General Assembly Session 52 meeting 62

The President

I would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that two proposals have so far been submitted under the agenda item 59 of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, entitled "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters". They are draft resolution A/52/L.7 and the amendments to it contained in document A/52/L.47.

As we are opening the debate on agenda item 59, I would like to reconfirm my understanding that the General Assembly will not be taking any decision on this item at this stage of its consideration, in accordance with the assurances that I have received to this effect.

Referring to my consultations with the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, I would also like to advise the Assembly that there is no requirement for proposals submitted under a particular agenda item to be introduced at the beginning of the consideration of that item by the Assembly. In accordance with the established practices of the General Assembly, proposals submitted under a particular agenda item are introduced by their sponsors prior to the General Assembly's proceeding to take a decision on them.

In view of these considerations, it is my understanding that the statements made by Member States in the course of the debate on agenda item 59, without prejudice to their substance, should not be considered formal introductions of the proposals.

It is also my understanding that the introductions of the proposals under this agenda item, if and when they take place, will be in the order they were submitted, in accordance with, inter alia, rules 78, 90 and 91 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

We shall now proceed with the debate on this agenda item.

Mr. Kausikan (Singapore)

Our discussions on Security Council reform over the last four years have resulted in two clear, if somewhat contradictory, conclusions. First, there is little doubt that the majority of Member States consider the current composition and working methods of the Security Council archaic and unsatisfactory. Secondly, it is, unfortunately, equally clear that, notwithstanding this widely held view, there are few prospects for early progress. The key difficulties arise from the many contradictions and ambiguities in the positions that the current permanent members have taken on Security Council reform; and, of course, the Charter gives them a decisive influence.

My delegation has on a number of previous occasions publicly analysed these contradictions and ambiguities. I will not repeat in detail what we have already exposed. I refer members to my delegation's statements in the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council reform of 5 and 9 May and most recently to my Minister's statement in this Hall on 29 September.

A central issue is the failure of the current permanent members to clearly pronounce themselves on whether a new permanent member, be it from an industrialized or a developing country, should have the veto. The power of a new permanent member is not a question that can be deferred to a later date merely to make it easier to select new permanent members. This is because the powers of the new permanent members are intrinsic to the very notion and definition of permanent membership.

We did not expect answers to the questions that we posed, and we have not received any satisfactory answer. We are not particularly disappointed. Resolving the ambiguities is not just a matter of negotiating a text in a working group. It is not just a question of clever drafting or diplomatic ingenuity to paper over differences. The ambiguities reflect profound geopolitical uncertainties that can be settled only over time by events in the real world, and not in any working group.

This ought to be obvious if we consider the origins of the current permanent membership. The countries that are permanent members were the victors of the Second World War. They gave themselves the privilege of the veto because they were then so essential to the maintenance of international peace and security that they had to be reassured that they could not be compelled to take any action that could lead to conflicts among themselves. This would have broken up the United Nations.

At the end of the Second World War, it was relatively easy to determine the identity of these powerful few. With most of the world in ruins after a long and devastating conflict, it was easy to discern the winners and losers. It was logical that the victors should bear the primary responsibility for maintaining the new international order. In any case, there was no choice. No one else was in a position to successfully argue against their claims. Their status as permanent members reflected the compelling geopolitical realities of the day.

Nevertheless, even then two of the three big victors -- the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom -- were sceptical of Roosevelt's view of China's ability to play a major role in the post-war world, and Churchill's insistence on including France among the elite group met with similar scepticism from Roosevelt and Stalin. It should not therefore surprise us that we now run into even greater difficulties in trying to decide who belongs in the new elite.

The end of the cold war took everybody by surprise. Its resolution was far from clear-cut. The end of the cold war has precipitated a period of transition and uncertainty. We are still debating the consequences because we are still living through them. It is of course obvious that the world has changed, but this does not in itself prescribe any particular new geopolitical configuration. The power structure of the post-cold-war international order is still evolving. The outcome of this process cannot as yet be predicted. The United Nations, as an Organization of sovereign States, must necessarily reflect international reality more than shape it, whatever else some may pretend to believe. But even this incontrovertible fact provides no practical guidance for our discussions on Security Council reform.

If the purpose of Security Council reform is to more accurately reflect the post-cold-war world, then, logically, there should now be only one permanent member. Only the United States now disposes of the political, military and economic clout on the global scale needed to maintain international peace and security. But, of course, it is politically unacceptable to have only one permanent member. And even the United States, in its post-cold-war mood of introspection, faces domestic political difficulties in exercising its undoubted capabilities. The Administration's failure to persuade Congress to pay its arrears to the United Nations is but one small symptom.

Even a cursory examination of the current situation of the other permanent members may lead us to wonder what real meaning permanent membership has in the contemporary situation of geopolitical flux and uncertainty. Russia's main preoccupations are internal, and understandably so. Given the serious problems that it is grappling with, Russia has neither the capability nor the desire to consistently exercise power on a global scale as the Soviet Union did. Russia will certainly rise again, but it will be a different Russia with global interests and relationships different from those of the Soviet Union.

China is already a rising Power, but it is still primarily a regional Power. In per capita terms it will be a poor country well into the next century. Its focus is on economic development and resolving urgent internal problems. Its primary international interest for many years to come will be to secure peace and stability around its immediate borders so that it can continue to grow and deal with its internal problems. It will not be as deeply engaged elsewhere.

The United Kingdom and France are now European Powers with at best only residual global influence and limited clout outside the European Union. The sad recent history of Bosnia demonstrated that even the most powerful European States were not capable of settling a European problem by themselves. It was the intervention of the United States that proved decisive, and the United States chose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), not the United Nations Security Council, as the vehicle for its intervention.

It is clear that most of the current permanent members no longer have the will or the capability to exercise power on the global scale necessary to maintain international peace and security as envisaged by the Charter. It is a geopolitical reality that in present times several current permanent members are not permanent members because they are great Powers or global Powers in the traditional sense of these terms. By a reversal of logic, if they currently enjoy the status of a great or a global Power, it is primarily because they are already permanent members.

Before I am drowned out by howls of protest, let me hastily make my position clear. I am not suggesting that Security Council reform requires that any current permanent member be relegated to the common herd. Of course, the consequences of such a suggestion are too horrifying to contemplate, especially for the countries that will be directly affected. So let it be placed on the record that I accept and respect the historical fait accompli, even if its logic is no longer compelling. I recognize the useful and constructive roles that many current permanent members continue to play in international affairs. And even if these are not the roles for which they were originally given permanent status, they deserve our appreciation.

My point is simply that these are different roles. These are no longer unique roles that no other country is capable of assuming. Several other Members of the United Nations already play similar roles without any ambition of elevation to permanent status.

Perhaps our discussion on Security Council reform would progress a little better if we temporarily abandon futile arguments over number and identity for a more fundamental re-examination of the meaning of permanent membership in the last years of the twentieth century. Let us examine what is really needed to maintain international peace and security in the twenty-first century. This is why my delegation had suggested, as early as the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly four years ago, that our discussions on Security Council reform should begin with an examination of the criteria for permanent membership. We are encouraged that several other delegations appear to be coming around to this view.

Our essential point can be stated simply. A reformed Security Council must reflect the post-cold-war geopolitical configuration if it is to be effective. The crucial decisions that will affect this geopolitical configuration are not going to be made in New York, or even in London, Paris, Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Berlin or Tokyo. It is not even clear that the geopolitical configuration can be shaped by a conscious and planned process of decision-making. The post-cold-war geopolitical configuration is going to emerge only gradually, over time, through the interactions of different countries in different regions of the world. It will be shaped by developments that cannot yet be predicted, developments which will probably surprise even those countries whose policies precipitated them. We will only waste time if we continue to pretend, as we unfortunately too often have for the last four years, that we can gather in a room in New York to decide the twenty-first century's geopolitical power structure through abstract intellectual debates.

Let me conclude by illustrating the point more concretely. My delegation has on several occasions commented on the studied ambiguity with which several, if not the majority, of the current permanent members have cloaked crucial aspects of their position on Security Council reform. This is understandable. No country is ever comfortable with a change in a status quo that favours it. But, that said, I must also acknowledge that a majority of the permanent members have appeared most categoric in their desire to see Japan and Germany as new permanent members. Let me therefore take that as the starting point of my illustration.

Many countries, certainly including my own and perhaps even a majority of Member States, would agree that when general agreement is reached on the expansion of the Security Council, Japan and Germany should be among the new permanent members. That Japan and Germany now exercise global economic clout is not in dispute. Nor is the fact that they want and are searching for a bigger international political role. These are positive developments. They are among the new realities whose consequences have yet to unfold.

But precisely because of this, there is still no clear consensus, either in Germany or Japan or in their respective regions, on the precise international roles they should play, particularly if this will involve the deployment of military forces. There has never been a period in the entire sweep of Asian history in which China and Japan have been simultaneously strong Powers. We are now entering such a period, with all its attendant uncertainties. In Europe, a newly unified Germany and a Russia that is still struggling to redefine itself apart from the former Soviet Union are both, for different reasons, currently internally preoccupied. Neither has yet definitively settled their relationship with each other or with their neighbours.

It is therefore not surprising that China and Russia, like all other permanent members, have not been clear on whether or not Japan and Germany should have the veto. It is therefore still unclear whether they really believe Germany and Japan should be new permanent members -- and this even though Japan and Germany enjoy widespread support for permanent membership from many other Member States.

I am not suggesting that Moscow and Beijing are being particularly difficult or different. After all, even the United States has not yet clearly stated that it trusts its own treaty allies, whose elevation to permanent status it strongly and publicly advocates, sufficiently to give them a veto over American policies. And even if the Administration is willing to do so, I am not sure Congress would agree.

This hesitation and coyness is perhaps only prudent. Perhaps it is even a duty, given the geopolitical uncertainties of the contemporary international system. Nobody wants to give any hostages to fortune. For the same reason, no Government that really believes that its country deserves permanent status can permanently commit all future governments to giving up the veto. The geopolitical uncertainties are no less elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They will certainly not be settled by conceptually contradictory slogans such as permanent rotational membership, as has been suggested by some.

I hope I am not misunderstood. I am not suggesting that China and Japan cannot cooperate or that Germany and Russia will never coexist. This is obviously not true, because they are already doing so. But the present happy situation is not to be taken for granted given the long, complex and often troubled history of relations between these countries -- a history that, in the case of China and Japan, has been characterized by many centuries of profound ambiguity. It is not unreasonable for countries that enjoy the privileges of the status quo to prefer to avoid making precipitate decisions. In fact, this is an entirely reasonable position to take given the geopolitical uncertainties. It would therefore be equally unreasonable to expect Asia, Africa or Latin America to take precipitate decisions on who from their regions should enjoy permanent status.

Time and events will clarify matters. How much time, no one can presently honestly say. Events must mature and unfold naturally to clarify themselves. This is not a process that can or should be rushed.

We would do the United Nations and the Security Council grievous damage if we were to take decisions that might eventually bear only a tenuous relationship to what finally evolves in the real world. Any international organization of sovereign States dooms itself to irrelevance if it ignores or divorces itself from the realities in which it is embedded. And the shape of those realities can be only imperfectly glimpsed at present. This is why we, like other Non-Aligned Movement countries, have been consistent in cautioning against a hasty decision on Security Council reform. A Security Council that includes all who now most assiduously press their claims to permanent status, but excludes other, currently not so obvious candidates whose claims may yet become compelling, would not just be ineffective. It would tear this Organization apart.

Four years is not a long time, given the gravity of the issues at stake. We understand the frustrations of those who see their hopes and ambitions recede with each passing year of endless debate. But pressure-cooking the process will not settle the crucial geopolitical realities that will, in the end, be decisive. Those countries that deserve permanent status will be given it when the time is ripe, not before. And when the time is ripe, there is no power that can resist their claims. Let us therefore not lose faith or patience and by so doing come to regret the consequences.

Mr. Gomersall (United Kingdom)

I do not wish to be misunderstood either. I do not want it to be thought that I am taking the floor in right of reply to the previous speaker. His views are always stimulating, though slightly exaggerated. But, as always, finding fault with the existing realities is somewhat of an evasion of the necessity which I think we all feel to try and find a way forward to the problems which he delineates, and the only way forward is to find a solution through negotiation. We have made a lot of painstaking efforts in that direction, and my delegation believes that the sensible thing to do is to continue.

It is always easy to attack the existing system without being quite so frank about the choices which all countries have to make with regard to the areas closest to themselves. We believe that the proposals which are on the table, in particular those submitted by President Razali last year, offer the best way of dealing with that admittedly very sensitive subject.

It was four years and one day ago that the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/26, which established the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, four years in which everybody has been agreed on the objective of enlargement of the Security Council, but in which, to the disappointment and frustration of the vast majority of us, a clearly ratifiable proposal for enlargement has yet to emerge. But the issue of the enlargement of the Security Council and reform of the methods of work of the Security Council remains as important now as it seemed to be four years ago. The political case for this item of reform is just as compelling as it is for other aspects of the modernization of this Organization.

We are closer now to seeing the outlines of a solution than we were at this time last year. This progress can be ascribed to two major developments: first, the consultations carried out by the co-vice-chairmen of the Working Group last winter. Their soundings demonstrated beyond any doubt that the vast majority of Member States do not want a temporary, half-hearted reform in just one category of Council membership, but a durable and significant enlargement in both categories of membership that increases developing country representation in those two categories. This general objective has furthermore been endorsed by several of the permanent members. For this, and for the rest of their hard work, we owe the co-Vice-Chairmen, Ambassadors Breitenstein and Jayanama, a vote of great thanks.

The second development was the presentation last March, by the then President of the General Assembly, Ambassador Razali, of a draft resolution on reform. This moved the discussion in a more concrete direction, and was the sort of comprehensive proposal which had long been required. It built on the co-vice-chairmen's consultations. It identified the mainstream in the debate, and came to be regarded as successfully representing the negotiating middle ground. Although it presented a number of delegations, including my own, with problems, it offered by far the best prospect for a solution so far, and indeed sparked a considerable amount of further positive consideration about how some of the remaining issues might eventually be solved. This was perhaps the most fruitful time in our debate so far, and we look forward to further consideration of the proposal this year.

Of course, neither of these developments brought about a consensus. Like your predecessor, Mr. President, you will be wise enough to recognize that consensus on a solution to this particular issue is probably unobtainable. But we recognize the need to respect the requirements of Article 108 of the Charter in a resolution adopting amendments to the Charter. Indeed, the statutory two-thirds majority for such a resolution would be a barely acceptable minimum. We want further efforts on a concrete proposal to reconcile the views of the greatest possible number of Member States. But at the end of the day, the General Assembly is here to take political decisions, and every effort should be made to take the necessary decisions at this session of the General Assembly -- and by the largest possible majority.

There is always an argument for putting something off. When Mr. Razali produced his proposal, the response was not so much that he had misjudged the content, but that more time should be given for consultation, particularly at the level of regional groups, and that the Assembly should not be rushed into a decision which would have lasting implications. That was nearly nine months ago. The proposal did serve, however, as an impetus for more focused thinking on how the tricky questions -- in particular that of selecting new permanent members, especially from the developing world -- should be approached, and in this regard it was a positive step forward.

Draft resolution A/52/L.7, sponsored by Italy and others, is, on the other hand, simply an invitation to eternal delay. Whatever the diversity of views among its supporters, it offers a backhanded endorsement of the status quo and ignores the progress which we made last year. We would share many of the specific comments made on the draft resolution by Ambassador Eitel in his latest letter to Permanent Representatives. We therefore welcome the announcement by you, Mr. President, of the understanding that no action will be taken on draft resolution A/52/L.7 at this stage.

The challenge remains, however, for the majority to find a basis for a broadly supported decision. My delegation is only one of many which have shown flexibility and political will over the last few months to try to achieve this, and we are not about to abandon the effort. There is now a much greater understanding on all sides of the parameters within which a workable outcome can be reached, and we will continue to make every effort with like-minded countries to bring this necessary reform to early fruition. Indeed, we are encouraged by the fact that the political energy still invested in this discussion proves that, underneath it all, there is a widespread recognition that this reform is inevitable.

We hope therefore that we shall begin our work in the new year with determination, building on the progress made during the fifty-first session and with an eye to taking a decision on the size and shape of the Council before the end of this "Reform Assembly".

Mr. Eitel (Germany)

For several weeks, many of us have been working to prepare for the discussion on agenda item 59. I am pleased that today offers another opportunity to make a couple of remarks on the issue. It is first and foremost here in the General Assembly that the important issues are and must be decided.

You, Mr. President, have prepared this debate carefully. You have consulted many delegations and have formed a common understanding about the way for our discussions to go forward and about their procedural result. You have acted with the authority and credibility inherent in the office of the President, and you deserve credit and applause. My delegation will do everything to respect and support your guidance.

The year 1997, especially the past few weeks, has been particularly dynamic as far as Security Council reform is concerned. It seems to me that procedural considerations, such as when and how the General Assembly should take a decision, have become more and more important and have been discussed almost more frequently than substance.

What precisely has happened since the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council started its work last January? First, we have witnessed the largest consultations in the history of the United Nations: the consultations of the co-Vice-Chairmen of the Working Group, Ambassador Breitenstein and Ambassador Jayanama, with 165 Member States, which led to major findings and clear majority views. Secondly, we have witnessed the presentation of the first full reform package, submitted by the former Chairman, Ambassador Razali. Thirdly, we have participated in the opening debate of the new session with Member States overwhelmingly focusing on United Nations and Security Council reform.

On these lines, I would like in my statement to focus on the following four main points: Germany as part of the mainstream; putting an end to self-centred discussions; the need for an agenda rather than an imposed time-frame; and faithful application of Article 108 of the Charter.

Six general debates, six agenda item debates and four Open-ended Working Group reports, with 48 annexes all together, have provided us with an extraordinary amount of statements, positions and proposals. Sometimes I feel as if we were like 185 pedestrians, looking for their way home in a big, rather dark, city with many unfamiliar streets, avenues and places. Many of us were lucky to find their way -- they took what I will call the "Avenue of the Two Enlarged Categories". That Avenue is ample and straight, with enough space for everyone. I would like to see as many as possible of the pedestrians who are still in search of their way, join those who have started to walk down the "Avenue of the Two Enlarged Categories". This Avenue is spacious; it has two lanes. It is straight; there are no unnecessary detours. It is secure in spite of heavy traffic -- hopefully, 24 members of an enlarged Council. It has enough sidewalk space. It is easy to look down because it is transparent. And it is easy to maintain -- the next overhaul, by a review, is already scheduled.

In my view, both the former Chairman and the co-Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group have made it clear in their papers annexed to the last report that their assessment of the views of 165 Member States go in that direction. One of the main findings was that a very large majority supported an increase in both categories -- permanent and non-permanent -- with a majority of them supporting an increase of five non-permanent and five permanent members, while only a few expressed categorical opposition to an increase in permanent membership. The Vice-Chairmen concluded that their findings made it clear that the Open-ended Working Group should fulfil its mandate within an expeditious and realistic time-frame.

I carefully double-checked both elements -- enlargement in the two categories and expeditious fulfilment of the mandate -- with the views expressed by Heads of State, Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and Heads of Delegation during this session's opening debate in September-October. Regarding the first element, I found that only 11 -- which makes 12 per cent -- out of 93 Member States that addressed the question of categories were against new permanent members, four of them expressing not even categorical opposition, but, rather, doubts or preference for rotation schemes on permanent seats. The rest, 81 Member States -- which makes 88 per cent -- favoured an increase in both categories. Among those that did not address the question were many Member States which referred in general to the official Organization of African Unity (OAU) position or which are otherwise known to support enlargement in both categories of membership.

Regarding the second element, my main criterion was: how did delegations tackle the question of the right timing? Out of 176 statements, 85 -- which is almost 80 per cent of those that addressed this question -- made more or less the point that a decision on Security Council reform should be taken soon. Only 18 -- which is about 20 per cent of those who spoke to it -- argued openly against any decision in the near future.

We must face one certainty: as long as we continue our discussion without a concrete negotiating text, all of us will continue to bargain for "best positions". If these "best positions" are maintained or new "best positions" are added, the failure of Security Council reform is guaranteed.

From the beginning, my delegation has tried to do its part to facilitate the process. We have proposed a periodic review which allows new permanent members to be replaced after 10, 15 or 20 years, thereby introducing a new and accountable concept of permanency. Moreover, we have stated on various occasions that, while discrimination within membership categories must be avoided, innovative and future-oriented ways of exercising the veto could be introduced.

In other areas, we also plead for a compromise between minimalist and maximalist positions, leading us to an enlargement package with the following features. The first is four new non-permanent members. The second is five new permanent members, three from the South and two industrialized States. Thirdly, there is election of the possible new permanent members by the General Assembly. Regional groups are not denied the right to propose regional mechanisms to the General Assembly as well; the General Assembly has the final decision. Fourthly, the original permanent members are to be engaged in a dialogue on their veto. Fifthly, the General Assembly decides about a veto for the new permanent members. If it does not agree on a solution, a high-level working group might be set up. In the meantime, new permanent members would enjoy certain interim rights.

Member States have come a long way in discussing reform. Since before 1992, when Member States were invited to submit comments on a possible review of the membership of the Security Council, the issue has been discussed year after year during the opening and the general debate of the forty-seventh, forty-eighth, forty-ninth, fiftieth and fifty-first sessions and now the fifty-second session. In addition, in 1993 the Open-ended Working Group was established, and since then it has submitted its yearly reports to the General Assembly. These reports were considered and adopted by the General Assembly in 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.

This issue cannot continue to be discussed in an abstract and endless manner. It ties up too many resources. Spending too much time and too many resources on dealing only with our own, home-made institutional challenges is not in line with our moral obligation to tackle the really pressing issues, issues which this Organization was created for. As examples, let me mention the areas of development, environment and human rights. In any of them, the existing situation gives serious reason for concern and requires immediate action. Can Member States and the United Nations afford to remain caught up in an internal, self-centred institutional debate which started at the beginning of this decade, if not earlier? My answer is a straight "No". Let us therefore put an end to our navel-gazing and show public opinion that the United Nations can do more than get absorbed in self-focused discussions. Security Council reform is not l'art pour l'art.

The imposed time-frame notion has made its entry into declarations of important groups of Member States, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of African States, to mention only two. Germany could not agree more with this position. No one can impose a time-frame on the General Assembly. There can be little doubt either that the General Assembly is sovereign in arranging a calendar for its decisions, if it wants to. A decision taken by the General Assembly in this sense, and in accordance with the Charter and the rules of procedure, is not "imposed"; at least, I myself have never heard someone question the legitimacy of a decision of the General Assembly by calling it "imposed". What we are dealing with here is not an imposed time-frame but a most ordinary agenda. It is agendas which determine our lives. Without an agenda little would ever go ahead.

By taking a decision in the near future, we would not introduce divisions in the United Nations membership, as some have claimed. The opposite seems to me to be true: the real division would be a continuation of fruitless and antagonizing exchanges in the Open-ended Working Group without any time agenda. Rather, further damage and contention would be prevented if an early preliminary decision to put Security Council reform on the tracks were taken through a democratic decision-making process in the General Assembly.

While I am convinced that sufficient time for reflection has to be given to those who need it, I am also pleading that we give ourselves a clear agenda to arrive at a decision. Moreover, I would like to point out two things. First, my delegation, at least, was not ready, and still is not ready, to put forward a proposal, since we feel that, in particular, the question of the overall size of the Security Council has not yet been agreed entirely. Secondly, if we had found agreement on a proposal with our like-minded friends, the Assembly can take my word that it would not have been presented to the membership by surprise. We have always been open about that, to everybody, including the main sponsors of document A/52/L.7.

Let me finally turn to a point of particular importance: the proposal to go beyond the Charter and to apply its Article 108 not only to amendments, but also to "amendment implications". I have been wondering what "implications" could mean in legal terms. For instance has a resolution like the one the Sixth Committee -- our lawyers -- adopted on 6 December 1995, with the positive votes of Italy and Mexico and as many as 92 countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, among them Egypt and Pakistan, had Charter amendment "implications"? When I read the resolution I found that by it the General Assembly recognizes that

"the enemy State' clauses in Articles 53, 77 and 107 of the Charter have become obsolete". [Resolution 50/52, thirteenth preambular paragraph]

A few lines later the resolution expresses the intention of the General Assembly to

"initiate the procedure set out in Article 108 of the Charter ... to amend the Charter" [ibid, para. 3]

-- that is, to apply Article 108 only at a later, perhaps the next, stage of the process. In my view, resolution 50/52 did have clear Charter amendment "implications", but correctly deferred the application of Article 108 to the next stage of amending the Charter in concreto.

To take another example: what if a draft Charter amendment resolution were to be postponed or submitted to a no-action motion? Would not we have to admit that these actions had "implications" for the envisaged Charter amendments? Or does not the General Assembly, when it decides to adopt reports of the Open-ended Working Group stating that there is agreement to expand the Security Council -- see, for instance, paragraph 13 of document A/49/47 of 15 September 1995 -- take decisions with Charter amendment "implications"?

Security Council reform is too important an issue to let ambiguities on the necessary voting majorities continue to exist. In paragraph 2 of Article 18, the Charter provides that decisions on important questions

"shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting".

I shall give an example. If for a vote on an important resolution which does not contain a Charter amendment 180 Member States are present and 170 of them vote, the necessary majority will be 114, which is two-thirds of 170. It is Germany's firm view that this majority must apply to important resolutions dealing with Security Council reform.

Article 108 of the Charter requires a majority of two-thirds of all Member States, which means at least 124 out of the present 185 Member States. Scholars and academia consider Article 108 a derogation of, and exception to, the general rules laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 18 of the Charter, and therefore not open to analogous extension and applicable only when -- to quote Article 108 -- "Amendments to the present Charter" are submitted. The raison d'etre of Article 108 is that the authors of the Charter wanted to make sure that any amendment to be sent to parliaments for ratification would have received beforehand a sufficiently large majority in the General Assembly to guarantee its following ratification.

Introducing a term like "Charter amendment implications" is not helpful, and even risks disrespect for the Charter and its well-defined voting system. Politically, it does not make a great difference, since the necessity of reaching a two-thirds majority of members present and voting under paragraph 2 of Article 18 is undisputed. When the General Assembly decision on concrete Charter amendments is taken, the necessary majority will, of course, have to be at least 124.

This interpretation of Article 108 of the Charter seems to me to be clear. However, in order to have the question clarified for everybody, I should like to ask you, Mr. President, to request a legal opinion from the Secretariat on the issue of whether or not Article 108 of the Charter is also applicable to decisions with amendment "implications".

Mr. Amorim (Brazil)

Mr. President, I would like to start by expressing my delegation's sincere appreciation for your skilful guidance in preparing the ground for today's debate. Security Council reform being one of the central issues on the United Nations agenda, it is reassuring to note that the President of the General Assembly is ready to exercise his wisdom and leadership in order to move our debate forward.

We have travelled a considerable distance since I last took the podium to address this issue a year ago. Thanks to the competence and dedication demonstrated by the co-Vice-Chairmen of the Working Group, Ambassador Breitenstein of Finland and Ambassador Jayanama of Thailand, we were able to start the year 1997 under the sign of a renewed dynamism. The exchange of views which they carried out with a total of 165 delegations, large and small, individually or in groups, revealed certain trends, providing delegations with a more focused image of where the possibilities for agreement lie. Their important findings, as transmitted to the Working Group on 10 and 14 March, have been included in our latest report, document A/51/47, under annex VII, and deserve to be recalled.

The co-Vice-Chairmen were able to discern the existence of a very large majority which favours an increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership. It is also of great significance that this majority believes there should be permanent members from both developing and industrialized countries.

These are the essential elements on the basis of which we must search for general agreement. My delegation, along with many others, is ready to proceed on Council reform taking fully into account the solid preparatory groundwork undertaken during this active year. As was made clear in the speech delivered by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, Ambassador Luiz Felipe Lampreia:

"There is a new thrust to negotiations. There is leadership, as well as carefully crafted proposals. We must take advantage of this unique opportunity in the history of the United Nations. We must not let the moment pass. Reform has become, more than a key concept; it has become the order of the day". [Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th meeting, p. 7]

In January 1998 the Working Group will resume its activities. Brazil is convinced that there is no need for additional exploratory debates and that we should fully embark on a negotiating process. We do not favour the establishment of artificial targets of any kind for completing our work. But we also oppose attempts to unduly slow down proceedings. Let us put aside the idea of artificial time-frames of any kind, either to impose hasty solutions or to obstruct the process. Let us make the most of the present session of the General Assembly in its entirety and concentrate our attention on the issues that require further refinement, such as veto and numbers -- and I will come back to that later.

In this year's general debate, Brazil expressed its willingness to accept the responsibilities of permanent membership in the Security Council, if called upon by the international community. Brazil is determined to carry out the role of permanent member as the representative of Latin America and the Caribbean so that our region may be present in the Council on a permanent basis and, through regular coordination and consultation, have a strong collective voice. As a non-permanent member, we have endeavoured in the past to maintain close coordination with countries in the region, and we will continue to do so during our next mandate. We are prepared to make this coordination and these consultations even more systematic and formal, in order to ensure that the interests and concerns of the region will be reflected to the fullest extent possible.

We consider that the proposal contained in annex I of this year's report -- the so-called Razali proposal -- constitutes an appropriate framework, with the necessary adjustments, for reforming the Security Council in a non-discriminatory and democratic way, allowing for Member States to express themselves in the General Assembly on candidacies for permanent membership from both the industrialized and the developing world. The proposal provides sufficient leeway for regional consultation and does not prejudge any outcome, although it does rule out discriminatory ones, which is one of the main reasons why we value it so much. We should not forget, in this respect, that since the adoption at the end of the General Assembly's fiftieth session of the report contained in document A/50/47, we have been working under the assumption that:

"In the event that there is agreement for an increase in the permanent membership, an increase only by industrialized countries would be widely regarded as unacceptable." [A/50/47, para. 26]

We would regard a reform which ascribed full permanent seats to industrialized countries and rotating seats to the developing world as unacceptable and contrary to that conclusion. It is a different matter if one part of the world comes forth with a specific suggestion arrived at by consensus, at the regional level, and submits it to the General Assembly. We understand that this has been a position held by African countries, and we fully respect that, even if, conceptually, we might have our misgivings.

We are confident that we will continue to move away from discriminatory conceptions of expansion and that those who contemplate the idea of permanent rotating seats as a solution for their own region will continue to hold that this is not exportable. As far as we are concerned, there is no market in Latin America and the Caribbean for this product.

In spite of the important strides made this year, we have still not found a centre of gravity as regards some complex issues, such as the veto and the total number of members in an expanded Council. Brazil has advanced several ideas with the objective of rendering the decision-making process in the Security Council more democratic, without impinging upon Charter privileges which the five permanent members are clearly unprepared to give up at this stage. We believe that there should be no discrimination, in principle, between current and new permanent members. At the same time, we have suggested that new permanent members might consider the option of not exercising their veto rights, without relinquishing them, until a comprehensive agreement on decision-making, involving all permanent members, can be arrived at. In other words, sensitive as the veto issue may be, it should not prevent us from moving ahead on expanding the Council's composition.

As to the overall number of members, a few delegations continue to have misgivings about a Council of more than 21 participants, in contrast with the preference of the wide majority for a higher figure, somewhere in the mid-twenties. While the problems related to the veto -- in spite of the fact that they touch on difficult questions of principle -- may be surmountable through intensified dialogue and negotiation, it appears that the numbers issue is at once a simpler but a more immediate stumbling block. It is our expectation that, as other aspects fall into place, some creative thinking on matters such as the action threshold and on improved Security Council practices and procedures may be able to help us in this regard.

It has sometimes been alleged that the incapacity of developing countries to reach consensus on prospective permanent members constitutes a major obstacle at this stage of our work. This is a gross distortion of the facts. To start with, as we all know, the strongest opposition to expansion in permanent membership is to be found in the industrialized world itself. The argument according to which there is no consensus in the regions of the South applies, perhaps with greater validity, to regions of the North. But this is not the issue. Consensus, although desirable, may not be attainable in any region, North or South. The real issues that are impeding progress are the veto and the numbers question. These should be the focus of attention as we resume our discussions within the Working Group next year.

If so many delegations have expressed an interest on this item of our agenda it is because we are here discussing the credibility of the United Nations in a principal area of concern: the maintenance of international peace and security. The future of the multilateral system of collective security rests on the legitimacy and representativeness of the Security Council. As recently stated in the British magazine The Economist, in an article on one of the major crises that the world is facing now,

"the Security Council is in a poor way, knowing that it should long ago have reformed itself".

Let us not prolong this agony indefinitely. Let us work firmly and responsibly towards a solution that is equitable and balanced, that takes into account aspirations of all nations, large and small, developed and developing, but, above all, let us bear in mind that this exercise is not about the prestige of any individual country or group of countries. It is about the prestige and effectiveness of our Organization.

Mr. Donokusumo (Indonesia)

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