General Assembly Session 50 meeting 124

Mr. Zahran (Egypt)

The Egyptian delegation would like to thank the Australian delegation for its initiative to convene this meeting of the resumed session of the fiftieth General Assembly, another indication of Australia's policy to contribute positively to the international efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament, the latest of which was the report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

The Egyptian delegation regrets that, despite its efforts since chairing the group on legal and institutional matters in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament, no consensus was reached this year in the Conference on the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) draft text contained in document A/50/1027. We believe that if more time had been allowed for the negotiations to continue it would have been possible for the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on some of the controversial issues in the draft text before the General Assembly.

The Egyptian delegation also regrets that no consensus was reached in the Conference on Disarmament to transmit the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, contained in document CD/1425 of 16 August 1996, to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session, pursuant to resolution 50/65. All Member States could have benefited from that report, as it contains the developments and results of the negotiations on the provisions of the treaty, in addition to the national positions of various members of the Conference on Disarmament on those provisions. The Ad Hoc Committee's report also acquires special importance as it contains the statement of the Chairman of the Committee, in which he presented his interpretation of some provisions relating to the abuse of national technical means and entry into force.

Egypt's support for the draft resolution contained in document A/50/L.78, which calls for the adoption of the draft CTBT text, is based on the fact that it contains positive aspects, which could be considered as a step -- albeit limited -- towards nuclear disarmament on a global level. This flexible and positive position should not be interpreted as indicating Egypt's full satisfaction with the text, which has several shortcomings.

In the first place, the draft does not include a commitment placing it in an identifiable framework for nuclear disarmament. We made every effort to include in the provisions of the treaty a clear commitment to achieving total nuclear disarmament, and we consider it to be an important step in a progressive framework for nuclear disarmament regionally and worldwide. It is a programme that aims at achieving total nuclear non-proliferation both horizontally and regionally, and nuclear disarmament, by capping any further qualitative development of nuclear weapons according to the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

Since then, in April 1996, the Pelindaba Treaty was signed in Cairo with the aim of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The non-proliferation system should be completed at the regional and global levels by expediting the process of, and giving priority to, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as a prelude to ridding the area of all weapons of mass destruction, following the initiative of President Mubarak of Egypt.

As coordinator of the Group of 21, and on behalf of 28 members of the Conference on Disarmament that are members of the Group of 21, Egypt submitted a proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as contained in document CD/1419 of 7 August 1996. Egypt believes that the purpose of this programme of work is to compensate for the lack of commitment on nuclear disarmament in the draft text of the CTBT. We hope that this programme will be seriously studied in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, the establishment of which we, with the Group of 21, called for. It should also be taken into consideration during the fifty-first session of the General Assembly as a follow-up to resolution 50/70 P and, not least, in the 1997 review process on the NPT.

I would also like to refer to the report of the Canberra Commission issued in August 1996, the central message of which is that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is militarily redundant and dangerous. We are looking forward to studying that report in detail, and I am sure that it, and the programme of action of the Group of 21, will contribute to international efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons.

Those two contributions were made one month after the unanimous Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice was issued on 8 July 1996, which recognized that

"There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

This should be implemented in the context of the future programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, as that body is the sole multilateral negotiating forum dealing with disarmament.

I would like to pay tribute to the decision of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights, in adopting resolution 1996/14 on 23 August 1996. The resolution

"Affirms that weapons of mass destruction and in particular nuclear weapons should have no role to play in international relations and thus should be eliminated;"

and

"Recommends that the relevant international forums, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, should immediately start negotiations on nuclear disarmament to reduce nuclear weapons globally within a phased programme, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, thus contributing to the enhancement of international peace and security and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and above all the right to life". (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/L.11/Add.1, resolution 1996/14, paras. 1 and 2)

We believe that the scope of the basic obligations of article I of the CTBT draft contradicts the actual title of the treaty, which refers to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Egypt's amendment to this provision, which would have ensured that the ban covered all nuclear-weapons tests, was, regrettably opposed by the majority of nuclear-weapon States, while the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States supported it. As a result, the text submitted to the General Assembly paradoxically does not ban all nuclear testing, but is restricted to explosive testing only. We therefore have before us yet another partial nuclear-test-ban treaty, not a comprehensive one. Other kinds of non-explosive nuclear tests remain un-prohibited and could be used to improve nuclear arsenals through the development of new generations of nuclear weapons. We believe that this contradicts the ultimate objective agreed upon in the NPT Review and Extension Conference Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, adopted in May 1995.

On the important matter of on-site inspections, the Egyptian delegation is of the view that these should, once requested by a State Party, proceed in the smoothest possible manner and be halted only if it is demonstrated that the request is baseless. Therefore, the "green light" approach endorsed in the draft treaty does not serve, in our view, the best interests of the international community to ensure full compliance with the provisions of the treaty, since the relevant decisions of the Executive Council require 30 votes. This could impede the on-site inspection, and therefore it will not be possible to verify the full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

The use of national technical means also represents a matter of misunderstanding. We agree that such means should have their place in the treaty and can be useful as a complement to the International Monitoring System, with the necessary guarantees needed to avoid the potential abuse or selective and partial use of national technical means. However, we consider that the interpretation of these means by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in his statement delivered before the Committee on 9 August 1996 would provide additional assurances against the misuse or abuse of national technical means.

The Chairman's statement of 9 August 1996 contained also an understanding by the Chairman whereby it was noted that article XIV, paragraph 2, of the draft treaty regarding the "Entry into Force" did not refer to United Nations Security Council punitive and coercive measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is worthwhile to note here that Egypt has undertaken in the last stage of negotiations sincere efforts in order to reach a compromise text to article XIV; however, its efforts were not crowned with success.

Egypt regrets that the composition of the Executive Council, as reflected in the current text, does not reserve equitable and balanced treatment for African countries. On numerous occasions during the negotiations Egypt, together with others, expressed concern over the limited number of Executive Council seats reserved for Africa, which is, as compared to other regional groups, underrepresented. Those concerns have been ignored, as have those concerning the unprecedented regional group system that has found its way into the CTBT draft text and which divides the world into six regional groups, rather than the five we are accustomed to in the United Nations system. Setting such precedents despite serious opposition may affect the credibility of the treaty and limit its chances of achieving universality. In addition, the decision-making in the Executive Council -- two-thirds majority for matters of substance -- may also paralyse it in comparison with the similar body in the Chemical Weapons Convention.

These are some of the major preoccupations of the delegation of Egypt with regard to the draft treaty before us. Consequently, we cannot subscribe to the adoption of the draft text. However, Egypt supports the draft resolution contained in document A/50/L.78 calling for the adoption of the CTBT, in view of the fact that Egypt is convinced that the legal system banning nuclear tests should be completed in order to save humanity and to protect the environment. This treaty is a step towards nuclear disarmament, and it should be followed by several serious steps on the road to the elimination of nuclear weapons within an agreed time-frame.

Mr. Mapuranga (Zimbabwe)

The Government of Zimbabwe has over the years supported, in various forums, initiatives aimed at reducing and eventually resolving conflict situations as well as eradicating confrontations throughout the world. Our commitment to world peace has been clearly demonstrated by our active participation in, and support for, the various and numerous resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly aimed at the maintenance of international peace and security.

On the eve of the twenty-first century, efforts to achieve lasting international peace and security have centred not only on general and complete disarmament, but also on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The ongoing negotiations on the establishment of more nuclear-weapon-free zones -- and Africa is one of them, on the basis of the Pelindaba Treaty -- is testimony to the aspirations of the international community for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The General Assembly mandated the Conference on Disarmament, which reaches its decisions by consensus, to undertake and conclude negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which would subsequently be endorsed by the General Assembly.

On 20 August, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the report of its Ad Hoc Committee, which concluded that no consensus had been achieved on the draft text of the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). Thus, under normal circumstances and in accordance with the spirit of consensus, which is the decision-making mechanism in the Conference on Disarmament deliberations, the CTBT draft was supposed to have been renegotiated and the concerns of those members of the Conference on Disarmament who had voiced reservations on the text addressed.

We are faced today with a situation where a CTBT draft text that did not enjoy consensus is being hurriedly submitted to the General Assembly for consideration.

We would like to point out that it is procedurally wrong to bring the current draft of the CTBT to the General Assembly before consensus is achieved in the body that was mandated by the General Assembly itself to negotiate the treaty and come up with a consensus text. Arguments have been advanced that this was due to force majeure, and we would strongly counsel that this procedural anomaly should not be allowed to constitute a precedent for our future modus operandi.

As for the text of the draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) before the Assembly, we would like to note that it fails to address the central issue of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework. In that regard, my country fully supported the proposals alluded to by previous speakers which were made in Geneva on 7 August 1996 by 28 member States of the Conference on Disarmament for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Those proposals are contained in document CD/1419 of 7 August 1996 of the Conference on Disarmament.

Previous speakers have also alluded to the epoch-making Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, which concluded that on the part of all States

"There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

The good faith called for is not reflected in the draft treaty before us, and its contents do not reflect the wide scope of its title. This is not a comprehensive test-ban treaty, since it bans only nuclear-weapons-test explosions, leaving other forms of testing uncovered. The term "comprehensive" should be understood to mean all forms of testing of nuclear weapons.

Thus, the upshot of the treaty would be to allow the most technologically sophisticated nuclear-weapon States to continue to improve their arsenals. It is understandable that some nuclear-weapons-threshold States find this unsatisfactory, for it blocks their advancement into the nuclear club -- yet it does not dissolve the club, but makes it even more exclusive.

Zimbabwe thus found it difficult to co-sponsor such a flawed treaty. My delegation will not, however, vote against the draft CTBT because, for all its imperfections, the banning of test explosions would rid the world of the hazard of nuclear fallout, which is a grave menace to humanity and the environment. My country will therefore vote for this draft treaty.

I wish to conclude by urging all of us to continue to work for a genuinely comprehensive test-ban treaty, for the elimination of the present stocks of nuclear weapons and for a world free of nuclear weapons.