General Assembly Session 53 meeting 65

Mr. Galuska (Czech Republic)

Not many of the issues considered recently by this Organization have drawn as much attention or been followed as closely and discussed as thoroughly, for such a considerable period of time, as that of Security Council reform. At first glance, consensus might seem within reach. We all want the Security Council to be geographically equitable, democratic and efficient. We all want to improve its working methods, and almost all of us would like to see the unlimited use of the veto curbed.

However, there are certain limitations to what we can achieve here, since all of these issues are interdependent. To maintain what we have -- a functional and operational Security Council -- and to get what we want -- equitable representation, democratization, more transparency and efficiency -- we have to find a balance between what is demanded and what is feasible. That balance is between geographical equitability and efficiency, between transparency and the need for informal negotiations, and between democratization and the unlimited use of the veto.

To counterbalance the additional burden that an enlargement of the Council would place on its operational ability, we need to modernize its working methods and decision-making process. We need to further develop the procedures that enable wider participation and transparent decision-making while facilitating prompt and effective action.

We have definitely made great progress throughout the intensive and constructive course of negotiations in the Open-ended Working Group. Here I would like to express our thanks and gratitude to the President of the previous session of the General Assembly, Mr. Hennadiy Udovenko, and to the two co-Vice-Chairmen of the Working Group, Ambassadors Breitenstein and Jayanama. Proposals have been refined and sharpened, and they now outline the whole scope of aspects of future reform. However, in spite of converging views, there is still a significant gap to be bridged.

As these issues are closely linked, they should be kept in one package throughout the negotiation and decision-making process, and the agreement should be reached on the whole package. To single out and prejudge one element of the package would be quite unfortunate and would necessarily limit our ability to deal with the rest of the package. In order to reach a general agreement, as called for in resolution 48/26, we need to maintain our momentum and continue to discuss all the issues related to Security Council reform in a positive, transparent and non-confrontational manner.

This brings me to the most frequently discussed topic of today's debate: the majority required for taking decisions on Security Council reform. Again, since this issue is part of the reform package, it should not be dealt with separately. The General Assembly's voting and decision-making process is clearly stipulated in the relevant articles of the United Nations Charter. It is essential first to know the proposal to be voted on; only after that can we decide what kind of majority is needed. The opposite approach, as proposed in draft resolution A/53/L.16, would create a dangerous precedent by bringing in a new, vaguely defined category -- a "resolution with Charter amendment implications" -- which is a legally flawed deviation from Article 108 of the United Nations Charter. It is unacceptable to us.

Let us be clear. We respect the Durban Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, which we understand as a legitimate political appeal to the Movement's member States, and indeed to the whole international community, to reach a general agreement on this issue.

We see a possible compromise in the adoption of the draft amendment (A/53/L.42) to draft resolution A/53/L.16, and we appeal to the President to organize further consultations in order to avoid confrontation and to find a solution that would be acceptable to us all.

Let me stress that the reform of the Security Council deserves our urgent attention. We have already seen the first signs of the erosion of its credibility, caused by inequitable geographical representation, as reflected in the decision of African States concerning the sanctions against Libya. It is up to us to decide what kind of Security Council we want to have in the next millennium. We have to decide also whether we want to continue living in a world based on post-Second-World-War realities or if we want to change with the times. There is a good chance for success if we keep our dialogue alive in a positive and constructive manner, as we used to.

We therefore fully support the continuation of the work of the Working Group in 1999 in order for it to examine all the proposals. We hope that this work will eventually produce concrete results that could be placed on the agenda of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly, in the framework of the Millennium Assembly concept.

Mr. Wilmot (Ghana)

My delegation believes that the clear convergence of views on the need for equitable representation on and an increase in the membership of the Security Council reflects a trend that augurs well for our active and positive consideration of this subject matter. An underlying factor in this trend is the recognition and indeed acceptance that the maintenance of international peace and security is a collective responsibility that lies at the foundations of the United Nations. It requires and demands the cooperation of all Member States.

But the cooperation of Member States should not be taken for granted by the Security Council, on which the Charter of the United Nations imposes the primary obligation to maintain international peace and security in a rapidly changing yet shrinking world. Given contemporary and potential conflicts in the post-cold-war era, the Council cannot discharge this onerous responsibility if its membership is not truly representative or does not reflect the composition of the United Nations, which currently stands at 185 Members.

Reform is in the air, and the Security Council cannot be an exception if it is to ensure the requisite accountability. As my delegation has stressed in previous statements, the needed enhancement of the Council's credibility through a substantive reform must be guided by the principles of democracy, the sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical representation. A reformed Security Council should be transparent in its activities and more responsive to the interests of the general membership in matters deriving from its Charter mandate. This is more so as all members of the United Nations are called upon to share the burden of the maintenance of international peace and security through, inter alia, assessed contributions to the peacekeeping budget and the provision of troops for United Nations peacekeeping missions. In this regard it is necessary to strengthen the transparency of the Security Council by improving its functioning, methods of work, decision-making powers and relations with States that are not members of the Council.

Our views regarding the achievement of equitable geographical representation in the Council have been clearly defined in the statements and working papers the Non-Aligned Movement has presented to the Open-ended Working Group entrusted by this Assembly with the mandate to consider and report on all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. In this regard, my delegation aligns itself with the views expressed by the Permanent Representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Movement has called for the Council's membership to be increased by not less than 11. This additional number is fair and reasonable and can accommodate the legitimate claims of all regions of the world to be represented in the all-important body entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Council, as recommended by the Non-Aligned Movement and several other delegations, will go a long way towards meeting our objectives and responding to the requirements of the vast majority of Member States. It is only through the expansion proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement that the views expounded by that vast majority can be accommodated without impairing the efficiency of the Council.

I also wish to reaffirm my country's adherence to the common African position, which calls for the allocation of two permanent rotating seats to the continent with the same prerogatives and privileges as are accorded to all other permanent members. In this connection, the Organization should avoid the creation of a new underprivileged class, as this can only mask the problem we are seeking to address.

Needless to say, my delegation disagrees completely with those delegations that call for a maximum size of 20 to 21 for the enlarged Security Council. Either those calls aim at setting a new mandate for the Open-ended Working Group, or they could be a ploy to have the best of two irreconcilable worlds: supporting expansion and equitable representation in one breath, while in another advancing proposals that are well known to stand very little chance of obtaining the general agreement that is a prerequisite for amending the Charter, as stipulated in Article 108.

The matter of the Security Council reform, much as it deserves urgent attention, cannot be subject to any imposed time-frame. Indeed, we recognize the need to allow Member States time to reflect on the question, with a view to identifying solutions on which general agreement can be reached. Should it become necessary, however, to take some early decisions, a page could be borrowed from the Non-Aligned Movement, which has proposed that expansion should take place only in the non-permanent category for the time being, if there is no agreement on other categories of membership.

The proposal for a periodic review of the composition of the Council has great merit and deserves serious consideration. Such periodic review, with the possibility of replacing non-performing members or any member if its regional constituents so decide, would enhance accountability and make the Council more responsive to the needs and interests of the international community at large. We wholly subscribe to this proposal. We also endorse the Non-Aligned Movement's proposal that a periodic review of the Council's structure and functioning is necessary in order to enable it to respond better and more effectively to the new challenges in international relations, especially with regard to international peace and security.

My delegation also recognizes the inherent problems associated with the use and abuse of the veto, and we reiterate our call for the limitation of its usage to clearly defined situations under Chapter VII of the Charter, pending agreement at an appropriate time on the veto's abolition. The time has come to review the concept of this undemocratic and anachronistic relic of the post-war era in view of its frequent misapplication by a privileged few in furtherance of parochial national objectives, thwarting the will of the general membership of the Organization. Whatever the outcome of our deliberations on this subject, it is the considered view of my delegation that all permanent members, new and old alike, should be accorded the same prerogatives and privileges.

I wish to conclude by reiterating the commitment of my delegation to the reform process. We stand ready to continue in our common effort aimed at reforming the Security Council in order to prepare it better for the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Ms. Rasi (Finland)

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Nordic countries: Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and my own country, Finland.

The Security Council is the principal organ of the United Nations to which the members of the United Nations have conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is important to recognize that many factors determine the Council's effectiveness and the authority it carries in the international community. Most important, of course, is the very quality of its decisions. The unity of purpose of its members is essential. So is the political and practical ability of the United Nations to carry out the decisions of the Council. A key factor, of course, is the Council's composition and working methods.

The views of the Nordic countries on enlargement and reform of the Security Council have been stated on several earlier occasions. Therefore, let me today recall the common Nordic approach to some of the basic issues.

We are in favour of enlargement and reform of the Security Council in order to make it better equipped and strengthened in its capacity to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security as we face the challenges of the new millennium.

The ultimate objective of the reform is to make the Security Council more representative and to strengthen its authority, while making it more open and transparent. At the same time, enlargement of the Council must take into account the need for the efficiency and effectiveness of its work.

The Nordic countries, like the wide majority of Member States, support enlargement in both the non-permanent and permanent categories of membership. Non-permanent members are a crucial part of the Security Council membership. They ensure representativity and accountability. They can be expected, as a matter of self-interest, to give priority to openness and broad consultations with non-Council members. Elected members should also constitute a majority in the Council in the future. The Nordic countries are also in favour of an increase in the number of permanent members of the Council. We would welcome Germany and Japan as new permanent members, together with developing countries of Africa and Asia, as well as of Latin America and the Caribbean.

As to the process of selecting new permanent members, the Nordic countries are ready to study all proposals carefully. We have noted with interest the rotation formula for Africa agreed upon at Ouagadougou last June by the Organization of African Unity. The General Assembly should take due account of any proposal by the regions concerned when taking its final decision on the matter.

The Nordic countries would want to see concerted action to reduce the role of the veto. Widespread concern has been expressed that any increase in the number of countries endowed with the veto -- as presently constituted -- might harm the efficient decision-making of the Security Council. The Nordic countries believe that restrictions in the scope of use and application of the veto could also be thoroughly considered within the so-called periodic review as one way of finding a solution to this issue.

Progress has indeed been made in efforts to make the Security Council more transparent and to improve its working methods, not only by the Open-ended Working Group, but also by the Council itself. We warmly welcome this development. We believe that the measures taken by the Council were to a large extent inspired by the very thorough work done in the Working Group. Yet more can and should be done. We believe that the need exists for a review of the Council's working methods and transparency on a permanent and continuous basis. The rapid increase in the tasks facing the Council and the changing nature of the problems with which it has to deal, as well as the extent to which non-members of the Council have become involved, justify such an approach. An important task to be included in such a continuing review mandate would also be to consider how the relationship and interaction between the Security Council and the General Assembly could be improved and enhanced.

In our view, it is now time for all Member States to engage in real negotiations to bring the reform process forward. The Nordic countries took careful note of the many calls for a more result-oriented approach to Security Council reform that were expressed in the Assembly's general debate in September. We also noted that many speakers expressed their disappointment at the slow progress and the lack of agreed proposals from the Open-ended Working Group, whose report nevertheless constitutes a useful compilation of the numerous ideas on the table.

Let me make it clear that by calling for a negotiating process the Nordic countries are not advocating any artificial time-frames or deadlines. No one can impose anything on the General Assembly. What we are urging is simply that the Open-ended Working Group live up to the calls for concrete and specific proposals for consideration by the Assembly.

This will not be easy. There are many problems, and they are complex and interlinked. But they have all been identified -- we know them. Positions of the Member States and Groups have been clearly enunciated, explained and defended. Since the inception of the Open-ended Working Group, a wealth of proposals have been put on the table -- some comprehensive, others addressing specific elements of the reform.

The membership of the Organization has long declared its determination to make the Security Council more representative and to strengthen its authority. We must find a solution which strengthens the Council, a solution supported by the overwhelming majority of Member States. To facilitate our common search for such a solution, we would do well to avoid divisive procedural debates or precipitate voting situations.

Mr. Andjaba (Namibia)

Allow me to express the appreciation of my delegation to the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council for the outstanding way in which they conducted the Group's work during the fifty-second session of the General Assembly.

Since the Open-ended Working Group was established in 1993, numerous proposals have been presented and discussed on all issues relating to Security Council reform. These include the composition and size of the Council and the veto power. Regrettably, divergent views still exist among Member States on these issues. However, it is important to note that significant progress has been made in discussing measures aimed at improving the working methods and transparency of the Council's activities. But we believe that much can be done, and should be done. The implementation of these measures would no doubt create a more participatory and open decision-making process in the Council. Therefore, the Security Council should institutionalize these measures.

The reform of the Security Council constitutes one of the important components in the efforts to strengthen, revitalize and democratize the United Nations. The central element in this process is to ensure that in the new arrangement the size and composition of the Council reflect the increase in the membership of the United Nations, and above all it must not ignore the principles of equitable geographical representation and the sovereign equality of States, which are key to the very survival of the United Nations. In the existing Council, developing countries are under-represented. Therefore, we must correct the existing imbalances in the composition of the Council in a manner which would enhance its credibility and effectiveness. We will consider unacceptable any expansion which overlooks the principles of equity and representativeness. We will not accept selective or partial expansion or enlargement of the Security Council. In this connection, we support the expansion of the Council in both categories, permanent and non-permanent. Developing countries must be adequately represented in the reformed Security Council. Africa's common position is on the table. It includes two permanent seats and additional non-permanent seats.

Namibia is opposed to the veto. It perpetuates differences and discrimination among members of the Security Council. It is anachronistic, and we therefore call for its abolition. For any action or inaction of the Council to be credible and legitimate, it should reflect the will of the majority of the Council members.

It is undemocratic, if not dictatorial, that one State can prevent a decision supported by the rest of the Council members. It is self-defeating to pretend to champion the cause of democracy at the country level while at the same time measures to ensure practical implementation of that principle at the international level are being opposed.

The Council must be democratized in order to ensure its accountability to the entire membership of the United Nations, on whose behalf it carries out the primary functions of maintaining international peace and security.

Namibia fully supports the position of the Non-Aligned Movement that any resolution with Charter amendment implications must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the United Nations membership, as referred to in Article 108 of the Charter.

Finally, my delegation has taken note of the recommendation of the report of the Open-ended Working Group as contained in document A/52/47. However, we must proceed with caution and respect to all proposals on the table. In our deliberations, we should bear in mind that our inability to reach any agreed recommendations could damage the credibility of the United Nations. On the other hand, we should not unduly hasten the process simply to satisfy some Members of our Organization to the detriment of others. To put it simply, no quick fixes, but also no indefinite negotiations.

Mr. Arcaya (Venezuela)

Five years ago, the Member States of the Organization decided to undertake one of the most important tasks related to the reform and revitalization of the United Nations as a result of the profound changes stemming from global politics. The General Assembly, through resolution 48/26, created the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. It was one of the most important decisions ever taken in United Nations history.

The decision that made it possible to establish the Working Group entailed a very complex exercise in negotiation, highlighting the commitment and flexibility of the Members of the Organization for the sake of adopting measures to give greater legitimacy to the Security Council. Today more than ever,this objective receives priority attention, with the development of political solutions to humanity's challenges and obstacles requiring collective responses through organs whose composition reflects the realities of our times.

The Working Group has made progress in some areas. However, the discussions to date reveal important differences remaining on issues relating to the possible increase in the number of Security Council members, as well to the veto. The activities undertaken by the Working Group show that, on this matter that concerns us all, it is impossible to conceive of fragmented or partial solutions that stray from the spirit and aim of the objective defined in resolution 48/26: the search for general agreement.

While we advocate the taking of decisions based on the majority opinion of the Members of this Organization on this subject, we also consider that the utilization of certain types of arguments, procedural or otherwise, that are aimed at impairing the process through polarization and confrontation, would not be in our interests. To the contrary, at this stage of discussions it is necessary that the Member States show the flexibility that this important matter demands.

We are convinced that the Working Group will remain the appropriate forum to promote progress in the achievement of the general agreement that will allow us, at the threshold of the new millennium, to make the Security Council an organ that serves the interests of the international community more effectively. We cannot cease in our efforts to overcome the differences that have surfaced to date.

As the report of the Working Group in document A/52/47 reveals, there is a set of proposals available to us that, in their scope, deserve our consideration. As a result, we must set aside rigid positions in order to promote in a positive manner arrangements that will promote an improvement in the capacity of the United Nations as an institution for dialogue and international understanding.

For Venezuela, the reform and expansion of the Security Council are inseparably linked to the reform of the United Nations itself. We cannot conceive of this larger process of reform without making the necessary adjustments to the Security Council in order to bring about greater transparency, efficiency and legitimacy in that organ, which is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security.

We consider that the Security Council must be enlarged, as Venezuela's President Rafael Caldera affirmed when he addressed the Assembly on 24 September last during the general debate. We believe that the possible expansion of the Council will in no way weaken the effectiveness or the authority of that organ in matters related to international peace and security, but will, rather, strengthen its capacity.

Since peace is an indivisible concept involving the entire international community, we consider that in the reform and expansion of the Security Council, we must bear in mind the principles of the sovereign equality of States and equitable geographical distribution, as well as the need for transparency, responsibility and democratization as regards the methods of work and procedures of the Security Council, including the decision-making process. These general principles, which we fully support, were restated by the Non-Aligned Movement at its recent summit in Durban, South Africa.

A central element of the ongoing debate on reforming that body is definitely the matter of the veto. Throughout the meetings of the Open-ended Working Group, we have heard many considerations and thorough analyses of the need for a restriction on the use of the veto to specific domains as a step towards its ultimate elimination. We have also heard arguments to the effect that today's circumstances no longer justify the existence of this tool, which is held to be anti-democratic and inimical to solidarity and the principle of the legal equality of States, which is the fundamental basis of our Organization and of public international law.

In this respect, Venezuela considers that the right of veto must be restricted with a view to its future elimination, and that the Charter will have to be revised so that it will be possible to use the veto only in connection with measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. In this connection, we would like to highlight the contributions made by the Non-Aligned Movement on matters pertaining to this particularly important question.

It is encouraging to note that at this stage in history the United Nations, imbued with a renewed sense of optimism, is influenced by trends towards dialogue and democratization. Confrontation and sterile debates have been left behind. With the support of the Member States, the Organization has promoted, in different areas, the adoption of decisions of planetary scope that have brought about the development of international norms to address humanity's pressing challenges, such as the promotion and defence of human rights, the protection of the environment, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the prohibition of certain categories of weapons of mass destruction and so forth. These are some of the achievements that can be attributed to the United Nations in over 50 years of action in the field of peace and economic and social development.

Mr. Jusys (Lithuania)

Reform of the Security Council is going down in United Nations history as the item discussed for the longest time without any practical outcome. The organ to be reformed is the Security Council, but so far the matter has affected only the General Assembly, by taking up its precious time and revealing conflicts of interests among the general membership.

Since the debate began, we have witnessed a rotation in the majority of permanent representatives, who change more frequently than the positions of their countries. Ironically, while the representatives are described as permanent, and the reform process is supposed to be temporary, the opposite would appear to be the case.

I know many of us often ask ourselves and each other, "Will the reform process ever end? Will the Security Council ever be transformed? Is this apparently elusive goal worth the time and resources spent and the intellect brought to bear?"

These thoughts come at moments of desperation, which is the usual emotion following each session of the Open-ended Working Group on the reform of the Security Council. When the mind is calm, it again becomes clear that with all that reform may require, it is nevertheless worth not only a try but resolute persistence.

A reformed Security Council will not only be more fairly representative but -- and as importantly -- more effective. A properly balanced membership will lend greater legitimacy to its decisions, which will thus gain greater authority and respect worldwide. The benefits of resolving a single additional international conflict or crisis would justify even the longest debate on the reform of the Security Council. It is regrettable that disagreement between the vast majority of the membership and a very few -- but very influential -- States about the size of an enlarged Council has been one of the major stumbling blocks to reform.

Lithuania's position has not changed, but we remain flexible in the search for a common goal. We have stated our views several times on all basic issues of reform. The fundamental component of our position is a search for compromise, which is achievable regarding all aspects of the reform, even the most difficult ones. In the Working Group, Lithuania identified areas of achievable compromise, including the enlargement of both categories of membership, the size of the Security Council, a review mechanism, regional rotation and others.

The search for a golden mean has been facilitated by the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group. In particular, the summaries of all standing issues this year have been most helpful. They list all reasonable ideas and represent the spirit of creativity that has prevailed throughout the exercise. The next logical step would be to identify the degree of support for each of the options and to see if a decision can be made.

We have now arrived at the current "smash hit": how to know what measure commands sufficient support for a final decision and what majority is required for reform. We spoke about this before and offered one possible interpretation of what a general agreement could be for this particular case: a halfway point between consensus among the total membership and the two thirds of all Member States that is required for United Nations Charter amendments. But there may well be other numbers or less definite notions of majority. Lithuania is open to any reasonable thinking.

The question of majority is complicated not only by the search for a number but also by considerations and speculation as to the stage of decision-making at which this or that majority is to be required. The appearance, for a second straight year, of a draft resolution such as one now contained in document A/53/L.16, was inspired precisely by this confusion.

In seeking solutions to this problem, we should be guided by the United Nations Charter. Articles 18, 108 and 109 cannot be interpreted in many ways. Charter amendments will come into force only after ratification by at least 124 States, including the five permanent members. This provision rules out any danger of someone sneaking into permanent seats through the back door, windows or chimney or by any other loopholes. It will be necessary to generate this much support to gain a permanent seat.

It is likely, however, that Charter amendments will be preceded by a formal decision of the General Assembly stating the conclusion of work and pronouncing a decision that we hope will trigger the process of Charter amendment. We expect that such a decision will be similar to a draft resolution once promoted by the former President of the General Assembly, Ambassador Razali. However, such a resolution or any other decision will not, in the strict sense, be an amendment to the Charter as such; therefore, Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter will not directly apply. It will be a decision of the type referred to in one of the paragraphs of Article 18.

There has been a lengthy debate about the majority that is needed for a resolution with Charter amendment implications. We voiced Lithuania's opinion in the Working Group: implications of Charter amendments are not yet amendments and therefore do not involve Article 108. Many things might imply Charter amendments. However, only amendments to the United Nations Charter -- not implications, elements, intentions, allusions or hints -- involve Article 108.

We must also remember that most prominent scholars of United Nations law and legal practice consider the application of Articles 108 and 109 to be an irregularity, as opposed to recourse to Article 18, which is designed for regular decision-making in the General Assembly. I would like to cite a respected book, United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, which warns us in volume 1, page 22, against the ambiguities that we seem to be falling into in this case:

"the majority stipulated in Articles 108 and 109, paragraph 1, refers to the number of members specified by the Charter (Article 9). This is an exception to the provisions of Article 18, paragraph 2 which require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting ... By derogating from Article 18, paragraph 2 and stipulating a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly it was intended to ensure that any amendment adopted would also be ratified later on, and render the review more difficult in order to achieve maximum recognition for the decision of the General Assembly."

Following the legalistic line of reasoning further, it may be difficult to define an implication, and it will be much more difficult to define a resolution with an implication requiring the application of Article 108. The meaning of the word itself is so indirect that it may be subjected to individual interpretation and speculation. After all, who will eventually be able to decide whether something is or is not an implication?

This is a difficult legal case; but it can be seen as a political case. The Non-Aligned Movement's position, for instance, offers a political approach to it. Member States might wish to make a political decision about the majorities required for reform. Such a decision may or may not be prescriptive for cases other than this reform. But we have to be very certain whether we would like to create such a precedent.

Another alternative contemplated is amending the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and setting new majorities for General Assembly decisions in cases like this. Such an exercise, however, might also be difficult. We must be very creative in establishing new procedures for decision-making in the General Assembly without inconsistencies with the United Nations Charter, which already has provisions on decision-making in the General Assembly.

We would prefer majorities different from those clearly defined in the Charter to be defined rather informally, without adopting decisions that might be contrary to the United Nations Charter. Our most sincere preference is not to dwell too much on majorities. More important work lies ahead; we have to find a formula that will fit all, and procedural issues must be secondary.

The draft resolution before us, A/53/L.16, cannot be adopted by consensus as it stands. There are sound arguments raised by its sponsors and also by its opponents, and although they are different, they are not totally incompatible. Nothing is impossible, and finding a compromise is certainly not impossible. Further consultations have to be undertaken in order to avoid additional confrontation. We saw enough division over the reform issue during the work of the Working Group; an additional display of conflicting views is unnecessary.

Mr. Opertti's predecessors worked hard for progress in the Working Group. They, with the assistance of the excellent outgoing co-Vice-Chairmen, Ambassador Breitenstein and Ambassador Jayanama, managed to establish an atmosphere conducive to intellectual exercise and a vast legacy of good ideas. This time, we urge the Chairman to establish an atmosphere that is also conducive to a result-oriented exercise. For that purpose, he will have our full and active support.

Mr. Dlamini (Swaziland)

Once again I am honoured to address the Assembly on behalf of the delegation of the Kingdom of Swaziland.

The international community has on diverse occasions taken several steps to reinforce its mutual collaboration within the framework of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, established under the terms of General Assembly resolution 48/26 of 1993. The interest the item has generated since the Working Group was set up reflects the unique nature of this issue and the desire to have a democratic and representative Security Council, as conceived in the Charter of the United Nations. The efforts we have invested in achieving the goals of the Working Group cannot be compared to any others, despite the differences we have on this item. As the debate resumes in this session, the so-called meeting-of-minds principle, which has eluded us in our endeavour to achieve a common position, is again a test of our commitment to the goals we initially set out to achieve.

My delegation is grateful to Ambassador Hennadiy Udovenko of Ukraine, the President of the General Assembly at its fifty-second session, for his effort and dedication in seeing to it that the Working Group efficiently performed its task. However, we are concerned that during this interim period the Working Group should not lose the opportunity to make further progress on all the issues before it. A good outcome would be for the Working Group to convene and discuss in more detail than in the past and to identify more precisely the means to achieve consensus on the issues that remain unresolved.

In our resolve to achieve a satisfactory solution to the question of the reform of the Security Council, it is worth mentioning from the outset that any attempt aimed at tackling the issue should be considered within the provisions of the Charter. I am referring to the widely recognized principles of sovereign equality and equitable geographical representation of States. The Council, as currently composed, does not reflect a true picture of what is envisaged by the Charter insofar as those two principles are concerned. The present situation is such that no one needs to be reminded that the developing world deserves to be represented not only in the non-permanent membership category but in the permanent membership as well. A Council built within this framework is more than likely to be perceived by the international community as legitimate, credible and truly representative in character. This is the positive approach that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of African Unity have enunciated in calling for an enlarged and universal Security Council.

In this regard, the Kingdom of Swaziland continues to support the African common position for two permanent seats with full rights that are enjoyed by the current membership in the permanent category. We remain opposed to any partial or selective expansion of the Council to the detriment of the developing countries, and we dare say that any attempt to do so runs the risk of being unacceptable to a significant number of the Members of the United Nations.

Closely linked to the expansion of the Council is the use of the veto. My delegation is of the considered view that the expansion of the Security Council should be accompanied by an understanding on the scope of the veto. We cannot envisage a situation in which new permanent members of the Council will not enjoy the use of the veto. And while we unreservedly favour extension of the veto to new permanent members, we do, however, in accordance with the decision of the recent twelfth NAM summit, held in Durban, South Africa, support the proposal that the veto should be curtailed with a view to its elimination and that it should apply to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.

On a more positive note, though, my delegation considers the implementation by the Security Council of the comprehensive set of measures to enhance its working methods and transparency to be a positive development. All we long to see now is that such measures should be institutionalized in the Council's rules of procedure. The adoption of this set of measures will, in my delegation's view, enable the Security Council to provide timely reports to the General Assembly as required by Articles 15 and 24 of the Charter. Again, through this procedure, the General Assembly will be kept informed on a reasonable basis of the activities of the Security Council. The report should not be limited to, but should include, reports on consultations with troop-contributing countries, regional organizations and the Security Council's subsidiary organs, among other things. In this connection, we are grateful to the Non-Aligned Movement for the paper it presented to the Open-ended Working Group on this subject.

In conclusion, may I, on behalf of my delegation, reaffirm my country's commitment to the goals of the Working Group. The exchange of views we have had during the past year, characterized by richness of debate, was useful and realistic. Notwithstanding the ground the Working Group has covered, we welcome further efforts, particularly through cooperation, to ensure that general agreement is reached before any decision is taken on this question.

Mr. Kamal (Pakistan)

As during several previous sessions of the General Assembly, I once again have the honour to address the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council.

The debate in our Working Group on this subject earlier this year showed, once again, how wide the divergence of views is between Member States on the core issues. There are deep differences on the composition and size of an expanded Security Council, on the manner in which the veto should be exercised or restrained, on the question of a review mechanism and on a host of other issues. The differences were so deep and so fundamental that the Working Group was once again unable to present a substantive report on its work to the General Assembly.

Allow me to briefly recapitulate some of the salient points of the deliberations held so far.

On the issue of the composition and size of an expanded Security Council, proposals ranged from increasing the total size of the Security Council to 20 or 21, supported by a handful of countries, to an expansion to not less than a figure of 26, supported by the 114 members of the Non-Aligned Movement and many others.

On the question of the veto, the Non-Aligned Movement proposed that this power of permanent members should be curtailed to actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Once again, a handful of countries, most of which, not surprisingly, are the beneficiaries of the veto power themselves, have rejected this proposal outright. The linked issue of whether possible new permanent members should enjoy all the rights and privileges of the original permanent five hangs in the balance, with no clear picture emerging, even after five years of negotiations.

On the issue of the review mechanism, a wide range of proposals has been made. Some have suggested that at the review conference to be convened 10 or 15 years after the possible expansion of the Security Council, the new permanent members could be unseated by the vote of a two-thirds majority of the United Nations membership. Others have proposed that the new permanent members will have to subject themselves periodically, every 10 or 15 years, to a vote of confidence, and that they would retain their status as permanent members only if they continued to enjoy the support of a two-thirds majority of the United Nations membership.

Despite the deep differences and the wide divergence of views which have existed among us for over five years already, there is a noticeable and sudden surge of activity at the beginning of every session, as the handful of pretenders to permanent membership and their ostensible supporters feel a quickening in their aspirations with each new session of plenary meetings. Last year, as our session began, this group of countries had contemplated submitting a framework resolution on the issue directly in the General Assembly in the hope that they could in this fashion somehow bypass the duly mandated Working Group and the need for general agreement in the Working Group.

Mr. Kamal (Pakistan)

Those framework resolutionists then had a sudden lapse of courage following the submission of draft resolution A/52/L.7, which warned them clearly that the adoption of any resolution with Charter amendment implications would require the endorsement of two thirds of the total membership of the United Nations as referred to in Article 108 of the Charter. It was quite obvious that the proponents of a framework resolution did not have the support of 124 members then, no more than they have it now or probably ever in future. Therefore, they had to back down from their ill-considered plan.

This year again, fresh efforts started in the same group to put forward a draft framework resolution at this session of the General Assembly. An analysis of the supporters of these moves shows that they now fall into two categories of countries. The main category is seeking a quick fix in order to further the narrow parochial interests of a few to the detriment of the common weal of a vast number of small and medium-size countries. A second, smaller, category consists of those countries that fear that any delay in the expansion of the Security Council might result in the demand for a single European Union seat, which could consequently affect their own current status.

Let us be absolutely clear. All proponents of a framework resolution or of a stage-by-stage approach aim only at circumventing the Open-ended Working Group's mandate as defined by General Assembly resolution 48/26, namely to reach general agreement on this issue. That concept of general agreement implies a vote of somewhere between two thirds of the membership of the United Nations and total consensus. It obviously cannot be achieved by ignoring the views of so large a majority of countries as lies within the membership of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Allow me to elucidate this last point. The idea of a framework resolution, dreamt up by a past President of the Assembly in a moment of non-mandated zeal, envisages an increase in membership of the Security Council from 15 to 24, thereby ignoring the demand of the vast majority of countries, including the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, that the increased membership should not be less than 26. Similarly, the demand of the African Group that it should be given two permanent seats has been completely ignored. The proposal also does not take on board the demand of the vast majority of Member States that the veto should be curtailed with a view to its elimination and that the Charter should be amended so that, as a first step, the veto power would apply only to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. In addition, it is being proposed, despite its having already been clearly rejected in the Working Group earlier this year, that the veto issue should be delinked from the ongoing exercise and should be discussed separately in another working group to be established for that purpose.

Pakistan rejects any quick-fix solution through the adoption of such a framework resolution. We also believe that the acceptance of any quick fix would amount to repeating the mistake of 1945, when a few countries arrogated to themselves the status of permanent members of the Security Council with the right of veto.

To recapitulate, Pakistan's position all along has been that the reform and expansion of the Security Council are cardinal issues of strategic significance for the ordering of international relations, especially in the next millennium. We firmly believe that the objective of the reform and expansion of the Security Council should be to promote greater democracy, and participation, and transparency, and accountability, in the work of the Security Council.

Pakistan is against any increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council, as this would serve to accommodate the interests of a few countries only and, conversely, would alienate the small and medium-sized countries, which constitute an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly. We strongly advocate an increase in the category of elected non-permanent members only, so as to proportionately reflect the increase in the general membership of the United Nations, particularly in the large number of small and medium-sized States.

The deliberations over the last five years clearly show that there are unbridgeable differences on the issues of composition and the veto. It is therefore time to look seriously at the fallback position of the Non-Aligned Movement that if there is no agreement on other categories of membership, expansion should take place, for the time being, in the non-permanent category.

Let me now turn to draft resolution A/53/L.16, of which Pakistan is a sponsor. The language of the draft resolution is drawn directly from the position of the Non-Aligned Movement, reiterated at its summit meeting held in Durban in just two months ago, in September this year. It states clearly that any draft resolution on this subject with Charter amendment implications must be adopted with a minimum of the two thirds majority of the total membership of the United Nations, as called for in Article 108 of the Charter. In other words, while a much higher figure representing the widest possible consensus, or general agreement, remains the mandated objective in the Working Group, it is now being stated clearly that any vote in the General Assembly on Security Council expansion and reform must have a floor of 124 votes, below which it cannot go. It is difficult for any of us to believe that a matter as important as this could possibly be decided with any lower threshold. In the process, draft resolution A/53/L.16 defends and safeguards the interests of the smaller and medium-sized States.

It is quite clear to most of us that all those who are embarked on disinformation campaigns against draft resolution A/53/L.16 or who are presenting the amendments contained in document A/53/L.42 are basically trying to attempt Security Council expansion and reform with smaller majorities. My delegation finds this surprising. In fact, we cannot understand how great countries, which pride themselves on being the "new realities" in a world half a century down the line, could possibly entertain the ambition to have their new status recognized on the basis of a vote which could perhaps be even less than half of the total membership of the United Nations. That is why we would in fact have hoped that all these aspirants could have seen fit to join the consensus on draft resolution A/53/L.16 so that we could all work together to give a new fillip to the examination of the question during the current session of the General Assembly.

As for the argument which we have heard from a few countries, that draft resolution A/53/L.16 has implications which go beyond the item under consideration, let me say categorically that our understanding is that the draft resolution has been presented by the sponsors strictly within the framework of the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. It is our understanding that the phrase "any resolution with Charter amendment implications" in the fifth preambular paragraph refers only to resolutions on this specific subject which contain proposals for concrete amendments to the Charter, or which could lead to the possible adoption of such amendments, or which provide criteria or elements for such amendments. Draft resolution A/53/L.16 thus relates to Security Council expansion and reform only.

Draft resolution A/53/L.16 is thus a procedural resolution which is crystal clear. It does no more than restate a position which has been adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement at the summit level, by all its leaders unanimously, a position which carries the additional support of a significant number of non-members of the Non-Aligned Movement also. It is our hope that draft resolution A/53/L.16 will be adopted without a vote because of its inherent merit and because it falls strictly within the spirit of the Charter. It is also our hope that others will desist from their procedural manoeuvres and amendments, which are no more than a transparent attempt to confuse the issue in the murky waters of a quick fix. We hope that the sponsors of these manoeuvres will see the futility of their moves and join the ranks of those of us who believe in the importance of this subject of Security Council expansion and reform and the need to keep it within the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

Let me now briefly touch upon the amendments proposed by Belgium and others in document A/53/L.42. Not surprisingly, this is no more than another attempt to spread confusion among Member States on this important issue of Security Council reform and to further the idea of a quick fix. Allow me to elaborate on why that is so.

First, document A/53/L.42 proposes the replacement of operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/53/L.16, which relates to the minimum threshold of votes required for the passage of any draft resolution on Security Council reform in the General Assembly, with a paragraph which merely attempts to define -- and in fact, to lower -- the meaning of the phrase "general agreement". This, as we know, is part of the mandate of the Working Group, where it is understood to imply a number somewhere between two thirds of the membership of the United Nations and total consensus. Since the concept of general agreement cannot be found either in the Charter of the United Nations or in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, it obviously cannot be prescribed for voting purposes in the General Assembly itself. It is therefore not difficult to see through the attempt of the sponsors of document A/53/L.42 on this point.

Secondly, document A/53/L.42 proposes that operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/53/L.16, which is clearly based on paragraph 67 of the Final Document adopted at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Durban earlier this year, should be replaced with a new paragraph which completely deletes the essential position of the Non-Aligned Movement that efforts at reforming and restructuring the Security Council shall not be subject to any time-frame.

Other amendments in document A/53/L.42 are similar attempts to distract the attention of the membership from the core issue of the voting threshold in the General Assembly in the important matter of the expansion and reform of the Security Council.

For all these reasons, it is the hope of the sponsors and supporters of draft resolution A/53/L.16 that this attempt to amend it through document A/53/L.42 will be defeated roundly and thoroughly.

Finally, may I say how very happy we all are to see you, Mr. President, devoting your personal attention to this important exercise, both here and in the Working Group. With your great experience and guidance, we have no doubt that the Working Group will see forward movement in its consideration of this matter of such serious concern to us all.

Mr. Samhan Al-Nuaimi (United Arab Emirates)

We would like to express our gratitude to the Chairman of the Working Group and his two Vice-Chairmen for the work done in order to achieve positive results in bolstering the role and effectiveness of the Security Council and the maintenance of international peace and security.

In spite of the sincere desire expressed by the international community, represented by the General Assembly, in recent years to reform the Security Council, expand its membership and enhance its working methods, we must point out that the prolonged and important deliberations that have taken place thus far have served to highlight the political complexities of this issue. We have studied closely the periodic reports of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council and have realized that the differences in views are essentially focused on the scope of the proposed expansion of the membership of the Council, both permanent and non-permanent, and the distribution of its geographical representation. This compels us to refocus the debate within the framework of the Working Group in a more transparent, fair and objective manner in order to have a better understanding of all the views and proposals submitted for consideration, in particular those introduced by the States of the Non-Aligned Movement.

We welcome the concern shown by most of the previous speakers for the need to reach a general agreement on this sensitive issue in accordance with the new structures of international relations. That agreement should be based on the principles of fair and equitable representation in consonance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of international law.

We also wish to reiterate our support for the recommendations made in the Final Document of the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, which was held recently in Durban, South Africa. Those recommendations call for the international negotiations on this issue to cover all aspects of the reform and expansion of the Security Council, for they are integral parts of a common and integrated project which should take into account the need for better representation of developing countries based on the principles of the sovereign equality of States and of equitable geographical distribution. This process should also guarantee transparency in the decision-making process, avoiding any tilting towards partiality or selectivity.

We reaffirm the essential role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, yet we find that the Council has on many occasions resorted to a policy of double standards, especially in dealing with Arab issues. That is why we hope that the Council will abandon such a policy and see to it that relevant resolutions are implemented. Furthermore, it has become extremely important today to strengthen consultation and coordination with countries directly concerned or countries affected by a decision of the Security Council by virtue of their geographic position. It is also important that their security and political, economic and social interests be taken into account.

Moreover, we support the proposals to review certain Articles of the Charter with a view to the gradual reduction or rationalization of the use of the right of veto. The use of the veto has proved its negative effects on attempts to contain some of the conflicts inscribed on the Council's agenda. Such use of the right of veto contravenes the objectives of peace set out in the Charter. We must also undertake an objective evaluation of the work of the Council so as to determine the situations in which Council deliberations did not lead to decisions or positions dealing with the substantive reasons leading to those situations.

We would also like to stress the importance and necessity of strengthening coordination between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice as well as the regional organizations, so as to take into consideration their active participation in the area of political and legal questions. These are among the measures for confidence-building, settling conflicts, and putting an end to situations of occupation and aggression, and violations of human rights.

In conclusion, we would like to express our hope that the current deliberations on reform will lead to positive and concrete results that would yield the reform we all want for the Security Council. We hope that these deliberations will result in better structuring of the Council, and in the improvement of its methods of work and procedures so as to enable it to improve its discharge of its increasing responsibilities in the area of maintaining international security and peace.

Mr. Satoh (Japan)

Since this is my first opportunity to address the General Assembly, I would like to begin by paying tribute to you, Mr. President, for the far-sighted manner in which you have been guiding the work of this body. I deem it an honour and a privilege to work with you on the many important issues before the General Assembly.

I am also pleased on this occasion to express the gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Mr. Udovenko, who also served as Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group, and to its two co-Vice-Chairmen, Ambassadors Jayanama and Breitenstein. Thanks to their wise and patient leadership and their dedication to our common goal of Security Council reform, the Working Group maintained crucial momentum throughout the course of its work last year.

As we continue our efforts, we must always remind ourselves that our goal in reforming the Security Council is to enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness as the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. This must be done by expanding its membership to render it more representative of the present-day international situation and also by improving its working methods.

Security Council reform is the common objective of all the Members of the United Nations. Thus, as I listened to the previous speakers, I was encouraged by the strength of their commitment to that objective. It is now incumbent upon us to redouble our joint efforts to reach agreement on a package of reforms.

Member States have expended a great deal of time, energy and thought on the issue since the Open-ended Working Group was established five years ago. All the major points have been thoroughly discussed. A convergence of views has been achieved on many issues, and the issues on which agreement remains to be reached have been identified. What is important now is that we muster the will to overcome the remaining differences so that we can move the process forward.

As Japan's Prime Minister, Mr. Keizo Obuchi, stressed in his statement in this Hall last September, we should be

"able to agree on a package that responds to the interests of the entire international community and to the legitimate concerns of the majority of countries." (A/PV.8, 52 or 53, p. 19)

In an effort to help focus our discussions, I would like to state Japan's position on the following three issues.

First, on the future structure of the Security Council, it is clear that a very large majority of Member States agree that Security Council reform should include an increase in both categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent. The Government of Japan also considers that an increase in the permanent membership should be realized through the inclusion of both developed and developing countries, and that the methodology for selecting new permanent members from among developing countries should be left to the respective regions to determine.

At the same time, in view of the dramatically expanded membership of the United Nations as a whole, the addition of an appropriate number of non-permanent seats is necessary in order to make the Security Council truly representative of the international community as a whole. Japan believes that equitable representation could be achieved and effectiveness in its work maintained by expanding its membership to 24 -- that is, 10 permanent and 14 non-permanent members.

The second major issue in Security Council reform concerns the veto. This is a complex and highly sensitive issue which requires very careful consideration. Therefore it is advisable for us to address this issue at the stage of formulating a final package of reforms. It is also advisable, given the delicate nature of the veto issue and its fundamental importance to Council reform, that we ask a high-level working group to consider the issue and come up with recommendations.

Let me hasten to add that this approach should by no means be interpreted as a sidestepping of this issue. Rather, we believe that by taking this approach we can avoid the danger that an impasse on the veto question might prevent progress on the other aspects of reform.

Thirdly, Japan believes that any package of Security Council reforms must include measures to improve the working methods of the Council and the transparency of its decision-making process in particular. As we have always stated, Japan regards this aspect of reform to be of just as great importance as other aspects.

Our task in the next round of the Open-ended Working Group is to further advance our negotiations with a view to working out a final package of reforms. In this process, each of us must summon the courage to take a flexible attitude and demonstrate a willingness to reach agreement on the outstanding issues. Only then can we achieve our common goal, which is to reform the Security Council.

In this context, I would like to refer to draft resolution A/53/L.16, which has been introduced and subsequently revised by the Permanent Representative of Egypt on behalf of its co-sponsors. There are three points I wish to make.

First, with regard to the so-called framework draft resolution to which some members have referred and which A/53/L.16 seems intended to preempt, I just want to draw your attention to the fact that there is no such draft resolution. Nor do we intend to present such a draft resolution without prior consultations with Member States.

Secondly, as many speakers have already pointed out, A/53/L.16 has profound legal implications. According to Article 18 of the Charter, General Assembly resolutions are adopted either by a simple majority or, in the case of important issues, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. The majority mentioned in Article 108 applies to Charter amendments only. Draft resolution L.16, however, in effect entails amending the Charter through a voting procedure that is not provided for in the Charter.

Thirdly, I share the concern that has already been expressed by a number of my colleagues that putting L.16 to a vote at this time could result in an unnecessary confrontation among us. Indeed, a considerable number of countries have already stressed the need for further consultations so as to preserve consensus.

Japan therefore welcomes the President's statement at this morning's session that he will hold consultations following the conclusion of the general debate on the present item, with a view to facilitating negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution to the matter.

I wish to emphasize that the amendment to A/53/L.16, which was introduced by the Permanent Representative of Belgium and which we are co-sponsoring, is an attempt to make it clear that, as the Charter clearly stipulates, Charter amendments can be effected only through the procedure laid out in Article 108.

Turning our attention to the work of the Working Group next year, I would like to suggest that it might be useful if the various highly motivated and interested regional groups and other groupings of countries would consult with one another and explore points on which compromise might be possible. Ideally, they would come up with concrete proposals that would provide a basis for negotiations on a package of reforms. My delegation is eager to join in any and all such consultations that may be held.

As we continue our work it may be well to ask ourselves: are we really willing to face the challenges of the twenty-first century with a Council whose composition was determined more than 50 years ago and revised only once, 30 years ago? Is it not time that we reconstitute the Council in order to enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness, so that it can better fulfil in the twenty-first century its purpose of maintaining world peace and security? The answers to these questions, I believe, are obvious, and I hope everyone will bear them in mind as we resume our efforts in the Working Group next year.

Mr. Malami (Nigeria)

Permit me at the outset to join other speakers who have taken the floor before me in paying tribute to your skilful guidance, Sir, in preparing the ground for today's debate. My delegation would also like to express its immense satisfaction with the excellent manner in which, during the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, Mr. Udovenko of Ukraine conducted the affairs of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council.

On behalf of my delegation, I wish to acknowledge the Secretary-General's dedication and consistent commitment to the cause of reform, as demonstrated in his comprehensive report which was presented to the fifty-third session of the Assembly. The notion of reform is a positive one that aims at enhancing the efficiency, relevance and flexibility of our Organization, with a view to achieving a greater sense of purpose and real democratization. Since the adoption of resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993, which established the Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the question of increase of the membership of the Security Council and other related matters, a lot of consideration and deliberations have taken place.

During the current general debate of the Open-ended Working Group, from the first session in January 1998 until now, several positions have been taken by delegations and regional groupings which reflect the diversity of views and perceptions on the basic issue of reform of the United Nations, especially as it relates to the expansion of permanent membership and to a review of the decision-making methods and processes.

The debates of the Working Group over the last five years have shown not just the multiplicity of opinions of Member States on the need for and the scope of reform of the Security Council but have also brought to light the intricacies of the issue at stake. The Working Group is divided between competing approaches to resolving the issue of Council reform. One approach seeks to perpetuate the status quo in order to prevent regional rivals from becoming permanent members of the Council, while another approach tends to articulate national positions.

On the whole, the majority of Members attending the sessions of the Working Group support an increase in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership of the Security Council. A large number of delegates also are of the view that the new members of the Security Council should emerge from both developing and industrialized countries.

My delegation is of the view that the issue of equitable representation includes, but is not restricted to, the crucial question of expansion of the Security Council in terms of increasing permanent and non-permanent seats. It also has to do with the working methods and procedures of the Council and the important question of strengthening and re-energizing the Council to better equip it to tackle global challenges as we enter the new millennium. This requires measures such as greater transparency in the conduct of the Council business and closer cooperation and consultation between the Council and the General Assembly. Such measures should increase the participation of Member States in matters that affect them.

Concerning the working methods of the Security Council and the transparency of its work, the session considered several views, including the question of improving the present relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, fine-tuning consultations between the Council and countries contributing to peacekeeping, and effective participation of non-members in the work of the Security Council.

It is tempting to get discouraged about the absence of significant progress in the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the subject of the expansion and democratization of the Security Council. However, one must continue to have faith in the ability of Member States to eventually overcome differences of opinion and reach consensus on the matter.

Let me reiterate the assertion the head of State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Abdulsalami A. Abubakar, made in plenary during the fifty-third session of the General Assembly: the United Nations must correct the anomalies in the composition and size of the Security Council which result in there being no African representation in the permanent membership category despite the fact that the 53 African Member States constitute almost one third of the entire membership of the United Nations.

It is therefore right to uphold the decision of the Organization of African Unity taken at its last summit meeting to seek two permanent seats for Africa in a reformed and expanded Security Council. That decision reflects the relevance of Africa in the international system and deserves the full support of Member States.

My delegation appeals to all Member countries to concentrate on achieving a consensus regarding the best way forward to expand and democratize the Security Council. This would be in the best interest of the United Nations, since a well-structured reform will revitalize the Organization and enable it to be more efficient and effective in carrying out its mandate on behalf of the entire membership.

Mr. Moubarak (Lebanon)

Allow me at the outset to salute your high qualities, Mr. President, as a statesman and diplomat and to wish you a most successful outcome in our work.

On several occasions, my delegation has stated its position regarding the reform of the Security Council. Today I would like to sum up our position.

My delegation is firmly convinced that the Open-ended Working Group would not have met the deadlock it has been facing for years if the geographical approach had been followed since the adoption of resolution 48/26, especially as the projected increase in membership of the Security Council is to be based on equitable geographical distribution. We should always keep in mind that resolution 48/26, which governs the issue, underlines clearly that the reform of the Council will have to be on an equitable and geographical basis. My delegation, which supports fully the principle of geographical rotation embodied in the two Arab papers, believes that geographical groups should determine what States from their respective groups will be filling the seats allocated to their geographical group. This is the meaning of our paper (A/AC.247/1998/CRP.2) of 2 February 1998, which emphasizes the modalities to implement our first paper, of May 1997.

This brings us to some schemes, official or hidden, which have developed since 1997 aimed at circumventing, first, the Charter, secondly, the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, thirdly, resolution 48/26, fourthly, the general agreement and, fifthly, the geographical approach.

All this manoeuvring has meant a loss of time and has not brought about any result. It has been rejected for not respecting the rules of the game. In reaction to those manoeuvres, the Non-Aligned Movement, from New York to Cartagena to Durban, has constantly underlined the necessity to abide by the texts in reaffirming the centrality of Article 108 of the Charter. This is the meaning of draft resolution A/53/L.16, sponsored by 33 Member States, including Lebanon.

The Non-Aligned Movement has always stuck to the terms of resolution 48/26, and in particular the concept of general agreement, which ensures that any reform of the Security Council shall be adopted by an overwhelming majority of United Nations Members -- general agreement meaning less than consensus and more than two thirds of the entire United Nations membership and not two thirds of those present and voting.

Let us not forget that, at the end of the day in 1945, the unanimity of the 51 signatory States agreed on the establishment of five permanent seats, and in 1963 the majority was 85 per cent for the establishment of new non-permanent seats. How could we imagine today that a lower majority would legitimately establish not only new non-permanent seats but also new permanent seats? This is why resolution 48/26 speaks clearly of general agreement. This brings us to the legal meaning of general agreement.

It is clear that in Articles 108 and 109 the United Nations Charter provides for a two-thirds majority of General Assembly members on amendments and revision of the Charter and not the two-thirds majority of the members present and voting for important questions, as stipulated in Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter and rule 83 of the rules of procedure, or a majority of the members present and voting for other questions, as stipulated in Article 18, paragraph 3, and rule 85. It is thus out of the question that the majority required for Security Council reform could be the simple majority indicated in Article 18 of the Charter.

This is why the Non-Aligned Movement has been constantly specifying that the reform of the Council must be dealt with under the relevant terms of the Charter and the appropriate rules of procedure of the General Assembly. It has consistently reaffirmed at each of its conferences, ministerial or summit, that the majority required is provided for in Article 108. This was reflected in 1997 in draft resolution A/52/L.7, presented by 22 Member States, including Lebanon. It is today reflected more explicitly in draft resolution A/53/L.16, presented by 33 Member States, including Lebanon. Draft resolution A/53/L.16 sticks to the declaration regarding the reform of the Security Council issued by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries at the summit held in Durban from 29 August to 3 September 1998, reaffirming that any resolution with Charter amendment implications must be adopted by the two-thirds majority of the United Nations membership referred to in Article 108 of the Charter.

We reiterate and emphasize that this reform is of such importance that no time-frame should be imposed on the subject in order to allow Member States to reach the general agreement envisaged in General Assembly resolution 48/26. Any resolution with Charter amendment implications must be adopted by the two-thirds majority of the United Nations membership referred to in Article 108 of the Charter. This is why we are pressing for the adoption of draft resolution A/53/L.16. It is high time to tackle seriously this issue. No State could ever pretend to fill a permanent seat with a simple majority, and this is the purpose of draft resolution A/53/L.16. When draft resolution A/53/L.16 is adopted, quick-fix dreams will evaporate and all of us will finally be able to discuss seriously the reform of the Security Council within view of reaching a general agreement.

Incidentally, it might be very useful to keep in mind that at least 63 Member States -- more than one third of the United Nations membership -- officially back the same geographical rotation formula of permanent seats in the projected increase in permanent membership. At least three papers concur about reaching this goal through ideas presented in the Working Group.

Let us face it: Africa is the leading example to follow if we are ever to achieve an equitable geographical reform of the Council. It does not serve any purpose to beat around the bush in trying to circumvent geographical groups or to ignore geographical rotation.

When it comes to substance and procedure, Lebanon believes, along with the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group, that the Council should expand in both the permanent and non-permanent categories. We stand firmly behind the declaration of the Durban summit and reiterate our stand, as reflected in the two papers presented by the Arab Group -- A/AC.247/1997/CRP.7 of 9 July 1997 and A/AC.247/1998/CRP.2 of 2 February 1998. Our position stems from the fact that the Arab Members share the great concern attached by all United Nations Members to the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council, and also to other matters related to the work of the Council. The Arab States consider that maintaining international peace and security is a collective responsibility which entitles everyone to participate effectively. They are keen to play an active role to further their participation in this regard. The Arab countries represent 12 per cent of the general membership of the United Nations, and they request to be represented in the Council in proportion to their number in the Organization, in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical representation.

In case additional permanent seats are to be added to the Council, the Arab Group requests to be allocated one permanent seat with all its prerogatives, as enunciated in the Arab Group ministerial resolution dated 21 September 1993. The countries of the Arab Group will seek this goal in coordination with the African or the Asian Group to which they respectively belong.

This having been said, allow me to explain why geographical groups are duty-bound to determine their representation to fill the permanent seat or seats allocated to their group, and I will focus here on the case of the Asian Group, to which Lebanon and 10 other Arab States belong.

We have stated on many occasions the five reasons governing the modus operandi Arab paper of 1998. First, substantive matters have already been discussed in the Asian Group. We will recall that some member States of the Asian Group have claimed that the Asian Group never dealt with substantive matters. This is not accurate. We documented this point time and again and recalled the many discussions on representation of the Asian Group in subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council, including operational organs which were established as a consequence of main international conferences convened under the auspices of the United Nations, the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Commission on Population and Development, the Commission for Social Development and the Executive Board of the World Food Programme, to name just a few.

Secondly, even if, for argument's sake, we were to admit that the Asian Group has never discussed matters of substance -- and we have seen that this is not the case -- the Asian Group will in any case have to discuss the matter of increased Asian representation in the Council's membership because, whether we like it or not, this increase in both non-permanent and permanent categories is of direct concern to the Asian Group and to all delegations of our Group and will directly affect the future of our countries. Why? Because the increase will take place on a geographical basis.

Few countries refuse to discuss substance? That is fine with us. But what about candidatures? Would all Asian delegations admit that the Asian Group is entitled to discuss candidatures? I think they would. Everyone knows that the Asian Group has discussed the guidelines in their proper setting. So if the Asian Group is to discuss candidatures, which has always been the case in the Asian Group, why not discuss candidatures for permanent seats? Who said it was forbidden?

And now we come to the core of the matter. My delegation would like to know how it is possible to discuss candidatures without discussing substance, and vice versa, candidatures and substance being truly indissociable. They are like the two sides of the same coin: you cannot deal with one without dealing with the other. Because we have to discuss candidatures, we also have to discuss substance.

Thirdly, the Asian Group does not live in a vacuum. It has to take into consideration the positions of other geographical groups, and particularly the position of the African Group, and I will explain why.

It is a fact that resolution 1991 (XVIII) A of 1963, which established the distribution of the last increase in non-permanent seats in the Security Council, states in paragraph 3 that the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern:

"(a) Five from African and Asian States;"

and I repeat,

"(a) Five from African and Asian States; (b) one from Eastern European States; (c) two from Latin American States; (d) two from Western European and other States."

At the outset, my delegation would like to restate its full backing for the African position requesting two permanent seats with veto power and other non-permanent seats. The request is just and has the full support of Lebanon and the Arab Group. I would like to recall that the Arab paper, distributed by the Permanent Representative of Bahrain in document A/AC.247/1998/CRP.2, backs fully the principle of geographical rotation of permanent seats.

We realize clearly here that the Asian and African Groups are intertwined in resolution 1991 (XVIII) and their distribution in the enlarged Council since 1963 has been considered in a similar pattern. Today the African Group is composed of 53 Member States and the Asian Group of 50, which means that the Asian Group will get roughly the same increase in both permanent and non-permanent seats.

May I add that resolution 1991 (XVIII) B decides in paragraph 3, regarding the representation of the Economic and Social Council, that additional members shall be elected according to the following pattern:

"(a) Seven from African and Asian States".

This is to stress that a link was defined in 1963, when the Charter was amended, between the African Group and the Asian Group in the increased membership of both the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council through the gentlemen's agreement of 1963 between the Asian Group and the African Group, and it is likely to be so in the projected enlargement of the Council. Even if the African Group and the Asian Group were not intertwined in resolution 1991 (XVIII), it remains obvious that the Asian Group still has to define its objectives and the means to attain these objectives, because we are part and parcel of the general agreement to be reached.

Fourthly, allow me to focus on resolution 48/26, Article 23 of the Charter and rule 143 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

These texts, which are neither restrictive nor exclusive with regard to candidatures, are relevant to our discussion on the election of non-permanent members in the existing and in the projected Council, but definitely not for permanent membership, because in 1945 the founding fathers of the United Nations did not foresee that the day would come when new permanent seats would be added to the existing permanent five.

Criteria enumerated in Article 23 of the Charter and rule 143 of the rules of procedure brought about the election of 21 Member States of the Asian Group out of 50 for non-permanent Asian seats in the Security Council. But what about criteria for permanent membership candidatures? There are none, because these texts, which constitute the reference for candidatures for non-permanent membership, are silent on the matter of new permanent members simply because the Charter adopted in 1945 did not consider the dramatic changes to come 50 years later and reflected in our debates in the last five years. This is why the Asian Group has to agree on criteria and on the number of new permanent Asian seats. This clearly concerns Asian representation in the Council, and the contenders aiming at occupying permanent seats will ultimately be able to fill the seats because they are primarily members of the Asian Group. Today, very few countries in the Asian Group refuse to allow the Asian Group to deal with this fundamental topic in its proper setting while allowing discussion on the representation of the Asian Group in other bodies of the United Nations.

But ultimately, the Asian Group, after deciding on its system for permanent membership, will have to deal with criteria for candidatures for permanent membership to fill the projected Asian seats. Article 23 could be one source of inspiration from which to draw some of the criteria for Asian representation, for new permanent Asian membership. Other criteria should be discussed as well. But it is of paramount importance that the proposed criteria should be democratic and non-discriminatory, if they are to ensure general agreement.

For the time being the Asian Group lacks a common approach to the system of representation, as well as criteria and, hence, candidatures regarding new permanent seats. It is high time to tackle the issue. And this is precisely one of the objectives of the "eleven Arab States démarche".

Fifthly, whether the Council is composed of 20, 21, 24, 26 or at least 26 members, the share of the Asian Group will be enlarged accordingly. If the Asian Group is not to be involved as such in the negotiations, I wonder who will speak for the Asian Group.

There has always been a general agreement, since Dumbarton Oaks, that the size of the Security Council should be large enough to provide for the inclusion of various interests, yet small enough to act efficiently.

At the inception of the United Nations in 1945, the Security Council consisted of 21.6 per cent of the membership. In 1963 the new ratio of Council membership to that of the Organization as a whole was 13.25 per cent. It follows that the new Council should consist of at least 26 members if it is to reflect a similar ratio to that of 1963. This is why the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab Group and the Organization of the Islamic Conference have always called for an increase which would ensure a membership of at least 26 in the Council. Failure to do so would run contrary to the spirit and the letter of resolution 48/26, which underlines the principle of equitable geographical distribution.

The Asian Group has a crucial role to play in the reform of the Security Council. This is why we call on all its members to show flexibility and open-mindedness in order to allow the launching of a thorough discussion with a view to bringing about a democratic debate among the 50 member States of the Group. The Asian Group, which never had the chance to embark on the consideration of the question, is duty-bound to decide on its system of representation and on candidatures for the Security Council, whether for new permanent or non-permanent seats.

We should always keep in mind that we are dealing with the representation of the Asian Group in the Security Council in both categories. It is time to study the issue if we are to unlock the present impasse on Security Council reform.

If posturing continues to block the necessary geographical approach to the representation of each geographical group in the projected new permanent and non-permanent seats, the stalemate will continue in the work of the Open-ended Working Group.

Does this mean that we are back to square one? Definitely not. In the last five years, we have achieved a lot in both clusters I and II, and today, when draft resolution A/53/L.16 is adopted, the General Assembly will be reminding everyone that texts -- whether the Charter, resolutions or the rules of procedure -- are to be implemented in order to allow the general agreement that will confer the necessary legitimacy on the foreseen enlargement of the Security Council. We believe firmly that the adoption of draft resolution A/53/L.16 by the General Assembly at the conclusion of our debate on this item will serve to provide a new impetus to the process of Security Council reform.

Mr. Mapuranga (Zimbabwe)

I wish to associate my delegation with the draft resolution before us in document A/53/L.16, entitled "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters", under agenda item 59. As we look ahead to continued debate in the Working Group of the General Assembly on the reform and expansion of the Security Council, it is pertinent that we highlight those areas which need serious treatment in order to give impetus to the work of the Working Group.

I wish to recall a number of ministerial meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as meetings at the level of heads of State or Government, including the recent Non-Aligned Movement summit in Durban, held only two months ago, which resolved that where there is a need for the Charter of the United Nations to be amended, then this Assembly is to be guided by Article 108 of the Charter. Article 108 stipulates that amendments to the present Charter of the United Nations must be "adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly" in order for the amendments to come into effect after due ratification by Member States.

Article 18, to which several Member States or delegations have alluded, though it deals with important matters on which decisions must be taken by the General Assembly, does not address decisions with Charter amendment implications. We believe this mode of amendment is constitutional and legal under the United Nations Charter and that it allows all Member States to exercise their rights on behalf of their populations when changes are made to any of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

My delegation is a sponsor of this draft resolution because it covers well the concerns of my country and my continent, Africa. The Assembly will recall that my delegation has said, both here and in the Working Group, and it will continue to say, now and in the future, that Africa wants two permanent and three non-permanent seats on the expanded Security Council, with new permanent members enjoying the same privileges as those exercised by the current permanent members. Africa requests that its permanent seats be held on a rotational basis, as determined by the Africans themselves and as approved by this Assembly. This is in keeping with the resolutions adopted by the African heads of State or Government in Harare last year, and in Burkina Faso in August this year.

Similarly, Zimbabwe concurs with the decision of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that the Security Council, in order to be representative, needs to be expanded to 26 members. We would want it to be expanded in both categories. In order for the Security Council to be democratic in its decision-making mechanism, the veto needs to be restricted to matters pertaining to Chapter VII of the Charter, with a view to the eventual elimination of the veto. Meanwhile, my delegation believes that no members of the Security Council should be discriminated against as far as the use of the veto is concerned.

The draft resolution now before the General Assembly, while calling for the debate to reach the earliest possible conclusion, provides that no time-frame should be stipulated, but rather that any decisions must take into account the concerns of all regions in crafting the size and composition of the new and expanded Security Council. Above all, there should be no quick fix to this important issue. This has been the stand of the Non-Aligned Movement and Africa all along. We, for our part, will continue to remind our colleagues of this in our negotiations.

Let me conclude by making one observation in order to quell any innuendo or rumour. My delegation is co-sponsoring the draft resolution on Security Council reform in good faith. The draft is not against Germany or Japan or any other Member of the United Nations. We are convinced that the time has simply come for the silent majority to speak on the two operational principles enshrined in the draft resolution so that our future actions will be rooted in the agreed upon guidelines.

My delegation, accordingly, urges the adoption of draft resolution A/53/L.16 by the Assembly.

Mr. Lee See-young (Republic of Korea)

The reform of the Security Council remains one of the top priority issues on our agenda, despite intensive deliberations among Member States for the past five years. The Republic of Korea has steadfastly supported the expansion of the Security Council and the democratic reform of its working methods. We believe that the Security Council should be expanded to better represent today's United Nations, which now has 185 Member States, a figure more than three times what it was in 1945. Furthermore, to be more effective, the expanded Council should work in a more democratic manner. These are indeed extremely important and very challenging tasks we should address together.

Although our departure point is the present, our aim in discussing Security Council reform should be directed towards the future. The process of reform should be undertaken in anticipation of the new international realities of the twenty-first century so as to enable the world community to meet the enormous challenges it will have to face for many decades to come.

The deliberations of the past five years in the Open-ended Working Group have confirmed the existence of broad support for the expansion of the Security Council. But the unfortunate reality is that we have not been able to find an expansion package which can enjoy general agreement. Divergent views still exist on a number of important issues such as the categories and total size of the enlarged Council, qualifications and modalities for the selection of the new membership and the system of periodic review.

With regard to the issue of the categories and size of the enlarged Council, particular care should be given to ensuring that all Member States can serve in the Council with reasonable frequency, commensurate with their capabilities to contribute to international peace and security. The utmost caution should also be exercised against ending up only with the empowerment of a select few Member States with a privileged status. In this vein, we are convinced that the number of veto holders must not be increased. The veto is indeed an exception to the principle of sovereign equality -- it came about under the special circumstances after the Second World War -- and therefore should not be expanded, but rather rationalized.

As to the issue of permanent membership, many questions remain unanswered. Regardless of whether or when the international community can find optimal answers to these questions, we are always prepared to go ahead with the expansion of the non-permanent membership. By definition, non-permanency through periodic elections better ensures the democratic representativeness of the Security Council.

In this connection, we also believe that an increased number of non-permanent seats should be distributed on a more equitable geographical basis. We should take into account all relevant factors, including the changed configurations which have come about in each regional group in the United Nations in the post-cold-war era. Given the recent enlargement of the membership and the geographical coverage of the Asian Group, it deserves special consideration in the composition of an expanded Council.

My Government also attaches high priority to the issue of periodic review of the enlarged Council. To be meaningful, periodic review should be undertaken in a substantive manner within a reasonable time-frame. In this regard, my delegation submitted a conference room paper to the Open-ended Working Group, as contained in its report to the General Assembly. We hope that this proposal will be examined more thoroughly by next year's Working Group.

The issue of improving transparency in the work of the Security Council is no less important than Council expansion itself. It is our firm belief that ensuring greater transparency will lead the Council to greater efficiency in its work. With this conviction, my delegation, together with those of other non-permanent members, took a joint initiative in December last year to make a number of practical suggestions for transparency measures. We followed it up in the Open-ended Working Group by submitting two conference room papers, as contained in the Working Group's report.

In this regard, we welcome the open meeting of the Security Council held recently, on 10 November, to hear the briefing by Mrs. Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, on protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations. This is a positive step forward. We also hope that it will become a regular feature of the Council. We have suggested a number of other practical steps which can be taken by Council members to increase the frequency of open meetings. For example, the incoming President of the Council could consider the provisional monthly programme in an open meeting rather than in a closed setting. This would allow the general membership to observe first-hand how the Council was going to work in that particular month. It would be a good way to engage the general membership in the work of the Council.

My delegation believes that the time has come to take stock of our past discussions and concentrate on the remaining issues. We will have to work hard together to reach general agreement on a reform package. My Government holds the consistent view that general agreement must adhere as closely as possible to consensus. Any decision on a reform package that neglects the minority positions could do more to undermine than to strengthen the integrity of the United Nations by dividing the general membership.

However, in case we have to take a decision by a vote on the Security Council reform package, we firmly believe it should be taken by at least a two-thirds majority of the entire United Nations membership, as stipulated in Article 108 of the Charter, since any reform package will require Charter amendment. It is self-evident from the Charter that the two-thirds majority of all members should be the minimum threshold. Any attempt to apply a lower threshold is simply unacceptable, given the gravity of the decisions and their virtual intractability for a long time to come. Those are the reasons which led the Republic of Korea to co-sponsor the draft resolution contained in document A/53/L.16.

For the last two days, we have heard many arguments about draft resolution A/53/L.16. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify a few points. First, contrary to some arguments, draft resolution A/53/L.16 does not ask for a complicated decision. Instead, it poses a very simple procedural question which is related only to the decision-making procedure to be applied to Security Council reform. Secondly, it provides a very clear-cut answer which is perfectly consistent with the letter and spirit of the Charter. The draft resolution upholds the integrity of the Charter, as it fills a procedural gap in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. Thirdly, the language of draft resolution A/53/L.16 is a faithful reflection of the decision already taken at the recent summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Durban, which commands the support of the large majority of United Nations Members.

Fourthly, regarding concern about the meaning of the phrase "any resolution with Charter amendment implications", let me quote what Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt stated yesterday:

"the phrase any resolution with Charter amendment implications' ... in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution refers to any resolution on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters which contains criteria for, or elements to be incorporated in, an amendment to the Charter or that lead to the possible adoption of amendments to the Charter." (A/54/PV.63)

Allow me now to make some comments on the amendments contained in document A/53/L.42. It is positive to note that the sponsors of document A/53/L.42 now recognize that the two-thirds majority of the entire membership should be the basis for decision-making on any Security Council reform package, although some of them which I do not wish to name, were not of that view until very recently. However, document A/53/L.42 is unacceptable to us because of the following shortcomings.

First, the amendment to operative paragraph 2 contained in paragraph 5 of document A/53/L.42, by referring to resolution 48/26, which concerns only the mandate of the Working Group, fails to address the real question posed by draft resolution A/53/L.16, namely, the decision-making procedure of the General Assembly itself.

Secondly, we find that document A/53/L.42 attempts to create another rule to be applied without the legal basis of the Charter. While draft resolution A/53/L.16 is based on the provision of Article 108 of the Charter, document A/53/L.42 bases its argument merely on another General Assembly resolution.

Thirdly, many doubts exist about the political intentions behind document A/53/L.42. As aptly pointed out by the Singaporean Ambassador yesterday, legal arguments have frequently been used to cover up political calculations. As for myself, I wish this were not the case with the sponsors of document A/53/L.42. We therefore expect them to take into account the above-mentioned shortcomings and come closer to the position maintained in draft resolution A/53/L.16 so that it can be adopted by consensus.

The adoption of draft resolution A/53/L.16 will clear up procedural uncertainties which have been hanging over the Security Council reform process. It will be a positive step forward in providing a fresh momentum to seeking general agreement on the substantive questions involving Council reform.

We expect that under your able leadership, Mr. President, next year's Working Group will reap a fruitful result and, indeed, we all count on you. I would like to conclude by reiterating the abiding commitment of my Government to the credible and democratic reform of the Security Council.

Mr. Petrella (Argentina)

May I begin by expressing my delegation's appreciation for the efforts and activities of the former Chairman of the Working Group, Mr. Udovenko of Ukraine, and by the Vice-Chairmen, Ambassadors Breitenstein of Finland and Jayanama of Thailand. All of us who have participated in the discussion of this delicate matter for the past five years pay tribute to them.

These five years have not been years of academic or sterile discussions. On the contrary, they have helped us all realize the difficult and serious implications of the reform of the Security Council.

Building a new international security system for the twenty-first century requires, in the first place, that we definitively abandon many of the criteria that served as a basis in 1945 for the current Security Council. Abandoning these criteria does not necessarily mean doing away with all that exists today. Abandoning the old criteria means specifically that the new Security Council should be built, without affecting the essential aspects of its structure, in a way that does not add new privileges or privileged categories, does not exclude the great majority of countries and that does not jeopardize the democratic principles on which the Charter was drafted after the Second World War.

To try today, at the end of the twentieth century, to return to 1945 would make no sense. To attempt to do so when, among other things, we are trying to incorporate civil society within the United Nations, would be an anachronism. Only the ambitions of a very few are creating the difficulties that we now face.

It is a regrettable contradiction to think that we could reform the security system by making it less democratic and more exclusive at a time when the Group of 7 demands more democracy and greater transparency on the part of the financial bodies in the construction of a new international financial architecture. It is even more regrettable, and incomprehensible, in the context of the process of European integration characterized by common statutes, a single currency, a common central bank, a common foreign policy and a common rotating presidency.

Imagine for only a moment the immense rupture that would be created by the establishment of unprecedented privileges in continents where by history, tradition and legal norms the sovereign equality of all States has been enshrined, as is the case in Latin America and the Caribbean, a region to which your country, Mr. President, and my own have the honour to belong.

The debate on draft resolution A/53/L.16 is merely a sample of the difficulty that reform of the Council entails. We must not allow some of the arguments formulated during the debate to confuse the meaning of the draft resolution. The draft resolution is of an exclusively procedural nature. It does not seek to create a third category of decisions not contemplated in Article 18 of the Charter. It seeks merely to guarantee that -- in the context of the question of Security Council reform -- decisions that imply amendments, or elements or criteria to be incorporated into amendments, be adopted in accordance with Article 108. Without draft resolution A/53/L.16 this type of decision could be adopted by only 70 or 80 votes, clearly contradicting the spirit and the letter of the Charter. The draft resolution is aimed precisely at preserving the integrity of the Charter and all its provisions.

To claim that draft resolution A/53/L.16 would have drastic legal consequences is to take it out of context: paragraph 2 clearly refers to any resolution on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters.

Argentina considers it essential that the Security Council reform its working methods and that it become a more transparent organ, so that national parliaments and public opinion can appreciate its vitally important work. Here, we congratulate the United States, which is presiding over the Council this month, on having convened an open debate on the question of refugees. We were inspired by that initiative because since the very first time it participated in the work of the Security Council Argentina has advocated the need for transparency; along with New Zealand, we submitted a document in that regard only a few years ago. We hope that the United States initiative will be followed up.

Mr. President, I would like expressly to state my delegation's agreement and admiration at the way in which you are guiding the work of the Assembly at this critical and difficult moment in history, which is unprecedented since we first began the reform process. We are convinced that with your ability and sensitivity you will be able to control this debate in order to avoid the rifts that we have seen appearing.

Such rifts are the result of hurried analysis of draft resolution A/53/L.16, and respond to petty interests. Opponents of the draft resolution see in it an obstacle to their wish to obtain permanent membership of the Security Council with the support of a minority of the General Assembly. But it would be to the greater benefit of both the