General Assembly Session 53 meeting 63

The President

I call on the representative of Egypt to introduce draft resolution A/53/L.16.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt)

I shall first speak on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/53/L.16, to introduce that draft resolution, and will then make a statement on behalf of the delegation of Egypt.

Draft resolution A/53/L.16 was submitted and circulated more than three weeks ago, so it is only fair to assume that every delegation in this Hall is well acquainted with its content. For that reason, I shall limit my introduction to a few points that will explain the objectives and the rationale of the text.

At the outset, it should be recalled that the Charter of the United Nations is the constitutional basis and the legal framework of our work. It should be recalled also that the General Assembly is the most democratic of institutions, whose responsibilities are discharged in a transparent manner in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and whose proceedings are regulated by its rules of procedure. The Charter clearly sets out the decision-making rules and the requirements for the adoption of amendments to the Charter. These are specified in Articles 108 and 109, which, as noted in the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution before us,

"when addressing matters relating to amendments to the Charter of the United Nations, ... calculate the majority required for taking decisions in the Assembly on the basis of the whole membership of the United Nations and not on the basis of the members present and voting".

Even in Article 109, which deals with the convening of a General Conference to review the Charter, the calculation of a majority is based on the membership of the United Nations: for the first 10 years it would have been a two-thirds majority, and since then it has been a simple majority -- of the Members of the United Nations, and not of members present and voting.

Needless to say, any decision relating to the expansion of the Security Council is intrinsically connected to amendment of the Charter, and should thus be subject to the decision-making threshold referred to in Article 108. Only such a conclusion would be in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

Cognizant of this conclusion, the heads of State or Government of the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed their determination only two months ago at their meeting in Durban, South Africa, that,

"any resolution with Charter amendment implications must be adopted by the two thirds majority of the United Nations membership referred to in Article 108 of the Charter". [Final Document of the twelfth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, chapter I, para. 65]

Draft resolution A/53/L.16 is a verbatim reflection -- word for word -- of the Non-Aligned Movement's position in this regard. I need not remind the General Assembly that it was adopted at the highest possible level, that of heads of State or Government.

In the course of the last few days, the sponsors of draft resolution A/53/L.16, in their ongoing efforts to work for the adoption of the draft resolution by consensus, have been listening to several views and concerns regarding the draft resolution. Allow me now to try to dispel some of those concerns in a genuine attempt by the sponsors to clarify the situation.

First, draft resolution A/53/L.16 is of a procedural nature. It does not touch or encroach upon matters of substance in any way and does not prejudice the position of any delegation with respect to the reform and expansion of the Security Council. The draft resolution aims at ensuring that the vital question of the composition of a reformed Security Council is decided by a credible majority of the United Nations membership, as prescribed in Article 108 of the Charter. Any country that wishes to enter the Security Council -- as either a permanent or a non-permanent member -- or any country that wishes to reform the Council in any way -- with respect to the veto, the working methods or any issue in cluster I or II -- should enter from the main gate: through Article 108 of the Charter. Back-door diplomacy can never replace the requisite majority prescribed by the Charter.

Secondly, the General Assembly has decided that the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council should continue its work on the basis of general agreement and submit a report before the end of the fifty-third session. It is therefore not acceptable to introduce draft resolutions on substance. Whether such draft resolutions are labelled as framework or conceptual draft resolutions is really immaterial. Yet rumours persist that such attempts are being considered. Draft resolution A/53/L.16 aims at ensuring that whenever a draft resolution on substance is advanced, the constitutional requirements stipulated for Charter amendments must be faithfully observed. Thus, the purpose and philosophy of draft resolution A/53/L.16 is -- and I would emphasize this -- to uphold the Charter requirements contained in Article 108.

It was for these considerations that the heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed in Durban the position of the Movement with respect to the decision-making threshold in the General Assembly, as reflected in this draft resolution. Allow me to underline this basic fact in no uncertain terms. Draft resolution A/53/L.16 is a faithful reproduction of paragraph 65 of the Final Document of the Durban summit. This is a fact that we all have to reckon with.

Thirdly, without draft resolution A/53/L.16 it is possible for an element of a Charter amendment on Security Council expansion and reform to be adopted by the General Assembly with as few as 70, 80 or perhaps fewer votes. Clearly, as I pointed out at the beginning of my statement, that would be contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Charter. It should also be recalled, in this context, that a certain proposal by the President of the General Assembly at its fifty-first session advanced what has been called a two-step approach. If it were not for such a proposal as the one that has become known as a framework or conceptual draft resolution, perhaps draft resolution A/53/L.16 would not have been proposed.

The Charter envisages a one-step approach. Indeed, the Charter cannot be amended unless the provisions or Article 108 are fully followed and observed. In this context, it should be recalled that the one single precedent with respect to the expansion of the Security Council took place in 1963, when Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter were amended. These amendments were adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1963 and came into force on 31 August 1965. The Assembly voted on a draft resolution which later became an amendment. No attempt was made then to produce a first step and a second step, a framework draft resolution or a conceptual draft resolution. Only a single resolution was adopted.

Fourthly, some views were expressed that this issue has already been discussed in the Working Group and that it should be continued to be discussed in that forum. The response of the sponsors to that view is that draft resolution A/53/L.16, by virtue of its procedural nature, does not prejudge any substantive question relating to the reform and expansion of the Security Council discussed in the Working Group, nor is it aimed against the aspirations of any region or any Member State. Indeed, draft resolution A/53/L.16 reiterates in its operative paragraph 3 that the Open-ended Working Group shall continue its work in 1999 in order to examine all proposals. Moreover, all of us who followed the deliberations of the Working Group last session can testify to the long time spent on the discussion of many of the procedural issues. In point of fact, the adoption of draft resolution A/53/L.16 will breathe life into the process of Security Council reform, as the clarification of the decision-making threshold in the Assembly will provide new impetus to our work in the Open-ended Working Group and will allow the Working Group to concentrate its time on the substantive questions related to the reform and expansion of the Security Council.

Fifthly, the possibility exists that some will seek the procedural path to confront draft resolution A/53/L.16 by alleging that its adoption requires a two-thirds majority. The sponsors will oppose any such attempts because draft resolution A/53/L.16 is of a purely procedural nature.

Sixthly, as to the concern about the meaning of the phrase "any resolution with Charter amendment implications", let me allay all concerns. That phrase, which is found in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, refers to any resolution on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters which contains criteria for, or elements to be incorporated in, an amendment to the Charter or that lead to the possible adoption of amendments to the Charter. I think this is an important point because we understand that some delegations had some concerns on this particular matter.

For all of these considerations, I submit draft resolution A/53/L.16 on behalf of the sponsors in the hope that it will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt)

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Egypt.

We are continuing our consideration of one of the most important items on our agenda: the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. Many of those who will speak on this item will probably be reflecting the importance of this question to all United Nations membership. This is natural and logical. Not only does this item concern reform of our international Organization, but it goes even further, addressing the restructuring of the contemporary international order itself.

The heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement have attached particular importance to this matter because of its sensitivity as well as its possible long-term repercussions. It affects the philosophy of the international system, the balance in international relations in general and the role of the United Nations and its credibility, in particular. Accordingly, the heads of State have stressed that this process should not be restricted to an imposed time-frame.

In spite of the importance accorded to this item as deserving of urgent attention, it could not be decided upon in the absence of a general agreement on it. That general agreement was reaffirmed in a resolution adopted by the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly establishing the Open-ended Working Group. In view of that resolution and in recognition of the importance of reaching a general agreement on this important question, the heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed the fact that any resolution with any implications of relevance to the Charter amendment had to be adopted by a two-thirds majority, as set out in Article 108 of the Charter.

I spoke in detail about this issue when I put forward the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, and I will not do so again. However, any draft resolution in the General Assembly containing anything relating to an amendment of the Charter either now or in the future, should be considered as constituting an amendment to the Charter requiring two-thirds majority.

In line with this concept, set forth in the Charter, any attempt to enshrine such ideas, regardless of what they are called, must be subject to the stipulations of Article 108. This is the only conclusion which accords with the Charter, in letter and spirit. This is also what the Non-Aligned Movement has put forward, and what Egypt is committed to. That is why we are co-sponsoring this draft resolution.

I would like to ask the following question: Who would benefit by contravening a resolution that calls for the full application of the provisions of the Charter that relate to amendments? Is not the honest response to this question that whoever tries to do so is trying to evade the provisions of the Charter that deal with amendments, and that such evasiveness is due to the fact that at present no two-thirds majority exists for the adoption of any amendment to the Charter?

Let me now turn to the question of reform of the Security Council. Our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amre Moussa, has already referred to the restructuring of the Security Council in his statement before the General Assembly. In his statement, he detailed the bases for the Egyptian position on the restructuring of the Security Council. These form the very bases of the Non-Aligned Movement's position: namely, that the reform of the Security Council and its expansion should be included in a single and integrated framework, in one transaction.

I should like to reaffirm that reforming the methods of work of the Security Council is no less important than the question of expansion of its membership. In fact, Egypt regards the latter as more important. It could even be said that discussions in the Open-ended Working Group have demonstrated that there is a narrowing of the differences in views relating to reforming the methods of work of the Security Council. We think that when the Working Group resumes its work next year, it should continue to attempt to build on that narrowing of differences and to translate it into clear provisions when it resumes its work next year.

In this context, allow me to refer to the paper presented by the 10 non-permanents in the Security Council in December 1997. Those States called for a review of the Council's provisional rules of procedure which last were amended in 1982. Even the provisional rules of procedure of the Council have, in reality and from a practical standpoint, become paralysed and non-applicable because the work of the full Security Council is done through informal consultations. In fact, the Security Council now works in the absence of the legal framework represented by the provisional rules of procedure.

Let me now turn to the question of the veto, which for historical reasons is held by a limited number of Powers. Fifty years have elapsed since the establishment of the Security Council, but the scope of the applicability of the veto has not yet been defined. Thus, the heads of State or Government have, for 20 years, called for a review of the veto. In 1995 at the Carthage summit and again in 1998 at the Durban summit, they stated that efforts must be made to democratize the United Nations and that the use of the veto should be restricted as a prelude to its eventual elimination. The Durban summit specifically referred to the need to amend the United Nations Charter in order to restrict the veto right to matters that fall under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Working Group has echoed that opinion, and several documents have been submitted in that connection. Restricting the veto right would be a step in the right direction. This matter should be taken up by the Working Group next year.

Let me now refer to the expansion of the membership with a view to rectifying the imbalance in representation on the Council. No better evidence exists to demonstrate this imbalance than the fact that the Non-Aligned Movement, comprising 114 Member States -- approximately two thirds of the membership of the Organization -- is now represented on the Council by only four States. Therefore less than one third of the membership of the Council represents 114 Member States. We think that any review of the membership should take that fact into account and that reform should be carried out on the basis of equitable geographical distribution and in the principle of equal sovereignty among States.

In this regard, Egypt supports the position of the Non-Aligned, which calls for a membership increase of no less than 11 States and would not accept any selective or partial expansion. We also support what was adopted at the Harare summit of African heads of State last year as regards the allocation of five non-permanent seats and two permanent seats to Africa, to be assigned on a rotating basis in accordance with criteria agreed upon by the group of African States. Discussions in the Working Group on the expansion of the Council have demonstrated that there are differing views among States, particularly with regard to increasing the number of permanent members of the Council. Several problems emerged which impede agreement on these issues for the present. These include the naming of States which are qualified to fill these seats or to alternate in occupying them. Also, there are problems on an agreement regarding the criteria to be followed in selecting such States and the possible negative impact if the number of States with permanent membership and thus veto power is increased. We should also refer to the view which is generally opposed to the principle of bestowing the veto power on any State or group of States without clear limits being set on the use of the veto. This reality demonstrates the need for more time to give this issue objective and careful consideration. The Open-ended Working Group is undoubtedly the proper place for such consideration.

In order to highlight the convergence of views in the Working Group, let us recall the fall-back position of the Non-Aligned States, as presented in the 1995 paper, namely, that if agreement is not reached regarding categories of membership, then the expansion should be limited for the present to the non-permanent seats. This does not preclude the possibility of continuing discussion of ideas relating to expansion of the other categories, which should proceed in an objective manner with a view to reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

The General Assembly, when adopting decision 52/490 by consensus last August, agreed that the Working Group would continue to work during this session. We do hope that what we have said will be considered at the resumed session of the Working Group. The Assembly can rely on Egypt to work towards the achievement of this goal.

In conclusion, allow me to express Egypt's hope that draft resolution A/53/L.16 can be adopted by consensus. We hope that the General Assembly will take the initiative of adopting the necessary draft resolutions as speedily as possible.

I apologize for having spoken at such length.

Mr. Yel'chenko (Ukraine)

My delegation takes note of draft resolution A/53/L.16, submitted under agenda item 59, and of its introduction by the representative of Egypt. We also take note of the amendments to this draft resolution contained in document A/53/L.42.

In view of this, let me set the record straight. Since we are all aware of the fact that there is still no consensus on these proposals, it is very important to do everything possible to avoid bringing them to a vote.

It is not the contents of the proposals that are the major reason for our concern. Both proposals contain elements that we greatly support, although our delegation believes that the formulation of them could be further improved. However, at this stage we have no intention to comment on their substance.

Nor is it the emergence of draft decisions relating to the Security Council reform that is causing our unfavourable reaction. We recognize the acute need for stimulating injections that could advance the decision-making process, and it would be a welcome development if the submitted proposals contributed to this goal.

What we disapprove of here -- if the word "disapprove" is strong enough to adequately reflect the reaction of my delegation -- is the fact that a vote on these two proposals would undoubtedly lead to undesirable confrontations among Member States and destroy the atmosphere of confidence that we managed to restore during the previous session of the General Assembly.

In this regard it must be recalled that last year the General Assembly was facing almost the same situation; however, its President discerned from the very beginning the damaging consequences that would result from the proposals being considered in plenary. His energetic efforts helped to avoid confrontation and led to agreement that the Assembly would not take any decision on this item. Such a solution to the problem was highly appreciated by all delegations, including the co-sponsors of the submitted proposals.

The precedent of the previous session proved that there is a way of avoiding unnecessary conflict situations. If my understanding of the established practices of the General Assembly is correct, then we must proceed first with a debate on this agenda item; only after that would we consider the above-mentioned proposals. Therefore delegations will have time to consult further with a view to reaching common ground on the matter.

My delegation feels with absolute certainty that the consensus the Assembly is seeking on the substance of Security Council reform will be problematic to achieve. It is a regrettable fact, but it is better to admit it than to be misled by unrealistic expectations. The implication is that one day the Assembly will inevitably face a vote on these matters.

At the same time, we are equally convinced that it may become possible to achieve consensus on the ideas contained in draft resolution A/53/L.16 and its amendments -- and I would like to stress that we must achieve this consensus. If common sense and political wisdom lead to the holding of additional consultations in order to reach a unanimous decision on the proposals, the delegation of Ukraine will be ready to contribute to these efforts by advancing a number of concrete suggestions.

Having said this, I would now like to make my delegation's contribution to the debate on the agenda item under consideration.

It is indisputable that we are witnessing very active and unremitting interest in the item under consideration. This interest should be regarded first of all as a reconfirmation of the refusal of the vast majority of the United Nations membership to accept the long-standing status quo in the organ entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Twenty years have elapsed since the inclusion of the issue of Security Council reform in the agenda of the General Assembly. For five consecutive years, various aspects of this reform have been thoroughly discussed within the Open-ended Working Group mandated to deal with this matter. As far back as three years ago, Member States undertook the commitment that the Security Council should

"be expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character and improve its working efficiency and transparency". (resolution 50/6, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, para. 14)

However, as we meet at this fifty-third session of the General Assembly, we have to admit that the fundamental question -- how to advance from the Security Council which we have now to an organ which is more representative and transparent but not less efficient -- remains unanswered. Many of us, including my own delegation, find it difficult to conceal our deep disappointment over the apparent stalemate in the decision-seeking process.

Nonetheless, Ukraine's firm position on the need for a reformed Security Council also remains unchanged. There are a few reasons for this. On the one hand, Ukraine has an immediate national interest in this endeavour, which has a direct relationship to considerations of national security. We must strengthen the capacity of the Security Council as the most reliable and effective guarantor of international relations free from any form of coercion or use of force, of the settlement of international disputes only by peaceful political means and of energetic collective action always being taken in order to avert any development endangering national sovereignty or threatening global stability.

On the other hand, my country does not want to remain apart, as a mere customer of security produced by efforts of the international community. Offering our contribution to the generation of global security is a top priority of our foreign policy today. The same reasons which compelled Ukraine to decide to seek election next year for non-permanent membership in the Security Council for the period 2000-2001 explain our determination to secure an additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group in the enlarged membership of that very important organ of the United Nations.

I am confident that the relevant interests of the overwhelming majority of Member States on the need for this reform are identical or similar to those of my country. It seems that practically nobody questions the urgency of such reform as the only means to ensure that the Security Council continues to function in the next century as a supreme international authority dealing with matters of peace and security.

Should our frustration on the slow pace of this reform discourage us from the endeavour to continue to search for generally acceptable outlines of the solution to this fundamental issue? My delegation's clear response would be "No". This reform is worthy of unsparing and strenuous efforts; it must advance on the road to this goal -- step by step, inch by inch. That is why we very much value the contribution in this reform exercise made by the Open-ended Working Group during the previous session of the General Assembly.

Although the outside world has not witnessed an expected breakthrough in the efforts to bring the reform process to fruition, the Working Group managed to consider all of the issues bearing relation to the transformation of the Security Council in the most comprehensive, structured and exhaustive manner. The results of this important work are accurately reflected in the annexes to the report of the Working Group.

I cannot help expressing our pride that your predecessor, Mr. President, who is our countryman, made an essential personal contribution, with the constructive support of practically all delegations, to creating a favourable and stimulating atmosphere allowing us to continue this job with new enthusiasm, determination and energy.

We also wish to acknowledge the very instrumental efforts of Ambassadors Breitenstein of Finland and Jayanama of Thailand, the former Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group. We were impressed with their dedication to the accomplishment of the Working Group's mandate. We hope very much that the Working Group, as it resumes its work during the current session, will continue to derive benefit from their exceptional expertise and unrivalled competence in the matter.

The fifth year of deliberations within the Working Group produced conclusive evidence that the time for academic debates and sterile discussions is over. Otherwise, we are doomed to continue this endless exercise without reaching a goal. The President of the General Assembly at its fifty-second session, in his very frank and, in our view, objective evaluation of the overall situation in the decision-seeking process, which he gave on 24 August 1998, came to exactly the same conclusion. As he rightly said,

"If there is still a need for something to be explored after five years of intensive discussions, perhaps it is our ability to see beyond our national interests and our aptitude to measure this reform against the historical imperatives of today's world." (A/52/PV.91, p. 7)

Therefore, the most feasible way to break the impasse in this process is to start a qualitatively new stage of deliberations in the Working Group which should be focused on discussing comprehensive blueprints for an eventual decision on the substance of the Security Council reform. Due to the existence of irreconcilable differences, and even mutually exclusive concepts about the reform, it is obvious that the first drafts of such blueprints cannot be prepared within the format of the Working Group. However, it is the Working Group that has to discuss the merits of these proposals after their emergence. My delegation insists that actual negotiations should be conducted in a spirit of utmost transparency and within the confines of that body.

It is clear that, in the end, these blueprints should be put to the test in the General Assembly. In this respect, my delegation associates itself with the broadly upheld approach that substantive decisions on the issue of enlargement of the Security Council and reform of its methods of work -- even if they do not contain immediate proposals for amendments to the Charter -- must receive as much support as possible, and certainly not less than a two-thirds majority of the United Nations membership.

My delegation believes that the adoption of a resolution which prescribes a two-thirds majority of the United Nations membership as a required voting threshold for such decisions would be the right step to bring us closer to the fruition of this reform.

However, as I emphasized at the beginning of my intervention, it is the strong conviction of the delegation of Ukraine that such a resolution has to be adopted by consensus, and there is every reason to believe that this consensus is possible.