General Assembly Session 51 meeting 43

The President

The draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in paragraph 19 of its first report (A/51/548) reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the first report of the Credentials Committee and the recommendation contained therein,

"Approves the first report of the Credentials Committee."

We shall now proceed to consider the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in paragraph 19 of its first report.

I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for an explanation of vote before the voting. May I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Al-Habib (Iran)

My delegation would like to express its reservations regarding those parts of the first report of the Credentials Committee, contained in document A/51/548, on the credentials of Israel.

In line with the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the issue, my delegation wishes to dissociate itself from the parts of the said report referring to the approval of the credentials of Israel.

The President

We have heard the only speaker in explanation of vote before the voting.

We shall now take action on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee set forth in paragraph 19 of its first report. The Credentials Committee adopted this draft resolution without a vote. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?

The President

I now call on the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, who wishes to explain his delegation's position on the resolution just adopted. May I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Matri (Libya)

I should like to indicate that the fact that my delegation did not object to the first report of the Credentials Committee in document A/51/548 in no way implies recognition of the credentials of the delegation of Israel.

The President

We have heard the only speaker in explanation of vote.

We have thus concluded this stage of our consideration of sub-item (b) of agenda item 3.

Mr. Tasovski (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

At the outset, I should like to thank on behalf of my delegation the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his annual report on the work of the Agency, for his remarks and for his continued successful efforts to promote the work of the Agency. The report reviewed the work of the Agency in various fields in the past year and the progress it has made. It also identified the problems and difficulties confronting the Agency.

During its nearly 40-year history, the IAEA has played an important role in the efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) last year was a crucial step towards achieving this goal. One of the most significant additional tools to curb the spread of nuclear weapons this year was the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which represents a concrete measure in the spirit of article VI of the NPT. It is the intention of my Government shortly to sign and ratify the CTBT. The conclusion of a multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes, the so-called cut-off convention, is an important goal in the strengthening of the NPT regime, and it needs to receive priority in the Conference on Disarmament.

Very profound changes have been the hallmark of recent years. The end of the cold war gave rise to the prospect of a new era of international peace and cooperation. My delegation is of the view that the IAEA's role in the forthcoming period will be of great importance in promoting cooperation among nations in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and providing nuclear safeguards. This is an important part of overall international cooperation. My delegation welcomes in particular the activities aimed at strengthening the nuclear-safety standards of nuclear installations. The international responsibility of the States operating nuclear-power plants at a critically low level of safety is of particular importance. It is therefore important that those States cooperate closely with the IAEA in implementing nuclear-safety measures and standards. The Convention on Nuclear Safety, the first legal instrument to address the safety of nuclear plants, entered into force on 24 October -- United Nations Day.

My delegation reaffirms its strong support for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, as well as its full commitment to Programme 93+2. The strict implementation of Programme 93+2 will increase the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

The Agency's activities in the area of technical cooperation are the most directly relevant to many members of the IAEA. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia is aware of the contribution that assistance in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy can make to the economic and social development of countries. My country's cooperation with the Agency is mainly in the field of improving scientific knowledge and the practical uses of nuclear energy in medicine, agriculture and industry. The technical assistance provided by the Agency has been very important, especially in the field of training, in accessing new technologies and in generating our own knowledge for the treatment of animal diseases, radio-immunological analysis technologies in nuclear medicine and personal dosimetry. We note with satisfaction the successful realization of the Agency's Country Programme Framework (CPF) mission in the first half of this year in order to define the Country Programme Framework for Cooperation by the year 2000.

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that my Government will continue to give its full support to the work of the IAEA, whose programmes and activities have proven to be effective in the promotion of international cooperation. I should like also to underline the importance of the adoption of the draft resolution before us entitled, "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency", which is co-sponsored by my delegation.

Mr. Bohayevsky (Ukraine)

Let me begin by extending our delegation's appreciation to Mr. Hans Blix for the comprehensive report he submitted to the General Assembly. His statement clearly underlined the crucial role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Both areas of the Agency's activities are of great importance to Ukraine. For my country, this year has been marked by a number of events and dates, two of which are closely related to the issue we are discussing today. The first one is 26 April, the sad occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe, which remains an inconsolable pain in our hearts and an incurable wound for our nation and the Ukrainian people.

The second important date is 1 June, the day Ukraine became a nuclear weapon-free State after the withdrawal of the last strategic nuclear warhead from its territory. That was a historic event of global importance because of its practical contribution to the elimination of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

By eliminating the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal, the one we inherited from the former Soviet Union, Ukraine has also made a very important practical contribution to diminishing the global nuclear threat.

Notwithstanding the immense difficulties we are experiencing today, Ukraine has consistently carried out its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has obtained a non-nuclear status. This fact, along with its ratification of START I, its accession to the non-proliferation Treaty and support of the decision on its indefinite extension, and its joining the States which signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is yet convincing example of Ukraine's determination to strengthen the existing international regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We fully support the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) aimed at accelerating and enlarging the benefits that atomic energy can bring to nations, if properly used. That is why we consider the Agency's safeguards system as the main element of the measures undertaken by the international community to ensure the use of nuclear power exclusively for peaceful purposes.

In view of the tasks facing us today, we consider the steps undertaken by the IAEA as appropriate to strengthen and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. We continue to support the Agency's efforts to improve its capabilities in detecting undeclared nuclear activity where it exists, thus helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ukraine also welcomes the progress reached by the Committee on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, established by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 June 1996. We are confident that, if the principles of respect of national sovereignty, the equality of requirements and the universal nature of the participation of States in this activity are met, success in developing a strengthened safeguards system based on the so-called "Programme 93+2" can be reached.

Keeping this in mind, Ukraine supported the relevant resolution adopted by the fortieth session of the Agency's General Conference, as well as the resolution on implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ukraine shares the concerns over the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. We support the programme on preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and expressed our willingness to support the objectives and actions incorporated in the Declaration adopted at the eight-nation Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security in April this year. Let me also recall that, at the Agency's fortieth General Conference, the delegation of Ukraine co-sponsored the resolution on measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.

"One Decade After Chernobyl: Summing up the Radiological Consequences of the Accident", an International Conference held also in Vienna this past April, was an important event in the area of maintaining the proper safety level of nuclear facilities. The lessons learned from the Chernobyl catastrophe will continue to be of acute concern to the public. But today it has become obvious that the experience gained from this tragedy shows that overcoming its heavy consequences should become a matter of universal concern.

In the above context, we think that the Agency's role in providing a regime of safe development of nuclear energy should be a leading one and ought to continue to grow in the coming years.

We in Ukraine fully understand the concern of many States over the safety of the Chernobyl nuclear-power plant. As members know, the decision was made to decommission this plant by the year 2000. However, this commitment can be successfully achieved only if our country receives the necessary financial and technical assistance. In this respect, we are grateful for the statement made yesterday morning by the representative of Ireland on behalf of the European Union that the Union was committed to providing financial aid to assist Ukraine in improving nuclear safety and security.

Ukraine supports the Agency's activities aimed at establishing a comprehensive regime of civil liability for nuclear damage and confirmed its adherence to its main principles by joining the relevant Convention in September 1996. We are satisfied with the expansion of technical cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which covers, among other things, the principal activities in the areas of nuclear and radiation safety and in nuclear-power-plant operational safety. Today, there are nine joint IAEA/Ukraine projects being implemented in the sphere of nuclear energy, which are of important practical significance for my country.

Ukraine also welcomes the elaboration of the convention on the safe management of radioactive waste and expects the practical results from the group of international experts engaged in this important work. Ukraine fully supports the preparation of such an instrument.

In conclusion, I wish to underline that Ukraine highly respects and supports the versatile activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at promoting global cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and upgrading the international non-proliferation regime.

Mr. Ali Khan (Pakistan)

On behalf of the Pakistan delegation, I would like to convey special appreciation to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to his team for improving the format and content of the report this year. It will doubtless facilitate better understanding of the work of the Agency.

The Agency, as we all know, has two major areas of activity: the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Any imbalance in these activities would not serve the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The priorities, of course, will be determined by the member States themselves.

The annual report, however, starts with a reference to the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in May 1995. The general thrust of the evaluation of this important decision gives the impression that the Agency will be guided by the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. However, the Review and Extension Conference, though a significant event, was, in our view, extraneous to the Agency.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament clearly states in paragraph 68:

"All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries." (A/S-10/4, section 3)

We believe that the Agency should look for guidance to the Member States as expressed in the policy-making organs.

Despite the negative public perception created in some countries and the fears aroused about the danger of nuclear proliferation, nuclear energy remains a viable and attractive energy option for many countries and particularly for fossil-fuel-deficient, developing countries. The conventional means of generating electricity -- whether thermal, oil, gas or coal -- not only impose a heavy financial burden on such countries, but also pose a serious threat to the environment.

In this context, it may be recalled that the international symposium on electricity, health and the environment organized by the Agency in October 1995 concluded that nuclear power can play an important role in reducing carbon dioxide emissions and pollution from the electricity sector. The effects on human health from nuclear-power plants were far fewer than those from coal-fired plants. Despite the crucial role that the relatively more environment-friendly nuclear power can play in the economic development of fossil-fuel-deficient countries, the message has not quite been appreciated by decision makers and the public.

In order to encourage and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear power, the basic requirement would be to provide technical assistance and cooperation. The performance of the Agency on this account has been satisfactory. I would like to congratulate the Director General for achieving a record-high 75.7 per cent rate on overall implementation and an 85.5 per cent rate for the implementation of model projects in 1995.

This high rate of implementation had, however, considerably decreased the readily usable reserve resources by the end of 1995. Any further reductions beyond this level could be detrimental to the efficient implementation of technical cooperation programmes. In order to ensure the continued success of the Agency in the area of technical cooperation, all member States should pay their contributions in full and on time.

Another major objective of the Agency is to prevent nuclear proliferation. For this purpose, the Agency has safeguards agreements with member States. Pakistan has consistently adhered to and shall continue to extend its fullest support to the Agency's safeguards. This is in consonance with our unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and our efforts to free our region from the menace of nuclear weapons.

Because of the existing tensions in our region, the problem of nuclear proliferation raises serious concerns. The situation can escalate any time in South Asia. The core cause of tension in South Asia is the Kashmir dispute and the brutal denial of the right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people. The only viable way to reduce this tension is to resolve the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The reduction of tension is likely to eliminate the causes of nuclear proliferation in that part of the world.

Our Prime Minister, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, in her address to this Assembly on 3 October 1996, proposed the convening of a multilateral conference on peace and security in South Asia. Such a conference could promote the resolution of the Kashmiri dispute as well as agreements on conventional arms control and measures for nuclear restraint. We hope that this proposal will evoke a positive response from the international community and from our neighbour.

While we fully support that the enhanced effectiveness and cost-efficiency of IAEA safeguards in order to rule out the possibility of non-compliance, any changes in the existing system should, in our view, remain within the present legal instruments. The suggested steps to strengthen the safeguards should be non-intrusive, technologically feasible and cost-effective.

Pakistan has actively participated in strengthening existing mechanisms and in developing the new methods that are included in "Programme 93+2". The Programme is meant for countries that have safeguards agreements based on document INFCIRC/153 with the Agency. Suggestions to extend the Programme to non-full-scope safeguards countries are contrary to the spirit of the Programme. We feel that the whole Programme should be extensively discussed to achieve consensus on its legal, technical and economic aspects.

Nuclear energy carries a twofold burden: the stigma of Hiroshima and the legacy of Chernobyl. While the first is addressed by safeguards, non-proliferation and disarmament measures, the second calls for greater attention to the safety of nuclear installations. Pakistan accords the highest priority to safety in its nuclear facilities and has benefited from the nuclear-safety expertise available through the Agency. The recent entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is a welcome step. We hope that the IAEA will now ensure the fullest possible exchange of safety-related information and the sharing of expertise. Pakistan will ratify the Convention as soon as requisite national legislative and administrative procedures are completed.

The regulatory responsibility of the Agency should not lead to the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful means. Unfortunately, restrictions have been imposed, even when it is evident that no proliferation dangers are involved. At times even safety-related information has been refused. This approach is conducive neither to the evolution of safer techniques and methods nor to the promotion of greater openness and transparency in the field of nuclear technology. Since these are the key objectives of the Agency, we hope that it will redouble its efforts for their achievement. The International Atomic Energy Agency should strive to remove all impediments to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

We expect the Agency to adopt non-discriminatory measures in providing access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It should not be linked to non-proliferation undertakings. The stratification of States in allowing access to technology for nuclear power, nuclear-safety related information and know-how for other peaceful uses would do more harm than good in achieving the overall objective of a safe, clean and secure world.

Ms. Tolle (Kenya)

Let me at the outset express our appreciation to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his comprehensive overview of the developments achieved by the Agency in the past year, in addition to the fortieth report of the IAEA for the calendar year 1995, circulated in document A/51/307. My delegation wishes to congratulate the Director General and the entire staff of the IAEA for their continued commitment and service to the international community in upholding the mandates entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Over the years, the International Atomic Energy Agency has provided assistance to member States for the development of peaceful applications of nuclear technology. With regard to training, the International Atomic Energy Agency has provided funding for regional courses that have gone a long way in promoting regional cooperation and facilitating the exchange of ideas. Through these efforts, several projects and nuclear technology activities have been initiated and several others planned.

In this respect, the African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) has been implemented. The programme has proved to be very valuable because of its orientation, focus and relevance to the needs of the region, particularly in the areas of manpower development, exchange of experience and the sharing of available facilities and expertise. It has played a vital role in strengthening the principle and concept of regional cooperation and self-reliance on the African continent. Kenya is committed to this principle and concept and would like to express its full association with and support for the activities of the AFRA programme.

At the bilateral level, the Agency is assisting in various projects the objectives of which are helping to improve our agricultural production. These include seven projects for animal disease diagnosis and control, improvement of livestock production, evaluation of tsetse and trypanosomiasis, isotope techniques for the efficient use of fertilizers, nitrogen fixation by multi-purpose tree species and the analysis of pesticide residues. All of these projects are currently in progress.

Similarly, a draft Kenya Country Programme Framework document, which will form the core of future International Atomic Energy Agency technology transfer activities in the medium term, has been produced and an approval process has been instituted by the Government as a result of the IAEA mission. When endorsed, the Country Programme Framework will not only constitute priority activities upon which technical cooperation efforts and resources will be concentrated, but will also serve as a frame of reference and a programming tool for future technical cooperation activities over the next four to six years and, where appropriate, will provide opportunities to initiate regional programmes.

An effective radiation-safety and nuclear-waste management infrastructure is a prerequisite for the efficient management and safe transfer of nuclear technology, as proposed in the principles of radiation protection and nuclear safety practices, which form the basis for the development and use of nuclear technology in our country.

The Agency has assisted in this area by providing necessary information and help to Kenyan institutions. We would like to see more assistance of this kind extended and urge the Agency to maintain its efforts in devising local solutions that are capable of significantly improving the general level of radiation safety and nuclear-waste management in all regions.

We are happy to note that the next open-ended group of legal and technical experts, which is helping to draft the convention on the safe management of radioactive waste, will be held in South Africa in November. We are pleased that the meeting is being held in Africa and wish to confirm that Kenya will participate actively in that meeting because of its legal and technical importance. We urge the Agency to increase the frequency of such high-powered international meetings in our region.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an exceptionally important global mechanism for the resolution of nuclear-proliferation issues. The signing in Cairo on 11 April 1996 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Pelindaba Treaty, by 45 African States and four nuclear States, is an historic event that will contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The creation of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone fortifies the measures taken with regard to the non-proliferation Treaty and confirms the esteem in which it is held by us in Africa.

It is Kenya's belief that such regional agreements are a useful means of reducing tension, encouraging sustainable socio-economic development and promoting confidence and regional security. These agreements have the advantage of being adaptable to the characteristics and special needs of the geographical region in which they apply. It is therefore extremely important to support such regional efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. To that end, we are encouraged by the work that is being carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the enforcement of safeguards and the minimization of all types of risk posed by nuclear technology.

Enhanced sustainable socio-economic development requires an adequate and reliable supply of energy. At the moment, there is overdependence on hydroelectric and fossil-fuel sources of energy, particularly in the developing and least developed countries. In some cases, this is neither economical nor environmentally friendly. Other sustainable sources of energy, including nuclear energy, must be explored. The Agency therefore has an important role to play in the development of nuclear-research reactors for Member States in the developing and least-developed categories. Such developments would enhance the transfer of technology for the possible future introduction of nuclear reactors for the development of an additional source of energy.

Kenya is confident that the International Atomic Energy Agency will provide assistance for the development of institutional capacity and a nuclear-science-and-technology development strategy, supported by well-designed thematic programmes, appropriate logistics and infrastructure.

My delegation is concerned about reported clandestine nuclear programmes and the trafficking of nuclear materials, which pose a serious threat to regional and international peace and security. In this regard, the Government of Kenya welcomes the implementation of Part 1 of "Programme 93+2" in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. The draft protocol currently under discussion in Vienna is a good working basis for further negotiation aimed at achieving a balanced legal instrument of a universal and non-discriminatory nature to provide better assurance against the diversion of nuclear materials from declared activities.

Finally, my delegation has noted with appreciation the commendable initiatives taken by the Agency in ensuring increased representation of developing countries on the professional staff of the secretariat, which now exceeds the 30 per cent target proposed by member States in 1981. My delegation also appreciates the increase of the representation of women on the secretariat's professional staff, and expresses the hope that equitable geographical representation will soon become a reality.

I shall conclude by expressing the conviction that nuclear technology will play an instrumental role for decades to come. The international community should therefore continue the exploration of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes with pragmatism, vision and imagination as we approach the twenty-first century and beyond.

Mr. Jose (India)

We have listened attentively to the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presented by the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, and we have taken note of the contents.

In this, the fortieth year of its existence, we should recall once again that this Agency was established with a view to:

"accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". (Statute of the IAEA, article II)

In these four decades, we have seen the Agency evolve and grow into what is perhaps the most scientific organization in the United Nations system. We note that the Agency has been able to cross some important milestones, including the setting up of model projects, implementing the Partners in Development concept, expanding several nuclear applications programmes, setting up a Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation as well as streamlining and improving a number of ongoing programmes and activities. We stress once again the need for countries to pay their voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund on time and in full.

The Agency, however, has a long way to go if it is to serve the cause of sustainable development, especially in developing countries, to an appreciable degree. There are still many who need to be convinced that nuclear technology is the inevitable option for satisfying the energy needs of developing countries and that it is worthwhile supporting nuclear-technology based programmes and activities also in the fields of fresh water, food, health and the environment. If we want the Agency to contribute to the creation of a better world, it will need to pay the same importance to its promotional activities as to its non-promotional activities.

As the Assembly is probably aware, the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) arose out of the India-Philippines Agency Project, which was essentially directed towards the utilization of existing research reactors in the region. We feel that the time has come to include the development of nuclear power within the ambit of the RCA. We have always supported RCA activities in view of its useful role in promoting regional cooperation in the application of nuclear techniques in medicine, agriculture and basic sciences and shall continue to do so in the future.

As one of the largest isotope producers in the world, India has a deep commitment to the practice of nuclear medicine. Most of the isotopes produced by India are used within the country for medical diagnosis and therapy, either as radiopharmaceutical or radiation sources for a wide range of medical problems. The irradiation of onions, potatoes, spices, pulses, grains, seafood and other foodstuffs, to preserve them and minimize losses due to sprouting and insect and microbial spoilage, is one of our national missions. The diversification of research and development into areas related to nuclear science and technology has been one of the hallmarks of our programme. An interface with industry enables various processes and prototypes developed by us to be transferred to commercial applications.

We have accorded a primary position to safety in all activities throughout the entire nuclear-fuel cycle, from the prospecting and mining of ores to the management of waste. Safety is an important subject for research and development and dedicated groups of the Department of Atomic Energy have been involved since the inception of our programme in the continuous monitoring and upgrading of systems based on our own experience and experience gained from elsewhere. The Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, set up in 1983, meets prevailing international norms of regulatory practice and has executed well its function as watchdog over our nuclear programme and other installations handling radiation. India was one of the countries which signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety when it was opened for signature and we are now in the process of ratifying it. India supports and will continue to support all IAEA activities to promote safety.

India has taken a keen interest in and has been actively participating in the development and drafting of the convention on the safety of radioactive waste management since mid-1995. Despite a large degree of convergence on many of the issues that will be addressed by this convention, we feel constrained to reiterate that, for countries like India, whose nuclear programme is based on a closed fuel cycle, it would not be possible to consider including spent fuel in a convention dealing with the safety of radioactive waste management. For us, spent fuel is a resource, and not a waste. Furthermore, since most of the environmental degradation and other effects witnessed on a global scale have resulted from radioactive waste from military activities, a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management can ill afford to be silent on such waste.

In recent years, a great amount of the Agency's time and energy has been expended on the question of strengthening safeguards, the famous "Programme 93+2". We reiterate our expressed concern that the financial implications of the Programme may turn out to be excessive; that overemphasis on the policing role of the Agency is creating an imbalance in the attention and resources devoted by the Agency to its promotional activities; and that, by rushing headlong into the Programme, the Agency may end up having bitten off more than it can chew. We believe that, before the Agency sets forth new goals, it should consolidate its current work, implement fully the measures contained in part I of the proposal, digest the lessons learned and make a clearer assessment of the likely costs. Nevertheless, we are ready to go with the consensus on this issue.

The coordinated research programmes, training programmes and technical meetings must increasingly address more advanced areas of nuclear technology to benefit the increasing number of developing countries that are enhancing the level of sophistication and capabilities of their respective national nuclear programmes.

As early as 1954, India was the first country to call for a convention on a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive action plan to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Indeed, we have not only joined every genuine effort to ban all weapons of mass destruction, but have also accepted every universally negotiated and agreed obligation in this regard. India's commitment to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains steadfast and undiminished.

Nuclear disarmament, we emphasize, is a global issue. With 27 other countries members of the Conference on Disarmament, India has presented a phased, step-by-step proposal leading within a specific time-frame to the elimination of nuclear weapons. We shall continue to strive with other like-minded nations to achieve the long-cherished goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm that India will continue actively to support the Agency's efforts in promoting and expanding the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of people all over the globe.

Mr. Park (Republic of Korea)

My delegation wishes to express its deep appreciation to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for submitting the annual report of the Agency for 1995 and for the additional information he provided in his oral report yesterday. We highly commend him and his staff for their professionalism and outstanding performance in carrying out their responsibilities.

The IAEA is entrusted with the dual mandate of promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy and of implementing the safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other international agreements. These twin missions of the Agency complement each other, as the worldwide nuclear transparency fostered by the safeguards system is essential to ensuring the wider peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world. The Agency has made vital contributions to strengthening public confidence on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. From the perspective of global security, the Agency's indispensable role in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be overemphasized.

Let me first touch on the issues associated with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a nation heavily dependent on nuclear-power generation for its energy requirements, with 11 power reactors in operation and six under construction, the Republic of Korea attaches great importance to the work of the Agency. We believe that nuclear power will play an increasingly important role in sustainable development as the most feasible and attractive alternative to fossil fuels, which have led to serious environmental degradation. We also recognize great potential for non-power applications of nuclear technology, including in the areas of water resources management, desalination, health and food production. For these reasons, my Government has actively supported, and will continue to support, the IAEA's activities in these important areas for the well-being of mankind.

We support the IAEA's central role in the promotion of international cooperation in the areas of setting standards and rules for nuclear safety. Addressing public concerns regarding the safety of nuclear-power operation and the environmental hazards of radioactive waste has been the preoccupation of all Governments interested in building nuclear-power reactors. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety last week on 24 October as one of the Agency's major achievements, and we look forward to the widest adherence possible to the Convention. As the first legal instrument to directly address the safety of nuclear-power plants worldwide, the convention will greatly enhance the international safety culture, thus facilitating the development of nuclear-power generation.

We also look forward to an early conclusion of the ongoing negotiations on a convention on the safe management of radioactive waste. The substantial progress reported in efforts to strengthen the existing regime of liability for nuclear damage should also be welcome as a positive step towards enhancing worldwide nuclear safety. We hope that these efforts will soon result in a revision of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. It must be emphasized, in this connection, that international conventions on matters of nuclear safety cannot replace the ultimate responsibility of national Governments to ensure the safety of nuclear activities within their own territory.

My Government attaches great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation activities as a means of assisting sustainable development in developing countries through the transfer of nuclear technology. While we welcome new initiatives and approaches taken by the Agency, such as the establishment of the Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation and the introduction of the concept of model projects, we also underline the importance of adequate funding for the continued success of technical cooperation projects.

As a country that has greatly benefited from the Agency's technical cooperation programme, the Republic of Korea is endeavouring to make a meaningful contribution to the advancement of nuclear technology and to the strengthening of IAEA technical cooperation activities. We are actively supporting various IAEA technical cooperation projects and are in the process of establishing the International Nuclear Training Center in our country. In hosting various Agency training courses at the Center, we look forward to sharing with other Member States our technical know-how accumulated in the areas of the design, construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear-power plants.

Let me now turn to the Agency's safeguards activities. The Republic of Korea has consistently supported the strengthening of the safeguards system aimed at improving the Agency's ability not only to detect diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities, but also to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. In this context, Korea is actively participating in the implementation of Part 1 measures of Programme 93+2 by making its facilities available for environmental sampling.

At present, member States and the Agency's secretariat are engaged in an extensive effort to develop measures for further strengthening the safeguards system under complementary legal authority. While we look forward to a satisfactory conclusion of Part 2 measures, we would like to emphasize that the legitimate concerns of the States involved should be duly addressed, as long as these concerns do not affect the main thrust of the strengthened measures. Since Part 2 measures are aimed at improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and at strengthening its effectiveness, there also needs to be a balanced approach to efficiency and effectiveness.

My Government shares the general concern about illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, which could undermine hard-won achievements in the Agency's safeguards activities. While there is no substitute for efficient national systems for accounting and control, especially in those countries possessing sensitive nuclear material, in preventing illicit trafficking, we recognize the crucial role the Agency can play in information-sharing and in identifying the sources of stolen material. We also welcome the programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material agreed upon by the participants in the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security of April 1996.

North Korea's long-standing non-compliance with its safeguards agreement under the NPT remains a matter of serious concern to the international community. My delegation commends the IAEA Director General and his staff for their impartial and faithful efforts to carry out the Agency's responsibilities under the safeguards agreement. The 1995 annual report of the Agency and the Director General's oral report yesterday clearly outline the status of this issue after all the exhaustive efforts made by the Agency and the international community to obtain North Korea's nuclear transparency. North Korea's open and persistent refusal to comply fully with its safeguards obligations poses a serious threat to the integrity and the credibility of the global non-proliferation regime under the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.

On the bilateral track of efforts towards resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, we note that there has been some progress in the implementation of the United States-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework. We share the view that the Agreed Framework, if fully implemented, will contribute to North Korea's denuclearization. That is why my Government is playing a central role in the provision of two light-water reactors to North Korea, with a commitment to share the bulk of the costs involved. However, it must be emphasized again that the Agreed Framework does not redeem or exempt North Korea from its multilateral obligations under the NPT. My delegation therefore urges North Korea to come promptly into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. Pending its full compliance, we urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate faithfully with the Agency in preserving all information relevant to verifying the accuracy and completeness of North Korea's initial report on the inventory of nuclear facilities and material subject to safeguards.

My Government shares the view that reform of the Agency's Board of Governors is long overdue. We strongly believe that article VI of the Agency's Statute should be amended without further delay in such a way as to reflect, in the composition of the Board, the fundamental structural changes which have occurred in the international nuclear community over the past two decades.

My delegation has joined in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document A/51/L.9, which was introduced by the representative of Canada. We sincerely hope that it will enjoy the overwhelming support of the General Assembly.

Mr. Berdennikov (Russia)

The Russian delegation expresses its gratitude to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his introduction of the Agency's annual report, which provides an impressive description of the activities of the IAEA.

The Russian Federation supports in all possible ways the priority activities of the Agency. We approve of IAEA efforts under its Programme 93+2 to establish and introduce an effective system for finding hidden nuclear activity.

We are aware of the Agency's great significance for international cooperation in the use of atomic energy, and in providing technical assistance to developing countries. The past year can be described as one of the best in the history of the IAEA with regard to the implementation of technical cooperation programmes. Despite the complicated economic situation, the Russian Government decided to contribute 7.5 billion rubles in 1996 to the Technical Cooperation Fund. We anticipate that the Russian contribution to the Fund for technical assistance and cooperation will be used effectively.

We are convinced that IAEA programmes will implement the conclusions of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, especially as implementation of these recommendations implies the widest and most effective participation by international organizations. Documents of the Moscow Summit have been issued as an official United Nations document. The results of the Moscow Summit are also described in paragraph 1079 of the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization as a welcome step in the right direction. They were also given a positive assessment during the general debate in plenary meeting and in the First Committee.

Confirming the significance of nuclear energy in defining development strategy for the twenty-first century was a starting point in the work of the Moscow Summit. At the same time, however, the future of nuclear energy is indissolubly linked to meeting ever-increasing safety requirements. In this connection, the Moscow Summit made a significant step forward in advancing specific programmes for international cooperation to insure the operational safety of nuclear power complexes.

This first of all involves projects to create safe nuclear reactors for the twenty-first century. We hope that the IAEA will promote the development of international efforts in this area, with due regard to experience gained and to the work successfully being done in Russia, France, Germany, Japan, the United States and other countries to create such reactors. The establishment of the international nuclear safety centres in Russia and the United States is a major step forward in fostering international cooperation in the field of nuclear safety.

Secondly, it also involves solving complex problems related to the safe and cost-effective utilization and disposal of radioactive waste. In this connection, the IAEA has already proved to be not only a coordinator, but also a genuine driving force for the process of international cooperation. In our view, a global programme for adequate radioactive waste management needs to be developed by all countries that use nuclear energy. The aim of such a programme could be not to increase the volume of radioactive isotopes on our planet, together with the intensive development of nuclear technologies.

The special federal programme of liquid and solid radioactive waste management adopted in Russia reflects the importance we attach to such activities. This programme is now under way in northern and far-eastern Russia. We hope that the participation of northern European countries, the United States and Denmark in work under this programme will substantively step up its implementation and will open the way for Russia very soon to accede officially to the 1993 amendment to the London Convention banning the dumping of radioactive waste at sea.

Thirdly, ensuring safety involves the development and improvement of existing international legal regimes for regulating activities in this domain. The entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is an important stage in this process, and Russia has already started practical implementation of its provisions. Also of considerable importance in this connection is the elaboration -- possibly with the participation of all States possessing nuclear installations and technologies -- of multilateral facilities to resolve the problems of liability for nuclear damage. The IAEA is playing an important role in this area. As is known, Russia has signed the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; preparations for its ratification are now under way.

The need for an adequate response by the international community to the persisting world risk of nuclear-weapons proliferation is a key element in insuring nuclear security. Russia highly appreciates last year's decision of the Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which decided by consensus to extend the Treaty indefinitely. That decision, together with the signing of the recent Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty consolidated the basis for international stability and security and created an additional element to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Of great importance, in our view, could be the beginning of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable multilateral agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and insuring nuclear security involve a reliable curbing of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. It is noteworthy that after the Moscow Summit, which adopted a programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material, such action was given high priority among United Nations activities related to disarmament, and, in particular, the portion of the medium-term plan for the period 1998-2001. This fundamentally important provision is also adequately reflected in the draft resolution under discussion, and in the IAEA report. We hope that draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1 will be adopted.

Mr. Edwards (Marshall Islands)

The topic before us is one that is of great interest to the Republic of the Marshall Islands and it is for that reason that we have supported and co-sponsored the draft resolution on this issue since our first year as a United Nations Member. We are proud to be able to do so again this year. In this regard, we wish to see all interested delegations working together with the sponsors to find an outcome that is true to the facts and that can accommodate all delegations. We think that, this year, the sponsors have done an admirable job and we have no difficulty giving draft resolution A/51/L.9 our wholehearted support. For the same reasons, we will not be able to support the amendments proposed to the draft resolution.

My delegation has noted the many activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as reflected in its report. The Agency has now concluded the collection of samples from the nuclear-weapon test sites in French Polynesia. The expedition was conducted by 11 distinguished scientists and we are encouraged by the fact that they appear to have been given fairly good access to the test sites. However, as my delegation pointed out in the First Committee, much work is still required and we feel that the French authorities could be helpful in allaying our fears that lasting damage has been done in French Polynesia. We call on them to assist in expediting the dissemination of the report.

The Marshall Islands has reported to the General Assembly that the South Pacific Forum has once again reaffirmed the existence of a special responsibility towards the peoples of the Marshall Islands, a former United Nations Trust Territory administered by the United States, who had been adversely affected by nuclear-weapon tests conducted during the Trusteeship period. That responsibility included the safe resettlement of displaced human populations and the restoration of affected areas to economic productivity. Members are aware that this is a matter of extreme importance to the Marshall Islands and we are very concerned that urgent progress needs to be made. The acknowledged role of the international community is now being given a presence in the Marshall Islands through the visiting mission of the IAEA. The mission met with President Kabua to give him a complete briefing on the scope and nature of the Agency's visit to the Marshall Islands. My Government welcomes the Agency's open and transparent manner of conducting its work, since it ensures that there are no false expectations on either side.

I am unable to give any report from the Marshall Islands side on our assessment of that visit by the Agency. I can assure the General Assembly that we made sure that the limited facilities we could provide were extended to the fullest to accommodate the Agency. We made sure that the Agency had access to all the damaged nuclear-weapon test sites in the Marshall Islands, as well as to the current storage site on Runit Island in Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. That is merely a concrete dome covering a large amount of topsoil that was scraped off some of the test sites. The dome has not been monitored for a very long time and we are concerned about the safety of the site. We feel that the Agency, as part of its work with the Marshall Islands, will be able to give us better information upon which to plan our future responses to that site.

The other task of the visiting mission is to make, in conjunction with my Government, an overall assessment of the situation in the Marshall Islands. I can assure the Assembly that my delegation will tender a full report of our own to ensure that the utmost transparency and cooperation remain the main feature of our cooperation with the IAEA.

Mr. Bergh (South Africa)

South Africa is pleased once again to be a sponsor of the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). My delegation would like to thank the Director General of the IAEA for his statement and to commend the Agency for its work over the past year. During that period, we have seen forward movement in global non-proliferation and disarmament, the most significant achievements being the adoption by the General Assembly of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the signing of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the Pelindaba Treaty, at Cairo. It is with regard to the latter that we would like to express our appreciation to the Director General for his initiative in arranging a special briefing on the Pelindaba Treaty for African Governments at Cairo on 12 April 1996, in which he highlighted the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology. The briefing was welcomed and appreciated by all delegations.

In our view, the Agency is succeeding well in carrying out its own particular mandate and we feel that the report for the year 1995, as well as the statement of the Director General that we heard yesterday, clearly show that all important facets in the field of nuclear technology are currently being covered by the Agency. The Agency is fully engaged in promoting the further application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and we are pleased to have been able to participate fully in the whole range of activities organized and administered by the Agency. We are very conscious of the range of activities that this mandate encompasses, from ensuring that developing countries are assisted in their efforts to benefit from nuclear technology and all its applications to providing the whole range of services in assisting all members to improve their nuclear related procedures, regulations and research and through to implementing the safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In the area of developing conventions and maintaining and improving safety standards, perhaps the most significant development was the entry into force last week, on Friday, 24 October, of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. I am pleased to be able to say that the South African Parliament will consider the ratification of the Convention at its current session. Furthermore, in a fortnight, South Africa will act as host to the open-ended group of legal and technical experts on a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, another important convention that should be finalized in the next year.

There have been many developments of interest in the field of nuclear technology and in the activities of the Agency over the past year, but I would like to focus on two activities that we consider to be particularly important. In the first place, in the field of technical assistance, we note the high degree of success that the Agency has achieved in implementing technical-assistance projects and we would like to commend the Secretariat for its efficiency in administering those projects. South Africa, has for the first time, submitted projects of its own for consideration by the Department of Technical Cooperation, projects that we believe will be beneficial not only to South Africa but to the southern African region as a whole. In the past year, South Africa has served as the Chairman of the countries members of the African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA), which is the regional organization charged with developing projects of benefit to the whole region and largely financed from the Agency's budget for technical assistance.

We feel that this work is particularly important, and have in fact devoted additional resources, funding and expertise to the furtherance of its goals over and above our contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund. We commend AFRA to the consideration of donor countries and we hope that its important work will continue to expand.

On the question of resources for technical assistance, my delegation wishes to state that South Africa will ensure that its own contribution remains fully in line with the targets set by the Board of Governors. We are, however, concerned at the fact that the vast majority of the funding paid to the Technical Cooperation Fund comes from a handful of donor countries and that not all countries that could easily afford to do so in fact contribute to the Fund. We feel also that a number of developing countries whose own share of the Fund's target is relatively modest but which are often substantial beneficiaries of the Agency's expertise and project funding could be more supportive. Our Ambassador in Vienna has accepted the task of chairing the working group on the funding of technical assistance and will devote much attention to seeking solutions to this problem.

I would also like to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the undertaking by all those Members which have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to the issue of technical assistance and recall the commitment made at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, in paragraph 19 of the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in areas such as of technical cooperation. My delegation expresses its appreciation to those members of the Agency, both donor countries and developing countries, that are currently meeting their commitments, and I appeal to those who are able to do more to rise to the challenges that face the Agency, especially as it prepares itself for the next millennium.

Moving on to the subject of safeguards, my delegation participates in the work of the committee that is currently examining the draft protocol to strengthen the efficiency and improve the effectiveness of the safeguards system. The committee has been making progress, and although this has not been as fast as we would have wished, we are nevertheless hopeful that it can conclude its work early in the new year; we look forward to the speedy implementation of the protocol. We are particularly attracted by two main features: the first is the improved ability that the protocol will give to the Agency to detect activities which pose a proliferation risk. We regard this as particularly important, and feel that it should be implemented without delay. At the same time we are very conscious of the need to contain costs, and we are therefore also attracted by the idea of improving efficiency. We hope that with the introduction of methods such as environmental sampling, the need for frequent and expensive safeguards inspections can be cut down, thus leading to savings.

Finally, my delegation would like to thank the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Hans Blix, for his able leadership, and we express our regret at his decision not to seek renewal of his contract.

Mr. Campbell (Australia)

In lending Australia's strong support to the draft resolution before us on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a text which we join in sponsoring, I would like first to thank the Agency's Director General, Mr. Blix, for his comprehensive statement, one which underlined the vital role of the IAEA in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We would also like to thank Mr. Blix for his excellent stewardship of the Agency.

Australia strongly supports the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have traditionally been at the forefront of supporters of the draft resolution on the IAEA report. We place great value on the IAEA's international safeguards and technical cooperation activities, activities which underpin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The international community reaffirmed the importance accorded to them by deciding to extend the NPT indefinitely at the Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

Australia is of course delighted at the adoption of the resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) last month and the opening of the CTBT to signature. We have at last brought nuclear testing to an end not only in our region but in all regions. We would like to take this opportunity to record our appreciation to the IAEA for the support it provides to the International Advisory Committee's study of the radiological situation at two atolls in the South Pacific -- Mururoa and Fanga Taufa. Australia is represented on the International Advisory Committee and looks forward to the study producing some concrete answers about the effects of nuclear testing in the South Pacific region.

This year's draft resolution highlights once more the important work being done by the Agency in a number of fields: safeguards, technical assistance, nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management, among others. In all these fields the IAEA makes a vital contribution to international security and non-proliferation, and to social and economic development. The Agency's activities in these fields deserve our continuing strong support.

The draft resolution also highlights the important measures and decisions the IAEA has taken to strengthen the safeguards system. This was an important element of the decision on Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. We welcome the implementation of a series of measures under Programme 93+2 under existing legal authority. We earnestly hope that the current negotiations in the IAEA to conclude a model protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements for measures requiring additional legal authority can be finalized as early as possible. States will remember the commitment made at the NPT Review and Extension Conference to support decisions adopted by the IAEA's Board of Governors to work at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards and to increase the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

We would urge States to meet that commitment through working without delay towards the conclusion of the negotiations on the 93+2 model protocol in the knowledge that this will help ensure that the IAEA's safeguards system can serve the fundamental security interests of States by strengthening its ability to detect undeclared activities. Further, the conclusion of those negotiations will be an important contribution to a successful launching next year of preparations for the year-2000 NPT review and extension conference.

We very much regret that it has been necessary again this year for the draft resolution to record the continuing non-compliance and lack of full cooperation on the part of two States with their safeguards agreements with the Agency. We urge those States, Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to extend their full, unfettered cooperation to the Agency. These cases of non-compliance underline once again the importance of strengthening the safeguards system.

Technical cooperation is a central element of the Agency's activities. It is also an important means of enabling access by developing countries to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate safeguards. This is in keeping with article IV of the NPT and with the Agency's Statute. This, too, was recognized in the decision of the NPT Review and Extension Conference on Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Australia has long been a supporter of the IAEA's technical cooperation activities, and we welcome the measures being introduced to improve and strengthen their effectiveness. We also welcome the entry into force on 24 October 1996 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

Finally, Australia is pleased to reiterate its support for the resolution before us, which takes note of and endorses the activities of an important international agency, the IAEA. The resolution as a whole gives clear United Nations General Assembly support for the IAEA and for its central role in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The President

I now call on the representative of Canada to introduce draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1.

Mr. Snell (Canada)

On behalf of the co-sponsors, Canada is pleased to present a revised draft resolution, A/51/L.9/Rev.1, on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This revised draft is the result of extensive consultations among the co-sponsors and interested parties to incorporate the concerns of some Member States over proposed amendments. In particular, document A/51/L.9/Rev.1 incorporates the ideas expressed in two proposed amendments, contained in documents A/51/L.10 and A/51/L.12. I am pleased to be able to inform you that as a result of these consultations the delegations of Egypt and Israel have agreed to withdraw documents A/51/L.10 and A/51/L.12 respectively. On behalf of the co-sponsors, I would like to express our gratitude to these two delegations for their efforts in working with us to achieve agreement on a text of this resolution. We are grateful for their support and cooperation in this endeavour.

Finally, Canada is pleased to put forward this revised draft on behalf of the co-sponsors. We truly believe that it is a text that can attract the widest number of supporters. We hope that this resolution will be adopted with the broadest possible support.

The President

In the light of the statement made by the representative of Canada concerning draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1, I understand that the amendments contained in documents A/51/L.10 and A/51/L.12 have been withdrawn and therefore should not be put to the vote.

I now call on the representative of Iraq to introduce the amendment to draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1 contained in document A/51/L.11.

Mr. Hamdoon (Iraq)

It is my pleasure to introduce the amendment of Iraq, contained in document A/51/L.11, to the draft resolution presented by Canada under agenda item 14, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency", contained in document A/51/L.9/Rev.1.

Before introducing our amendment, I would like to reiterate our position once again on the draft resolution submitted under this item. Such draft resolutions should focus on the technical aspects of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and should commend its efforts in areas within its competence. Any attempt to use this item for political aims will not only harm targeted States but also undermine the neutrality of the IAEA. This situation becomes more dramatic when such draft resolutions are used as a pretext for continuing the starvation of an entire nation.

The coercive measures imposed on Iraq by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations mandated the IAEA with specific tasks. The IAEA submits its reports on these tasks to the Security Council regularly. These attempts to go beyond the conclusions contained in the IAEA report will undermine the credibility of the IAEA and should be halted. Operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution is a clear example of attempts to undermine the assessments of the IAEA contained in its semi-annual report submitted to the Security Council on 7 October 1996 in document S/1996/833. Operative paragraph 7 contains an inaccurate and unfair assessment of Iraq's implementation of its obligations, and I would like to cite a few examples.

Firstly, this paragraph calls upon Iraq to cooperate fully with the IAEA, while the IAEA report states the following:

"The Iraqi counterpart has continued to cooperate with the IAEA in a productive way." (S/1996/833, para. 28)

Secondly, operative paragraph 7 expresses concern that

"Iraq failed to provide immediate access on 7 July 1996 to the Agency's Action Team".

This is not accurate. Paragraph 8 of the report of the IAEA describes the case as follows:

"On 7 July 1996, the fifth such multi-disciplinary inspection of a capable' site met with some difficulties in gaining immediate access to the site. The facility to be inspected was a factory building located inside an army camp. On arrival at the entrance gate, the joint IAEA-UNSCOM team was advised that the facility was an installation of the Special Guards and as such was considered to be a sensitive site. Hence, the UNSCOM modalities for inspection of sensitive sites' were to be applied. The team was kept at the gate for approximately two hours waiting for the arrival from Baghdad of a high-ranking Iraqi officer, before being granted access and allowed to proceed with the inspection. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials, or activities was detected." (ibid., para. 8)

It is clear from this paragraph that there was no delay, but that on the contrary the modalities for the inspection of sensitive sites agreed upon between the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and Iraq on 22 June 1996 were implemented.

This paragraph confirms that the inspection found no indication of prohibited equipment, material or activities.

Thirdly, operative paragraph 7 states that Iraq

"has previously withheld from the Agency information about its nuclear weapons programme in violation of its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions".

The IAEA report does not refer to the past. The draft resolution should therefore not seek to justify the continuation of the blockade by referring to events that have already been addressed.

Fourthly, operative paragraph 7

"stresses that the Agency's Action Team will continue to exercise its right to investigate".

This is an incomplete and out-of-context quotation from paragraph 28 of the IAEA report, which begins by stating that:

"The IAEA continues with the rigorous implementation of its plan for the monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions". (S/1996/833, para. 28)

Hence, the draft resolution should contain a reference to the efficient and vigorous implementation of the ongoing monitoring plan.

Fifthly, operative paragraph 7 omits any reference to many positive developments contained in the IAEA report, such as the following, in paragraph 28:

"In the period since the last report to the Council, the IAEA has not seen instances of activities, or the presence, in Iraq, of equipment or materials proscribed by those resolutions." (ibid.)

The draft resolution also omits any reference to paragraph 29 of the IAEA report, which states:

"All quantities of special nuclear material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) found in Iraq have been removed, and the industrial infrastructure which Iraq had set up to produce and weaponize special nuclear material has been destroyed." (ibid., para. 29)

All these references substantiate the huge difference between operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution and the assessment of the IAEA contained in its report. The political reasons behind that are crystal clear and known to all.

For these reasons, my delegation proposes an amendment to the draft resolution by replacing operative paragraph 7 with the following:

"Also commends the Director General of the Agency and his staff for their strenuous efforts in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April, 707 (1991) of 15 August and 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, and supports the conclusions and assessments contained in the consolidated semi-annual report of the Director General of IAEA submitted to the Security Council on 7 October 1996 (document S/1996/833), and calls upon Iraq to continue its cooperation with IAEA in achieving the complete implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions;".

This new paragraph respects the assessment of the IAEA and adds nothing to it. We therefore appeal to Member States to support it.

The President

We have heard the last speaker in the debate on this item.

I should like to announce that since the introduction of the draft resolution, the following countries have become co-sponsors of draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1: El Salvador and Iceland.

We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/50/L.9/Rev.1 and the amendment thereto contained in document A/51/L.11.

Before calling on the first speaker in explanation of vote before the voting, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

I now call on those representatives who wish to make statements in explanation of vote before the voting.

Mr. Kim Chang Guk (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula originated with the United States, which has deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea and has created nuclear suspicion of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Therefore, we hold the consistent position that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is not a matter to be brought to the United Nations. The Agreed Framework signed in October 1994 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States eloquently demonstrates that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is a political one to be settled between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula will be definitively resolved only when the DPRK-United States Agreed Framework, stipulating ways and means for and the time of the settlement of the issue, is fully implemented. The kernel of the Agreed Framework is confidence-building between the DPRK and the United States, the provision of light-water reactors by the United States and the freeze on graphite-moderated reactors. The principle of simultaneous action is vital in the implementation of this Agreed Framework.

Since the first days of the DPRK-United States Agreed Framework, the DPRK has been faithfully fulfilling its obligations to freeze its nuclear facilities. And the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is cooperating with the IAEA in routine and ad hoc inspections of the nuclear facilities that are not subject to the freeze. However, the officials of the IAEA are making things complicated by disregarding the DPRK-United States Agreed Framework and by bringing up subjects that should be dealt with only when a sizeable portion of the light-water reactors are provided.

The IAEA officials are putting forward unreasonable demands. They know very well that the DPRK-United States Agreed Framework cannot be implemented in one or two years. We cannot interpret these demands in any other way than as an indication of their intention to drag the nuclear issue back to its original starting point by putting the brake on the implementation of the Agreed Framework. If the United Nations were to take sides with the IAEA officials, that would disregard the Agreed Framework and force unreasonable demands upon us. It would only imperil the DPRK-United States Agreed Framework.

In order to eradicate the root cause of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, it is essential to build confidence between the DPRK and the United States by fully implementing the Agreed Framework, which stipulates the replacement of graphite-moderated reactors with light-water reactors and the normalization of political and economic relations between the DPRK and the United States. Both parties have agreed that within three months of the signing of the Agreed Framework, they will reduce trade and investment barriers, including lifting restrictions on communications services and financial transactions. To build confidence between the DPRK and the United States, the United States should fulfil the commitments of the Agreed Framework, thus turning the current confrontational relations into a relationship based on trust.

The continued unfriendly policies of certain countries towards the DPRK does not help the settlement of the issues on the Korean peninsula. The draft resolution is intended to put pressure upon us, although it has become clear to everyone that the implementation of the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States is indispensable for the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. It will only endanger the implementation of the Agreed Framework rather than help settle the nuclear issue. We cannot but interpret it as a reckless attempt on the part of certain indecent forces that are hell-bent on putting the brakes on the implementation of the Agreed Framework. If they are really concerned over the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, they should try to contribute to creating a favourable environment for the implementation of the DPRK-United States Agreed Framework. Therefore, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will vote against the draft as a whole.

Mr. Kumar (India)

As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since its inception in 1957, India has consistently attached the highest importance to the objectives of the IAEA. We actively participate in the activities of the Agency. Since this draft resolution pertains to the activities of the IAEA as a whole, to which we attach great value, we would go along with it. However, we have considerable difficulty with preambular paragraph 3. The language of preambular paragraph 3 in the draft resolution, contained in document A/51/L.9, indicates a linkage between adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the freedom to engage in research on, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Article II of the IAEA Statute reads:

"The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." (Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, article II)

Furthermore, article IV C states:

"The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members". (ibid., article IV C)

The purpose of these articles in the IAEA Statute is obviously to encourage unfettered access of member States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any discrimination whatsoever.

Any perceived discrimination will have an inevitable consequence on member States' response to their obligations to the Agency. The NPT is not a universal Treaty and cannot be used to create a differential among members of the Agency. By implying that adherence to the NPT, on which my Government's views are well known, has a bearing on access to peaceful uses of atomic energy, the draft resolution deviates from the objectives enshrined in the Statute. We have therefore been constrained to call for a vote on preambular paragraph 3 and shall vote against it.

Mr. Robinson (United States)

The amendment proposed by Iraq appears to simplify operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. But the reality is that it does so in an inaccurate and unbalanced manner. For the first time this year, the Agency's report on Iraq notes a few positive aspects of Iraqi behaviour, while continuing to list a number of areas in which Iraq has refused to meet its obligation.

The text proposed by the sponsors, while inaccurate in one respect, as we explained in our statement yesterday, reflects a careful and generally accurate balance of the most important positive and negative elements in the report. By contrast, the Iraqi amendment tries to pretend that there is no negative statement about Iraq's behaviour in the Agency's report, and that Iraq's cooperation was complete. Instead of simply endorsing all of the findings of the report, an approach we could have agreed to, it takes a single positive finding out of context, as if that were the only important information in the report.

This is the third year in a row that the Iraqi representative has asked the Assembly to adopt language referring to Iraq's continued cooperation. The Iraqi argument that it was cooperating with the IAEA was false 24 months ago, coming at a time when Iraq was concealing hundreds of thousands of pages of documents on its nuclear programme from IAEA inspectors. It was a false argument 24 months ago, when Iraq was still providing purposely inaccurate information in its so-called full, final and complete declarations, and there is nothing in the Agency's report to indicate that Iraq has cooperated fully. In fact, the Agency's report noted

"the IAEA's opinion that Iraq still retained a complete record of the nuclear programme". (S/1996/833, para. 26)

I urge my colleagues to vote against this inaccurate and one-sided amendment and to support the carefully balanced language proposed by the sponsors.

Mr. Ladsous (France)

An amendment has been proposed on operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. The terms of this amendment accord with the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its conclusions. France supports the actions of the Agency, and wishes to see Iraq continue to cooperate with that body in order to ensure the comprehensive implementation, without delay, of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

France, as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, will support operative paragraph 7 as it stands. For that reason, France will abstain in the voting on this amendment.

The President

We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote before the voting.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1 and on the amendment thereto, contained in document A/51/L.11.

In accordance with rule 90 of the rules of procedure, the Assembly will first vote on the amendment circulated in document A/51/L.11.

The President

The General Assembly will now vote on draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1.

A separate, recorded vote has been requested on the third preambular paragraph.

The President

The Assembly will now vote on draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1, as a whole.

The President

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to make statements in explanation of vote. May I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Abou-Hadid (Syria)

My delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/51/L.9/Rev.1. It did so because Israel did not accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That is why it was not possible, despite the efforts made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in particular by its Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Israel is the only country in the region that has not yet acceded to the Treaty. Furthermore, it has declared that it has no intention of acceding to it or of submitting its installations to the safeguards regime of the IAEA. This represents a danger for the region and for the entire world.

Israel's obstinate refusal is likely seriously to jeopardize international peace and security. We hope that the efforts of the international community will result in a successful attempt by the IAEA to persuade Israel to accede to the NPT so that the Middle East region can, like other regions of the world, become a nuclear-weapon-free zone, thereby contributing to the maintenance of peace and the establishment of peace and security in the region and throughout the world.

With regard to the thirteenth preambular paragraph on the composition of regional groups, we support the comments of the representative of Egypt on article VI of the Statute of the Agency. We must take into account the fact that, in accordance with that paragraph, the accession of one State to a regional group is subject to the approval of all the States of that regional group.