangements for an expanded and reformed Council after 10 or 15 years, allowing for the possibility of further reforms to reflect geo-political change.

Sadly, while these contours are clear and general agreement appears within striking distance, progress continues to founder over the strong opposition of a relatively small number of Member States to one or another of these elements. Some oppose an expansion of the permanent membership because they fear an impact on their perceived relative influence. Others oppose any reform of the veto, not out of concern to improve the decision-making and credibility of the Council, but to protect old privilege.

The current stalemate will persist unless a greater degree of flexibility is shown by all parties, but particularly by those who are holding to entrenched positions shared by only, I repeat, a handful of other Member States. The time has come to look beyond narrow national positions and to reflect more seriously on where and how compromises can be found.

Let me reiterate at this point where Australia's interests in this issue lie. We are not an aspirant to permanent membership. No parochial Australian interest will be served by agreement to one reform model over another. Our interests lie in strengthening the Council, and by doing so, strengthening the United Nations.

We attach great importance to the principle of equitable geographic representation, and we believe that the erosion of equitable representation since the Council was last expanded in 1965 -- when, as the Assembly knows, the United Nations membership stood at 113 -- must be reversed if we are to prevent further erosion of the Organization's credibility, its relevance and its effectiveness. Our opposition to the veto reflects a position that we have held since 1945, since before I was born. And our strong support for both improved working methods and periodic review reflects our attachment to the principles of transparency and accountability.

Let me expand briefly on the issue of periodic review because this is something to which we are very attached and we do not think this matter has been given enough consideration. We do not support the principle of periodic review out of some masochistic sense of anticipation of another round of protracted negotiations in 10 or 15 years. We support it for practical reasons. First, we think it could be an important circuit-breaker in the current negotiations, a means of assuring all Member States that the reforms that we agree to at this time are not locked in for ever. Secondly, it is a vital mechanism for accountability, ensuring that the permanent members of the Council, old and new, uphold their responsibility under the Charter to act on behalf of the wider membership. And thirdly, it reflects the obvious reality that the world is not a static place, and the composition of the Council will have to be adjusted again at some point in the future to reflect further geo-political change.

It is instructive to look closely at the Working Group's report to the General Assembly. On the face of it, the Working Group spent long hours in meetings, but made little progress in narrowing differences. The failure of the Group to agree even on a set of general observations, as it had done the previous year, would seem to suggest that positions are even farther apart. In fact, that is not entirely the case.

Annex XIII of the report, which contains the Bureau's general proposed observations, is an important summary of the substantive aspects of the Working Group's efforts over the last year. It underlines the depth of discussion, and it very usefully highlights the areas of both agreement and disagreement. To that extent, we think that it provides a very good basis for the Working Group to continue its efforts next year.

Let me in this context pay tribute to the previous President of the General Assembly, Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab of Namibia, and to Ambassadors John De Saram of Sri Lanka and Hans Dahlgren of Sweden, for their leadership of the Working Group over the last year. That these general observations did not enjoy consensus support is no reflection on their efforts. We all know from our delegations on the Working Group that this was not for want of trying.

But the absence of consensus on this part of the Working Group's report underlines three key points I referred to earlier: first, that progress on particular issues is being held up by a small, unrepresentative number of Member States; secondly, that the negotiating dynamics of the Working Group have assumed a life of their own, to the detriment of substantive progress; and thirdly, that greater flexibility and a new spirit of compromise are needed before agreement on a balanced package of reforms is within reach.

This is the challenge that awaits all of us, along with the President of the General Assembly and his Vice-Chairpersons as they lead us in the Working Group next year. In taking up the challenge, we will be building on the substantial body of work of recent years, but our new President will have behind him the full authority of our leaders, who at the Millennium Summit exhorted us to intensify efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform. In that endeavour the President may be assured of Australia's complete support.

Mr. Pradhan (Bhutan)

At the recent Millennium Summit I was privileged to observe the discussions at the third round table with my head of Government. The meeting was chaired by the President of Venezuela and attended by a number of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers from all parts of the world. During their deliberations, one issue that was highlighted by our leaders, and on which they shared broad agreement, was the critical need to reform the United Nations. I particularly recall an intervention pointing out that despite what we have been told about reforms taking place, some of the United Nations institutions remain terribly outdated, the Security Council being one of them. Our leaders were of the view that for the United Nations to enjoy unquestioned legitimacy, the Security Council needed urgent reform to reflect current realities and not those of the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. At those discussions, our leaders expressed grave concern that the efforts to reform the Security Council had thus far not been fruitful.

Seven years have now passed since the inception of the Open-ended Working Group, and it is a matter of great regret and concern that we have failed to reach agreement on one of the most crucial issues before this Organization. In some respects, my delegation is not surprised at the outcome in the Working Group, especially on cluster I issues. There is an inherent obstacle in the natural tendency not to relinquish one's position of power and privilege. Unless there is concern for the greater good of our United Nations and there is the political will to make changes in the Council's permanent seats to reflect current realities, we do not see possibilities of meaningful progress. But it would be right, just and fair and, above all, democratic -- all concepts and words that we hear so frequently in these halls on a host of other issues -- to make the Security Council representative of the United Nations membership. From the Asian perspective, because they are economic and population giants and have sociocultural and political clout in the region and beyond, my delegation supports India and Japan for permanent membership in the Security Council. We cannot continue to deny the representation of vast continents and populations on the Security Council.

My delegation realizes that only a handful of countries can be permanent members. For countries to be chosen to fill this category, they should have the necessary qualifications and the capacity to represent their regions, and not simply their own national concerns. Selection to the permanent category should mean a greater ability to fulfil larger international responsibilities than other United Nations Members. Permanent members should make substantially larger contributions to the United Nations budgets. They should be able to commit more troops, equipment and resources for maintaining peace and security. These attributes would enable the rest of the membership to be more amenable to putting the permanent members on a higher pedestal, a position of international prestige and greater responsibility.

Bhutan has supported the non-aligned position on the question of Security Council reform and expansion not simply because it is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. We are quite convinced that the proposal of the non-aligned countries reflects the changed global political and economic environment and that the majority of United Nations Member States support this position. Hence, Bhutan has called for the expansion of the Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories, and we see this as imperative. Furthermore, it is equally essential that developing countries that have long endured unjust marginalization within the Council be given adequate representation in both the permanent and non-permanent categories.

My delegation is aware that the veto power of permanent members is closely linked to the issue of expansion of the Council. In this regard, we share the view of the Non-Aligned Movement that the veto should be curtailed and that the Charter should be amended so that the veto power should apply only to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The leadership of the President of the General Assembly in our quest to reform the Security Council is very important. The Secretary-General's advice and guidance is vital in this process. My delegation looks forward to substantive progress during the course of the Millennium Assembly. In the continuing discussions on this matter, we need to expedite our work and keep our meetings both transparent and open-ended.

Last but not least, my delegation takes this opportunity to congratulate the new non-permanent members of the Security Council on their recent elections: Colombia, Ireland, Mauritius, Norway and Singapore.

Mr. Nguyen Thanh Chau (Viet Nam)

The question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters is an important item on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations at this millennium session. After considering this question for six consecutive years, we have now arrived at a very crucial juncture. In fact, the General Assembly today should heed the earnest call to action made by Secretary-General Kofi Annan when he sent his millennium report to this body last March. In the Millennium Declaration, the heads of State and Government also called for intensified efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council. Our delegation firmly believes that settlement of this question will be a major achievement in our follow-up efforts to realize the Millennium Declaration.

In his statement this session during the general debate, summing up the views of member countries, the former President of the Assembly, Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab of Namibia, rightly pointed out that the question of reform and expansion of the Security Council to reflect the realities of today's world and make the Council more representative and more legitimate was emphasized by many delegations. The issue before us is very challenging, however. The Open-ended Working Group charged with this task has held numerous meetings and informal consultations over the last six years, and the views of member countries are very divided on some subtle but fundamental elements, namely, the questions of the expansion of the membership -- in particular with regard to an increase in permanent seats -- veto power, and enhanced transparency in the work of the Council. The Open-ended Working Group has made tremendous efforts, yet solutions to these questions are still beyond our reach.

Our delegation regrets that, after strenuous efforts last year, the Group failed to include in its annual report general observatory remarks. Keeping this in mind, we feel that the tasks at hand for the Group this year will be even more difficult and burdensome. However, our delegation wishes to commend the efforts of the President's predecessor and his two Vice-Chairmen in guiding the work of the Open-ended Working Group during the last session. It is our sincere hope that the Group will continue its work this year with greater determination and enthusiasm.

Our position on the need for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council is crystal clear. We have also spoken on various occasions about how we believe the Council should be reformed and expanded. Let me take this opportunity to give a brief outline of our position on this question.

The reform of the Security Council must ensure that the Council will be more representative and accountable, and its work more transparent and more legitimate. Viet Nam strongly supports an increase in the Council's membership in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. In our opinion, an expanded Council of about 24 members can ensure that the Council works effectively and legitimately. Developing countries must be represented appropriately and be able to participate fully in the Council's decisions on important matters of world peace and security. With regard to an increase in the permanent membership, the general package to be agreed upon should ensure that developing countries from the three continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America are represented. That expansion may also take into account the need to include some developing countries, as well as certain developed countries, such as India, Japan and Germany, which can play a significant role and which have made major financial and material contributions to the United Nations.

On the issue of the veto, Viet Nam fully supports the position of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, namely that measures should be taken, as interim steps, to curtail the application of this power. Until it is finally eliminated, the power of the veto should be used only to deal with matters that may fall under provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Now more than ever before, the United Nations must ensure that it can demonstrate its ability to reform itself and move forward with tangible steps in this regard. It is high time that member countries make more vigorous efforts to commence true negotiations in order to realize the reform of the Council and revitalize the abundant strengths of the United Nations. It is our firm conviction that for that to happen, Member States must act with great cohesion and stronger determination and with flexibility and vision. My delegation looks forward to working in this manner with other delegations in the coming meetings of the Open-ended Working Group next year. We hope that some critical progress can be achieved to break the current deadlock on this crucial issue.

Mr. Satoh (Japan)

At the outset, I would like to express our appreciation to the former President of the General Assembly, Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab of Namibia, for his guidance on the issue of Security Council reform during the fifty-fourth session. I would also like to thank the two Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group, Ambassador De Saram of Sri Lanka and our former colleague, Ambassador Dahlgren of Sweden, for preparing the excellent report that is before us.

The urgent need and broad support for Security Council reform was reaffirmed yet again at the Millennium Summit and during the general debate last September. According to our observations, as many as 99 leaders took up the issue of Security Council reform, making it -- along with the broad issues of globalization and development -- one of the most frequently discussed issues. The importance given to this issue is reflected in the Millennium Summit Declaration, which emphasizes the need to intensify our efforts to realize genuine reform. The fact that, as of this morning, as many as 96 delegations are inscribed on the speakers' list for today's meeting is yet further testimony of the commitment of Member States to the task ahead.

Just as significantly, 69 delegations at the Millennium Summit and the subsequent general debate indicated their support for expanding both the permanent and non-permanent membership, while only four delegations explicitly supported an expansion of only the non-permanent membership.

If we add those countries that have expressed their positions at previous sessions of the General Assembly, the African countries that subscribe to the position of the Organization of African Unity and the countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), whose views were expressed in a recent joint statement by ministers of CARICOM countries and of Japan, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of the United Nations membership supports the expansion of both categories. With that clear and broad convergence of views on the need to expand both the permanent and the non-permanent membership, we should now focus our attention on two questions of major importance: the optimal size of the expanded Council and the veto.

As for the size of the expanded Council, we should give due consideration to the fact that the number of Security Council members has not changed since 1965, while the membership of the United Nations has grown by 72 countries since then. The need to expand the Council to ensure that it is truly representative of today's international community is beyond dispute. It has been Japan's position that a membership of 24 would redress the imbalance while maintaining the Council's effectiveness. In that context, it was indeed a welcome development that one of the permanent members modified its position last April and showed some flexibility on the question of the maximum size of the Council.

On the question of the veto, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States wish to restrict its use. Here again, it is encouraging that a permanent member has shown some willingness to consider restraining the use of the veto in certain situations. We hope that all the permanent members will be more attentive to the views that have been put forward by other Members of the United Nations and will make every effort to advance the discussion on this question.

I want to point out the important fact that while the Open-ended Working Group has been engaged in deliberations for the better part of a decade, the nature and scope of the Security Council's work have undergone a profound change. The Council is now being called upon to take a more comprehensive approach to questions of international peace and security by addressing the root causes of conflict, which include economic and social as well as political and military issues. Recently, the Council has entrusted peacekeeping operations with mandates that encompass nation-building activities and the establishment of civil administrations, in addition to traditional military and civilian police activities. These developments clearly underline the need to expand the Council, particularly its permanent membership, whose composition reflects the world that existed more than half a century ago.

Moreover, there has been a conspicuous decrease in the financial burden shouldered by the five permanent members. Their share of the regular United Nations budget has decreased from 64 per cent in 1965, at the time the Council was last expanded, to just 38 per cent at this time. Their share of the peacekeeping budget has decreased from 63 per cent in 1974, when the peacekeeping budget was created, to 47 per cent. That decrease reflects the significant changes which have taken place in the international community, and those changes must likewise be reflected in the composition of the Security Council if that important body is to retain its credibility.

Before concluding, I would like to thank the Working Group's Bureau for the tremendous service it has rendered by compiling the exhaustive list of proposals put forward on cluster I issues, which are contained, together with the Bureau's own observations, in the report of the Working Group to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session (A/54/47). That document will be an invaluable guide to us as we proceed with our work.

I would like also to encourage the Bureau to solicit the views of as many Member States as possible before the Working Group reconvenes, and to continue to identify areas where agreement can be reached, especially on cluster I issues. Moreover, I hope that the Bureau will come up with suggestions as to how we might focus our deliberations in the most effective manner.

I assure the Assembly that Japan, for its part, will cooperate fully in the endeavour of advancing our discussions with the aim of achieving our common and vitally important objective.

Mr. Levitte (France)

The French position in the debate on enlargement of the Security Council was stated by His Excellency Mr. Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, on 6 September 2000, at the Millennium Summit. He recalled that "France is committed to this critical reform" and that it "calls for ... enlarging both categories of Security Council membership" (A/55/PV.3, p. 16).

The President of the Republic reaffirmed that position on 7 September, at the meeting of the Security Council at the level of heads of State or Government. There, he stated that the enlargement of the permanent and non-permanent categories should not only benefit the industrialized countries but should also result in greater representation of the countries of the South.

The position of France in this debate is guided by a resolve to take account of the emergence of new Powers and to enable the Security Council to continue fully to play its role. The Security Council must be able to take the necessary decisions when international peace and security are threatened by humanitarian crisis or by massive violations of human rights.

That position is similar to that expressed by a great many speakers at the Millennium Summit and during the ensuing general debate. A vast majority felt that such reform was a priority. Many delegations argued in favour of enlargement in both categories of membership. The momentum of the Millennium Summit should encourage us to pursue this effort, which has been under way since 1993.

The work since that time has already produced results. It led to the consensus adoption two years ago of resolution 53/30, by which the Assembly determined that any General Assembly resolution or decision on this subject required the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the membership. That work also made it possible for the Working Group to make progress in its consideration of matters relating to the Council's working methods. The General Assembly welcomed that development this year when it renewed the Working Group's mandate for the fifty-fifth session.

The progress can also be gauged by the Security Council's practices. It is easy to see the efforts that it has made towards greater transparency in its work, as reflected in a larger number of public meetings, during which representatives of the Secretariat or Special Representatives of the Secretary-General are more frequently invited to make presentations. There has also been progress with respect to the information that is furnished to non-members of the Council with respect to informal consultations.

France contributed to this effort during its presidency of the Council in June, in particular through an increased use of the possibilities provided by the Internet. We are constantly appealing for the dialogue between Council members and troop-contributing countries to be strengthened. We also appeal for greater transparency and the improved functioning of the sanctions Committees.

With regard to the continuation of the work of the General Assembly on the expansion of the Security Council, we must continue to work tirelessly to achieve the goal we set ourselves in 1993. This will require, first of all, the search for imaginative formulas capable of meeting with general agreement. Efforts must also be made to engage in dialogue to reconcile points of view and maintain the tranquil atmosphere necessary for our work. The Bureau of the Working Group has done admirable work in this area this year, and we should like to pay a warm tribute to the two Vice-Chairmen, Ambassador Dahlgren and Ambassador De Saram. We have every confidence that the new President of the Assembly and the other members of the Bureau will continue in that direction.

Ms. Tan (Singapore)

We are still on our merry-go-round. For the eighth time, we will debate United Nations Security Council reform; for the eighth time, we will repeat old arguments; and for the eighth time, we will probably not get anywhere. The theme of our statement is therefore very simple: we are going round in circles and not getting anywhere because we are addressing fringe issues and not core issues in the debate, like the veto.

The situation could, perhaps, be treated as a comedy, if it were not for the fact that the stakes are very high in this debate. What is at stake is nothing less than the peace and security of the world, for which the Security Council has been assigned primary responsibility. The real tragedy of this debate is that we never hear loudly enough the voices of the real stakeholders: the small States of the world. At least 110 of our Member States have populations of less than 10 million. There are another 30 or so States which have nominally larger populations, of between 10 million to 30 million, but they are caught next to larger neighbours, which dwarf them. The interests of this vast majority of Member States are clear and simple: they wish to see Security Council reform leading to a stronger and more effective Council.

Singapore belongs to this group. We probably have a greater interest in peace and stability than most States. Our total trade is three times the size of our gross national product; trade needs stability, and instability stifles trade. We are also among the first to acknowledge that Security Council reform is long overdue. There is no way that a Council fashioned in 1945, reflecting the needs and interests of the victorious Powers of the Second World War, can be said to adequately cater to the needs and interests of our times. Our world has changed dramatically in the past 55 years, and it is likely to change even more dramatically in the years to come. We therefore support, rather than oppose, Security Council reform.

Nothing illustrates the magnitude of the change better than a sentence in paragraph 30 of the Secretary-General's Millennium report (A/54/2000), in which he states,

"Simply put, our post-war institutions were built for an inter-national world, but we now live in a global world."

This is no small change. If the Security Council's primary responsibility is to move from international to global peace and security, there has to be a serious change of mindset among the Security Council members, especially the permanent members. To carry out their responsibilities seriously, they will have to put global interests ahead of national interests. But none of the permanent members has ever done this. If we add more permanent members as a result of Security Council reform, do we want the new members to behave like the old members, or to behave differently?

Let us stress another important point. If the new permanent members behave like the current permanent members -- assuming all the perks and privileges, without taking on any specific responsibilities, such as greater financial responsibilities -- the United Nations will never be rescued from the financially crippled state that it has been in for more than a decade. The great irony of the United Nations is that many want a permanent place in the key organ, but none want to take care of its financial health. Is it in the interests of the United Nations to give the valuable veto power without assigning commensurate responsibilities?

This is the main reason why we cannot avoid discussing the question of the veto if we want to engage in Security Council reform. A group of 10 countries has put it very eloquently, stating,

"General agreement on a comprehensive reform package is unlikely to be achieved without an understanding on the future scope and application of the veto".

The veto is a defining element of the Security Council, distinguishing it from all other bodies in the world. Furthermore, it is not a static instrument. The founding fathers of the United Nations anticipated a limited use for it. In 55 years, it has grown into an enormous instrument, which, while rarely used formally, has completely dictated the nature of decision-making in the Council. The failures of the Security Council in the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica, for example, can be directly traced to the veto. We challenge anyone to disprove this point.

But let us also quickly add here that we are political realists. We do not believe that the veto can be abolished in a reformed Security Council. At its core, it serves a useful purpose. It would be disastrous for the United Nations to launch or authorize a war, as it did in the cases of Iraq and Yugoslavia, against any nuclear Power. The veto can provide a reality check, which is sometimes needed in international relations.

But the veto, like any other powerful instrument, needs its checks and balances. It must also be linked to the principle of accountability. Last year, the Foreign Minister of Germany wisely advocated that a permanent member be asked to explain to the General Assembly the use of a veto. This year, we would like to suggest that this principle be extended to the informal use of the veto. For example, who made the crucial decision to block additional deployment of United Nations forces in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and why? Who will accept ultimate responsibility for these decisions?

Another undeniable reality of international relations is that the distribution of power is dynamic. History never stops or ends. The five most powerful members of the global community in 2000 are not the same as the five most powerful members of the international community in 1945. There will be even greater changes by 2045, when the United Nations celebrates its one hundredth anniversary. Should the structure of the United Nations be based on a frozen picture of the international Powers of 1945? Or should it be flexible? We believe that it should be the latter. That is why we have said that when general agreement is reached on the expansion of the Security Council, Japan and Germany would naturally qualify as new permanent members.

Ms. Tan (Singapore)

We cannot, however, reform the Security Council without taking into consideration the needs and interests of the developing countries, who provide 80 per cent of the world's population -- and now close to 100 per cent of United Nations peacekeepers. The challenge for us is to ensure that the needs and interests of this vast proportion of humanity are given due weight in any Security Council reform.

But this is a challenge we have not even come close to facing. Instead, to be completely honest, we have had a completely warped debate on Security Council reform. The debate is controlled and managed by a very few small number of actors: the permanent five, whose only interest is to preserve their privileges in perpetuity; and a small group of major and medium-sized Powers, who believe that they have arrived and deserve the same privileges. The interests driving this debate are therefore purely privilege and power, not the needs and interests of the global community.

The Open-ended Working Group and its working methods should therefore not be blamed for the fact that the discussions are not progressing faster. In fact, the Working Group's "fault", if it can be called that, lies in its being too representative, democratic and transparent; qualities that continue to evade the Security Council. Indeed, for the record, it is also worth reiterating that much of the improvement in the working methods of the Security Council has been as a result of the discussions within the Working Group.

Not once in this entire seven-year debate on Security Council reform have we heard any major State declare that it deserves permanent membership because it is willing to give a solemn commitment to put global interests ahead of national interests. But if we get no such commitments, why should we -- the small States who make up the vast majority of United Nations Member States and who also have the greatest vested interest in a new Security Council dedicated to global interests -- support any Security Council reform that ignores our interests?

This is the main reason why Singapore has been advocating great caution in this debate on Security Council reform. We have a deep fear that a few countries will develop some kind of "quick fix" that will preserve or enhance their national privileges, while ignoring the needs and interests of the larger membership of the United Nations. We are also worried about a step-by-step approach, because, until we know the final direction of our steps, how do we know we are not heading down the wrong path? We would therefore like to end our remarks with a small appeal to our fellow small States to be careful and vigilant in this debate on Security Council reform. If we are not careful, our needs and interests will be trampled on, as the major and medium-sized Powers reshuffle the Security Council deck to suit their interests.

It is really the same old story all over again. When elephants, big or medium, fight, the grass suffers. And when they make love and deliver "quick fix" or "slow fix" Security Council reform, the grass will suffer also.

The President

Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I would like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed at 1 p.m.

The list of speakers in the debate on this item will be closed at 1 p.m.

Mr. Baali (Algeria)

Allow me, first of all, to pay tribute to Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab for the wise manner in which he led the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and related matters.

I would also like to express our thanks to the two Vice-Chairmen of the Working Group, Ambassador John De Saram of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Hans Dahlgren of Sweden for the patience and perseverance they have shown throughout the past year.

The consideration today of this important issue comes after another phase of intense discussions within the Working Group. The report before the Assembly is a very useful source of information on this phase, although it contains no specific recommendations on the substantial issues that were discussed.

Nonetheless, the report indicates that the detailed and in-depth discussions were marked by great objectivity, open-mindedness and pragmatism, going beyond general statements, and gave voice to ideas and concrete, rational proposals that have significantly clarified the major issues that are at stake.

However, once again, it is regrettable that these proposals have not been translated into tangible and measurable progress. In actual fact, the results that we had all hoped for have not been attained. This reveals the difficulty of our task, while also reflecting the significance of the interests and stakes involved and, at the same time, showing the depth of differences on certain points -- and this despite the accumulation of a very comprehensive set of suggestions and comments. This should hardly surprise us, because we do not believe that any issue can be more politically sensitive or be likely to have profound and lasting consequences for the United Nations than this issue, since it deals with the composition and functioning of the Organization's fundamental organ for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Despite the legitimate frustration that we feel, we nevertheless are convinced that the general momentum for reform should be maintained and given further impetus, and that discussions should continue within the Working Group, because without a doubt the Working Group is the only suitable framework for such reflection. My delegation hopes that the Working Group will continue its work during the next session on the basis of transparency, in order to formulate, in a relaxed atmosphere and a completely non-confrontational context, a programme of overall reform of the Council in all its aspects that is acceptable to all the Member States.

This year once again the discussions within the Working Group have shown that, although there are clearly areas of convergence on certain non-insignificant aspects of reform -- such as working methods -- serious differences remain with regard to the veto and the enlargement, composition and size of the Council.

From this perspective, despite the complexity of the issues at stake, broad agreement is emerging on several fundamental points and, above all, on the need to ensure greater transparency in the work of the Council. In fact, the overwhelming majority of Member States feels that the Council should be more democratic in the way in which it operates, more representative in its composition, more transparent in its working methods, more capable of giving an account of its work, and more efficient in its activities. Member States also feel the Council should enjoy the support and trust of the Member States.

In this respect, the improvements in the functioning and working methods of the Council are a response to the need for effectiveness and transparency. In this context the efforts of the Security Council -- efforts highlighted by the recent adoption of several measures -- should be pursued. We note with satisfaction that the Council has introduced into its practice positive measures designed in particular to improve its relations with the General Assembly and to increase the number of public debates on current issues. Although the changes are still at an experimental stage, these initiatives, which were inspired by the debate that took place within the Working Group, have helped the Council make some progress towards achieving the final objective: to ensure that the Security Council is a transparent, democratic and credible body. These practical measures are the first fruits of our common effort. We strongly hope that they will be institutionalized and incorporated in the Council's rules of procedure in order to guarantee their systematic application. Nevertheless, much remains to be done.

The same is true of the regrettable practice of having informal negotiations and discussions among a few privileged parties, excluding the vast majority of delegations. The Security Council should consult on an ongoing basis with the States that are directly or indirectly affected by conflicts or whose situation is discussed in the Council, as well as the representatives of regional organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States, and give them the opportunity to present their positions to the Council before it begins informal consultations.

Greater efforts should also be made with regard to the troop-contributing countries, whose role in maintaining peace and international security goes without saying, with a view to their being included in the formulation of mandates for forces deployed by the United Nations. In this respect, we welcome the important step taken by the Security Council in adopting resolution 1327 (2000) on 13 November, underlining the need to improve and strengthen the mechanism for consultations with troop-contributing countries throughout all the phases of peacekeeping operations.

Finally, I would like to reiterate some comments that I shared with members of the Security Council on 4 October last, when we were examining the Palestinian question. I expressed my concern over the growing trend to oppose the holding of formal sessions, to restrict the ability to take the floor to members of the Council and to recommend that speakers adopt a particular tone. I pointed out that all Member States had an absolute right to request a public meeting and to take the floor if they wished in Council debates. I felt that to restrict the right to speak and to prefer the secrecy of consultations to a frank, transparent and open debate was not democratic and was contrary to the very principles on which the Organization is based.

Similarly, I would draw the attention of Member States to a worrying tendency for the Council to go off course; for some time now it has been dealing with matters that are clearly not within its responsibility, but come under bodies of the General Assembly or of the Economic and Social Council. In fact, the Security Council, charged with peacekeeping and international security and very much in demand to deal with serious conflicts shaking the world, is by its own choice, being transformed into a simple committee of the General Assembly or even a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council. It therefore appears to us to be urgently necessary to sound the alarm so that the Council fulfils the mandate given to it by the Charter and leaves it to the competent organs, with which it can cooperate and interact, to deal with matters that are within their competence and that they are best equipped and prepared to deal with.

I turn now to the question of the veto, which my delegation feels is intrinsically linked to that of the enlargement of the Council. It remains at the heart of the problem of Security Council reform and is clearly one of the most complex and controversial issues that we have to deal with in the framework of the restructuring of the Council. Keeping the right of veto has made the Security Council, whose decisions have world-wide scope and effects, a political instrument of the permanent members. Although the formal exercise of the veto has lessened since the end of the cold war, the simple threat of recourse to it has often been exploited by certain countries for their own interests, to the detriment of the preservation of international peace and security. Moreover, the right of veto, which gives the permanent members an exclusive and dominant role, denies the principles of democracy and sovereign equality between States, and recourse to it, as has often been shown in the past, prevents the Council from responding to the wishes of the international community.

For all these reasons, the vast majority of Member States have supported the view that the right of veto in the Council is anachronistic, discriminatory and anti-democratic, and have therefore underscored the need for a progressive restriction of this privilege, limiting it first to questions relating to Chapter VII of the Charter, before its total elimination, so that a more democratic decision-taking process can apply in the Council. While we wish to be realistic, and recognize the difficulty of the task, we hope that the permanent members will themselves acknowledge what needs to be done and be much more open and less dogmatic in their approach to this problem.

With regard to the enlargement of the Council, which is just as controversial, a broad majority has clearly spoken out on the need to remedy the current imbalance and the lack of representativity in the Council's structure by ensuring a more balanced and fairer geographic representation and by strengthening the participation of developing countries. The Council does not reflect the political changes that have taken place at the international level over the past decades, just as it no longer represents universality and the plurality of its mandates. This lack of representation leads to a loss of the Council's legitimacy and credibility; hence the need to review its composition and its size.

In this respect, I would like to stress that any formula which would exclude the interests of the developing countries would be counter-productive and certainly unacceptable. Here my delegation reiterates its support for the specific proposals made by the Non-Aligned Movement, and in particular that relating to an increase in the number of Council members, which we hope will be studied and receive all due consideration. In this context, the Non-Aligned Movement, while recognizing the difficulty of achieving agreement on the category of permanent members, and with concern to promote a prompt reform of the Council, proposes that enlargement should be limited for the moment to the non-permanent category. For the United Nations to remain in harmony with a rapidly changing world, the reform of the Council should relate to questions where an area of common interest can be most easily found.

I would stress at this stage that any enlargement of the Security Council should lead to increased representation for Africa, the region which has the greatest number of Member States and which has no permanent representative in the Council. This need is underscored by the fact that the majority of questions that the Council is dealing with today relate to developing countries in general and African countries in particular. The position of Africa on the reform of the Council was formulated by the African heads of State and Government in 1997 at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Harare, where they solemnly requested the enlargement of the Council to 11 seats, the allocation of two permanent seats on a representative rotational basis, with the same prerogatives as those of the other permanent members, and two non-permanent seats to be shared between African States, according to criteria and methods agreed by the Africans themselves. In the same vein, my delegation feels that a reformed Council, composed of at least 26 members, would be more representative and be able to work with the desired efficiency.

Security Council reform is one of the most important aspects of the strengthening, revitalization and democratization of the United Nations. In order to be truly comprehensive, reform requires us, inter alia, to renew the various organs of the Organization and to ensure a better balance of powers and responsibilities between its organs, in conformity with their respective mandates, and in particular between the Security Council and the General Assembly, which enjoys a much broader mandate than any other United Nations body, as was rightly reaffirmed by our heads of State and Government in the Millennium Declaration.

Several years have gone by since the Working Group was established and we note that no final agreement has yet been reached on one of the most critical issues facing our Organization, in spite of the efforts made to that end. Our frustration at the slow pace of reform should not discourage us from seeking the outlines of a solution. There is a need for substantial progress in the Council's reform process, but we feel that the task of restructuring the Council should in no way be subject to a deadline or pushed towards a partial decision taken in haste, which would compromise the opportunity to achieve real reform and might cast a shadow over this very sensitive process, whose ultimate objective is the shared aspiration of all States Members of our Organization. We therefore feel it essential that the interests of all States and regions be taken seriously into account in this historic debate. In any case, the vital question of Security Council reform must be addressed in strict respect of the provisions of Article 108 of the Charter.

In conclusion, I wish to stress yet again the importance that my delegation attaches to the objectives of comprehensive, genuine and far-reaching Security Council reform and to reiterate our will and desire to cooperate with the Council in order to make the Working Group's work at its next session as constructive and fruitful as possible.

Mr. Schumacher (Germany)

It is becoming more and more difficult to be creative about reform initiatives because so many things have already been said. To retain the picture painted by the representative of Singapore of lovemaking elephants trampling around, we have now been trampling around for almost eight years, but we have not even damaged the grass. We have just stirred up the dust.

Hardly anyone denies the need to bring the Security Council into line with today's political conditions and the need for reform. This issue was one of the outstanding elements of speeches made by our heads of State and Government at the Millennium Summit. We cannot just turn our heads away and continue business as usual. The world has changed; the nature of conflicts has changed; but the Security Council has, in principle, remained the same ever since 1945, with the permanent members having gradually reduced their financial burden, as laid out impressively by Ambassador Satoh of Japan.

What do we need? We need a more representative Council and therefore expansion in both categories, taking into account the justified interests of the developing world. To put it bluntly, my country, Germany, is not and has never been after a quick fix. We need a more accountable Council and therefore a review process. We need a reform of the veto to make the Council more democratic, and Germany has put on the table what I think is a realistic proposal to tackle this challenge. We need a reform of its working methods to make the Council more transparent.

The question is: How do we proceed? We are indeed, as my colleague from Viet Nam put it, at a crucial juncture. One might argue that a debate on procedural questions is a waste of time and that substance should be discussed instead. I beg to differ. We have been discussing substance for seven years and I am afraid we might see a repetition of these discussions for the eighth year in the Open-ended Working Group. We do not lack substance -- there are proposals on the table; we lack procedure. We lack not words, but action. I could not agree more with my colleague from Australia that the negotiating dynamics of the Working Group have assumed a life of their own, to the detriment of substantive progress.

In this context, I would once again, as I did on 17 October on the occasion of the debate on agenda item 11, "Report of the Security Council", like to quote the Secretary-General in his speech of 12 September 2000 before the General Assembly:

"Consensus is highly desirable, but it need not mean waiting for absolute unanimity on every sub-clause among 189 Member States. The minority, often a very small minority, should not withhold its consent unreasonably ... We can no longer afford to operate always at the level of the lowest, and slowest, common denominator." (A/55/PV.10, p. 2)

All members know what happened in the Working Group on Security Council reform this year. The draft of both our Vice-Chairmen on general observations failed in the Working Group, despite its excellent content and the broad support it enjoyed from reform-minded countries. It was possible for a minority of Member States -- and here again I would like to reiterate the words of my colleague from Australia to the effect that this minority represents a small, unrepresentative number of Member States -- to prevent the Working Group from reaching an agreement on this issue. The only positive outcome of this deplorable development is that the original version of the Vice-Chairmen's draft has become an annex to the report and thus gives us an untouched picture of the Bureau's views and assessment. I would recommend that everybody take a close look at this excellent paper and get an idea of where we stand and where we might go from here.

I sincerely hope that you, Mr. President, and the Bureau of the Working Group will take a lead in the reform discussion. We might also consider combining efforts with the Secretary-General, who has always guided us towards new horizons. The Millennium Summit and the general debate have proven again that there is a broad basis for the reform issue. Even specific elements, such as the enlargement in both categories and the need to reform the veto, have been mentioned by an impressive number of Member States. We must transform these verbal commitments into deeds.

Again, we do not lack substance or words. We lack action and we urgently need initiative.

Mr. Yel'chenko (Ukraine)

As with many other delegations, Ukraine's participation in this debate and subsequent consideration of this item will inevitably be influenced by contradictory feelings of encouragement and disappointment.

On the one hand, the untiring interest in this item is a clear demonstration of the broad understanding among Member States of an urgent need to reform the Security Council -- that is, to bring its structure and working methods into line with the realities and requirements of today's world. On the other hand, despite the protracted deliberations about this issue, both in the General Assembly and in the framework of the Open-ended Working Group, we do not so far find ourselves much closer to achieving any substantial results on the matter.

For seven consecutive years various aspects of reform have been discussed in detail within the Working Group. A wide range of proposals and ideas has been submitted by Member States and other participants in the process. The Working Group's discussions during the last General Assembly session were also of a substantive nature and were characterized by an engaged and constructive climate. Nevertheless, the Working Group once again appeared not to be in a position to submit to the General Assembly any agreed recommendations on the substance of the matter, except that the Group should continue its work during the next session.

With such a slow pace in Security Council reform, there exists a real danger that this issue will become one of the so-called frozen items on the General Assembly's agenda. This would not be acceptable to Ukraine or, I hope, the majority of other Member States. The impressive list of speakers on this item is clear proof of that.

The Security Council, as the body entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, represents the central element of the collective security system established by the United Nations Charter. The majority of Member States, including Ukraine, associate with the Security Council the realization of their legitimate right to live in peace and prosperity, free of any form of coercion, and with full respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is absolutely essential that in the twenty-first century the Security Council preserve its authority and enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness. Attaining this goal depends very much on the results of the efforts to achieve the Council's comprehensive transformation.

Taking advantage of today's discussion, I would like to reiterate the basic elements of Ukraine's position on the matter. First and foremost, the reform should be based on strict compliance with the norms and principles of the Charter. Equitable geographic distribution of non-permanent seats in the Security Council represents the principle to which Ukraine attaches special significance. Ukraine could not agree to any comprehensive reform proposal that does not take into account the interests of the Group of Eastern European States. Obvious underrepresentation of the Eastern Europeans in the Security Council provides convincing arguments in favour of their claim for allocation of one additional non-permanent seat in the enlarged Council.

With respect to the idea of creating new permanent seats in the Council, we continue to maintain that those countries which are able and willing to take greater responsibility -- including financial -- in the maintenance of international peace and security, and which enjoy the necessary international authority and support at both the regional and global levels, may receive that status.

The institute of the veto is another major issue, which bears a direct relationship to the effectiveness of the Security Council. Ukraine strongly believes that, under present political realities, the veto right is absolutely obsolete. Although over recent years this undemocratic instrument has been applied by the permanent members less frequently than in the past, our recent experience, including as a member of the Security Council, gives us enough examples of when the mere existence of the veto right prevented the Security Council from exercising its Charter responsibilities. If we do not want such incidents to occur in the future, resolute action is required to find a generally acceptable solution to this issue.

Significant progress has been achieved in improving the working methods of the Security Council and in increasing transparency in its activities. Ukraine will continue to encourage the Council to move further towards starting a new phase in its relationship with Member States, on behalf of which it takes the decisions in the realm of peace and security. The non-members of the Security Council, first and foremost the parties to the dispute and the major troop-contributing countries, should be given broader opportunities to influence the decisions of the Council.

I should like to conclude my contribution to this debate by highlighting the fact that the leaders of Member States have twice in the last five years emphasized the need to reform the Security Council. As far back as five years ago, in the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, they expressed their position in the most unambiguous manner by stressing that the Security Council should

"be expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character and improve its working efficiency and transparency". (Resolution 50/6, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, para. 14)

And more recently, in the Millennium Declaration, our leaders resolved

"To intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects". (Resolution 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, para. 30)

My delegation believes that these are mandatory directions to the General Assembly and its relevant Working Group. They are also mandatory directions to the President of the Assembly, who may count on the full support and understanding of my delegation in your efforts to move this process forward. To share with you and the members of the General Assembly some of the major conclusions based on Ukraine's first-hand experience regarding this matter, I conclude with just one conclusion from the remarks made by Mr. Hennadiy Udovenko, the President of the General Assembly at its fifty-second session, on the day the report of the Open-ended Working Group was adopted:

"If there is still a need for something to be explored after five years of intensive discussions, perhaps it is our ability to see beyond our national interests and our aptitude to measure this reform against the historical imperatives of today's world." (A/52/PV.91, p. 7)