General Assembly Session 50 meeting 95

The President

As indicated in document A/50/817, the General Assembly, by its decision 49/321 of 23 December 1994, appointed four members of the Joint Inspection Unit for a five-year term of office beginning on 1 January 1996 and expiring on 31 December 2000. Subsequently, the Secretary-General was informed that one such member, Mr. Ali Badara Tall, of Burkina Faso, had submitted his resignation on 17 October 1995 before commencing his term of office, which would have started on 1 January 1996 and expired on 31 December 2000.

The General Assembly is accordingly required, at the fiftieth session, to appoint a person to serve as a member of the Joint Inspection Unit for a five-year term of office beginning on 1 January 1996 and expiring on 31 December 2000.

In accordance with the procedures described in article 3, paragraph 1, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, having consulted the regional group concerned, and on the basis of a candidature submitted by the African States, I have determined that Burkina Faso should be requested to propose a candidate to replace Mr. Tall.

As further indicated in document A/50/817, as a result of consultations in accordance with article 3, paragraph 2, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, including consultations with the President of the Economic and Social Council and with the Secretary-General in his capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, I now submit to the Assembly the candidature of Mr. Louis Dominique Ouedraogo, of Burkina Faso, for appointment as a member of the Joint Inspection Unit for a term of office commencing on 1 January 1996 and expiring on 31 December 2000.

May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to appoint the candidate?

The President

The Assembly has thus concluded its consideration of sub-item (g) of agenda item 17.

Before starting consideration of the next agenda items, in view of the large number of speakers on the list for this afternoon, I should like to appeal to the delegations concerned to limit their statements to a maximum of 10 minutes. I thank delegations in advance for their cooperation.

The President

The draft resolution before the Assembly, issued as document A/50/L.60, has two parts: part A is entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan" and part B is entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security".

I now call on the representative of Germany to introduce draft resolution A/50/L.60.

Mr. Henze (Germany)

Germany is pleased to introduce the draft resolution whose two parts are entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan" and "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security".

The draft resolution is sponsored by the following Member States: Afghanistan, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazaksktan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam and Yemen.

My country has enjoyed a long history of friendly and intensive relations with all segments of Afghan society. We therefore feel honoured that, as at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, we were again able to work together with interested delegations on the texts now before us. In this respect, I would like to thank the delegations that participated in this exercise for their cooperation.

At the same time, we are deeply worried about the continuing civil war in Afghanistan, which has brought massive destruction upon the country and immeasurable grief upon its people. Civilian targets are being bombarded, massive violations of human rights are occurring and there is no end to the plight of the population.

While the developments on the ground in Afghanistan over the last 12 months may be cause for sadness, and while there may be frustration that more could not be accomplished in the search for peace, we must not give up hope that progress is possible, and we should strengthen our efforts to achieve such progress.

To do so, we should make an unvarnished assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. Also, we should try to be clear on what the international community can and should do to help and what can be accomplished only by the Afghan parties themselves. On this basis, we should define ways to support and further strengthen the efforts of the United Nations in Afghanistan.

The draft resolution I am introducing today follows this approach. It takes stock and gives an unvarnished assessment of the situation. The draft expresses deep concern about the lack of progress in reaching an agreement on the establishment of an acceptable and broadly representative mechanism, the transfer of power and an immediate and durable cease-fire. It also expresses deep concern about the consequences of 16 years of war, the prolongation and, in some regions, intensification of armed hostilities and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. It affirms Afghanistan's need for continued international assistance and takes note of the extremely critical economic situation of this land-locked, least developed and war-stricken country.

The draft resolution urgently appeals to the international community, including the international financial institutions, to provide much-needed assistance for humanitarian and, as far as conditions on the ground permit, reconstruction purposes. It calls upon all States to promote peace in Afghanistan, to stop the flow of weapons to the parties and to put an end to this destructive conflict. At the same time, it calls upon all States to strictly refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and to respect the right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny.

The draft resolution also makes it clear that peace can only be achieved by the parties themselves. It urges the leaders of all Afghan parties to renounce the use of force and to settle their differences by peaceful means. It reiterates its call upon all Afghans, especially the leaders of the parties, to cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan in establishing a broad-based authoritative council and to cooperate with this. It also states the close interrelationship between peace and normalcy in Afghanistan and the country's chances for economic development.

On the basis of this assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and the draft resolution's appeals to the international community and the Afghan parties, the draft resolution centres on extending strong support for the United Nations effort in Afghanistan. It welcomes the efforts of the United Nations Special Mission headed by Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri. It underlines the importance of the urgent creation of a fully representative and broad-based authoritative council. It emphasizes the continuing need of the Special Mission for strong political support by the international community. Finally, it welcomes the decision of the Secretary-General to strengthen the Mission by stationing four additional political counsellors in Afghanistan.

We hope this draft resolution will be adopted by consensus. In doing so, the General Assembly would send a strong message of support to Afghanistan, would call upon the parties to end this terrible conflict and would call upon the international community and all States to do all they can to contribute to putting an end to the bloodshed. But, first and foremost, this resolution would extend an offer to the people and the parties in Afghanistan -- an offer of strengthened support from the United Nations, both in the humanitarian and the political fields.

Finally, I would like to strongly urge all parties in Afghanistan to accept this offer and to make the best possible use of it. If they do so, I am convinced that progress towards peace and security and away from war and endless suffering, can and will eventually be achieved.

The President

I should like to propose that, if there is no objection, the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed at 3.45 this afternoon.

The President

I therefore request those representatives wishing to participate in the debate to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible.

Mr. Kharrazi (Iran)

The situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, resulting in the continued killing of and injury to many innocent civilians, the displacement of thousands of people and widespread destruction of property in that war-stricken country. It was our fervent hope that, after the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and the establishment of an Islamic State in that country, Afghan parties and groups would set aside their differences and work towards the reconstruction of their country. But, unfortunately, more fighting replaced a period of calm, and the suffering of the people of Afghanistan has continued, especially in Kabul, whose people are suffering from both a hard winter and indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, which has many things, as well as a long border, in common with the people of Afghanistan, has traditionally maintained close and friendly relations with that country. We are therefore gravely concerned about the situation there. Besides being host to millions of Afghan refugees and rendering humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people, my country has spared no effort to help various parties and groups inside Afghanistan to overcome their difficulties and differences. In that respect, we have repeatedly called upon all parties to agree on a durable cease-fire and a just and lasting political settlement.

Nevertheless, we are keenly aware of the sensitivity of the Afghan people with respect to foreign interference in their internal affairs and the imposition of any solution from outside, and we utterly respect and support their right to determine their own destiny. On this basis, our policy has focused on maintaining contact with the Government and all Afghan groups to persuade them to arrive at a solution through negotiations.

We firmly believe that what the people of Afghanistan need first and foremost is the support of the entire international community in bringing about a peaceful solution, acceptable to all parties, to this regrettable fratricidal war. For our part, we continue to use every opportunity to promote peace, and we shall continue to cooperate with our neighbours to help to achieve peace in Afghanistan, which will serve the best interests of all the people of the region.

The United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, headed by Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, has played a crucial role in the efforts to bring peace and normality to Afghanistan. Ambassador Mestiri has our full support and cooperation in his difficult task. We also commend and support the efforts of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in this regard. We hope that the close cooperation and coordination between the United Nations, the OIC and neighbouring countries will give added impetus to the peace process in Afghanistan.

The sad situation in Afghanistan has endangered the very basic rights of the innocent people of that country, who are living in an exceedingly difficult situation. As the Secretary-General points out in his report, the incidence of disease and malnutrition in some areas of the country is reaching alarming proportions. The need to address these poverty-related issues simultaneously with the rehabilitation of war-affected areas and reconstruction of the country is critical to improving the overall situation there and to achieving a sustainable development process.

We agree with the Secretary-General that the transition from humanitarian assistance to rehabilitation and development is not a linear process. Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation must be pursued in parallel, with the longer-term development perspective always being kept in mind. It is in this context that an enduring commitment on the part of the international community to providing both humanitarian assistance and financial support is necessary in order to restore peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.

Since 1980 the Islamic Republic of Iran has been host to 2.5 million Afghan refugees, whom we have received and protected with a very high standard of treatment, based on our Islamic values and international commitments. Unfortunately, international assistance for these refugees and their repatriation has not been commensurate with the magnitude of the problems.

Since the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, we have been in close contact with its Government in order to facilitate the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homes. Thus far, about 1 million refugees have returned to their country voluntarily, and the process is being monitored through close coordination between the two Governments and related agencies of the United Nations.

However, the problem of millions of anti-personnel land-mines and unexploded ordnance in Afghanistan, as well as continuing armed hostilities in the country, may be preventing many Afghan refugees from returning to their homes. To ensure the safe and secure repatriation and resettlement of refugees, international cooperation and assistance to remove the existing obstacles is an absolute necessity.

Last year, in coordination with the World Health Organization, my country initiated a vaccination plan for Afghan children. It has distributed 8 million doses of vaccine throughout Afghanistan. In addition, Afghan medical groups have been trained in Iran, and hospitals and clinics have been established in certain areas of Afghanistan. We have also made arrangements to establish a Joint Commission to examine ways of more effectively controlling the flow of narcotics through the region and converting the poppy-growing areas in Afghanistan to the production of useful alternative crops that meet the basic needs of the Afghan people.

Besides all these initiatives, fuels, food and non-food assistance have been provided to the people of Afghanistan on an ongoing basis. This task will continue to be pursued with dedication and vigilance.

Finally, we hope that with the adoption of draft resolution A/50/L.60 the approach of the international community with regard to Afghanistan will enter a new phase. Today, Afghanistan is in dire need of our support to arrive at an immediate and durable cease-fire and to form an acceptable transitional government. Similarly, it needs our commitments to render all financial, technical and material assistance for the restoration of basic services, the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the voluntary, safe and secure return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes. The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to do its utmost to contribute to these humanitarian endeavours.

Mr. Owada (Japan)

Today Afghanistan finds itself in a tragic situation. The internal conflict in that country has been going on for more than 15 years. It has had disastrous consequences for the civilian population and has nearly destroyed the country's social infrastructure.

The situation in Afghanistan, if it continues in this way, could threaten the stability of the region to such an extent that the conflict, if left unattended, could spread to neighbouring countries. Indeed, it is my Government's conviction that the present situation demands the urgent attention of the international community. In particular, the vigilance of the United Nations is of immediate urgency. In this regard, the efforts of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan under Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri and of the Secretary-General's Office in Afghanistan, to both of which I wish to pay high tribute, are of utmost importance for achieving peace and promoting national reconstruction and reconciliation in Afghanistan.

As an Asian country, Japan is gravely concerned about the present situation. We in Japan are particularly concerned that some foreign countries are providing the warring parties, directly or indirectly, with military weapons, ammunition and other forms of military-related assistance. This, we believe, is at least in part responsible for the prolongation of the very dangerous situation in Afghanistan. Japan calls upon those countries to immediately halt such exports -- which are in fact illegal -- and to actively support the efforts of the United Nations aimed at achieving peace among the parties concerned.

The humanitarian situation and human rights problems in Afghanistan are also sources of grave concern. Japan attaches particular importance to the safe and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons. Also, demining activities and infrastructure building should be essential elements in the reconstruction of the political system.

Japan urges all the parties concerned to cease their hostile activities and accept the peace plan set forth by the Special Mission of the United Nations, which provides for negotiations for the transfer of power and the establishment of a transitional mechanism. For the United Nations to play a significant role in this context, it is essential that the parties to the conflict ensure that the safety and security of United Nations personnel in no way be jeopardized. The parties to the conflict must guarantee the freedom of movement of such personnel.

The Government of Japan has long supported the peaceful efforts of the United Nations. It has provided a political officer to the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan (UNGOMAP) and has contributed more than $400 million in refugee assistance, including $12 million for de-mining activities. As one of the fellow members of Asia, Japan feels it incumbent upon it to shoulder a useful role in cooperating with the United Nations for the resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan. It is as a manifestation of this desire on Japan's part that my Government has decided to respond positively to the request of the United Nations and send a political officer to assist Ambassador Mestiri, provided that certain prerequisites for ensuring the safety of his person are met.

As an Asian nation, Japan is especially sensitive to the need to assist the people of Afghanistan in their national reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. I should like, therefore, to strongly urge Member States to support the United Nations as it addresses the myriad problems confronting war-stricken Afghanistan and to abide by their obligations under the draft resolution which the General Assembly is about to adopt.

The Government of Japan, for its part, is committed to contributing to efforts toward the restoration of peace and the building of prosperity in Afghanistan.

The draft resolution introduced by the German delegation and co-sponsored by Japan and other like-minded countries was prepared through a lengthy process of discussion and negotiation. My delegation pays high tribute to the German delegation for the coordinating role it played in achieving consensus among the countries concerned. My delegation considers the draft resolution to be a clear expression of the determination of the international community to assist, in both political and humanitarian spheres, Afghanistan's efforts to restore peace and prosperity. Japan hopes that this draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo (Spain)

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the European Union. Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Hungary and the Czech Republic associate themselves with our statement.

The European Union supports draft resolution A/50/L.60, which has two parts. All the member States of the European Union are co-sponsors of the draft resolution. The efforts of the United Nations in Afghanistan should be able to count on our support and should be strengthened. We hope that through its efforts the United Nations can contribute to bringing an end to this destructive conflict. We are convinced that all the people of Afghanistan wish to live in peace and security. We want that wish to be fulfilled.

We therefore welcome the steps taken so far by the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, headed by Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri. We are grateful to Ambassador Mestiri for the commitment he has shown, and we encourage him to continue his efforts, through his talks with all parties, to facilitate national reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The European Union supports the aim of such talks, namely, to achieve an agreement that includes the establishment of an acceptable and broadly representative mechanism, the transfer of power and an immediate and lasting cease-fire.

In spite of all the assistance the United Nations can and should provide, it must be pointed out that the parties in Afghanistan bear the main responsibility for reaching such an agreement in order to end the bloodshed that has engulfed the country for so many years. We urge the parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Mission and to strive to achieve a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict.

The peace process in Afghanistan must proceed without outside interference and on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. We encourage all States to help promote peace and stability in Afghanistan.

The memorandum to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session, which was circulated with the speech delivered on behalf of the European Union by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Mr. Solana, on 26 September 1995, stated the following:

"The European Union continues to give its full support to the efforts of the United Nations Special Representative, Ambassador Mestiri, to achieve a negotiated and comprehensive solution to the Afghan conflict.

"The European Union calls upon the parties to the Afghan conflict to redouble their efforts in the search for peace and for an agreement on the political process. It also requests third countries to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."

This summary of the European Union's policy towards Afghanistan is reflected in the draft resolution introduced today in the General Assembly. The situation on the ground has become even more critical in the past few months, and the adoption and speedy implementation of this draft resolution are necessary in order to send a clear signal of support -- of humanitarian support -- for war-stricken Afghanistan and its people and of political support for the United Nations effort to promote peace and stability in the country.

The European Union is deeply concerned about the ongoing war in Afghanistan. We are convinced, however, that by supporting and further strengthening the United Nations Special Mission, by urging the parties in Afghanistan to cooperate in good faith with the aim of achieving peace and by appealing to the international community to give much-needed humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to Afghanistan, the adoption of this draft resolution will help create the political and economic framework needed by the Afghan people to move towards peace and leave war and widespread suffering behind.

Lastly, the European Union, wishes to express its hope that, if still necessary, draft resolutions under agenda items 20 (d) and 54 will be considered next year.

Mr. Ghafoorzai (Afghanistan)

For the fourth time since 1992 the General Assembly is considering the agenda sub-item entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan".

Obviously, the main objectives are to evaluate and assess the evolution of the situation and the success of United Nations efforts carried out by the Special Mission to Afghanistan towards the implementation of related resolutions and to bring about peace and national reconciliation in war-stricken Afghanistan.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan would like to present its assessment of the situation during the past year and elaborate on the reasons which have hindered the implementation of last year's resolution (49/140) on Afghanistan.

The present impasse in Afghanistan could be analysed from different angles on the basis of diverse views and conclusions. One fact, however, is certain and a reality: interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs not only prevails but is assuming wider dimensions, and, as a result, the conflict is continuing, with all its disastrous effects on the life of the Afghan nation. This reality, as well as the tragic plight of Afghanistan, is somewhat overlooked, and effective steps to remedy the situation have yet to be taken.

It is surprising, despite our deep gratitude for its endeavours to bring peace to Afghanistan, that even the United Nations has taken some positions which do not come close to supplementing a course of action conducive to the early return of peace to Afghanistan. Some contradictory and equivocal statements of the Special Mission about the Taliban mercenaries, for instance, could be referred to by way of example. By now, all the evidence about this group has been provided by the mass media, including the Pakistani press. I do not intend to go into details about an incident that took place in Stockholm on 1 and 2 June 1995 at an international conference of donor countries.

The people and the Government of Afghanistan are thankful to His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the head of the Special Mission, His Excellency Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, for their continuous endeavours aimed at achieving a lasting peace in Afghanistan. We are committed to cooperating with the Special Mission to enable it to succeed in accomplishing its mandate. It is on the basis of this commitment, as well as the realization of a historic responsibility on our part to defend our national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, that we have to point out some shortcomings in the endeavours of the Special Mission. There have been failures to identify explicitly foreign interference as the root cause of the conflict and to recommend effective measures to terminate it; to identify and observe a logical sequence in the stages of the peace process on a pragmatic and realistic basis; and, finally, to identify adequately and promptly the true nature of the mercenaries, called the Taliban, at the time of their emergence and subsequently to reveal their well-known foreign links.

Allow me to elaborate on these items one by one:

First, we firmly believe that one of the main causes of the tension and crisis has been and continues to be foreign interference in our country. We are at this time presenting additional evidence to the Assembly to justify our claim. In our view, the primary task of the international community with respect to our war-ravaged country is to put pressure on foreign circles to end their interference in Afghanistan and to take the necessary measures to speed up the peace process by terminating such interference. Only then can it be confidently anticipated that the peace-making pattern will be implemented smoothly and step by step.

In our previous statement before the General Assembly, on 4 October 1995 (A/50/PV.19), we presented major evidence concerning the intervention of Pakistani circles in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. All the events since then substantiate our rightful claims against the manoeuvres of the short-sighted Pakistani circles, which, in the pursuit of their expansionist ambitions, are betting on the precious moral capital of the Pakistani nation -- the Afghan nation's friendship, fraternity and trust vis-à-vis the people of Pakistan.

Here are a few examples.

On 28 September 1995, Reuters, under the heading "Pakistan lays phone cables in Afghanistan", wrote,

"Technicians of the State-run Pakistan Telecommunications Corporation (PIC) have laid new telephone cables in southern and western Afghanistan to connect the war-ravaged country to Pakistan, PIC sources said."

The provinces connected with the Pakistani communication network include Kandahar and Helmand in the south, Ghazni in the south-west and Herat in the west. The towns of all these provinces are controlled by the Taliban. These facilities were provided to the Taliban without any kind of notification of or consultation between the authorities of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Colonel Amir Imam of Pakistan, acting as de facto Governor of Herat replied to reporters that the facilities had been established on the request of the "local authorities". I am wondering if such a denial of the sovereignty of a nation falls within any accepted norms governing the conduct of relations between sovereign States.

On 5 November 1995, Mr. Asef Ali, Pakistani Foreign Minister, accompanied by Ambassador Qazi Homayun, paid a "sudden" visit to Mazar-i-Sharif in the northern province of Balkh of Afghanistan to hold negotiations with Abdul-Rashid Doestam, a leader of the opposition. The visit took place without the communication of any prior information to the Afghan Government -- a violation of all recognized international norms. The visit was based on the malicious assumption of the Pakistani Government that Afghanistan is already a fragmented country, an act clearly aimed at the dismemberment of Afghanistan. Moreover, this visit was aimed at subverting and impairing very sensitive inter-Afghan dialogue to achieve national reconciliation on the basis of a General Assembly resolution dated 20 December 1994. Politically, the visit had a provocative character. Its main purpose was to sabotage the efforts of the United Nations in Afghanistan at a time when Ambassador Mestiri was conducting very important negotiations with all Afghan parties involved in the peace process.

On 9 December 1995, the Pakistani Government decided to move its Embassy to Jalalabad, the administrative centre of the eastern province of Nangarhar. Once again the decision was taken unilaterally and without consultation with the Afghan Government. The Pakistani Government also decided to send Ambassador Qazi Humayun and staff members of the Embassy to Jalalabad. It is ironic that Qazi Humayun had been accredited as Ambassador to the Government of Afghanistan in the capital city, Kabul. He had been received by President Rabbani, to whom he had presented his credentials.

As is well known, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations codified international diplomatic relations. Afghanistan and Pakistan are both parties to this Convention. In accordance with article 3 of the Convention, diplomatic agents represent the State by which they are sent in the State to which they are accredited. The diplomatic agents are required to promote friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State.

Unfortunately, despite those clear and explicit provisions of the Vienna Convention, and contrary to provisions of the international law in this regard, Pakistan's unilateral action in sending their accredited Ambassador to a provincial town, while other countries' Embassies are functioning in the capital city of Kabul, is astonishing.

These two deliberate moves by Pakistan are also to be considered as a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, as unfriendly and provocative moves that, once again, prove to the international community the design of Pakistani circles to create a fragmented and divided Afghanistan where tensions and war would continue and prevent any successful intra-Afghan dialogue. The Islamic State of Afghanistan strongly condemns these despicable acts of the Pakistani Government.

The security forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan captured red-handed Pakistani military spies commissioned by the Inter-service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan to engage in espionage and perpetrate subversive acts inside Afghanistan. These spies confessed to their seditious actions against the Islamic State of Afghanistan. The names and place of arrest of these spies are as follows.

The first is Ishfaq Sadeq, son of Mohammad Sadeq, ISI officer from Punjab, who was collecting military and political information from various provinces of Afghanistan. He had established contacts with the Afghan opposition and, while gathering information, he was captured in the Panjsher valley on 8 September 1995. He had on him forged documents and instruments of communication. The second is Shakil Ahmad, son of Bir Jan from Peshawar, Pakistan, an employee of the Pakistan military intelligence, the ISI. He was captured on 8 September 1995 with Ishfaq Ahmad while gathering information. He was carrying a revolver and had on him forged documents and secret-code working lists, and so on. The third is Hemayattullah, son of Ghulam Hazrat, a Pakistan police officer, who was in fact serving the ISI. He was captured in Kabul on 28 August 1995 and found to be in possession of forged documents and spying instruments. The fourth is Dawood Jan, son of Ghulam Sarwar Khan. He is an Intelligence officer registered with the naval forces of Pakistan who was captured in Kabul seven days after the Taliban attack on Chahar Asyab, south of Kabul, on 17 October 1995 while gathering sensitive information. The fifth is Rahmatullah, from the Kuhat district of the north-west frontier province of Pakistan, who was captured in Maidan Shahr in November 1995 with other mercenaries engaged in fighting against the forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. All these spies are awaiting trial.

The Taliban, which exemplifies Pakistani meddling in Afghanistan, is nothing but a creation of the Pakistani ISI, for purposes other than the return of peace to Afghanistan. In this context, we merely point to the statements of a number of prominent Pakistani politicians, senators, members of parliament, analysts and commentators, as well as the Pakistani press.

I turn now to violations of Afghanistan's airspace by Pakistani planes. On 30 November 1995, a C-130 airplane, departing from Karachi, violated the airspace of Afghanistan and landed at Kandahar airport, bringing weapons and ammunition to the Taliban.

On 3 December 1995, two small UAF airplanes, departing from Pakistan's Faisalabad airport, violated the airspace of Afghanistan and landed at Kandahar airport, again bringing weapons and ammunition to the Taliban.

On 16 November 1995, a C-130 aircraft containing military weapons and ammunition violated the airspace of Afghanistan and landed at Kandahar airport. The exact point of departure is yet to be identified.

On 26 November 1995 a Gold Stream-type jet aircraft with a delegation aboard violated the airspace of Afghanistan and landed at Kandahar Airport. The exact point of departure has yet to be identified.

On 3 December 1995 a C-130, as well as two small AC aircraft transporting arms and arms-production-related equipment, violated the airspace of Afghanistan and landed once again at Kandahar Airport. The exact point of departure is unidentified.

On 5 December 1995 two military transport aircraft, a UAF-132 and an AC ALFA, violated the airspace of Afghanistan and landed at Kandahar Airport. The exact point of departure is yet to be identified.

Moreover, there is another important piece of evidence that should be noted: Recently, the Afghan authorities traced and discovered evidence of one of the many deals, one worth $27 million, between a Pakistani arms dealer and a defence contractor in a Western European country. The documents obtained, which contained detailed information about the Pakistani side, emphasize a deadline of 10.30 a.m., 13 November, for the budgeting proposal, a clear illustration of the fact that there is Government involvement. The deal is to obtain anti-tank weapons, as well as night-vision equipment and some military spare parts -- AM/UAS-12A -- obviously for the Taliban.

In a series of diplomatic actions, the Pakistani leadership has been vainly trying to dissemble and play innocent with regard to the events in Afghanistan in an attempt to diminish world reaction, especially within the region, to its irrefutable involvement in the Afghan conflict. Among these actions are the visits of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and other Pakistani leaders to some countries of the region. However, those countries' refusal to accept the Pakistani leaders' explanations that they are not behind the Taliban foiled the main purpose of those attempts. We wish to express our admiration for those countries' wisdom and sense of realism. By taking such a clear stand they have surely contributed to the cause of peace and stability in the region, in addition to extending valuable moral support to the Afghan nation in this critical phase of its struggle against foreign intervention. In order to secure responsive international action to terminate the acts of aggression and interference, on 14 September 1995 the Government of Afghanistan requested the Secretary-General

"to dispatch promptly a fact-finding mission to western Afghanistan ... to track down the presence of foreign forces and to prove that the acts of aggression occurred". (S/1995/795, annex, p. 1)

The sending of the United Nations fact-finding mission would be highly useful and is necessary even now.

Before making specific comments about the efforts of the United Nations Special Mission during 1995, I should like to make some preliminary observations. When we glance at United Nations peace-making activities in other areas of the world, such as Cambodia, Angola, El Salvador and so on, we realize that there is to some degree a unified pattern of peace-making operations that has been developed step by step.

The first step in this pattern is to distinguish the status of the parties to an internal conflict -- namely, the Government and the insurgent forces. This makes it possible to ascertain their views on a negotiated political settlement. Throughout this whole process the United Nations is to maintain strict impartiality. It is not advisable to endorse one side or another in a peace process. The United Nations should also avoid prematurely anointing any one side, because such an endorsement or any preferential treatment would undermine trust in the United Nations as a peace broker. Generally, continuous contacts and painstaking negotiations with the main actors lead to a formal agreement among the parties, which usually includes two chapters, one political and one military.

The political chapter includes agreements about the structure of power, the transfer of power, electoral law, the holding of elections and, whenever needed, the adoption of a constitution. The military chapter of such an agreement generally deals with the demobilization of irregular forces and the building of a national security force.

We understand that the United Nations, as an honest broker in all peace-making operations, must develop a practical and pragmatic approach to secure an overall agreement and to supervise its implementation. In all cases, the most important and urgent matter is to put into effect an immediate and durable cease-fire.

However, in Afghanistan it seems that the United Nations Special Mission, in spite of the rich experience of past United Nations peace-making activities, in the absence of a political agreement and due consideration of the imperative elements and factors of a peaceful political process, emphasizes only one element: the transfer of power. This approach might give one the impression that the Mission has lost sight of other major elements and stages as basic components of the peace process and prerequisites for a durable, just and credible political settlement.

As far as the Islamic State of Afghanistan is concerned, President Rabbani responded to the continuous insistence by the Special Mission that the President make his position known with regard to the transfer of power. When he received Ambassador Mestiri on 3 November 1995, President Rabbani promised to announce his decision at a gathering to be attended by the members of the Supreme State Council, the Cabinet, prominent religious scholars, leaders of parties and tribes, intellectuals, members of independent associations and others. Accordingly, such a gathering was convened at Kabul on 6 November 1995 and was also attended by Mr. Abunafisa, political adviser of the Special Mission. The President announced that he would transfer State power as soon as a mechanism to receive power was established, as a product of an inter-Afghan dialogue, with the assistance of the United Nations Special Mission.

Furthermore, the President called upon the United Nations to expedite its efforts to achieve the early establishment of such a mechanism, in accordance with resolution A/49/140 of 20 December 1994.

To facilitate the process, the Islamic State of Afghanistan expressed its initial agreement to a list, prepared by the United Nations, of 28 prominent Afghan personalities to form the mechanism for the transfer of State power. To create an atmosphere conducive to the consolidation of the political process, Afghanistan initiated new direct talks with the majority of the opposition groups. These talks are producing positive results.

Here I should like to make it clear that as far as the Islamic State of Afghanistan is concerned, as a matter of principle, no major obstacle to the transfer of power seems to exist. However, the logical questions are whether merely obtaining the consent of the President on the transfer of power can be a panacea to ensure all the conditions needed for the return of peace and stability, as well as national reconciliation, and whether the transfer of power is in itself capable of resolving and providing answers to such critical issues as conditions for a cease-fire, the scope of responsibilities during the period of transition and the duration of the transitional period. Does it secure the assurance of an immediate and effective halt to foreign interventions? Does it solve the problem of provisional and local administrations? Can it prevent outside sabotage of the interim authority? Can it resolve the issues of the security force, the collection of arms, the formation of a national army, regional and international guarantees and so on?

Transfer of power should lead to the end of a conflict. If a conflict continues after the transfer of power, then what? A prior overall agreement among the sides to the conflict on a comprehensive peace plan would guarantee that the end of a war and the transfer of power complemented one another.

With the end of the cold war, the United Nations has been engaged in various peacemaking, peace-keeping and even peace-enforcement operations. The valuable experience acquired in these operations will be useful in any similar cases in the future. We are of the view that in the case of special missions guidelines would be necessary, in addition to the United Nations Charter, to serve as a code of conduct in this regard. These codified guidelines would further facilitate the implementation of the mandate given by the United Nations to the special missions. These guidelines need to be practical enough to accommodate global implementation, but also sufficiently flexible to take into account the specific characteristics of the nations involved in each case.

I wish to highlight some facts about the Taliban.

Simple logic and analysis with regard to the nature of the Taliban and their present capabilities leave no doubt as to their links to the outside. Given its proximity and interrelationships, and the existence of an open border, that outside place can be none other than Pakistan.

In my statement before the General Assembly on 4 October 1995 (A/50/PV.19), I submitted evidence and figures resulting from objective analysis and referred to statements by high-ranking Pakistani officials, members of Parliament, senators and statesmen that attempted to refute Pakistan's direct financial and military involvement with, training of and even physical assistance to the Taliban.

If one assumes that the military, logistical and other daily expenses of a single Talib amount to $100, and if one multiplies that figure by 40,000 men -- which they now claim to have -- the expenses run to $120 million every month. This legitimate and obvious question then arises: Who is providing this budget to the Taliban, as well as thousands of gallons of fuel and other logistical support every single day? It would be an insult to the intelligence of the world community to endorse the claim that Pakistan is not involved with the Taliban, or the ridiculous assertion that the Taliban are being financially assisted from madrassas and merchants and sources inside Afghanistan. In fact, the country is a least-developed and landlocked country and 17 years of war have left the private sector with no capacity to support vast military operations like those launched by the Taliban.

However, let me quote the Pakistani media in submitting some evidence that provides logical answers to this puzzle.

On 20 October 1995, Dawn, a well-known Pakistani newspaper, featured an editorial written by a distinguished Pakistani political analyst and writer, Mr. Baqir Naqvi, under the heading "Kabul: Time for restraint". Analysing the root causes of the conflict and the strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the editorial says the following:

"Political-wallahs" -- which in Urdu means politicians -- "in Islamabad would do well to pause and ponder. It is no use striking a pose of innocence or pretending that we are not concerned, that it is the Taliban and their opponents who are having it out. No one in the world buys that. That would be stretching plausible deniability too far. The Taliban's umbilical cord to Pakistan has been visible to all. There is no point pretending otherwise. World reaction will surely come down against Pakistan and not the specific entity called Taliban. We might as well face facts as they are."

In its November 1995 issue, Soldier of Fortune, a United States magazine interested in the activities of mercenaries around the world, identified some troubled spots around the world which, in spot No. 12, include Afghanistan. This article says:

"The Taliban Students' Militia, which came out of nowhere to become a major force over the last year, is in fact a creation of Pakistani intelligence, which provided funding, weapons and a cadre of trained military exiled Afghan officers from the Khalq faction."

For the Assembly's further information, I add that Khalq was one of the two branches of the outlawed Communist Party, which collapsed in 1992.

On 20 March 1995, the Pakistani newspaper The Nation, in an article under the heading "What is Happening in Afghanistan?", wrote:

" The most interesting thing about the Taliban is that nobody knows where they came from.' This was Aabha Dixit, an expert on Afghanistan, speaking on the front page of The Washington Post on 20 February 1995."

The article continues:

"The Taliban -- the name means student' in Arabic, Persian and Urdu -- are the creation of Pakistani military intelligence. The schools from which these students have emerged are institutes of religious training called madrassa, hundreds of which dot the Pakistani landscape. The Taliban themselves, forged as zealots and fighters in the madrassa, have been organized by General Naseerullah Babar, Pakistan's Home Affairs Minister. My man in Lahore tells me that the Taliban have been armed and infiltrated into Afghanistan by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence, which explains why they have tanks and artillery as well as guns."

The Sydney Morning Herald of Australia, in its 25 September 1995 edition, published an article under the heading "Pakistan meddling upsets balance in South-West Asia" by Professor A. Saikal, Director of the Centre for Middle-Eastern and Central Asian Studies at the Australian National University. Under the main theme that Pakistan's short-sighted manoeuvring in Afghanistan threatens to create a serious conflict in the area, he writes:

"Pakistan's Interior Minster took steps late last year to deploy the Taliban force. It is reportedly made up of a number of Afghans, trained in refugee camps by a Pakistani Islamic organization, and of many of their ethno-linguistic kindred from the Pakistani side of the border."

Jane's Intelligence Review, on 7 November 1995, ran a comprehensive article entitled "Afghanistan's Taliban" by Anthony Davis. In a section on page 318, under the heading "Pakistan's influence", Mr. Davis writes:

"Denial from Islamabad notwithstanding, Pakistani backing is known to have reached the Taliban from the official sources. In the late summer of 1994, Pakistani Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar is understood to have begun providing some covert backing. A retired general and Afghan hand' who, in the mid-70s, had a decisive influence on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's policy towards Kabul, Babar is today a leading adviser to [Bhutto's] daughter, Benazir Bhutto. Funds and some arms began flowing to the students."

The article continues:

"Not surprisingly, current support to the Taliban has been seen in Kabul in stark terms. Having found Hekmatyar and the SCC" -- the Supreme Coordination Council of the opposition to the Government -- "inadequate to the task of toppling the Government, the Pakistani military has thrown its weight behind a new and far more popular Pushtun contender for power. Senior Government sources claim that, as part of this campaign, the ISI has mobilized former Afghan officers of the Khalq wing of the defunct Communist party to serve with Taliban forces in key logistical and technical roles."

The Muslim, a Pakistani newspaper, of 12 November 1995, writes,

"The Pakhtoon Khawah Milli Awami Party (PMAP) of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province has alleged that the intelligence agencies of Pakistan were constantly interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. ... A meeting of the PMAP, [was] held with its President, Mukhtar Khan Yousofzai, who took a strong position holding Pakistan responsible for the destruction of Afghanistan and affirming that Pakistan was involved in the internal affairs of Afghanistan".

The Pakistani newspaper Nation, on 3 December 1995, published an article entitled "Punjab Wants Lahore Rule in Afghanistan", which read in part:

"Quetta -- Mahmood Khan Achakzai, Member of the Pakistan National Assembly and the Chairman of the Pakhtoon Khawah Milli Awami Party (PMAP), while accusing the Punjab and Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) for the destruction of Afghanistan, claimed, Both want to impose the rule of Lahore over Kabul through Taliban'. ... Achakzai regretted the present in-fighting in war-torn Afghanistan and said that the Afghan nation was currently passing through a critical stage and that all Pushtuns were under an obligation to resist the foreign interference in Afghanistan. Otherwise, history will never forgive them ...

"Mahmood Achakzai said that the in-fighting in Afghanistan is not a war between infidels and Muslims, but it is a conspiracy by Punjabis and the ISI to conquer Afghanistan and impose the rule of Lahore. He urged the Taliban not to play the game of ISI, and learn the lessons of the past".

I quote again from the Pakistani newspaper The News, dated 7 December 1995:

"Mahmood Khan Achakzai, Member of the National Assembly of Pakistan and Chairman of PMAP, criticizing the Government with reference to its Afghan policy, said that the Government was giving the impression that there was a war between the Tajiks and Pushtuns in Afghanistan and that in fact the war was being fought on the question of whether Kabul can run an independent Afghan Government. ... Mr. Achakzai continued, saying, 'Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto should have talked to Rabbani in Kabul to remove misunderstandings between Kabul and Islamabad, as the Government in Kabul represented Afghanistan'".

Frontier Post, another Pakistani newspaper, in its 3 December 1995 issue, once again quotes the leader of the Pakistani PMAP saying that

"ISI was behind the fighting in Kabul, as this agency wants Punjab's domination in Afghanistan and ISI was creating confusion, claiming that the ongoing fighting around Kabul was between Tajiks and Pushtuns".

The International Herald Tribune of 23 November 1995 contained an article written by John Thor-Dahlberg, entitled "Behind Afghan Militia's Blitzkrieg, Some Outside Help"; this was also published in the Los Angeles Times of 21 November 1995. The article said,

"But from Pakistan have come gasoline for the Taliban's tanks, aircraft and armed vehicles, truck convoys filled with munitions and other supplies and telecommunications equipment, experts and advice. 'This is the work of the Lawrence of Arabia of the ISI, said the opposition Senator Abdul Rahim Khan Mundokhel of Baluchistan.' He was referring to the Inter-Service Intelligence, Pakistan's mysterious and powerful military intelligence agency. He accused his country's Government of trying to play the puppet master in Afghanistan. ... Numerous interviews indicate that officers from the ISI regularly escort supply convoys to the Afghan border from Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, which is also an important Pakistan Army garrison town and home of one of the largest munitions dumps in the country. Some Afghan Talib Muslim religious students say they have been trained by Pakistan in Afghanistan".

The Los Angeles Times of 21 November 1995, in an article by John Thor-Dahlberg, adds:

"Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Pakistani boys and men have been streaming over the frontier to fight along with the Taliban. ... Frequently, the Pakistani recruits have been enlisted at madrassas, or religious schools, operated by the fundamentalist Pakistani Islamic Party Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islame, or JUI, whose legislators support Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's coalition Government. During recent weeks, a single JUI madrassa in Quetta has seen 22 of its students become shahid, or martyrs, in battles around the western city of Herat and Maydan Shahr, south-west of Kabul".

Interestingly, the article quotes Muhammad Ijaz ul-Haq, son of the late President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan, who is a Pakistan Muslim League member of the National Assembly as having said that

"We tease our Interior Minister, retired Major-General Nasirullah Khan Babar, Pakistani Minister of the Interior, by saying that he has become Commander-in-Chief of Taliban".

The article in the Los Angeles Times contained important points that reveal the true supporters of the so-called Taliban. I quote from that article:

"Prime Minister Bhutto, who espouses a pro-United States foreign policy and neutrality towards Afghanistan, has said that Pakistan has no favourites in Afghanistan. ... Residents of Quetta scoff at such official Pakistani declarations. Recent interviews indicate that the city, located 120 miles from Kandahar, Afghanistan, has become a major staging area for support to the Taliban. ... Recently, Alam Gul, a labourer in his mid 30s, who was surprised to see civilian trucks entering and leaving the walled-in complex before dawn with military escorts, said, I talked to the drivers, and they told me they are going to take ammunition to Afghanistan'. He added, To Taliban'. ... Outside central Quetta at the bulk storage depot of the Pakistan State oil company, workers said that ISI officers now regularly requisition fuel for Afghanistan ... truck convoys, and also fill truck tanks with gasoline to take to Afghanistan".

The same article says:

"Twenty miles from the frontier, at the Chamnan octroi, or toll station for commercial goods being transported by truck, workers can count the number of vehicles heading out of the country. They report that Pakistan is shipping large quantities of secret goods into Afghanistan daily. ... Every day more than 18 to 20 trucks head into Afghanistan', said Gul Achakzai, who has been in charge of the checkpoint since July. A major from the ISI accompanies them. They are usually in a blue or red pickup and show their identification. They say: "we have so many trucks for Afghanistan; you have to let us through". Sometimes the trucks are covered with traps. We do not know what is in them: men, munitions, petrol, whatever. And the ISI does not let us disclose', Achakzai said. The employees said the vehicles were carrying 100 telephones, two 50-unit switchboards and a VHF telephone relay station and an antenna to provide a wireless link with the Pakistani telephone centre at Chaman. Also in the convoy were 50 Telegraph and Telephone engineers and linesmen. The convoy's destination, Kandahar, was confidential, they said. When we went, I did not tell my family where I was going. We were told it was supposed to be a secret job', one Telegraph and Telephone employee said. In Kandahar, the Pakistanis' presence was also carefully concealed."

As brought to the attention of the Council in our letter of 7 December 1995, published as Security Council document S/1995/1014, the Taliban seems recently to have been enabled to enjoy air-power capabilities. Let me quote some pertinent testimony to this effect.

Internationally known Pakistani journalist and observer of the Afghan conflict Ahmad Rasheed was interviewed by the BBC World Service on Sunday, 26 November 1995. I wish for the sake of the record to quote part of the transcript of the interview:

"BBC: Where did the Taliban get their planes from?

"Ahmad Rasheed: The Taliban captured over 40 aircraft from Herat, the city that was captured several months ago. They had some planes in Kandahar that needed spare parts and munitions. They have been getting some help putting these planes into the air, first from General Abdul Rashid Doestam and also from Pakistan, as far as technical help is concerned.

"BBC: How much and what sort of technical help?

"Ahmad Rasheed: Well, for example, in recent weeks it has been widely published that Pakistan has helped set up a telephone network for Taliban in Kandahar and in Herat, and also I think spare parts for MIGs are also being given. At the same time, the Taliban are spending a lot of money hiring pilots from the former Afghan regime who have been in exile in Pakistan. These are Communist pilots who are hiding out in Quetta or Pashawar and have been hired at $4,000 to $5,000 a month to fly these planes out of Kandahar. These were the pilots, I think, responsible for today's bombing of Kabul city.

"BBC: Has Pakistan thrown in its lot with the Taliban as opposed to Rabbani or anybody else? Or are there various competing Pakistani agencies?

"Ahmad Rasheed: There was a time when Pakistan was really not involved. However, I think now Pakistan is much more directly involved. Pakistan is now seeing that its only ally in the field is the Taliban".

As a result of such Pakistani assistance, which empowered the Taliban with air capability, in recent months they have conducted aerial strikes on the Kabul civilian population. These strikes, in March 1995 and since 11 October 1995, and as recently as 17 December 1995, have caused great losses of life and injuries, while destroying much public and civilian property. These actions by Taliban prove that these mercenaries have no respect for international humanitarian law.

I should like to elucidate, for the sake of the record, the grave concerns of the Government and of the people of Afghanistan with regard to the Taliban and the threat they pose for the future.

We wonder if the sponsors of the Taliban have ever envisaged the danger of the group's turning, totally or partially, towards terrorist organizations in the region, for the following reasons.

First, in the light of the tendency of the Taliban to aim for the possession of power and their reluctance even to share power with other parties, should they fail to achieve what they have been promised they would naturally resort to terrorism as a means of revenge.

Secondly, the Taliban are currently in close contact with some of the fundamentalist groups, such as Sepah-e-Sahaba in Pakistan, which are engaged in armed hostilities against other sects.

Thirdly, the possession of a military base and an operational field inside Afghanistan would further provide them the chance of expansion in the whole region and even beyond.

Fourthly, as a complement to the trends and as part of a certain agenda for terrorism, a terrorist group needs to accumulate money and weapons, with which the Taliban seem to have already been well supplied.

Fifthly, such groups become predominantly parties to the traffic of illicit drugs as a source of revenue. In the case of the Taliban, it is worth noting that they are in military control of parts of the country, such as the Helmand province, where poppies are cultivated.

Setting forth these facts, however, does not necessarily imply an intention on the part of the Islamic State of Afghanistan to advocate an antagonistic attitude towards Pakistan. The principled foreign policy of the Islamic State of Afghanistan firmly advocates sincere friendship and a cooperative relationship with all Member States, in particular with neighbouring countries.

We remain indebted to the fraternal Pakistani nation, which stood by us in our days of trial -- a chapter of history in which the Afghan nation fought to defend not only itself but countries far beyond it, countries situated on the path of the Soviets' southward thrust, including Pakistan, the region to be shielded from that potential threat. As we have announced on numerous occasions, we would like to re-establish close and brotherly ties with Pakistan. Quite obviously, these ties must be based upon mutual respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Afghanistan, together with Pakistan, can play a significant role in strengthening and broadening the cooperation between all the countries of the region in the economic and cultural fields. We believe that effective regional cooperation, coordinated by the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), cannot be achieved without peace and a cooperative relationship between the two countries.

In past years, the United Nations has actively participated in rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. While we are deeply appreciative of the efforts undertaken to revitalize basic and infrastructural projects in the rural and urban areas, we are expecting additional endeavours and resources, in coordination with the Ministry of Planning of Afghanistan and other concerned Ministries, for the longer-term prospects for the country's development.

Further and special attention is needed to strengthen cooperation in mine clearance. This coordination of rehabilitation activities would further promote the necessary contacts of the local authorities with the relevant Ministries and enhance the national dimensions of projects, in accordance with the national strategies elaborated for the overall economic development of the country.

In conclusion, with regard to draft resolution A/50/L.60, introduced by Germany on behalf of the co-sponsors, we express satisfaction at the final shape the draft has taken. We are happy to find ourselves in a position to join the consensus, although there are still concepts and notions in the text that do not seem to bear any direct relation to the actual purpose behind the item under consideration. We once again thank all those who positively contributed to the achievement of the draft resolution.

The draft only lists some basic principles and re-emphasizes the mandate of the Special Mission. The degree of future success in carrying out the mandate, however, remains dependent upon the sincerity of all of us -- the parties to the conflict and the United Nations as mediator -- in playing the roles foreseen for us and in contributing to the peace process, as expected.

Countries that are in a position to have the kind of political leverage that, if utilized, could help terminate foreign interference could play a larger and salutary role. The road to peace in Afghanistan is clear, if these countries give sufficient weight to a United Nations role in which the Special Mission can use its capabilities and, acting with active impartiality, remove the hindrances. It is in the interest of the people of Afghanistan, who have endured more than enough pain and suffering, destruction and bereavement, as well as in the interest of regional peace and stability, to expect the United Nations to enhance a peace process in which the main actors -- the Afghan people -- will decide for themselves what is the essence of democracy, without which only the rule of diktat will prevail.

Mr. Shah (India)

India has traditional and historic ties of friendship with Afghanistan. Geographic proximity and cultural linkages have enhanced the bonds of friendship between us over centuries of interaction. The unsettled political conditions in Afghanistan have a direct and adverse fall-out on peace and security in the region and affect my country. We therefore have an abiding interest in the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan. Our commitment to this cause is reflected in the fact that India is among the few countries which maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul notwithstanding the difficult living conditions in that city.

The human tragedy in terms of the toll taken of innocent lives, including those of women, children and displaced persons, and the pervasive deterioration in the quality of life in Afghanistan has assumed alarming proportions. Peace and stability are a prerequisite for national reconstruction. However, despite the indefatigable efforts of Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, the attempts made to restore peace in Afghanistan have regrettably not yielded the desired results. India supports the endeavours of the Head of the United Nations Special Mission to bring about a political settlement in Afghanistan. We stand ready to assist the United Nations in this endeavour.

It is our firm belief that a lasting settlement can only be reached in Afghanistan if it is acceptable to all parties, is a reflection of the popular will of the country and is neither imposed by military means nor dictated from outside. A feeling of injustice on the part of any party is likely to result in the continuance of the present situation of violence and conflict. The acceptance of the cease-fire which is being stipulated by the Afghan Government is necessary to embark on the path to peace and for the success of the United Nations initiative to transfer authority to an acceptable mechanism. The diplomatic and political process cannot meet with success unless suitable conditions are created through a cease-fire for the transfer of such authority. Only a cease-fire will give confidence to all the parties that political initiatives can succeed.

There can be no peace in Afghanistan without total cessation of foreign interference. As the Secretary-General has stated in his report contained in document A/50/737/Add.1, foreign intervention has persistently complicated efforts to restore peaceful conditions. The history of Afghanistan is replete with examples of the strong opposition of the Afghan people to outside interference in the internal affairs of their country. External interference in Afghanistan has now reached dangerous proportions. Fundamentalist forces are being trained, financed and armed by outsiders who have abandoned all sense of restraint. The Government of Afghanistan has repeatedly pointed out specific instances of foreign intervention and supply of arms to various factions in its letters to the Secretary-General. We therefore endorse the Secretary-General's recommendation in paragraph 70 of his report contained in document A/50/737 and urge the international community to forcefully reassert that external interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan should end forthwith.

The annual effort by the General Assembly to focus on the tragedy of Afghanistan is seen by many as a simple exercise to cleanse its conscience. Much more needs to be done. The United Nations must gear itself up with determination to assist in restoring peace, stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. In this perspective, the request contained in draft resolution B in document A/50/L.60 that the Secretary-General report to the General Assembly every three months on the progress of the United Nations Special Mission is noteworthy as it would, at least periodically, focus the attention of the international community on the happenings in Afghanistan and hopefully act as a catalyst to arouse our collective conscience.

At the same time, the urgent requirement of humanitarian assistance to the war-ravaged people of Afghanistan needs to be underscored and addressed. The situation in Kabul is, in particular, a matter of grave concern. Kabul remains a city without electricity and potable water. The situation of malnutrition in some of the more remote areas is described as reaching alarming proportions. Yet, in 1994-1995, the contributions by the international community for emergency humanitarian assistance fell short of the target of US $106.4 million by US $27.1 million. We believe that the long-suffering civilian population of Afghanistan deserves immediate and adequate international assistance. We hope that the enhanced appeal for US $124 million for 1995-1996 will evoke a favourable response from the international donor community.

India's concern for the welfare and prosperity of the Afghan people is only natural. Despite our resource constraints we have contributed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Through various programmes of the United Nations in 1994-1995, India supplied relief items worth nearly 4 million rupees. During the current year we have provided medicines, tea, tents and other items worth over 10 million rupees as part of our bilateral assistance to Afghanistan. We will continue such humanitarian assistance. This is our tradition. It is symbolic of our concern and sympathy for the people of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a founding member of the United Nations. To support its sovereignty and integrity is the duty of the international community and requires both firm political will and willingness to devote the means to achieve the desired ends. We, therefore, welcome the Secretary-General's observation that the international community should be prepared to assist in every possible way towards the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan and its reconstruction. India stands ready to cooperate with the United Nations, the Afghan Government and the Afghan people in this vital effort.

Mr. Awaad (Egypt)

The delegation of Egypt wishes, at the outset, to express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report contained in document A/50/737 on emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of Afghanistan. We would also like to commend all the efforts made by the United Nations in order to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and, by the same token, to express our appreciation for the United Nations Special Mission led by Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri for its work towards a peaceful and just solution to the issue of Afghanistan that would put an end to the bloodshed which has pitted brothers and friends in Afghanistan against each other, safeguard the sovereignty and integrity of Afghanistan and open up the way for development efforts and reconstruction.

The delegation of Egypt also takes this opportunity to express its full appreciation for the unremitting efforts of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in helping the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan to promote a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. Special thanks go to the Islamic Conference's Secretary-General, Dr. Hamed al-Ghabid.

The report we are now considering under agenda item 20 (d) refers to the possibility of continuing the United Nations efforts aimed at facilitating national rapprochement in Afghanistan by promoting the establishment of a fully representative and broad-based authoritative council that would embrace representatives of all Afghani parties, whatever their previous external and internal affiliations might have been. The council would have the authority to negotiate and oversee an immediate cease-fire; to create and control a non-partisan national security force that would provide for security throughout the country and oversee the collection of all heavy weapons in the country; and to form a transitional Government that would continue to administer the affairs of the country until conditions for free and fair elections that would return a democratic government were established throughout the country.

The delegation of Egypt cannot but forcefully support the continuation of efforts towards the establishment of such a broad-based mechanism which would put paid to a war that has lasted for far too long and has devastated the country and exhausted the strength and resources of its people. Here, the delegation of Egypt wishes to reiterate its support for the Special Mission to Afghanistan and support for the Secretary-General's decision to strengthen the Mission by stationing four additional Political Affairs Officers in four major cities in Afghanistan in order to ensure continuity of information exchange and consultation between the Special Mission and the political leaders based in those cities.

In his report, the Secretary-General points out that:

"Continued instability in Afghanistan would have grave consequences not only for the Afghans themselves but also for the whole region." (A/50/737, para. 68)

We would add to this that the negative effects of instability in Afghanistan spill over far beyond the region.

Instability and the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan have made it possible for various extremist groups that take cover under the mantle of Islam to use Afghan's territory as a haven for misguided factions that hatch plots which cause a great deal of harm and shed the blood of innocent people. To restore stability to Afghanistan and to effect national reconciliation between the Afghani factions are essential prerequisites that have to be met if Afghanistan is to regain its control over all its territory and thereby to deprive those terrorist groups of the opportunity of using that territory to launch their criminal schemes.

While we consider the political aspects of the restoration of peace to Afghanistan, we should not overlook the other aspects relating to rehabilitation and reconstruction. Though the rehabilitation activities undertaken by the United Nations have undoubted results that are significant and tangible, yet those activities, by themselves, constitute an extremely small proportion of the huge volume of the assistance needed for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Much more long-term assistance is needed by this friendly country which has been devastated by war. The country's infrastructure is in dire need of continuous and vigorous reconstruction schemes that should enjoy the support of the United Nations system and of the international community at large.

Proceeding from this, the delegation of Egypt, with a view to striking a balance between the political and the economic aspects of peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, appeals to the donor countries to go beyond the framework of humanitarian assistance by funding reconstruction programmes that would make it possible to rebuild the infrastructures of Afghanistan, which have been devastated by war.

We sincerely hope that, in the months to come, the Afghani people will be able to heal its wounds and that the Afghani leaders will have the vision and patience to engage in a wide-ranging political dialogue aimed at the achievement of the national reconciliation that would make it possible to initiate the country's march towards recovery, reconstruction and development.

Egypt, as one of the sponsors of the two draft resolutions under this agenda item, hopes that they will be adopted by consensus, without a vote. We should like also to express thanks and appreciation to the delegation of Germany for its positive and significant role in coordinating consultations on the two draft resolutions.

Mr. Schifferdecker (United States)

The United States is pleased to be a sponsor of the draft resolution on Afghanistan. As one of the States that founded the United Nations Special Mission two years ago, my Government remains firmly committed to helping to restore a legitimate government in Afghanistan and to assisting the people there with the daunting task of rehabilitating and reconstructing their war-torn country.

The United States appreciates the Secretary-General's peacemaking efforts, under the auspices of the United Nations Special Mission, headed by Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri. But, frankly, we are deeply disappointed that the Afghan parties have so far failed to display the necessary political will and flexibility to achieve peace and national reconciliation.

The present draft resolution provides a clear blueprint to achieve those goals. The key components are a transfer of power to a broad-based interim council, a nationwide cease-fire, the creation of a national security force and the formation of an acceptable transitional government. We strongly urge the Afghan parties to grasp this opportunity for peace before time runs out.

The United States shares this draft resolution's premise that a settlement cannot be won by force of arms. Prolongation of the conflict only increases the temptation for outsiders to meddle further in the country's affairs. The draft resolution bluntly warns of the dangers of Afghan territory being used as a springboard for terrorism, arms smuggling and narco-trafficking, in the region and beyond. We therefore join with other supporters in calling on all States to respect Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to strictly refrain from shipping weapons or other war-making materials to the factions.

My Government supports the aims of paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/50/L.60 B, regarding the Secretary-General's decision to strengthen the United Nations Special Mission. However, in keeping with our efforts to establish a ceiling on budget growth for the 1996-1997 biennium, we firmly believe that the resources to implement this decision must be found within the programme budget for 1996-1997. This can be done without impairing other programmes.

At the same time, my Government remains committed to assisting the people of Afghanistan, many of whom are internally displaced or live as refugees in neighbouring countries. Through the United Nations, its specialized agencies and private voluntary organizations, the United States provided nearly $50 million in fiscal year 1995 for the Afghan people. These funds were allocated for refugee programmes in the areas of nutrition, shelter, health and education, as well as for de-mining operations.

Within our resource constraints, we intend to continue to help alleviate the suffering of the Afghan people. But, unfortunately, as this resolution makes clear, the lack of an agreed political framework seriously inhibits the ability of the donor countries to assist in the longer term process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country.

The United States looks forward to the day when all Afghan refugees can return to their homes in safety and honour, and begin picking up the pieces of their shattered lives. But, for this to happen, the warring parties, including the present holders of power in Kabul, must begin now to break through the current sterile debates and begin talking about how to build, rather than destroy. This draft resolution offers them their best -- and perhaps only -- chance to accomplish this worthy task.

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to express its deep gratitude to our colleagues of the German delegation, who once again steered this draft resolution through a difficult negotiation to a successful conclusion.

Mr. Çelem (Turkey)

At the outset, I would like to thank the Secretary-General for the report that he has submitted in document A/50/737 and its addendum on the overall situation in Afghanistan, the implementation of the emergency humanitarian assistance programme in that war-stricken country, and the work of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan.

We would also like to express our gratitude and full support for the tireless efforts of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, led by Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri.

More than three years have gone by since encouraging changes took place in the political situation in Afghanistan, following a long and painful struggle of the Afghan nation for the liberation of their country. The establishment of an interim government in Kabul at that time had brought us hopes that, at long last, all Afghans would put aside their differences and start the process of reconciliation. We had hoped that a broad-based reconciliation process, including all groups, could have started. However, we have been greatly dismayed at the resumption and continuation of the armed conflict, which has caused heavy casualties, the total devastation of the economic infrastructure, and a deepening refugee crisis affecting not only Afghanistan, but also neighbouring countries in the region.

The continuing hostilities have not only created enormous humanitarian problems of outstanding proportions, but have also endangered the process of political normalization. We, therefore, once again appeal to all conflicting sides in Afghanistan, especially the leaders of the warring parties, to agree on a national reconciliation process and to support the Special Mission's efforts in this regard.

We attach great importance to the unity and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. In this respect, we fully support the United Nations Special Mission's wide-ranging consultations with Afghan parties and its proposals to bring about an end to the factional fighting, to set in motion the process of political reconciliation and to embark on the challenging task of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

We welcome the reference made in draft resolution B to the national reconciliation process through the establishment of a fully representative and broad-based authoritative council, which would ensure the transfer of power and would have the authority, among other things, to negotiate and oversee an immediate and durable cease-fire. We firmly believe that the draft resolution before us provides a sound and workable basis for the speedy resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan.

In this respect, we attach particular importance to the constructive role the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has been playing to help bring about national reconciliation among the parties in Afghanistan and fully support its efforts. The endeavours of the OIC are conducted in close cooperation and coordination with the United Nations Special Mission and they are complementary in nature to those of the United Nations.

Turkey is co-sponsoring draft resolution A and B submitted under agenda items 20 (d) and 54. Our heartfelt appreciation goes to the German delegation for the exemplary manner in which it has conducted the long and sensitive work of coordinating the drafting of the two documents. We also thank the other interested delegations which have been closely involved in the drafting process. In this respect, we strongly support the appeal in draft resolution A, addressed to all Member States, to provide all possible financial, technical and material assistance for the repatriation and settlement of Afghan refugees and displaced persons, and for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. We welcome the expression of gratitude made in the draft resolution to all Governments that have rendered assistance to Afghan refugees, in particular the Governments of Pakistan and Iran. Accordingly, the international community should actively respond to the Secretary-General's appeal for Afghan humanitarian assistance by generously contributing to the Fund set up for this purpose. I should also like to take this opportunity to commend all relevant United Nations agencies taking part in the emergency humanitarian assistance programme for Afghanistan for their strenuous efforts to remedy the humanitarian situation in that country, as well as to help resolve the refugee problem.

The senseless fratricidal conflict that has been tearing Afghanistan apart has to come to an end. First and foremost, the main responsibility lies with the warring parties, which must settle their differences. The international community can only help and support their political will in this regard. To that end, my country stands ready to do all it can. Inspired by the close historical and cultural bonds existing between Turkey and Afghanistan, we will continue to shoulder our responsibility to promote peace and prosperity in that country. We, therefore, reiterate our support for the draft resolution before us and hope that it will be adopted by consensus as a display of international solidarity for the people of war-stricken Afghanistan.

Mr. Allagany (Saudi Arabia)

It is regrettable indeed that once again the Assembly has to consider two draft resolutions with the aim of restoring peace and normalcy in fraternal Afghanistan. We had hoped that the different factions in Afghanistan would respond to the request for power transfer and the establishment of a permanent cease-fire as provided for by the General Assembly in its last year resolution. Had this been the case, we would have been considering today a draft resolution on the reconstruction of this war-ravaged country.

The question of fraternal Afghanistan has and still commands the concern of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which has continuously provided assistance to the people of Afghanistan as it did during its heroic struggle. Therefore the present situation, which continues to devastate Afghanistan and whose effects spill over beyond the borders of that country, is cause for concern to us.

We wish to reiterate here that we are confident that with the continued interest of the international community and with the help of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Afghani people will once more be able to live in peace and start to reconstruct its war-ravaged country.

In light of the foregoing, the delegation of Saudi Arabia is pleased to join in sponsoring the draft resolutions entitled "Emergency International Assistance for Peace, Normalcy and Reconstruction of War-Stricken Afghanistan" and "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for International Peace and Security".

We believe that these two draft resolutions represent a framework for a political solution to the Afghani problem while at the same time guaranteeing continued economic and humanitarian support for Afghanistan.

I would be remiss if I did not pay tribute to the strenuous efforts of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in making it possible to achieve the text of these two draft resolutions. We hope that the draft resolutions will enjoy more than verbal support on the part of the international community in general and on the part of the different Afghani factions in particular.

We sincerely hope that the Afghani factions will heed all the provisions of the two draft resolutions which we hope will be adopted today in order to put an end to the suffering of the Afghani people. We call on the United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan to redouble its efforts to effectively discharge the tasks entrusted to it in the two draft resolutions under discussion today in order to help the Afghani people achieve peace.

We pray for our brethren in Afghanistan and wish them peace, prosperity and security.

Mr. Kamal (Pakistan)

The people of Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked by bonds of faith, history and culture. The ties were further reinforced during the 14 years of Jihad in which the people of Pakistan stood by their Afghan brothers in a struggle that finally led to the restoration of freedom, political independence and the sovereignty of Afghanistan.

During these long years, and despite its own economic difficulties and constraints, Pakistan provided shelter to 3.5 million Afghan refugees on its soil. After the end of the war, a pilot project for the repatriation of these Afghan refugees was launched by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1990, in collaboration with the World Food Programme and the Government of Pakistan. Around 1.7 million refugees have been repatriated to date under this programme, but the process of the return of the refugees has considerably slowed down since 1992 due to factional fighting in Afghanistan.

So far, Pakistan has spent around PRs. 10.5 billion from its own resources on the care and maintenance of Afghan refugees. The presence of a large number of refugees for 16 years has, in addition, imposed a heavy burden on the economy and resources of Pakistan. The presence of the Afghan refugees on Pakistani soil has caused enormous environmental degradation and ecological damage and has adversely affected Pakistan's social fabric. The strain on Pakistan's limited resources continues, as over l.5 million Afghan refugees, who are unable to return to their homeland due to intra-Afghan fighting, are still living in 179 camps in Pakistan. Because of the intra-Afghan fighting, additional Afghan refugees still continue to cross into Pakistan. International assistance, on the other hand, has shown substantial decline, essentially due to donor fatigue. The situation needs to be carefully reassessed as the problem remains visible to all. Despite these substantial reductions, including those in the assistance programmes of the UNHCR and the World Food Programme for Afghan refugees, Pakistan will continue to look after its Afghan brethren until such time as the hostilities cease in Afghanistan and the refugees are able to return to their homeland in dignity and honour.

Having played a key role in helping the Afghans to regain their sovereignty and political independence, Pakistan then defended those principles during the Geneva negotiations, which culminated in the Geneva Accords of 1988. After the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan then helped its Afghan brethren in reaching a consensus on the Peshawar Accord of 1991, helped bring about a cease-fire between Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Commander Ahmed Shah Masoud in August 1992, was a catalyst in bringing about the Islamabad Accord on 7 March 1993, and promoted a meeting between the Afghan leaders in Jalalabad, which refined the political framework of the Islamabad Accord and brought about the formation of a Cabinet. In the light of all these efforts, it is most regrettable that, although more than seven years have elapsed since the signing of the Geneva Accords, peace and normalcy have not returned in Afghanistan because of the factional fighting between Afghan brothers.

According to the Islamabad Accord of 1993, Professor Rabbani's tenure as the transient President of Afghanistan was to end on 28 June 1994, by which date he was to complete a due electoral process which would lead to a proper representative government in Kabul. However, he had his rule extended by highly questionable means for another six months - to 28 December 1994. That date came and went. Professor Rabbani then told Ambassador Mestiri that he would step down on 21 March 1995. That date too came and went. Professor Rabbani reneged once again on a solemn commitment, just as he had reneged earlier on his duty to complete the electoral process.

The fact that Professor Rabbani did not take any of the measures stipulated in the Islamabad Accords suggests also that he never intended to hand over power in the first place. He was to have established an election commission and to hold elections within eight months of the Islamabad Accord, or by the end of 1993. He did not do so. He was to have also established a Defence Council, comprising two members from each party, to take possession of heavy weapons from all parties and to demilitarize Kabul and other cities of Afghanistan. He did not do so either. It is the resultant misgivings among the Afghan factions, due to the non-implementation of the Islamabad Accord, that have led to renewed hostilities among the warring parties in Afghanistan.

In his report of 6 December 1995, the Secretary-General notes that:

"The general view of the Afghan people remains that, his mandate having expired on 28 December 1994, Mr. Rabbani must transfer power to a broad-based representative body". (A/50/737/Add.1, para 12)

It is therefore Professor Rabbani's obduracy against sharing power with other groups in Afghanistan that lies at the root of the current fighting in this war-torn country. Professor Rabbani has failed so many times to fulfil his promise to hand over power that the opposition groups are today totally sceptical about his real intentions. According to the Secretary-General's report, during his meeting with Ambassador Mestiri on 11 November 1995, General Doestam characterized Mr. Rabbani's declaration of 6 November 1995 to hand over power:

"as yet another ruse to gain time and cling to power". (A/50/737/Add.1, para. 16)

The members of the Taliban Shura who met with Ambassador Mestiri also expressed serious doubts about Mr. Rabbani's intention to relinquish power.

In June 1995, Ambassador Mestiri had informed the Donor Briefing Conference in Stockholm that the base of the Afghan "Government" had become narrower and could be said to represent only the Tajik ethnic group, the Pushtuns, the Uzbeks and the Hazaras, representing about 60 per cent of the population of Afghanistan, having been totally alienated. Since then Professor Rabbani has lost control of most of Afghanistan and is now pushed back into Kabul and just five of the 32 provinces of the country. According to the Secretary-General's report, the Taliban are in control of more than half the country.

As I stated earlier, it was the mediatory role played by Pakistan in the negotiations on the Islamabad Accord which made it possible for Professor Rabbani to take over power from Professor Sibghatullah Mojadedi in 1993. However, when Pakistan did not support Professor Rabbani's refusal to share power in accordance with the Islamabad Accord, the Kabul regime launched a malicious propaganda campaign against Pakistan. A dastardly attack was carried out by terrorist Afghan elements against the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul on 6 September 1995. The Embassy was burnt down. One member of the Pakistan Embassy was killed, and others including the Ambassador and the Defence Attaché received serious wounds. There is ample evidence to suggest that the attack against the Pakistan diplomatic mission was aided and abetted and in fact carried out by the Kabul authorities themselves. This was a gross violation of the norms of diplomatic behaviour, and obviously ran contrary to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. It also explains why the Pakistan Embassy is returning to Jalalabad, and not to Kabul.

It is clear that, in an effort to deflect the attention of the international community from the core issue of the transfer of power, the Kabul regime has raised the bogey of foreign interference in its internal affairs, while itself receiving plane- loads of arms from outside to eliminate other Afghan factions. The evidence is visible and incontrovertible.

Today, the people of Afghanistan have no faith or confidence in the ability of those in Kabul whom they consider usurpers to deliver peace in that country. Their sufferings can only be alleviated if the international community addresses the root cause of the conflict in Afghanistan and urges Professor Rabbani clearly and unambiguously to hand over power to a broad based interim council with the authority to negotiate and accept the transfer of power, oversee an immediate and durable cease-fire, and demilitarize Kabul and the entire country.

Pakistan has absolutely no preference for one group over the other in the intra-Afghan rivalry. Throughout the Afghan crisis, Pakistan has continued to follow a policy of neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Our only interest is in the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan, which alone would enable the remaining one and a half million Afghan refugees in Pakistan to return to their homeland in honour and dignity. We believe that this peace and stability can only be achieved by a broad-based transitional mechanism which goes beyond ethnic exclusivism. We also believe, firmly and earnestly, that a solution to the crisis in Afghanistan lies only with the Afghan people themselves.

We have heard the wild and rather prolonged accusations hurled at Pakistan by the representative of the Kabul regime earlier this afternoon. These are no more than the ineffectual flutterings of a regime that has no more credibility in this international forum than it has in its own country. But let us set the record straight regarding the Taliban. The emergence of the Taliban is an indigenous phenomenon in Afghanistan. It reflects the war-weariness of the Afghan people to whom the Taliban's promise of demilitarization and the induction of an honest administration came as a welcome relief from the extortionist practices of predatory warlords and the unbridled ambitions of a regime in Kabul. The Taliban's victories did not come because of their military expertise or their professional training but because of the defection of local commanders disillusioned with the continued conflict and bloodshed. In fact, Professor Rabbani himself collaborated closely with the Taliban movement. He is on record as having admitted publicly that he supported Taliban during their initial victories. His forces had helped the Taliban in their assault against the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Subsequently, Jamaat-i-Islami's official organ, The Afghan News acknowledged that:

"The State seized a large number of tanks and guns and huge quantities of ammunition from Hekmatyar during the latter's defeat at the hands of the Taliban".

The Afghan News further disclosed that Professor Rabbani's forces themselves had handed over Charasiab and Rishkore to the Taliban. It is clear that Professor Rabbani cooperated with the Taliban until his enemies were being decimated by the latter. However, when the Taliban started demanding the resignation of Professor Rabbani, the Kabul regime accused it of having Pakistan's support.

Pakistan fully supports the Special Mission of the Secretary-General to Afghanistan, as mandated by the United Nations General Assembly. We hope that Ambassador Mestiri will continue efforts to facilitate national rapprochement and reconstruction in Afghanistan by ensuring the transfer of power through the urgent establishment of a fully representative and broad-based authoritative Council, which can then complete the other actions which will alone pave the way to peace and security in Afghanistan. We hope that this year's resolution in the General Assembly will contribute to that process. Pakistan, for its part, stands ready to assist the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in these endeavours.

Finally, the historic struggle of the people of Afghanistan against foreign invasion and occupation is a glorious chapter in contemporary history. Many political scientists believe that the steadfast struggle waged by the Afghans hastened the demise of the cold war and ushered in a new era of freedom. The people of Afghanistan, and the entire international community which supported them, deserve commendation for this achievement. While the Afghan jihad was reaching its conclusion, hopes were rekindled of a new vision of cooperation among the States of Central Asia and West Asia for a better and prosperous future. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the resolution of the Afghan crisis, uncertainty still continues. It has been compounded by internecine strife and bloody infighting. The war-stricken Afghans, who were hoping to return to their homeland to reconstruct their devastated economy and landscape, still continue to live in an atmosphere of fear, deprivation and armed conflict. Their beautiful dawn has been postponed by the senseless fighting going on in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has always played a pivotal role in history. It has made rich contributions to human civilization. It still is the key to prosperity and stability in Central Asia. It still is the nerve centre for empathy and cohesion among the peoples of the region. We hope that all the people of Afghanistan and their leaders would demonstrate sincerity and maturity and help Afghanistan resume its rightful place in today's world.

The Acting President

We have heard the last speaker in the debate under sub-item (d) of agenda item 20 and under agenda item 54.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/50/L.60.

The report of the Fifth Committee on the programme budget implications of the draft resolution is contained in document A/50/825.

I should like to announce that since the introduction of the draft resolution the following countries have become sponsors of draft resolution A/50/L.60: Albania, Bangladesh, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Honduras, Italy, Latvia, Mongolia, Netherlands and Nigeria.

May I take it that the Assembly decides to adopt draft resolution A/50/L.60?

The Acting President

May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of sub-item (d) of agenda item 20?

The Acting President

May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 54?

The Acting President

The General Assembly will now consider the reports of the Fifth Committee on sub-item (b) of agenda item 122 and agenda item 133.

If there is no proposal under rule 66 of the rules of procedure, I shall take it that the General Assembly decides not to discuss the reports of the Fifth Committee that are before the Assembly today.

The Acting President

Statements will therefore be limited to explanations of vote.

The positions of delegations regarding the recommendations of the Fifth Committee have been made clear in the Committee and are reflected in the relevant official record. May I remind members that under paragraph 7 of decision 34/401, the General Assembly agreed that:

"When the same draft resolution is considered in a Main Committee and in plenary meeting, a delegation should, as far as possible, explain its vote only once, that is, either in the Committee or in plenary meeting, unless that delegation's vote in plenary meeting is different from its vote in the Committee".

May I remind delegations that, also in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Before we begin to take action on the recommendations contained in the reports of the Fifth Committee, I should like to advise representatives that we are going to proceed to take decisions in the same manner as was done in the Fifth Committee.

The Acting President

The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 6 of its report (document A/50/824).

The draft resolution was adopted by the Fifth Committee without a vote. May I consider that the Assembly wishes to do the same?

The Acting President

I now call on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, who wishes to speak in explanation of position on the draft resolution just adopted.

Mr. Sulaiman (Syria)

My delegation would like to explain its position on the draft resolution in document A/50/824 on the financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

We wish to indicate that, if this draft resolution had been put to a recorded vote, we would have voted against it in conformity with our established principled position set out at earlier sessions of the General Assembly. In essence, our position is that the cost of financing UNIFIL should be borne by the aggressor party, Israel, whose aggressive practices necessitated the presence of this Force.

The Acting President

We have thus concluded this stage of our consideration of sub-item (b) of agenda item 122.

The Acting President

The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 5 of Part III of its report (A/50/705/Add.2).

The draft resolution was adopted by the Fifth Committee without a vote. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?

The Acting President

We have thus concluded this stage of our consideration of agenda item 133.

The Acting President

I now call on the representative of Sudan to introduce draft resolutions A/50/L.58 and A/50/L.59.

Mr. Yassin (Sudan)

I have the honour to address the Assembly, on behalf of the African Group, as Chairman of the Group for the month of December to introduce two draft resolutions: A/50/L.58 on special emergency assistance for the economic recovery and reconstruction of Burundi and A/50/L.59 on the situation in Burundi.

The two draft resolutions on Burundi before us are basically identical to those adopted at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly and are a clear demonstration of the conviction of the Assembly of the urgent and special attention that needs to be given to the situation in Burundi. The two present draft resolutions reflect and take into consideration the new political and economic developments both in Burundi and in the world as a whole.

By its resolutions of 25 October and 2 December 1994, the General Assembly called for a global programme of assistance to Burundi whereby the international community would positively respond to Burundi's urgent needs and mobilize the necessary economic and humanitarian resources to help Burundi overcome its two-year crisis.