General Assembly Session 55 meeting 52

The Acting President

The draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in paragraph 13 of its first report (A/55/537) reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Credentials Committee and the recommendation contained therein,

Approves the report of the Credentials Committee."

We shall now take action on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee as set out in paragraph 13 of its first report.

I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote or position before the Assembly takes action on the draft resolution.

Mr. Hamzehei (Iran)

My delegation would like to express its reservations regarding those parts of the first report of the Credentials Committee (A/55/537 and Corr.1) that relate to the credentials of Israel. In line with the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on this issue, my delegation wishes to dissociate itself from the parts of the report that refer to the approval of the credentials of Israel.

The Acting President

The Credentials Committee adopted the draft resolution recommended in paragraph 13 of its report without a vote. May I take it that the General Assembly to do the same?

The Acting President

We have thus concluded this stage of our consideration of agenda item 3.

The Acting President

I invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, to present the report of the Agency for the year 1999.

Mr. ElBaradei (International Atomic Energy Agency)

The Millennium Summit in early September focused the attention of the world on a number of objectives for the new millennium: the establishment of enduring world peace, the eradication of poverty, the fight against disease and the protection of the environment. In the efforts to realize these objectives, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a modest but essential role. I will speak briefly today about the three fundamental functions of the Agency: our role as a catalyst for the development and transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies, our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to move towards nuclear disarmament, and our work to build and maintain a global nuclear safety regime.

Nuclear technologies provide preferred solutions -- and sometimes the only solutions -- to many economic and social problems. The IAEA, in accordance with its statute, serves as a catalyst for the development and transfer of those technologies.

In 1999, nuclear power supplied roughly one sixth of global electricity. Trends vary by region: some countries are phasing out nuclear power plants, while others have embarked on new construction or innovative research and development. While the future of nuclear power remains uncertain, it is clear that certain factors will be crucial to that future: the safety of facility operations; the demonstrated feasibility of safe and environmentally sound radioactive-waste disposal; the ability to make nuclear power economically competitive; the growing need for environmentally clean sources of energy; and public acceptance. Projections of global energy demand, which take into account the development needs of developing countries and the predicted increase in population by two billion people over the next two decades, led the World Energy Council to conclude that a total reliance on fossil fuels and large hydroelectric facilities is not sustainable, and that the current position of nuclear power needs to be stabilized, with the possibility of future expansion.

In that context, the Agency's role is to help ensure that the nuclear power option remains open, a process that requires ensuring a fair hearing for nuclear power in the comparative energy assessment debate, preserving nuclear expertise as fewer young people pursue nuclear science careers and, above all, developing innovative reactor and fuel cycle technologies.

To be successful, innovative reactor and fuel cycle technologies must be inherently safe in terms of operation and waste disposal, proliferation resistant, cost effective and adaptable to different applications and energy needs. The Agency intends to establish a task force on innovative reactors later this year to assess the technology and energy demands of prospective users, consider existing efforts in this area and determine what additional research and development should be encouraged to meet the needs of member States. Naturally, we will work in close cooperation with other national and multinational initiatives in this area.

A major part of the Agency's nuclear technology activities are related to applications other than electricity generation. Agency-coordinated research projects supported by our research and service laboratories focus on the use of nuclear techniques and radioisotopes to, inter alia, increase food production, fight disease, manage water resources and protect the terrestrial and marine environments. In the food and agriculture area, for example, insect sterilization techniques have produced significant gains in livestock production and fruit production; radiation-induced mutations have been used to produce crops with greater yield and higher quality; and direct food irradiation has been employed to preserve freshness and eliminate disease-causing organisms.

With each year, new nuclear techniques related to human health are developed. This year the Agency's programme of assistance and coordination placed significant emphasis on the validation of new nuclear tools for diagnosing drug-resistant strains of malaria and tuberculosis. Other work was related to diagnostic procedures in support of medical applications ranging from paediatrics to cardiology and the use of stable isotopes in malnutrition studies to track the intake of vitamins and other nutrients.

The management of water resources is an area of increasing worldwide concern. Today, more than one billion people are without access to clean water, and about two thirds of the global community will face clean water shortages by 2025. In addition to projects on desalination techniques, the Agency has supported extensive member State use of isotope hydrology to plot groundwater aquifers for sustainable water resource management. We also have begun to support member States' exploration of the use of advanced electron-beam accelerators to decontaminate and disinfect waste water and drinking water.

Other Agency projects focus on an array of environmental analysis and clean-up techniques. For example, the use of ionizing radiation to clean flue gases from coal-fired plants -- a technology catalysed by the Agency -- is now being demonstrated or under development in Bulgaria, China, Japan and Poland. Another important recent initiative is the Agency's coordination of efforts to develop nuclear techniques for the detection of anti-personnel landmines, which continue to maim civilians in regions where conflict took place in the past.

In each of these areas of nuclear application, the Agency seeks to promote the development and application of techniques that serve the priorities of its member States, with a focus on the special needs of developing countries. Where nuclear technology is the most effective means of addressing a given problem, and where the recipient country has the necessary infrastructure, the Agency ensures that the technology is transferred safely and efficiently. In 1999, our technical cooperation programme amounted to approximately $64 million, with more than 850 projects. The IAEA annual report for 1999, which the Assembly has before it, provides a more detailed discussion of these and other Agency achievements.

The Agency's safeguards system is designed to provide assurance that nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In recent years, we have strengthened our safeguards capabilities to enable us to provide assurances not only that declared nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful purposes, but, equally importantly, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist. This comprehensive assurance, however, can be provided only for States that have in force both a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency and the complementary additional protocol. The Agency is also currently developing "integrated safeguards" -- the optimum combination of traditional safeguards measures with those of the additional protocol to ensure a system that is cost-efficient while achieving a high degree of effectiveness.

Earlier this year, the sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was convened here in New York. The Final Document of the Conference recognized IAEA safeguards as an essential component of the non-proliferation regime, and endorsed the strengthened safeguards measures of the additional protocol. However, the same document noted that 51 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force. The additional protocol numbers are similarly disappointing: the 11 States that had additional protocols approved in the past year bring the total to 55, but so far only 17 of these have entered into force. I appeal to all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

Since December 1998, the Agency has been unable to implement its mandate in Iraq under United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and related resolutions. As a result, we cannot at present provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. In January of this year, with the cooperation of the Iraqi authorities, we carried out an inspection under Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement. Our inspectors were able to verify the presence of nuclear material under safeguards in Iraq. To be sure, this inspection was not designed to be, nor could it serve as a substitute for, the monitoring and verification activities mandated under the Security Council resolution. The Agency must return to Iraq if we are to provide the enhanced assurances sought by the Security Council. We continue to maintain an operational plan and capability that would allow us to resume our activities at short notice. Provided that we could verify that Iraq's past and present nuclear activities have not changed since December 1998, the Agency could move forward to a full implementation of its ongoing monitoring and verification plan.

The Agency also remains unable to verify that all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been declared. Fully assessing the accuracy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial safeguards declaration will require a series of Agency activities to be undertaken with the full cooperation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Given that the entire verification process may take between three and four years, those activities should begin immediately, if the light water reactor project provided for in the Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is to proceed as scheduled. With the recent positive developments in the Korean peninsula, it is my hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will soon be ready to commence active cooperation with the Agency to that end. The normalization of relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency would also help us to provide important safety advice and expertise related to the light water reactor project.

In keeping with the General Conference mandate, I have continued my consultations with the States of the Middle East region regarding the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and the development of model agreements that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Regrettably, little progress has been achieved so far. Needless to say, I will continue to use all available means within my authority to move that mandate forward. Movement towards an overall settlement in the region will certainly boost my ability to make progress. At this year's General Conference, I was asked to make arrangements to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could meet to learn from the experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence-building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The Agency secretariat continues to consult with the Russian Federation and the United States of America on methods of verifying nuclear materials excess to their military programmes. These verifications must be sufficient to assure the international community that the material has been irreversibly removed from military application. In September, the United States of America and Russia also signed a bilateral plutonium management and disposition agreement. This new agreement commits each party to the withdrawal of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium from its weapons programme and to early consultations aimed at concluding an agreement with the IAEA to allow Agency verification measures. I welcome this agreement as a further step towards nuclear arms control.

The third major area of Agency activity is safety -- nuclear safety, radiation safety and waste safety. While safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on safety-related matters has proved to be indispensable. The continuing positive results of international collaboration leading towards safety upgrades at nuclear installations in Eastern Europe is an important case in point.

The international safety regime consists of three major components: international conventions, a body of internationally agreed safety standards and mechanisms for applying these standards. Conventions in the safety area aim to establish binding norms that cover activities across the entire fuel cycle. To date, the Agency has developed conventions that cover the safety of power reactors, radioactive waste and spent fuel management, early notification and assistance in case of a nuclear accident and physical security. The Agency continues to identify areas in which binding norms are needed, such as in the safety of research reactors and of fuel cycle facilities.

The Agency has also made significant progress in the past several years on updating its body of safety standards; nearly 80 new or revised standards will be produced in total. To be effective, these standards must be comprehensive, internationally agreed upon and subject to regular peer review. In my view, once agreed upon, these standards must be uniformly applied by all States, as is the case in the aviation field, which is under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Agency safety services, such as our operational reactor safety assessments, design reviews and regulatory reviews, also continue to make a significant contribution to promoting a global nuclear safety culture through peer review and information exchange.

The Agency also continues to focus international attention on the threats to public health arising from so-called orphan radioactive sources -- that is, sources that are no longer under the control of national authorities. In the past year, assistance was provided to several Member States. Regrettably, five people died during this same period in Thailand and Egypt as the result of accidents involving radiation sources. We have worked extensively to strengthen the ability of Member States to respond to such emergencies, focusing on infrastructure upgrades, the development of national registries of radioactive sources, and the enhancement of regulatory structures. In addition, we have intensified education, training, and information exchange among regulators, users and manufacturers, and we recently circulated to all States and relevant international organizations a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources and Radioactive Materials.

But perhaps one of the most pivotal issues in the current debate over nuclear technology is the safety of managing spent fuel and radioactive waste. While experts are confident that geological disposal is safe, technologically feasible and environmentally responsible, the public at large remains skeptical, and the volume of high-level waste continues to build. A number of countries are engaged in geological disposal projects. Research is also active on waste disposal methods that are reversible, to allow retrieval of the waste at a later date, if desired. Researchers are also focusing on waste transmutation and other techniques to reduce the activity or volume of long-lived waste. The Agency continues to maintain international focus on the waste issue in order to accelerate progress towards demonstrated solutions and to bridge the gap in perception between technical experts and the public at large.

The foregoing review of portions of the Agency's programme makes it clear that the scope of IAEA activities continues to grow -- whether that growth is occasioned by a new assignment for verification of nuclear arms control measures, a request by a developing country for help with water resource management, or the need for safety assistance at a fuel cycle facility. But in a continuing environment of zero real growth budget, which the Agency has adhered to for over a decade, some of these priority demands cannot be accommodated, or can be accommodated only through an increasing and excessive reliance on extra-budgetary resources -- a reliance which has a negative impact on our ability to implement our programmes with the expected effectiveness and efficiency.

I should also mention that the Agency is finding it increasingly difficult to recruit and keep qualified staff. Given our need for highly specialized technical personnel and the limited pool of resources, recruitment and retention is especially problematic for scientific staff, as well as in fields such as information technology. This situation will only continue to intensify as United Nations salaries and conditions of employment continue to lose their competitiveness with the private and public sectors.

The Common Service must become more flexible in order to respond to the needs of its organizations and support their reform efforts in human resources management. In that respect, the proposal by the Secretary-General, on behalf of all heads of United Nations system organizations, for a review of the International Civil Service Commission deserves serious consideration, with the ultimate aim of strengthening the international civil service and restoring the competitiveness of the Common System.

We have continued to look for ways to meet the growing demands on Agency resources. We are using a five-year medium-term strategy to improve the planning, implementation and evaluation of our activities. Our new results-based approach to programming and budgeting focuses more on outcomes -- the real changes produced for our Member States -- than on outputs, such as the number of meetings or publications, to ensure a more rigorous prioritization. An emphasis on a "one-house" approach to all our activities ensures better coordination of our diverse programmes, better use of our resources and a more streamlined secretariat structure.

In conclusion, let me say that the IAEA continues to play a key role in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are shared globally, that peaceful nuclear activities are conducted safely, and that the international community is provided with a credible framework for curbing nuclear-weapon proliferation and moving towards nuclear disarmament. Naturally, our ability to continue to carry out these functions effectively depends on Members' political commitment and financial support, which I hope and trust will continue to be forthcoming.

Finally, I would like to conclude by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Government of Austria, which continues to be a generous and gracious host to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Acting President

I give the floor to the representative of Nigeria to introduce draft resolution A/55/L.25.

Mr. Mbanefo (Nigeria)

Allow me at the outset to express appreciation to the Director General for his comprehensive report on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is noteworthy that under his leadership, the Agency has continued to fulfil its three major mandates, namely to serve as a catalyst for the development and transfer of technology, a recognized authority in nuclear safety, and an instrument for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation.

I am particularly delighted to note that these efforts have served in large measure to meet humanity's global objectives of freedom from fear and freedom from want -- the major challenges facing it. In this connection, I also note with satisfaction the confidence placed in the Agency in the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which reaffirmed its contribution to sustainable development, non-proliferation and safety.

Nigeria attaches great importance to the objectives of the Agency and has demonstrated on several occasions its political commitment and support for international peace and security and global non-proliferation efforts, especially those directed at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and all forms of weapons of mass destruction. These objectives informed its decision to become a member of the Agency in 1964. Nigeria is therefore most honoured to introduce, in its capacity as Chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), draft resolution A/55/L.25, on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The draft resolution before us is a reflection of the important issues raised earlier in the report presented by the Director General and the relevant resolutions adopted mainly by consensus at the forty-fourth session of the General Conference of the IAEA. I should therefore like to briefly highlight the main contents of this draft.

The text has 18 preambular paragraphs and 14 operative paragraphs and reiterates the importance that Member States attach to the agreement reached on the amendment of article VI of the statute. It seeks expansion of the membership of the Board of Governors from 35 to 43 members. Draft resolution A/55/L.25 dedicates an operative paragraph to encouraging all States members of the IAEA that have not yet ratified this amendment to do so. Similarly, a paragraph is devoted to the amendment of Article XIV.A of the statute, which provides for biennial budgeting by the Agency and urges those Member States that have yet to ratify this amendment to do so.

The draft draws attention to the increasing relevance of the non-proliferation regime; to the safeguards agreements, especially as they have a direct bearing on verification and confidence-building in general; and, particularly, to the need for the Agency to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the integrated safeguards system, in conformity with the statute of the Agency. It further stresses the importance of the Model Additional Protocol approved on 15 May 1997.

The draft resolution also reiterates the concern of the international community in the field of nuclear energy with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iraq. It expresses concern about the Agency's inability to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, therefore, about the inability to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It calls upon that country to fully comply with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. With regard to inspections in Iraq, the text stresses the need for full implementation of all Security Council resolutions and for providing the necessary access to enable the Agency to carry out its mandate.

Attention is also drawn to the entry into force on 24 October 1996 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and notes with satisfaction the outcome of the first review meeting of the contracting parties to the Convention. It looks forward to safety improvements in areas that are found deficient. With respect to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, it appeals to States that have not yet become parties to do so.

The draft resolution under consideration is a product of strenuous work. The consensus was reached after consideration of many proposals made by different delegations in Vienna. In this regard, Nigeria has taken cognizance of the genuine contributions of all delegations, which facilitated the achievement of this transparent and balanced text. Undoubtedly it is a factual and accurate representation of the main issues dealt with by the Agency during the period under review. At this juncture, let me express appreciation to the sponsors of this draft resolution and particularly to the two Vice-Chairmen of the Board of Governors, Austria and Poland.

I would equally like to express our appreciation for the support and cooperation received in Vienna and here in New York from the secretariats of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of the United Nations.

The Acting President

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt to introduce the amendment to draft resolution A/55/L.25, contained in document A/55/L.26.

Mr. Aboulgheit (Egypt)

I would like at the outset to express warm thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his excellent presentation of the annual report of the Agency for 1999. It also gives me great pleasure to congratulate him on his distinct contribution to the development of the programmes and activities of the Agency during the past three years. This contribution has been reflected in the increasing role played by the Agency in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in various fields in the service of humanity, and in improving the relevant infrastructure.

The delegation of Egypt presented to the forty-fourth session of the General Conference of the IAEA a comprehensive review of all the fields in which it is cooperating with the Agency and of the role that we are trying to play at both the regional and international levels within the framework of the Agency's own role and programmes. From this perspective I would like to address a number of topics to which Egypt attaches particular importance.

The Agency is playing a prominent role in drawing up technical criteria to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in contributing to technical cooperation programmes that promote the use of nuclear technology in a number of countries. This, however, should not lead us to ignore another important aspect of the Agency's work, which stems from its responsibility as one of the main pillars of the non-proliferation regime.

Egypt attaches great importance to the attainment of the objectives of non-proliferation and to ensuring nuclear disarmament all over the world. We think that in order to achieve progress in this respect, particularly in the Middle East region, this issue should be considered on an urgent basis, because of its potential positive impact on stability in the region as a whole. Within the framework of these efforts, Egypt has sought since 1974 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since 1980 the General Assembly has made an appeal for the creation of such a zone under a series of resolutions adopted by consensus.

In response to this unanimous show of support by the international community for the establishment of such a zone, in April 1990 President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak called for the establishment of a Middle East zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. This initiative was an extension and a natural development of Egypt's constant call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In support of these efforts, and because of the importance of this subject, Egypt, through the IAEA, has called year after year for the comprehensive safeguards system of the Agency to be applied to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East. These efforts and appeals are not simply an Egyptian or an Arab demand; they are an international endeavour in which all other countries, regardless of their various alliances and orientations, join us. The international community expressed its position through the consensus adoption of the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was held in 2000.

The document welcomed the admission of all countries of the Middle East, except for Israel, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It stressed the importance of Israel's adhesion to the Treaty and of subjecting all its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s comprehensive safeguards in order to attain the ideal objective, that of ensuring universal adhesion to this Treaty in the Middle East.

Thus, last week, the First Committee adopted a resolution under item 76 concerning the danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The resolution was adopted by a majority of 139 votes; operative paragraph 2 stressed the importance of Israel's adhesion to the NPT. It mentioned Israel by name and called upon that country to subject its nuclear facilities to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system. I would like to point out that my statement does not represent an attack on Israel; nor is it a criticism, although Israel imagines it as such and reiterates that view in its statements before the international body; rather, it is a call for a comprehensive and lasting peace based on firm foundations. We think that it is high time for Israel to act positively in this connection and to respond to the international will by joining the NPT and by subjecting its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards system of the Agency. It should also give up its old-fashioned doctrine of deterrence.

Nonetheless, Egypt will enthusiastically continue to work towards ensuring the application of the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East, without exception. We support all efforts aimed at strengthening the safeguards system, because it is the main international mechanism for verification. The IAEA is working to develop and support the safeguards system through the adoption in May 1997 of an additional model protocol for the safeguards agreements -- I mean the 93 + 2 system -- which Egypt supports -- a system which provides the necessary legal basis for developing the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities and nuclear materials. We think that the Agency plays an important role in urging countries to sign and implement the comprehensive safeguards agreements in accordance with article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, which is the basis for ensuring that the Agency verify that nuclear materials are not diverted from their declared activities. Moreover, this is the gist of the IAEA's verification activities, carried out in accordance with the non-proliferation regime.

I would like to reaffirm that any renunciation of our responsibilities or our commitment to apply the comprehensive safeguards system will have negative and dangerous consequences on the credibility of the safeguards system as a whole and the pioneering role played by the Agency in this respect.

Therefore, the Egyptian delegation has introduced an amendment to operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution concerning the report of the IAEA, contained in document A/55/L.26. Our amendment stresses the integrated role played by the Agency in carrying out safeguards activities and the importance of the comprehensive safeguards system, to say nothing about the additional protocols concerning those safeguards.

Mr. Albin (Mexico)

The Mexican delegation wishes to express its thanks to the Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his introduction of the report on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1999.

Mexico wishes to state its satisfaction with the positive results of the Sixth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) carried out this year. There can be no doubt that the adoption by consensus of the final document by the States Parties to the Treaty is one of the outstanding events in the field of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Of particular importance for the international community is the unambiguous commitment of the nuclear-weapons States to eliminate totally their nuclear arsenals, with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament.

Bearing in mind that one of the International Atomic Energy Agency's main functions is the application of verification measures on nuclear materials and equipment, the fulfilment of this commitment is of particular importance. Our satisfaction with the success of the NPT Review Conference also extends to our recognition of the important role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of safeguards, non-proliferation, technical cooperation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mexico will continue to support this work of the Agency in those sectors.

The improved fulfilment of the verification responsibilities that the international community has entrusted to the IAEA requires a strengthened safeguards system. Mexico is satisfied at the increasing number of countries which have acceded to the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards. At present, Mexico is carrying out an internal consultation process to facilitate a decision on our country's accession to the Model Additional Protocol.

Last year saw an increase in the cooperation links between Mexico and the Agency. Under the project entitled "Improvement of Radioactive Waste Management", Mexico's nuclear sector, headed by the Energy Ministry, has begun to formulate a national radioactive waste policy that meets the current needs of the sector and Mexico's international commitments. With IAEA support, Mexico's national nuclear research institute is carrying out work to rehabilitate the site currently occupied by the radioactive waste storage centre. This is a priority activity of the national nuclear sector.

With regard to regional cooperation activities, Mexico has reaffirmed its commitment to collaborate with Latin America by being the first country of the region to ratify the Regional Cooperative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL). We express our satisfaction at the support given by the IAEA to this programme. We are convinced that the implementation of regional cooperation agreements will work to the benefit of the Agency's general objectives. We urge the other States members of this mechanism to ratify the Agreement and to apply, within this framework, the criteria that have been proposed by the Agency's Board of Governors as part of the IAEA's new technical cooperation strategy.

In the area of nuclear safety, we look forward to renewed efforts by States to promote a universal culture of nuclear safety to include the promotion of binding legal instruments and safety standards and measures to apply these instruments and standards. We encourage all interested countries to work for a framework of understanding to ease the concerns of States that find their national security affected by the passage of ships carrying radioactive nuclear waste. Although work has begun in this field, much ground remains to be covered.

In conclusion, my delegation expresses its gratitude to the Director General and secretariat of the IAEA for their efforts to comply fully with the mandates entrusted to them by the States members of the Agency. We are aware that the success of their work depends, in addition to the political support of States, on adequate financing. In this connection, we encourage all States to meet their financial commitments to the Agency on time.